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EARLY GREEK
PHILOSOPHY
LATER IONIAN AND
ATHENIAN THINKERS

PART 1



Edited and Translated by

ANDRÉ LAKS

GLENN W. MOST

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VOLUME VI

LATER IONIAN AND
ATHENIAN THINKERS

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ANDRÉ LAKS AND GLENN W. MOST

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CONTENTS

LATER IONIAN AND ATHENIAN THINKERS, PART I

25. Anaxagoras	2
26. Archelaus	185
[27. Atomists in Vol. VII, LCL 530]	
28. Diogenes of Apollonia	218
29. Early Greek Medicine	298
30. The Derveni Papyrus	373

LATER IONIAN AND
ATHENIAN THINKERS
PART 1

25. ANAXAGORAS [ANAXAG.]

According to what seems our most reliable information, Anaxagoras was born in 500 BC and died in 428, making him an older contemporary of Empedocles. The chronology of his stay in Athens, which he visited, doubtless attracted by Pericles' cultural politics, and where he seems to have remained for thirty years, is documented but is difficult to reconstruct. It is with Anaxagoras that philosophy, which earlier had been Ionian and Italian, definitively gains a foothold in Athens—the echo can clearly be heard in the theater, especially in Euripides' tragedies (see **DRAM. T75–T80**). This development was evidently not uncontroversial; Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety, the first of its kind, on the basis of a decree passed in 438/7 that made the teaching of theories regarding celestial phenomena a crime (cf. especially **P23**). From his book, which Plato tells us could be bought in the marketplace at Athens, there remain about twenty fragments; the great majority are preserved by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. Most of these fragments come from the beginning of his book, where the indications bearing on the principles of his doctrine were concentrated: the statements that every thing contains a part of every other thing and the ones regarding the infinitely small and the organization of the world by Mind (*Nous*).

ANAXAGORAS

But numerous doxographical reports also provide rather precise information about his specific cosmological and physiological theories. In the interpretative tradition founded by Plato, Anaxagoras' importance derives from the role he assigned to *Nous*, but also from the distance existing between this potentially teleological principle and particular explanations, in which it was not directly applied; although this same problematic is also present in Aristotle, the latter concentrates essentially on the implications of Anaxagoras' infinitism, of which the implications remain uncertain to this day. It seems certain in any case that Anaxagoras had no qualms about paradoxes, as is suggested by his assertion that snow is black since water is too, according to Homer (D7).

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EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

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OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Chronology (P1–P5)

The Meteorite at Aegospotami (P6–P7)

Other Predictions (P8–P9)

His Hostility to Democritus (P10)

Anaxagoras at Athens (P11–P26)

His Move from Ionia to Athens (P11–P13)

Anaxagoras’ Students in Athens (P14–P22)

Euripides (P14)

Thucydides (P15)

Archelaus (P16–P17)

Pericles (P18–P22)

Anaxagoras’ Trial (P23–P26)

Another Student: Metrodorus of Lampsacus (P27)

Character (P28–32)

Apothegms (P33–P41)

Nickname (P42–P43)

A Doubtful Anecdote (P44)

Last Years and Honors (P45–P48)

Iconography (P49)

D

Only One Book (D1)

Three Summaries Going Back Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D4)

ANAXAGORAS

Epistemology (D5–D8)

From the Opening of Anaxagoras' Book: Principles and the Primordial State of the World (D9–D14)

Nothing Comes from Nothing (D15–D21)

All Things Are in All Things (D22–D25)

Mind (D26–28)

Cosmogony (D29–D32)

Cosmology (D33–D52)

The World Order (D33–D35)

Astronomy (D36–D52)

Aether (D36–D37)

Sun and Moon (D38–45)

Other Heavenly Bodies (D46–49)

Comets and Meteors (D50–D52)

Meteorology (D53–D57)

Thunder, Lightning, and Related Phenomena (D53)

Clouds, Snow, and Hail (D54)

Rainbows and Related Phenomena (D55–D56)

Winds (D57)

The Earth (D58–D67)

The Earth Rests Upon Air (D58–D61)

Earthquakes (D62–D63)

The Sea (D64–D65)

The Flooding of the Nile (D66)

Stones (D67)

Biology (D68–D95)

Zoogony (D68)

Soul (D69)

Sensations (D70–D79)

General Principles (D70–D71)

Sight (D72)

Touch and Taste (D73)

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Smell and Hearing (D74–D77)

Relation between an Animal's Size and the Acuity of Its Perception (D78)

Sensation Is Painful (D79)

Humans and Animals (D80–D81)

Sleep and Death (D82)

Respiration (D83)

Reproduction (D84–D92)

Origin of the Semen (D84)

Respective Contributions of the Father and the Mother (D85–D87)

Embryology (D88–D90)

Peculiarities of Animal Reproduction (D91–D92)

Botany (D93–D95)

Mathematics (D96–D97)

A Moralizing Interpretation of Homer (D98)

R

Earliest References and Allusions to Anaxagoras (R1–R3)

Democritus (R1–R2)

Herodotus (R3)

Euripides (DRAM. T75–T80)

Aeschines the Socratic (PROD. R3)

Plato's and Xenophon's Evaluations of Anaxagoras' Teleology (R4–R7)

Plato (R4–R6)

Xenophon (R7)

Peripatetic Reconstructions and Evaluations of Anaxagoras' Doctrines (R8–R23)

Comparison with Anaximander (cf. R19)

Comparison with Empedocles (R8)

Teleology (R9–R10)

ANAXAGORAS

Mind (R11–R13)

*Anaxagoras' Ultimate Components Identified with
Aristotelian 'Homeomers' (R14–R15)*

*Aristotle's Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Infinitism (R16–
R17)*

*Anaxagoras' Principles Can Be Reduced to Two (R18–
R19)*

The Beginning of the Cosmogonic Process (R20–R21)

The Clepsydra (R22)

*Theophrastus' Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Theory of
Sensations (R23)*

*Various Doxographical Reports Influenced by Later Doc-
trines (R24–R30)*

Platonico–Aristotelian Interpretations (R24–R25)

*The Skeptic Arcesilaus Includes Anaxagoras Among
His Predecessors (R26)*

An Eclectic Reading (R27)

The Epicureans (R28–R29)

Epicurus (R28)

Lucretius (R29)

A Stoicizing Interpretation (R30)

Anaxagoras in Simplicius (R31–R34)

*Simplicius Nuances Plato's Criticism of Anaxagoras
(R31)*

*Simplicius Defends Anaxagoras Against Aristotle's
Criticisms (R32–R33)*

*The Transmission of the Fragments of Anaxagoras: An
Example (R34)*

A Judgment on Anaxagoras' Style (R35)

An Aphorism Attributed to Anaxagoras in Syriac (R36)

Anaxagoras in The Assembly of Philosophers (R37)

ANAXAGORAS [59 DK]

P

Chronology (P1–P5)

P1 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.6–7

Ἀναξαγόρας Ἡγησιβούλου ἢ Εὐβούλου, Κλαζομένιος. οὗτος ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιμένους [. . .] [7] λέγεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ξέρξου διάβασιν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, βεβιωκέναι δὲ ἐβδομήκοντα δύο. φησὶ δ' Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τοῖς Χρονικοῖς [FGrHist 244 F31] γεγενῆσθαι αὐτὸν τῇ ἐβδομηκοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι, τεθνηκέναι δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ὀγδοηκοστῆς¹ ὀγδόης.

¹ ὀγδοηκοστῆς F³ et Meursius: ἐβδομηκοστῆς BP

P2 (< A43) Arist. *Metaph.* A3 984a11

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὢν τούτου [. . . cf. **R8**].

P3 (< A5) Diog. Laert. 9.41

γέγονε δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις, ὥς αὐτός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μικρῷ

ANAXAGORAS

P

Chronology (P1–P5)

P1 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

Anaxagoras, son of Hegesiboulus or Euboulus, from Clazomenae. He studied with Anaximenes [. . .]. He is said to have been twenty years old when Xerxes crossed over [= 480/79 BC] and to have lived seventy-two years. Apollodorus in his *Chronology* says that he was born in the 70th Olympiad [= 500/496] and died in the first year of the 88th [= 428].

P2 (< A43) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was earlier than him [i.e. Empedocles] in age [. . .].

P3 (< A5) Diogenes Laertius

As he himself [i.e. Democritus] says in his *Small Ordering*

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

διακόσμῳ, νέος κατὰ πρεσβύτην Ἀναξαγόραν, ἔτεσιν αὐτοῦ νεώτερος τετταράκοντα. [. . . = **ATOM. P9**]

P4 (< A4) Cyrill. Alex. *Jul.* 1.15

ἐβδομηκοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι φασὶ γενέσθαι Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν, φιλοσόφους φυσικοὺς [. . .].

P5 (A4) Eus. *Chron.*

[Ol. 80.1] Anaxagoras moritur.

The Meteorite at Aegospotami (P6–P7)

P6 (< A11) Plin. *Nat. hist.* 2.149–150

celebrant Graeci Anaxagoran Clazomenium Olympiadis LXXVIII secundo anno praedixisse caelestium litterarum scientia quibus diebus saxum casurum esset e sole, idque factum interdiu in Thraciae parte ad Aegos flumen, qui lapis etiam nunc ostenditur magnitudine vehis, colore adusto, comete quoque illis noctibus flagrante. [. . .] [150] in Abydi gymnasio ex ea causa colitur hodieque modicus quidem, sed quem in media terrarum casurum idem Anaxagoras praedixisse narretur.

ANAXAGORAS

of the World, he was young when Anaxagoras was old, as he was forty years younger.

P4 (< A4) Cyril of Alexandria, *Against Julian*

They say that Democritus and Anaxagoras, natural philosophers, were born in the 70th Olympiad [= 500/496] [...].

P5 (A4) Eusebius, *Chronicle*

[Ol. 80.1 = 460 BC] Anaxagoras dies.¹

¹ Perhaps this notice results from confusion between Anaxagoras' *akmê* (conventionally forty years of age) and his death.

The Meteorite at Aegospotami (P6–P7)

P6 (< A11) Pliny, *Natural History*

The Greeks record that during the second year of the 78th Olympiad [467/66]¹ Anaxagoras of Clazomenae predicted, on the basis of his knowledge of the science of astronomy, the days on which a stone would fall from the sun, and that this occurred during the daytime in a region of Thrace near Aegospotami; the stone is still displayed, a wagon-load in size, of a scorched color; during those nights there was also a comet that blazed. [. . .] For this reason, in the gymnasium of Abydos even today one [scil. stone] is venerated, of middling size to be sure, but one of which they say that the same Anaxagoras foretold that it would fall onto the earth.

¹ According to the inscription on the Parian Chronicle (A11 DK), the event occurred in 468/67. The Chronicle of Eusebius (A11 DK) dates the event to 466.

P7 (< A12) Plut. *Lys.* 12

οἱ δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ λίθου πτώσιν ἐπὶ τῷ πάθει τούτῳ
σημεῖον φασὶ γενέσθαι· κατηνέχθη γάρ, ὡς ἡ δόξα
τῶν πολλῶν, ἐξ οὐρανοῦ παμμεγέθης λίθος εἰς Αἰγὸς
ποταμούς. καὶ δείκνυται μὲν ἔτι¹ νῦν, σεβομένων αὐ-
τὸν τῶν Χερρονησιτῶν. λέγεται δ' Ἀναξαγόραν προ-
ειπεῖν ὡς τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδεμένων² σω-
μάτων γενομένου τινὸς ὀλισθήματος ἢ σάλου ῥύψις
ἔσται καὶ πτώσις ἐνὸς ἀπορραγέντος· [. . . = **D46**]. τῷ
δ' Ἀναξαγόρᾳ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Δαίμαχος ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ*
εὐσεβείας *ἱστορῶν* [FGrHist 239 A57] ὅτι πρὸ τοῦ πε-
σεῖν τὸν λίθον ἐφ' ἡμέρας ἐβδομήκοντα πέντε συν-
εχῶς κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἑωράτο πύρινον σῶμα παμ-
μέγεθες, ὥσπερ νέφος φλογοειδὲς [. . .].

¹ ἔτι <καὶ> Koraïs ² ἐνδεδεμένων A² ed. Ald.: ἐνδεδυ-
μένων GL: ἐνδινουμένων Koraïs

*Other Predictions (P8–P9)***P8** (A6) Philostr. *V. Ap.* 1.2 (p. 3.6–12 Kayser)

τίς οὐκ οἶδε τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν Ὀλυμπίασι μὲν, ὁπότε
ἤκιστα ἦε, παρελθόντα ὑπὸ κωδίῳ εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐπὶ
προρρήσει ὄμβρου οἰκίαν τε ὡς πεσεῖται, προειπόντα
μὴ ψεύσασθαι, πεσεῖν γάρ, νύκτα τε ὡς ἐξ ἡμέρας
ἔσται καὶ ὡς λίθοι περὶ Αἰγὸς ποταμούς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
ἐκδοθήσονται, προαναφωνήσαντα ἀληθεύσαι;

ANAXAGORAS

P7 (< A12) Plutarch, *Lysander*

Others say that the fall of the stone occurred as a sign of this disaster [scil the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405]. For, according to the opinion of most people, an enormous stone fell from the sky at Aegospotami. And it is displayed now, and the inhabitants of the Chersonese venerate it. Anaxagoras is said to have foretold that there would be a slippage or shaking of the bodies fastened onto the heavens and that one of them, becoming detached, would be propelled away and would fall down. [. . .] Daemachus too bears witness in favor of Anaxagoras in his *On Piety*: he reports that for seventy-five days before the stone fell, an enormous fiery body like a flaming cloud was continuously seen in the sky [. . .].

Other Predictions (P8–P9)

P8 (A6) Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*

Who does not know that Anaxagoras was not mistaken when, although it was not at all raining at Olympia, he appeared at the stadium under a sheepskin, predicting rain in this way, and also when he foretold that a house would fall down (for it did), and that he turned out to be right when he predicted that the day would turn to night, and that stones would be set loose from the sky near Aegospotami?

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P9 (A10) Amm. Marc. 22.16.22

hinc Anaxagoras lapides e caelo lapsuros et putealem limum contrectans tremores futuros praedixerat terrae.

His Hostility to Democritus (P10)

P10 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.14

ἔδοξε δέ πως καὶ Δημοκρίτῳ ἀπεχθῶς ἐσχηκέναι ἀπο-
τυχῶν τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν κοινολογίας.

Anaxagoras at Athens (P11–P26)
His Move from Ionia to Athens (P11–P13)

P11 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.7

ἤρξατο δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν Ἀθήνησιν ἐπὶ Καλλίου,¹ ἐτῶν
εἴκοσιν ὧν,² ὥς φησι Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς [Frag.
150 Wehrli] ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀρχόντων ἀναγραφῇ, ἔνθα καί
φασιν αὐτὸν ἐτῶν διατρῖψαι τριάκοντα.³

¹ Καλλικᾶδου Meursius ² ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν ὧν del. Diano:
ἐτῶν εἴκοσιν <ἐκεῖ διατρίβων Mansfeld ³ τριάκοντα B: λ'
P: πεντήκοντα (i.e. ν') Marcovich

P12 (< A7) Ps.-Galen. *Hist. phil.* 3

οὗτος δὲ τὴν Μίλητον ἀπολελοιπὼς ἦκεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθή-
νας [. . . = **P16**].

ANAXAGORAS

P9 (A10) Ammianus Marcellinus, *Histories*

It is from these [i.e. the secret writings of the Egyptians] that Anaxagoras foretold that stones would fall from the sky, and, by examining the mud in wells, that there would be earthquakes.

His Hostility to Democritus (P10)

P10 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He seemed in some way to feel hostile toward Democritus, since he had failed to enter into contact with him [= **ATOM. R10**; cf. **R1**].

Anaxagoras at Athens (P11–P26)
His Move from Ionia to Athens (P11–P13)

P11 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He began to do philosophy at Athens while Callias [scil. was archon = 456], at the age of twenty,¹ as Demetrius of Phaleron says in his *List of Archons*; they also say that he spent thirty years there.

¹ According to this chronology, Anaxagoras was born in 476. Perhaps “Calliades” (archon in 480) should be read.

P12 (< A7) Ps.-Galen, *Philosophical History*

He [i.e. Anaxagoras], having left Miletus, came to Athens [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P13 (< A7) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.63

οὗτος μετήγαγεν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωνίας Ἀθήναζε τὴν δια-
τριβήν [. . . = **P17**].

Anaxagoras' Students in Athens (P14–P22)

Euripides (P14)

P14

a (< A21) Alex. Aet. Frag. 7.1

ὁ δ' Ἀναξαγόρου τρόφις¹ ἀρχαίου² [. . .].

¹ τρόφιμος mss., corr. Bergk ² αρχαιου mss. (αρχι-
διον X): χαιου Valckenaer

b (< A20c) Satyr. Vit. Eur. (Frag. 37 Col. 1.22–25 Schorn)

ἐ[τίμ]α¹ δὲ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν δαιμονίως . . .

¹ suppl. West

c (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.10

[. . .] Εὐριπίδην, μαθητὴν ὄντα αὐτοῦ [. . .].

d (< A33) Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* 4.7

[. . . = **P38b**] τοῦτο λαβὼν Εὐριπίδης τὸ νόημα [. . . =
DRAM. T80].

ANAXAGORAS

P13 (< A7) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

He brought the practice [scil. of philosophy] from Ionia to Athens [. . .].

Anaxagoras' Students in Athens (P14–P22)
Euripides (P14)

P14

a (< A21) Alexander of Aetolia

The nursling of old Anaxagoras [scil. Euripides] [. . .].

b (< A20c) Satyrus, *Life of Euripides*

He [i.e. Euripides] honored Anaxagoras extraordinarily
...

c (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] Euripides, who was his student [. . .].

d (< A33) Galen, *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*

[. . .] Euripides took this idea [i.e., “I knew when I begot him that he was mortal,” from Anaxagoras; cf. **P38**].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

e (< A20a) Schol. in Pind. *Ol.* 1.91 (p. 38.11–12 Drachmann)

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ γενόμενον τὸν Εὐριπίδην μαθητὴν [. . . = **DRAM. T75a**].

Thucydides (P15)

P15 (≠ DK) Marcell. *Thuc.* 22

ἤκουσε δὲ διδασκάλων Ἀναξαγόρου μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις,¹ ὅθεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντυλλος, καὶ ἄθεος ἡρέμα ἐνομίσθη, τῆς ἐκείθεν θεωρίας ἐμφορηθείς [. . .].

¹ ἤκουσε . . . φιλοσόφοις post ἐμφορηθείς hab. mss., transp. Casaubon

Archelaus (P16–P17)

P16 (< A7) Ps.-Galen. *Hist. phil.* 3

οὗτος [. . . = **P12**] καὶ Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον πρῶτον εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρώρμησεν.

P17 (< A7) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.63

[. . . = **P13**] τοῦτον διαδέχεται Ἀρχέλαος, οὗ Σωκράτης διήκουσεν.

ANAXAGORAS

e (< A20a) Scholia on Pindar's *Olympians*

[. . .] Euripides, who was Anaxagoras' student [. . .].

Cf. also **DRAM. T76–T81**

Thucydides (P15)

P15 (≠ DK) Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*

Regarding his teachers, he [scil. Thucydides] studied with Anaxagoras among philosophers, because of which, Antylus says, he was considered to be a little bit atheistic, since he had filled himself up with theory coming from that source [. . .].

Archelaus (P16–P17)

P16 (< A7) Ps.-Galen, *Philosophical History*

[. . .] and it was this man [i.e. Anaxagoras] who was the first to stimulate Archelaus the Athenian to practice philosophy.

P17 (< A7) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

[. . .] He [i.e. Anaxagoras] was succeeded by Archelaus, with whom Socrates studied.

See also **ARCH. P1–P6; SOC. P8**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Pericles (P18–P22)

P18 (A15) Isocr. *Ant.* 15.235

Περικλῆς δὲ δυοῖν ἐγένετο μαθητής, Ἀναξαγόρου τε τοῦ Κλαζομενίου καὶ Δάμωνος [. . .].

P19 (A15* Lanza) Plat. *Alc.* 118c

[ΑΛ.] λέγεται γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ [. . .].

P20 (< A15) Plat. *Phaedr.* 269e–270a

[ΣΩ.] κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι. [. . .] πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὃ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο· προσπεσὼν γὰρ οἶμαι τοιούτῳ ὄντι Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὧν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἴλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

ANAXAGORAS

Pericles (P18–P22)

P18 (A15) Isocrates, *Antidosis*

Pericles was the student of two teachers, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, and Damon [. . .].

P19 (\neq DK) Plato, *First Alcibiades*

[Alcibiades:] They say, Socrates, that he [i.e. Pericles] did not become wise on his own, but that he associated with many wise men, like Pythocleides and Anaxagoras [. . .].

P20 ($<$ A15) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Socrates:] No doubt, dear friend, it is for good reason that Pericles became the most perfect of all with regard to oratory. [. . .] All the arts that are most important need to chatter idly and to explain celestial phenomena regarding nature: for that is where this sublime intelligence and effectiveness in all matters seems to come from. This is exactly what Pericles acquired, in addition to his natural capacity. For I think that when he encountered Anaxagoras, who was this kind of man, he became filled with explanations about celestial phenomena and arrived at the nature of intelligence and its contrary, matters about which Anaxagoras spoke a lot, and derived from there, so as to apply it to the art of speeches, what is useful for this.

P21 (A16) Plut. *Per.* 6

λέγεται δέ ποτε κριοῦ μονοκέρω κεφαλὴν ἐξ ἀγροῦ τῷ Περικλεῖ κομισθῆναι καὶ Λάμπωνα μὲν τὸν μάντιν, ὥς εἶδε τὸ κέρας ἰσχυρὸν καὶ στερεὸν ἐκ μέσου τοῦ μετώπου πεφυκός, εἰπεῖν ὅτι δυνεῖν οὐσῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δυνασθειῶν τῆς Θουκυδίδου καὶ Περικλέους εἰς ἓνα περιστήσεται τὸ κράτος παρ' ᾧ γένοιτο τὸ σημεῖον· τὸν δ' Ἀναξαγόραν τοῦ κρανίου διακοπέντος ἐπιδείξαι τὸν ἐγκέφαλον οὐ πεπληρωκότα τὴν βάσιν, ἀλλ' ὅξυν ὥσπερ ῥόν ἐκ τοῦ παντός ἀγγείου συνωλισθηκότα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἐκείνον, ὅθεν ἡ ρίζα τοῦ κέρατος εἶχε τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ τότε μὲν θαυμασθῆναι τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων, ὀλίγῳ δ' ὕστερον τὸν Λάμπωνα τοῦ μὲν Θουκυδίδου καταλυθέντος τῶν δὲ τοῦ δήμου πραγμάτων ὁμαλῶς ἀπάντων ὑπὸ τῷ Περικλεῖ γενομένων.

P22 (A32) Plut. *Per.* 16

καὶ μέντοι γε τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν αὐτὸν λέγουσιν ἀσχολουμένου Περικλέους ἀμελούμενον κεῖσθαι συγκεκαλυμμένον ἤδη γηραιὸν ἀποκαρτεροῦντα, προσπεσόντος δὲ τῷ Περικλεῖ τοῦ πράγματος ἐκπλαγέντα θεῖν εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δεῖσθαι πᾶσαν δέησιν, ὀλοφυρόμενον οὐκ ἐκείνον ἀλλ' ἐαυτόν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἀπολεί τῆς πολιτείας σύμβουλον. ἐκκαλυψάμενον οὖν τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν εἰπεῖν πρὸς αὐτόν· “ὦ Περικλεῖς, καὶ οἱ τοῦ λύχνου χρεῖαν ἔχοντες ἔλαιον ἐπιχέουσιν.”

ANAXAGORAS

P21 (A16) Plutarch, *Pericles*

They say that one day the head of a ram with only one horn was brought to Pericles from the countryside, and that the prophet Lampon, when he saw that the horn was strong and solid and had grown from the middle of the forehead, said that, of the two forces in the city, Thucydides' and Pericles', the power would pass over to one man, the one to whom this sign had appeared. But Anaxagoras demonstrated, when the skull had been cut in half, that the brain had not occupied the whole of its place, but had become elongated like an egg and had slipped out of the whole of the cavity toward the place where the root of the horn began. At the time, those present admired Anaxagoras, but a little later it was Lampon, when Thucydides was dismissed and absolutely all of the political power passed over to Pericles.

P22 (A32) Plutarch, *Pericles*

They say that Anaxagoras himself, while Pericles was busy, lay neglected, an old man, his face already covered by a veil [i.e. ready to die], and that he was starving himself to death; but when this matter was brought to Pericles' attention, he was dismayed, ran to the man immediately, and entreated him as forcefully as he could, lamenting not Anaxagoras, but himself, if he lost such a political advisor. Then Anaxagoras uncovered his face and said to him, "Pericles, those too who have need of a lamp pour oil into it."

See also **MEL. P4**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Anaxagoras' Trial (P23–P26)

P23 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.12, 13–14

[12] *περὶ δὲ τῆς δίκης αὐτοῦ διάφορα λέγεται. Σωτίων μὲν γάρ φησιν ἐν τῇ Διαδοχῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων* [Frag. 3 Wehrli] *ὑπὸ Κλέωνος αὐτὸν ἀσεβείας κριθῆναι διότι τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον ἔλεγε διάπυρον· ἀπολογησαμένου δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ Περικλέους τοῦ μαθητοῦ, πέντε ταλάντοις ζημιωθῆναι καὶ φυγαδευθῆναι. Σάτυρος δ' ἐν τοῖς Βίοις ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδου φησὶν* [Frag. 16 Schorn] *εἰσαχθῆναι τὴν δίκην ἀντιπολιτευομένου¹ τῷ Περικλεί· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀσεβείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδισμού· καὶ ἀπόντα καταδικασθῆναι θανάτῳ.* [13] [. . . cf. **P40**] *Ἑρμιππος δ' ἐν τοῖς Βίοις φησὶν* [Frag. 30 Wehrli] *ὅτι καθείρχθη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τεθνηξόμενος. Περικλῆς δὲ παρελθὼν εἶπεν² εἴ τι ἔχουσιν ἐγκαλεῖν αὐτῷ³ κατὰ τὸν βίον· οὐδὲν δὲ εἰπόντων “καὶ μὴν ἐγώ,” ἔφη, “τούτου μαθητῆς εἰμι· μὴ οὖν διαβολαῖς ἐπαρθέντες ἀποκτείνητε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πεισθέντες ἄφετε.” καὶ ἀφείθη· οὐκ ἐνεγκὼν δὲ τὴν ὕβριν ἑαυτὸν ἐξήγαγεν.* [14] *Ἱερώνυμος δ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Τῶν σποράδην ὑπομνημάτων* [Frag. 41 Wehrli] *φησὶν ὅτι ὁ Περικλῆς παρήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον διερρηκτότα καὶ λεπτόν ὑπὸ νόσου, ὥστε ἐλέω μᾶλλον ἢ κρίσει ἀφεθῆναι.*

¹ ἀντιπολιτευομένου] <τοῦ> ἀντιπολιτευσαμένου Bergk

² εἶπεν mss.: εἰπεῖν <ἐκέλευσεν> Croenert

³ αὐτῷ mss.: corr. Stephanus

ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras' Trial (P23–P26)

P23 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[12] Reports vary about his trial. For Sotion says in his *Succession of the Philosophers* that he was accused of impiety by Cleon because he said that the sun is a mass of red-hot metal; he was defended by Pericles himself, his student, and was fined five talents and exiled. Satyrus in his *Lives* says that he was brought to trial by Thucydides (who opposed Pericles politically) [cf. **P21**], and not only for impiety but also for supporting the Persians; and that he was condemned to death in absentia. [13] [. . .] Hermippus says in his *Lives* that he was imprisoned to await execution; but Pericles delivered a speech, asking the people whether they had anything to accuse him [i.e. Pericles] of in his life, and when they said they did not, he said, “And yet I am this man’s student; do not allow yourselves to be carried away by slanders and do not kill the man, but listen to me and set him free.” And he was set free; but he could not endure the affront, and so he killed himself. [14] Hieronymus says in Book 2 of his *Scattered Notes* that Pericles brought him into the courtroom, feeble and emaciated by illness, so that he was released, more out of pity than because of a verdict.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P24 (A17) Diod. Sic. 12.39.2

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν σοφιστήν, διδάσκαλον ὄντα Περικλέους, ὡς ἀσεβοῦντα εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς ἐσυκοφάντουν.

P25

a (A17) Plut. *Per.* 32

περὶ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον [. . .] ψήφισμα Διοπίθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, ἀπειρόδομος εἰς Περικλέα δι' Ἀναξαγόρου τὴν ὑπόνοιαν [. . .] Ἀναξαγόραν δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἐξέκλειψεν¹ καὶ προὔπεμψεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

¹ ἐξέκλειψεν Emperius: ἐξέπεμψεν mss.

b (< A18) Plut. *Nic.* 23

[. . .] ἀλλ' ἀπόρρητος ἔτι καὶ δι' ὀλίγων καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων. οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πρωταγόρας ἔφυγε καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν εἰρχθέντα μόλις περιποιήσατο Περικλῆς.

ANAXAGORAS

P24 (A17) Diodorus Siculus

And besides these [i.e. Phidias and Pericles, who had ordered a statue], they [scil. Pericles' enemies] falsely accused Anaxagoras the 'sophist' (*sophistês*), who was Pericles' teacher, of committing impiety with regard to the gods.

P25

a (A17) Plutarch, *Pericles*

About this time [scil. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War] [. . .] Diopeithes proposed a law according to which those who did not acknowledge divine matters or who taught theories about celestial phenomena would be prosecuted, making use of Anaxagoras in order to direct suspicion against Pericles. [. . .] In fear he [i.e. Pericles] seized Anaxagoras in secret and sent him away from the city.

b (< A18) Plutarch, *Nicias*

[. . .] but it [i.e. Anaxagoras' theory about the light of the moon, cf. **D38**] was still secret and circulated only among a small number of people, demanding some degree of precaution or trust. For people did not tolerate the natural philosophers, who were called at that time "talkative air-heads" because they reduced divinity to irrational causes, nonprovidential powers, and necessitated processes: so that Protagoras was exiled [cf. **PROT. P19**] and Pericles only barely managed to rescue Anaxagoras from imprisonment.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P26

a (A38) Plut. *Exil.* 17 607F

ἀλλ' Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμόν ἔγραφε [. . .].

b (< A3) *Suda* A.1981

ἔφυγε δὲ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν Περικλέους αὐτῷ συνειπόντος.

Another Student: Metrodorus of Lampsacus (P27)

P27 (< 59 A1, < 61.2) Diog. Laert. 2.11

[. . .] Μητροδόωρον τὸν Λαμψακηρόν, γνώριμον ὄντα αὐτοῦ [. . .] [cf. **D98**].

Character (P28–P32)

P28 (A13) Plat. *Hipp. mai.* 283a

[ΣΩ.] καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν χρημάτων καταμελῆσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα· οὕτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφίζεσθαι.

P29 (< A30) Arist. *EN* 6.7 1141b3–8

διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν [. . . = **THAL. P13**] καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν

ANAXAGORAS

P26

a (A38) Plutarch, *On Exile*

But while Anaxagoras was in prison he was drawing [or: writing about] the squaring of the circle [. . .].

b (< A3) *Suda*

He was exiled from Athens, Pericles having spoken in his favor.

Another Student: Metrodorus of Lampsacus (P27)

P27 (< 59 A1, < 61.2) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who was his pupil [. . .].

Character (P28–P32)

P28 (A13) Plato, *Greater Hippias*

[Socrates:] He neglected the great wealth that he had inherited and lost everything—so stupid was the wisdom he practiced.

P29 (A30) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

That is why **people** say that Anaxagoras [. . .] and men **like that** are wise but not prudent, when they see that they

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἶδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

P30 (< A13) Plut. *Per.* 16

ἀπάδοντα¹ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τῆς Ἀναξαγόρου σοφίας, εἶγε καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐκείνος ἐξέλιπε καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνῆκεν² ἀργὴν καὶ μηλόβοτον ὑπ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης.

¹ ἅπαντα mss., corr. Valckenaer, alii alia

² ἀνῆκεν Bryan: ἀφῆκεν mss.

P31 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.6

οὗτος εὐγενείᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ διαφέρων ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη, ὅς γε τὰ πατρῶα τοῖς οἰκείοις παρεχώρησεν [. . .].

P32 (A21) Ael. *Var. hist.* 8.13

Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιον φασὶ μήτε γελῶντά ποτε ὀφθῆναι μήτε¹ μειδιῶντα τὴν ἀρχήν.

¹ μή mss., corr. Hercher

ANAXAGORAS

do not know what is advantageous for themselves; and they say that what they know is extraordinary and marvelous and difficult and divine—but useless, since they do not inquire about human goods.

P30 (< A13) Plutarch, *Pericles*

This [i.e. the careful management of Pericles' household by his slave Euangelus] is in disaccord with the wisdom of Anaxagoras, if it is true that, because of his enthusiasm and nobility of spirit, he abandoned his household and left his land fallow and as pasture.

P31 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He was distinguished for high birth and wealth, but also for nobility of spirit, for he ceded his patrimony to his relatives [. . .].

P32 (A21) Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*

They say that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was never seen laughing nor smiling at all.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Apothegms (P33–P41)

P33 (A28) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ5 1009b25–28

Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἐταίρων τινός,¹ ὅτι τοιαῦτ' αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν.

¹ τινός EJA^b: τινάς recc.

P34 (cf. A48) Iambl. *Protr.* 8 (p. 48.16–18 Pistelli)

“ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός,” εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι “ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινος.”

P35 (A30) Arist. *EE* 1.5 1216a10–14

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἅττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, “τοῦ” φάναι “θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον τάξιν.”

P36 (A29) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2.130

Ἀναξαγόραν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κλαζομένιον τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν λέγουσιν [. . .].

ANAXAGORAS

Apothegms (P33–P41)

P33 (A28) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

A saying of Anaxagoras' is also reported by one of his companions: that beings would be for them such as they supposed them to be.

P34 (cf. A48) Iamblichus, *Protreptic* (from Aristotle, *Protreptic*)

“Our mind is god”: either Hermotimus or Anaxagoras said this, and that “a mortal life has a share in a god” [cf. **R9**].

P35 (A30) Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*

They say that Anaxagoras said to someone who had difficulties of this sort and kept asking why one might prefer to be born rather than not to be born, “To observe the sky and the order in the universe.”

P36 (A29) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

For they say that Anaxagoras of Clazomenae said that the goal of life is observation and the freedom that comes from this [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P37 (A30) Arist. *EN* 10.9 1179a13–15

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην
ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμά-
σειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς.

P38

a (A7* Lanza) Cic. *Tusc.* 3.30

[. . .] Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse:
“sciebam me genuisse mortalem.”

b (< A33) Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* 4.7

διὸ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου παρείληφεν ἐνταῦθα, ὡς
ἄρα τινὸς ἀναγγείλαντος αὐτῷ τεθνάναι τὸν υἱὸν εὖ
μάλα καθεστηκότως εἶπεν “ἦδειν θνητὸν γεννήσας”
[. . . **P14d**].

P39 (A31) Val. Max. 8.7 ext. 6

quali porro studio Anaxagoran flagrasse credimus? qui
cum e diutina peregrinatione patriam repetisset posses-
sionesque desertas vidisset, “non essem,” inquit, “ego sal-
vus, nisi istae perissent.”

P40 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.7, 10–11, 13

[7] αἰτιαθεὶς γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμελῶν. “τί οὖν,” ἔφη,
“οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐπιμελείσθε;” καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ

ANAXAGORAS

P37 (A30) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

Anaxagoras too seems not to have supposed that the happy man is wealthy or powerful, for he said that he would not be surprised if **such a man** seemed someone strange to most people.

P38

a (≠ DK) Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*

[. . .] they say that when the death of his son was reported to him Anaxagoras said, “I knew that I had begotten a mortal.”

b (< A33) Galen, *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*

For this reason he [i.e. Posidonius] has cited in this connection Anaxagoras’ saying: when someone reported to him that his son had died, he retained his composure and said, “I knew that I had begotten a mortal.”

P39 (A31) Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*

What kind of zeal should we believe it was that set Anaxagoras aflame? When he returned to his country after a long stay abroad and saw his estates in a state of abandon, he said, “I myself would not be safe, if these had not perished.”

P40 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[7] When he was accused by them [i.e. his relatives] of neglecting it [i.e. his patrimony], he said, “Why then don’t

τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. ὅτε καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα “οὐδέν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος”; “εὐφήμει,” ἔφη, “ἐμοὶ γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,” δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν [. . .] [10] [. . .] πρὸς τε τὸν εἰπόντα εἰ τὰ ἐν Λαμψάκῳ ὄρη ἔσται ποτὲ θάλαττα, φασὶν εἰπεῖν· “ἐάν γε ὁ χρόνος μὴ ἐπιλίπη.” ἐρωτηθείς ποτε εἰς τί γεγέννηται, “εἰς θεωρίαν,” ἔφη, “ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ οὐρανοῦ.” πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα· “ἐστερήθης Ἀθηναίων,” “οὐ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφη, “ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι ἐμοῦ.” ἰδὼν τὸν Μανσώλου τάφον ἔφη· “τάφος πολυτελὴς λελιθωμένης ἐστὶν οὐσίας εἰδωλον.” [11] πρὸς τὸν δυσφοροῦντα ὅτι ἐπὶ ξένης τελευτᾷ, “πανταχόθεν,” ἔφη, “ὁμοία ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς Αἰδοῦ κατάβασις.” [. . .] [. . . = P23] [13] ὅτε καὶ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῷ προσαγγελόντων, τῆς τε καταδίκης καὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων τελευτῆς, εἰπεῖν περὶ μὲν τῆς καταδίκης, ὅτι ἄρα¹ “κᾶκείνων κᾶμου πάλαι ἢ φύσις κατεψηφίσατο,” περὶ δὲ τῶν παίδων, ὅτι “ἥδειν αὐτοὺς θνητοὺς γεννήσας.” (οἱ δ’ εἰς Σόλωνα τοῦτο ἀναφέρουσιν, ἄλλοι εἰς Ξενοφῶντα.)

¹ ἄρα mss.: “ἀλλὰ Richards

P41 (A34) Stob. 4.52b

Ἀναξαγόρας δύο ἔλεγε διδασκαλίας εἶναι θανάτου, τὸν τε πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι χρόνον καὶ τὸν ὕπνον.

ANAXAGORAS

you take care of it yourselves?"; and in the end he withdrew and devoted himself to the observation of natural phenomena, not paying any attention to political matters. And when someone said to him one day, "Do you have no care for your fatherland?" he replied, "Don't be blasphemous: for I do care for my fatherland, and indeed very much"—and pointed to the sky. [...] [10] [...] To someone who asked him whether the mountains in Lampsacus would someday become sea, they say he replied, "Yes, if time is not lacking." Asked one day for what purpose he had been born, he answered, "To observe the sun, the moon, and the sky." To someone who said, "You have been deprived of the Athenians," he replied, "Not at all, but they have been, of me." When he saw the tomb of Mausolus he said, "An expensive tomb is the image of a petrified wealth." [11] To someone who complained that he was dying abroad he said, "From every place the descent to Hades is the same." [. . .] [13] And once when both pieces of news were reported to him, one about his condemnation and the other about the death of his children, he said about the condemnation, "Nature has long since condemned both them and me," and about his children, "I knew that I begot them as mortals." (Some people attribute this saying to Solon, and others to Xenophon.)

P41 (A34) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Anaxagoras said that there are two things that teach us about death: the time before our birth, and sleep.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Nickname (P42–P43)

P42 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.6

[. . . cf. **R33**] παρὸ καὶ Νοῦς ἐπεκλήθη· καὶ φησι περὶ αὐτοῦ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις [Frag. 24 Di Marco] οὕτω·

καὶ πον Ἀναξαγόρην φάσ' ἔμμεναι, ἄλκιμον ἥρω
Νοῦν, ὅτι δὴ νόος αὐτῷ, ὃς ἐξαπίνης ἐπεγείρας
πάντα συνεσφήκωσεν ὁμοῦ τεταραγμένα
πρόσθεν.

P43 (A15) Plut. *Per.* 4

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ὃν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι Νοῦν
προσηγόρευον, εἴτε τὴν σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ μεγάλην εἰς
φυσιολογίαν καὶ περιττὴν διαφανείσαν θαυμάσαντες,
εἴθ' ὅτι τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην οὐδ' ἀνάγκην
διακοσμήσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν
καὶ ἄκρατον ἐν μεμιγμένοις πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποκρί-
νοντα τὰς ὁμοιομερείας.

ANAXAGORAS

Nickname (P42–P43)

P42 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] For this reason [i.e., the cosmogonic role of mind; cf. **D27**¹] he was nicknamed ‘Mind.’ And Timon says about him in his *Mockeries* (*Silloi*):

And they say that Anaxagoras is somewhere, valorous
hero,
‘Mind,’ because he has a mind that, having suddenly
awakened
All things that were jumbled beforehand, pinched
them together.

¹ Diogenes Laertius locates this episode at the beginning of the treatise, like Aëtius (cf. **ANAXAG. D3**, n. 2).

P43 (< A15) Plutarch, *Pericles*

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .] whom the men of that time called ‘Mind,’ either because they admired the great understanding, manifestly superior, that he had for natural philosophy (*phusiologia*), or because he was the first to establish as the principle for ordering the whole world not chance or necessity but pure and unmixed mind, which separates the homoeomeries¹ in all the other things, which are mixed [cf. **D27**].

¹ On the meaning of this term, see **D3**, n. 1.

Cf. also **P48**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

A Doubtful Anecdote (P44)

P44 (A40) Cod. Monac. 490, f. 483v

τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν δέ φασὶν τινες λόγον περὶ ἀπόρων
ζητημάτων γράψαντα τοῦτον ἱμάντα καλέσαι διὰ τὸ
ταῖς δυσπορίαις ἐνδεσμεῖν, ὥς ᾤετο, τοὺς ἀναγινώ-
σκοντας.

Last Years and Honors (P45–P48)

P45 (< A3) *Suda* A.1981

καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐν Λαμβάκῳ ἐκείσε καταστρέφει τὸν βίον
ἀποκαρτερήσας. ἐξήγαγε δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἑαυτὸν ἐτῶν ο',
διότι ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐνεβλήθη ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ οἷά τινα
καινὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ παρεισφύρων.

P46 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.14–15

καὶ τέλος ἀποχωρήσας εἰς Λάμψακον αὐτόθι κατ-
έστρεψεν. ὅτε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τῆς πόλεως ἀξιούν-
των τί βούλεται αὐτῷ γενέσθαι, φάναι. “τοὺς παῖδας
ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μηνὶ κατὰ ἔτος παίζειν συγχωρεῖν.”
καὶ φυλάττεται τὸ ἔθος καὶ νῦν.¹ τελευτήσαντα δὲ αὐ-
τὸν ἔθαψαν ἐντίμως οἱ Λαμψακηνοὶ καὶ ἐπέγραψαν·

ἐνθάδε, πλεῖστον ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τέρμα περήσας
οὐρανίου κόσμου, κείται Ἀναξαγόρας. [*Anth.*
Gr. 7.94]

¹ <ἔτι> καὶ νῦν Cobet

ANAXAGORAS

A Doubtful Anecdote (P44)

P44 (A40) From a miscellaneous manuscript in Munich

Some people say that Anaxagoras wrote a treatise about unsolvable problems and called it *Thong*, because he expected readers to be trussed up by its difficulties.

Last Years and Honors (P45–P48)

P45 (< A3) *Suda*

And after he reached Lampsacus he ended his life there by starving himself to death. He killed himself at the age of seventy because he had been imprisoned by the Athenians for introducing a new doctrine about god.

P46 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

And in the end he retired to Lampsacus and died there. And when the magistrates of the city asked him what he wished to be done regarding himself, he asked that children be allowed to play every year in the month in which he had died; and this custom is preserved to the present day. When he died, the citizens of Lampsacus buried him with great honor and inscribed an epitaph:

Here, having arrived at the farthest limit of the truth
About the celestial world, Anaxagoras reposes.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P47 (A23) Alcid. in Arist. *Rhet.* 2.23 1398b15

καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ
τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν.

P48 (A24) Ael. *Var. hist.* 8.19

[. . .] καὶ βωμὸς αὐτῷ ἵσταται καὶ ἐπιγέγραπται—ὁ¹
μὲν Νοῦ ὁ² δὲ Ἀληθείας.

¹ οἱ Koraïs

² οἱ Koraïs

ANAXAGORAS

P47 (A23) Alcidamas in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

The citizens of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, who was a foreigner, and they honor him to the present day.

P48 (A24) Aelian, *Historical Miscellany*

An altar has been erected for him too [i.e. besides the epitaph in his honor, cf. **P46**] and it bears an inscription, one [scil. says] that it is dedicated to Mind, another to Truth.

Iconography (P49)

P49 (A27) Richter I, p. 108 and Figures 574–75; Richter-Smith, p. 86 and Figure 49; Koch, “Ikonographie,” in Flashar, Bremer, Rechenauer (2013), I.1, pp. 223, 225.

ANAXAGORAS [59 DK]

D

Only One Book (D1)

D1 Diog. Laert.

a (< A37) 1.16

οἱ δὲ ἀνὰ ἓν συγγράψαντες¹ [. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας.

¹ συγγράψαντες BP, γρ. F²: σύγγραμμα F¹

b (< A1) 2.11

πρῶτος δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίον¹ ἐξέδωκε συγγραφῆς.²

¹ βιβλίον <έν> Gigante

² σὺν γραφαῖς Ruestow, alii alia

Three Summaries Going Back Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D4)

D2 (< A41) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 26.31–27.17

τῶν δὲ ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει λεγόντων οἱ μὲν ἀπλᾶς

ANAXAGORAS

D

Only One Book (D1)

D1 Diogenes Laertius

a (< A37)

[. . .] others, who wrote only one treatise: [. . .] Anaxagoras.

b (< A1)

Anaxagoras was also the first person to publish a book in the form of a treatise.¹

¹ Text and meaning uncertain.

Three Summaries Going Back Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D4)

D2 (< A41) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Among those who say that they [i.e. the principles] are infinite in number, some said that they are simple and

ἔλεγον καὶ ὁμογενεῖς οἱ δὲ συνθέτους καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς καὶ ἐναντίας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζόμενας. Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας, πρῶτος μετέστησε τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας καὶ τὴν ἐλλείπουσαν αἰτίαν ἀνεπλήρωσε, τὰς μὲν σωματικὰς ἀπείρους ποιήσας· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ χρυσόν, ἀγέννητα μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἀφθαρτα, φαίνεσθαι δὲ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, πάντων μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐνόντων, ἐκάστων δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζόμενον. χρυσὸς γὰρ φαίνεται ἐκείνο, ἐν ᾧ πολὺν χρυσίον ἐστὶ καίτοι πάντων ἐνόντων. λέγει γοῦν Ἀναξαγόρας ὅτι “ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι” καὶ “ὅτῳ πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ ἦν” [cf. D26, D27]. καὶ ταῦτά φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος [Frag. 228A FSH&G] παραπλησίως τῷ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ λέγειν τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν· ἐκείνος γάρ φησιν ἐν τῇ διακρίσει τοῦ ἀπείρου τὰ συγγενῆ φέρεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρυσὸς ἦν, γίνεσθαι χρυσόν, ὅτι δὲ γῆ, γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὥς οὐ γινομένων ἀλλ’ ἐνυπαρχόντων¹ πρότερον. τῆς δὲ κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἐπέστησε τὸν νοῦν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας, ὑφ’ οὗ διακρινόμενα τοὺς τε κόσμους καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φύσιν ἐγέννησαν.

¹ ἐνυπαρχόντων E^a: ὑπαρχόντων DEF

ANAXAGORAS

homogeneous, others that they are composite, nonhomogeneous, and contrary, but characterized by what dominates. Anaxagoras [. . .], after having shared in the philosophy of Anaximenes, was the first person to transform the doctrines about the principles and to supply the missing [scil. final] cause. As for the corporeal principles, he posited that they are infinite. For all the homeomers like water, fire, or gold, are ungenerated and indestructible, and they only appear to be generated and destroyed by virtue of combination and separation, since every thing is in every thing, and each thing is characterized by what dominates in it. For that thing appears as gold in which there is much that is golden, even if every thing is in it. At least, Anaxagoras says that **“in every thing there is a portion of every thing”** and **“that of which each thing contains the most, this is what it is and was most manifestly”** [cf. D26, D27]. And Theophrastus says that Anaxagoras speaks in a way similar to Anaximander, for the latter says that at the time of the separation of the unlimited, related things move toward each other, and that everything that was gold in the whole becomes gold, and whatever earth, earth, and similarly for each of the other things, on the idea that they are not generated but were already present within earlier [cf. **ANAXIMAND. R7–R9**].¹ As for motion and generation, Anaxagoras assigned as their cause mind, by the action of which things, in separating, generated the worlds and the nature of everything else.

¹ Theophrastus is summarizing Anaximander's theory in Anaxagorean terms.

D3 (A46) Aët. 1.3.5 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ ἀρχῶν τί εἰσιν]

Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων τὰς ὁμοιομερείας ἀπεφάνητο· ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀπορώτατον εἶναι, πῶς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος δύναται τι γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν· τροφήν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα ἀπλὴν καὶ μονοειδῇ (οἶον τὸν Δημήτριον ἄρτον,¹ τὸ ὕδωρ πίνοντες) καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τρέφεται θρῖξ φλέψ ἀρτηρία σὰρξ νεῦρα ὅσῃα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια· τούτων οὖν γιγνομένων ὁμολογητέον ὅτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερομένῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὔξεται· καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἐστὶ τῇ τροφῇ μόρια αἵματος γεννητικὰ καὶ νεύρων καὶ ὀστέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἃ ἦν λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μόρια· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀνάγειν, ὅτι ἄρτος καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ταῦτα κατασκευάζει, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μόρια· ἀπὸ τοῦ οὖν ὅμοια τὰ μέρη εἶναι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τοῖς γεννωμένοις ὁμοιομερείας αὐτὰς ἐκάλεσε καὶ ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀπεφάνητο, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὁμοιομερείας ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἷτιον νοῦν τὸν πάντα διαταξάμενον. ἄρχεται δὲ οὕτως· “ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν” [cf. **D9**], νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διήρηκε² καὶ διεκόσμησε [. . .].

¹ ἄρτον <ἔδοντες> prop. Mau
διήρε mss.

² διήρηκε Lachenaud:

ANAXAGORAS

D3 (A46) Aëtius

Anaxagoras [. . .] asserted that the principles of the things that are are the homeomerics.¹ For it seemed to him to be very difficult to explain how something can come about out of what is not, or be destroyed into what is not. In any case the food that we ingest is simple and of a single species (like the bread of Demeter and water when we drink it), and out of this are nourished the hair, veins, arteries, flesh, sinews, bones, and all the other parts.² But since this happens, it must be recognized that everything that exists is present in the food ingested and that everything grows from out of the things that are; and that in that food there are parts that generate blood, sinews, bones, and everything else—parts that are observed by reason. For one should not refer everything to sensation, because bread and water produce these things, but they contain parts visible by reason. Given, then, that the parts (*merê*) in food are similar (*homoia*) to the things that are generated, he called them ‘homeomerics’ (*homoiomereiai*) and asserted that they are the principles of the things that are, and that the homeomerics are the matter, and the efficient cause is mind, which organized everything. He begins as follows: **“All things were together”** [cf. D9], and mind has separated them and put them in order³ [. . .].

¹ ‘Homeomerics’ (or ‘homeomers’) is the Aristotelian term for homogeneous substances. These terms do not go back to Anaxagoras. Cf. R14–R15.

² Cf. Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* 1.18.723a10–11: “Anaxagoras says, with good reason, that flesh coming from food are added to the flesh.”

³ Aëtius’ formulation suggests that the action of mind was mentioned from the very beginning of the treatise, but this was not the case (cf. Also P42).

D4 (< A42) (Ps.-?) Hippol. Ref. 1.8.1–12

[1] μετὰ τοῦτον γίνεται Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .]. οὗτος ἔφη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν νοῦν καὶ ὕλην· τὸν μὲν νοῦν ποιοῦντα, τὴν δὲ ὕλην γινομένην· ὄντων γὰρ πάντων ὁμοῦ, νοῦς ἐπελθὼν διεκόσμησεν. τὰς δὲ ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς σμικροτέρας¹ αὐτῶν ἄπειρα² λέγει.³ [2] κινήσεως δὲ μετέχειν τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ κινούμενα συνελθεῖν τε τὰ ὅμοια. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν κεκοσμήσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου κινήσεως· τὸ μὲν οὖν πυκνὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ πάντα⁴ τὰ βαρέα συνελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, ἐξ ὧν παγέντων τὴν γῆν ὑποστήναι· τὰ δ' ἀντικείμενα τούτοις, <τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ>⁵ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ κοῦφον, εἰς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ αἰθέρος ὀρμῆσαι.

¹ σμικροτέρας mss.: σμικροτάτας Marcovich

² an ἀπείρους? ³ καὶ τὰς σμικροτέρας . . . λέγει: κατὰ τὴν σμικρότητα αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον λέγων Diels

⁴ πάντως Diels ⁵ <τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ> C. W. Mueller

[3] τὴν δὲ γῆν τῷ σχήματι πλατεῖαν εἶναι καὶ μένειν μετέωρον διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν καὶ διὰ τὸ¹ τὸν ἀέρα ἰσχυρότατον ὄντα φέρειν ἐποχουμένην τὴν γῆν. [4] τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς ὑγρῶν τὴν μὲν θάλασσαν ὑπάρξαι <ἐκ> τε τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ὑδάτων, <ὧν> ἐξατμισθέντων τὰ ὑποστάντα² οὕτως γεγονέναι, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καταρρευσάντων ποταμῶν. [5] τοὺς δὲ ποταμούς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀμβρῶν λαμβάνειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν,

ANAXAGORAS

D4 (< A42) Ps.-Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies*

[1] After him [i.e. Anaximenes] comes Anaxagoras [. . .]. He said that the principle of the whole is mind and matter, mind that makes, and matter that becomes. For when all things were together, mind supervened and separated and organized them. He says that the material principles are unlimited [scil. in number] and that the smaller ones among them are unlimited.¹ [2] All things participate in motion because they are moved by mind, and similar things are combined. What is in the heavens has been ordered by the circular motion: the dense, the moist, the dark, the cold, and everything heavy has combined toward the center, and the earth was formed from their solidification; what is opposed to them, <the rarefied,> the warm, the bright, the dry, and the light, rushed outward toward the farthest part of the aether.

¹ Text uncertain.

[3] The earth is flat in shape and remains floating because of its size and because there is no void and because the air, which possesses a very great force, bears the earth which rides upon it. [4] As for what on the earth is liquid, the sea is composed both from the waters that it contains (after evaporation, what remained was this) and from the rivers that pour into it. [5] The rivers derive their existence both from rains and from the waters that are under the earth.

¹ τοῦτο Usener ² <ἐκ> τε τῶν . . . τὰ ὑποστάντα
Diels: τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῇ ὕδατα ἐξατμισθέντα ὑποστάντα mss.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

καὶ ἐξ ὑδάτων³ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν κοίλην καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασιν. τὸν δὲ Νεῖλον αὖξασθαι κατὰ τὸ θέρος καταφερομένων εἰς αὐτὸν ὑδάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀρκτοῖς⁴ χιόνων. [6] ἥλιον δὲ καὶ σελήνην καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄστροι λίθους εἶναι ἐμπύρους, συμπεριληφθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς <τοῦ>⁵ αἰθέρος περιφορᾶς. εἶναι δ' ὑποκάτω τῶν ἄστρον ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ⁶ σώματά τινα συμπεριφερόμενα, ἡμῖν ἀόρατα.

³ ὑδάτων L in marg.: αὐτῶν cett. ⁴ ἀνταρκτικοῖς
Roeper ⁵ <τοῦ> Brandis ⁶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην mss.,
corr. Roeper

[7] τῆς δὲ θερμότητος μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ἄστρον διὰ τὸ μακρὰν εἶναι¹ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῆς γῆς· ἔτι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως θερμὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ διὰ τὸ χώραν ἔχειν ψυχροτέραν. εἶναι δὲ τὴν σελήνην κατωτέρω τοῦ ἡλίου, πλησιώτερον ἡμῶν. [8] ὑπερέχειν δὲ τὸν ἥλιον μεγέθει τὴν Πελοπόννησον. τὸ δὲ φῶς τὴν σελήνην μὴ ἴδιον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. τὴν δὲ τῶν ἄστρον περιφορὰν ὑπὸ γῆν γίνεσθαι. [9] ἐκλείπειν δὲ τὴν σελήνην γῆς ἀντιφραττούσης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑποκάτω τῆς σελήνης, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ταῖς νοσηνῖαις σελήνης ἀντιφραττούσης. τροπὰς δὲ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην ἀπωθουμένους² ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος. σελήνην δὲ πολλάκις τρέπεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρατεῖν τοῦ ψυχροῦ. [10] οὗτος ἀφώρισε πρῶτος τὰ³ περὶ τὰς ἐκλείψεις καὶ φωτισμούς. ἔφη δὲ γήινην εἶναι τὴν σελήνην ἔχειν τε⁴ ἐν αὐτῇ πεδία καὶ φάραγγας. τόν

ANAXAGORAS

For this latter is hollow and contains water in its cavities. The Nile rises in the summer when waters coming from snows to the north¹ flow down into it. [6] The sun, the moon and all the heavenly bodies are fiery stones which are carried along by the rotation of the aether. There exist below the heavenly bodies certain bodies that are borne along together with the sun and moon and that are invisible to us.

¹ But cf. **D66**.

[7] The heat of the heavenly bodies is not perceived because of the earth's considerable distance from them. Moreover, they are not hot as the sun is because they occupy a colder region. The moon is below the sun, closer to us. [8] The sun surpasses the Peloponnese in size. The moon does not possess its own light but receives it from the sun. The revolution of the heavenly bodies occurs under the earth. [9] The eclipse of the moon occurs when the earth stands in the way, and sometimes the bodies below the moon, and that of the sun, when the moon stands in the way at the time of the new moon. The returns [i.e. solstices] of both the sun and the moon occur when they are repelled by the air. But the moon turns frequently because it is not able to overcome the cold. [10] He was the first person to determine what is involved in eclipses and illuminations [i.e. the lunar phases]. He said that the moon is like the earth and possesses plains and precipices.

¹ καὶ διὰ post εἶναι del. Gomperz
-μένης LOB ³ τὰ Gronovius: τὰς mss.

² ἀπωθουμένων T:
⁴ τε LB: δὲ O

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

τέ⁵ γαλαξίαν ἀνάκλασιν εἶναι τοῦ φωτὸς τῶν ἄστρον
τῶν μὴ καταλαμπομένων⁶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. τοὺς δὲ
μεταβαίνοντας ἀστέρας ὥσεί σπινθήρας ἀφαλλομέ-
νους γίνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ πόλου.

⁵ δὲ Roeper

⁶ καταλαμβανομένων mss., corr. Menagius

[11] ἀνέμους δὲ γίνεσθαι λεπτυνομένου τοῦ αἵρος ὑπὸ
τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἐκκαιομένων πρὸς τὸν πόλον
ὑποχωρούντων καὶ ἀποφερομένων.¹ βροντὰς δὲ καὶ
ἀστραπὰς ἀπὸ θερμοῦ γίνεσθαι, ἐμπίπτοντος² εἰς τὰ
νέφη. [12] σεισμοὺς δὲ γίνεσθαι τοῦ ἄνωθεν αἵρος εἰς
τὸν ὑπὸ γῆν ἐμπίπτοντος· τούτου γὰρ κινουμένου καὶ
τὴν ὀχουμένην γῆν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σαλεύεσθαι. ζῶα δὲ τὴν
μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐν ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι,³ μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ἀλ-
λήλων· καὶ ἄρρενας μὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν δε-
ξιῶν μερῶν ἀποκριθὲν τὸ σπέρμα τοῖς δεξιῶις μέρεσι
τῆς μήτρας κολληθῇ, τὰ δὲ θήλεα κατὰ τοῦναντίον.

¹ ἀποφερομένων LB: ἀποφαινομένων O: ἀνταποφερομένων
Usener ² ἐμπίπτοντος B: ἐκπίπτοντος LO ³ γενέ-
σθαι LO: γεννᾶσθαι B

Epistemology (D5–D8)

D5 (B21) Sext. *Adv. Math.* 7.90

ὁ μὲν φυσικώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλ-
λων τὰς αἰσθήσεις “ὑπ’ ἀφαυρότητος¹ αὐτῶν, φησίν,

ANAXAGORAS

The Milky Way is the reflection of the light of the heavenly bodies that are not illuminated by the sun. The shooting stars come, like sparks leaping down, from the movement of the pole.

[11] Winds occur when the air becomes thin because of the sun and what is completely burned recedes toward the pole and withdraws from it. Thunder and lightning occur because of heat, when it falls onto clouds. [12] Earthquakes occur when the upper air falls onto the air that is located under the earth; for when this latter moves, the earth, which rides upon it, is shaken too. Living beings were born at the beginning in what was moist, and after this from one another; and males are born when the seed, having been separated out from the parts on the right, becomes fastened onto the parts of the womb on the right, females when the opposite occurs.

Epistemology (D5–D8)

D5 (B21) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

Anaxagoras, the natural philosopher *par excellence*, reproaches the senses with their weakness, saying, “**because of their feebleness, we are not able to dis-**

¹ ἀμυνρότητος Ritter

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

οὐ δυνατοί ἐσμεν κρίνειν τὰληθές,” τίθησί τε πίστιν αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπιστίας τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν τῶν χρωμάτων ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ δύο λάβοιμεν χρώματα, μέλαν καὶ λευκόν, εἴτα ἐκ θατέρου εἰς θάτερον κατὰ σταγόνα παρεκχέοιμεν, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ ὄψις διακρίνειν τὰς παρὰ μικρὸν μεταβολὰς καίπερ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποκειμένας.

D6 (< B21a) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.140

ὄψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα.

D7

a (< A97) Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh. Hyp.* 1. 33

[. . .] ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ¹ λευκὴν εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ἀντετίθει, ὅτι ἡ χιών ὕδωρ ἐστὶ πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐστὶ μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιών ἄρα μέλαινα ἐστίν.

¹ τῷ <κατασκευάζονται> Mutschmann

b (A98) Schol. A in *Il.* 16.161

μέλαν ὕδωρ] Ἀναξαγόρας ἐπεὶ φύσει μέλαν· καὶ γοῦν ὁ καπνὸς μέλας ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος τῶν ξύλων ἀνιέμενος.

D8 (< A96) Aët. 4.9.1 (Stob.) [εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ αἰσθήσεις]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ψευδεῖς εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

ANAXAGORAS

tinguish what is true,” and cites as proof of their untrustworthiness the gradual change of colors. For if we took two colors, black and white, and we poured drop by drop the one into the other, our sight would not be able to distinguish the gradual changes, although they exist in the nature of things.

D6 (< B21a) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

Appearances: vision of things that are invisible.

D7

a (< A97) Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*

[. . .] Anaxagoras opposed to snow being white [scil. the argument] that snow is frozen water, that water is black, and hence that snow is black.

b (A98) Scholia on Homer's *Iliad*

“black water”: Anaxagoras, since it is by nature black: indeed, smoke is black because it ascends from the water present in logs.¹

¹ It is uncertain whether the last part of the sentence belongs to Anaxagoras.

D8 (< A96) Aëtius

Anaxagoras [. . .]: sensations are deceptive.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

*From the Opening of Anaxagoras' Book: Principles
and the Primordial State of the World (D9–D14)*

D9 (B1) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 155.26–30 [διὰ τοῦ πρώτου
τῶν Φυσικῶν λέγων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς]

ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ
σμικρότητα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ
πάντων ὁμοῦ ἑόντων οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον¹ ἦν ὑπὸ σμι-
κρότητος· πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ κατεῖχεν
ἀμφοτέρα ἄπειρα ἑόντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν
ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει.²

¹ ἔνδηλον EF: εὔδηλον D
Anaxag. Sider

² ταῦτα . . . μεγέθει abiudic.

D10 (B2) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 155.31–156.1 [μετ' ὀλί-
γον]

καὶ γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ ἀποκρίνονται ἀπὸ τοῦ
πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος, καὶ τό γε περιέχον ἄπειρόν
ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος.

D11 (A70) Theophr. *Sens.* 59

τὸ μὲν μανὸν καὶ λεπτὸν θερμόν, τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν καὶ
παχὺ ψυχρόν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας διαιρεῖ τὸν ἀέρα
καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα.

ANAXAGORAS

*From the Opening of Anaxagoras' Book: Principles
and the Primordial State of the World (D9–14)*

D9 (B1) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*
[“through Book 1 of his *Physics*, saying at the beginning”]

All things were together, unlimited both in quantity and in smallness; for what was small too was unlimited. And as all things were together, nothing was manifest on account of the smallness. For air (*aêr*) and aether (*aithêr*), both of them being unlimited, covered them all. For these are the greatest things present in the totality of things, both in quantity and in magnitude.

D10 (B2) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*
[“shortly after” **D9**]

For both the air and the aether separate out from the surrounding mass, and what surrounds is itself unlimited in quantity.

D11 (A70) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

What is rarefied and thin is warm, what is dense and thick is cold, as Anaxagoras distinguishes air and aether.

D12 (< B4) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 34.21–26 (et al.)

πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι ταῦτα¹ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲ χροίη ἐνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία· ἀπεκώλυνε γὰρ ἡ σύμμιξις ἀπάντων χρημάτων, τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ, καὶ γῆς² πολλῆς ἐνεούσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλήθος³ οὐδὲν ἐοικότων ἀλλήλοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔοικε τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ.⁴ τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐν τῷ σύμπαντι χρῆ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι⁵ πάντα χρήματα.

¹ ταῦτα om. Simpl. p. 156.4, del. Sider: πάντα Wendt

² γῆς Simpl. p. 156.7: τῆς mss. ³ πλήθους mss., corr. Schorn ⁴ οὐδὲ . . . τῷ ἐτέρῳ hab. Simpl. p. 156.8, om. Simpl. p. 34.25, post ἐτέρῳ lac. susp. Sider ⁵ εἶναι mss., corr. Bessarion

D13 (< B4) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 34.29–35.9 (et al.) [μετ' ὀλίγα τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ φύσεως p. 34.25–26, μετ' ὀλίγα p. 156.1]

τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων χρῆ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι¹ πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ ἀνθρώπους γε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν εἶναι καὶ πόλεις συνωκημένους² καὶ ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ

D12 (< B4) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* [probably shortly after **D10**, perhaps after **D13**]

Before these things [i.e. probably air and aether] **separated out, all things being together, there was not any manifest color either; for it was prevented by the mixture of all things, of the moist and the dry, of the warm and the cold, of the bright and the dim, with much earth present within, and seeds unlimited in quantity not at all resembling one another. For none of the other things either was similar to each other. These things being so, one must think that all things are present in the totality of the whole.**

D13 (< B4) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* ["shortly after the beginning of the first book *On Nature*"; "shortly after" **D10**, probably shortly after **D12**¹]

These things being so, one must think that many things and of all kinds are present in all the aggregates and [or: i.e.] seeds of all things, possessing all kinds of shapes, colors, and flavors; and that in particular human beings were formed [literally: solidified] as well as all the other animated beings (*zôa*) that possess life (*psukhê*); and that these human beings possess inhabited cities and cultivated fields, just as among us, and that they have a sun and a

¹ The last sentence of **D12** is almost identical with the first sentence of **D13**.

¹ ἔν εἶναι mss., corr. Diels

² συννημμένας Simpl. p. 157.12

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἡέλιόν τε αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,
ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύτειν πολλά
τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνήιστα³ συνενεικάμε-
νοι εἰς τὴν οἴκησιν χρώνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μοι
λέλεκται περὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσιος, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἡμῖν
μόνον ἀποκριθείη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλη.

³ τὰ ὀνήιστα Simpl. p. 157.15, alia leviter discrepantia p. 35.7

D14 (B9) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 35.14–18 [μετ' ὀλίγον]

[. . .] οὕτω τούτων περιχωρούντων τε καὶ ἀποκρινο-
μένων ὑπὸ βίης τε καὶ ταχυτήτος· βίην δὲ ἢ ταχυ-
τῆς ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ ταχυτῆς αὐτῶν οὐδενὶ ἔοικε χρήματι
τὴν ταχυτήτα τῶν νῦν ἐόντων χρημάτων ἐν ἀνθρώ-
ποις, ἀλλὰ πάντως πολλαπλασίως ταχύ ἐστι.

Nothing Comes from Nothing (D15–21)

D15 (B17) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 163.20–24 [ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ
τῶν Φυσικῶν]

τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζου-
σιν οἱ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρήμα γίνεται οὐδὲ
ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγε-
ταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν
τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι
διακρίνεσθαι.

moon and the other [scil. heavenly bodies], **just as among us, and that the earth produces for them many things and of all kinds, of which they gather the most useful ones into their household and make use of them. This then is what I had to say about the separation, that there will not have been separation among us alone, but elsewhere too.**²

² Some scholars think that Simplicius' quotation comprises two fragments, the first having a general bearing, the second (starting with "and that these human beings") bearing on other worlds than ours. But this passage may also refer to other regions of the world we inhabit.

D14 (B9) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* ["shortly after" **D13**]

[. . .] while these things revolve and separate out under the effect of the force and rapidity. As for the force, it is the rapidity that causes it, and their rapidity does not resemble anything, as far as rapidity is concerned, among the things that exist now among humans, but it is certainly many times more rapid.

Nothing Comes from Nothing (D15–D21)

D15 (B17) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* ["in the first book of the *Physics*"]

The Greeks do not conceive correctly either what it is to come to be or what it is to be destroyed. For no thing comes to be or is destroyed; but rather, out of things that are, there is mixing and separation. And so, to speak correctly, they would have to call coming to be 'mixing' and being destroyed 'separating.'

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D16 (B5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 156.10–12

τούτων δὲ οὕτω διακεκριμένων γινώσκειν χρή ὅτι
τὰ¹ πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πλείω. οὐ γὰρ
ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλείω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα αἰεί.

¹ τὰ DE, om. F

D17 (< A50) Arist. *Phys.* 3.5 205b 1–5

Ἀναξαγόρας [. . . = **R20**] στηρίζει γὰρ αὐτὸ αὐτό
φησι τὸ ἀπειρον· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄλλο γὰρ
οὐδὲν περιέχειν) [. . .].

D18 (< A43) Arist. *Metaph.* A3 984a11–16

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ [. . . = **R8**] ἀπείρους εἶναί φησι τὰς
ἀρχάς· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα τὰ ὁμοιομερῇ καθάπερ
ὔδωρ ἢ πῦρ οὕτω γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι φησι, συγ-
κρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, ἄλλως δ' οὔτε γίνεσθαι
οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι ἀλλὰ διαμένειν αἶδια.

D19 (cf. A54) Aët. 1.17.2 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ μίξεως καὶ
κράσεως]

οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν [. . .] τὰς κράσεις κατὰ παράθε-
σιν.

ANAXAGORAS

D16 (B5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Since it is in this way that things have separated, one must recognize that all things [i.e. taken in their totality] **are neither less numerous nor more numerous (for it is not possible to be more numerous than all things), but rather the totality of things is always equal** [scil. in quantity].

D17 (< A50) Aristotle, *Physics*

For Anaxagoras [. . .] says that the unlimited maintains itself stable by itself,¹ and that this happens because it is in itself: for nothing else surrounds it [. . .].

¹ The expression “maintains itself stable by itself” might go back to Anaxagoras.

D18 (< A43) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Anaxagoras [. . .] says that the principles are unlimited [scil. in number]; for he says, does he not, that all the homeomers (like water and fire) come to be and are destroyed in this way, viz. by aggregation and separation alone, and that they neither come to be nor are destroyed in any other way, but remain, eternal.

D19 (cf. A54) Aëtius

Anaxagoras and his followers [. . .]: mixtures occur by juxtaposition.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D20 (< A52) Arist. *Phys.* 1.4 187a23–29

ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι ἐκκρίνουσι τὰλλα. Δια-
φέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τῷ [. . .] ποιεῖν [. . . cf. **EMP. D81**]
τὸν μὲν ἄπειρα τά τε ὁμοιομερῇ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, τὸν
δὲ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μόνον· ἔοικε δὲ Ἀναξα-
γόρας ἄπειρα οὕτως οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν
τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥς οὐ
γινομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος [. . .].

D21 (< B10) Schol. in Greg. Naz. *Orat.* 9, vol. 36,
p. 911B–C Migne

πῶς γὰρ ἂν, φησὶν, ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο¹ θρίξ, καὶ
σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός; οὐ μόνον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν χρωμάτων ταῦτα κατηγορεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεῖναι
τῷ λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν ἔλεγε, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν² τῷ μέλανι.
τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥοπῶν ἐτίθει, τῷ βαρεῖ τὸ κοῦφον
σύμμικτον εἶναι δοξάζων καὶ τοῦτο αὐθις ἐκείνῳ.

¹ γένοιτο Migne: γένηται mss.
τῷ λευκῷ cod. 216

² τὸ λευκόν cod. 484:

All Things Are in All Things (D22–D25)

D22 (B8) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 176.29 (οὐ . . . πελέκει)
et 175.12–14 (οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται . . . θερμῷ)

οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ
ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυ-
χροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ.

ANAXAGORAS

D20 (< A52) Aristotle, *Physics*

For these men too [i.e. Empedocles and Anaxagoras] say that all other things separate out from the mixture. But they differ from one another in that [. . .] for the one, these are the unlimited [scil. in number] homeomers and the contraries, while for the other [i.e. Empedocles] they are only what are called the elements. Anaxagoras seems to have thought that they are unlimited in this way because he accepted as true the common view of the natural philosophers that nothing can come to be out of what is not [. . .].

D21 (< B10) Scholia on Gregory of Nazianzus

How could it be possible, he says, that out of nonhair hair could ever come to be, and flesh out of nonflesh?¹ He made these assertions not only about bodies but also about colors. For he said that in black there is present white, and white in black. He posited the same thing about weights, supposing that the light is mixed with the heavy and inversely the latter with the former.

¹ Scholars disagree on whether or not this is a verbal citation.

All Things Are in All Things (D22–D25)

D22 (B8) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

The things that are in the one world order have not been separated from one another and they have not been chopped apart by an ax, neither the warm from the cold, nor the cold from the warm.

D23 (< B7) Simpl. *In Cael.*, p. 608.26

. . . ὥστε τῶν ἀποκρινομένων μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ πλῆθος
μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ.

D24 (B3) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 164.17–20

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστὶ τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’
ἐλασσον αἰεί· τὸ γὰρ ἐὼν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μῆ¹ οὐκ εἶναι.²
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου αἰεί ἐστὶ μείζον· καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ
τῷ σμικρῷ πλῆθος· πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ
μέγα καὶ σμικρόν.

¹ τὸ μῆ] τομῆ coniecit Zeller: τομῆ <μῆ> Jöhrens: τὸ del.
Kranz ² εἶναι <οὔτε τὸ μέγιστον> Schorn ex 166.16

D25 (B6) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 164.26–165.1

καὶ ὅτε δὴ¹ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ
σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα·
οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν
μετέχει· ὅτε <δὲ>² τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ
ἂν δύναίτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ’ ἂν³ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενέ-
σθαι, ἀλλ’ ὅπως περ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα
ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινο-
μένων ἴσα πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσιν.

¹ δὴ plerique mss.: δὲ EF ² <δὲ> ed. Ald.: <τε>
Deichgräber ³ οὐδ’ ἂν E: οὐ λίαν DF: οὐδ’ ἂν λίαν
ed. Ald.

ANAXAGORAS

D23 (< B7) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens*

. . . so that of the things that separate out one does not know the quantity either in theory (*logos*) or in deed.

D24 (B3) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

For there is not, of what is small, something that would be the smallest, but rather always something that is smaller: for it is not possible, for what is, not to be. But of what is large too there is always something larger. And it is equal to the small in quantity, but with reference to itself each thing is at the same time both large and small.

D25 (B6) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And since the portions of both the large and the small are equal in quantity, in this way too all things would be in every thing; and it is not possible to be apart, but all things possess a portion of every thing; and since it is not possible that something be the smallest, it would not be possible that there be separation or existence by itself [i.e. independent], but rather all things, just as at the beginning, so too now are together, and in all things there are also many of the things that are separating out, equal in quantity, both in the larger and in the smaller ones.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Mind (D26–D28)

D26 (B11) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 164.23–24

ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι
δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἔνι.

D27 (B12) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 164.24–25 (τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
. . . μέμικται οὐδενί) et 156.13–157.4 (νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν . . .
ἔστι καὶ ἦν) (et al.)

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει,¹ νοῦς δὲ ἔστιν
ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρή-
ματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ
ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεω ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν
ἂν² ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεω. ἐν παντὶ
γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
μοι λέλεκται [cf. **D25**, **D26**]. καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυνεν αὐτὸν
τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν
ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ
λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον,
καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἰσχει³ καὶ ἰσχύει
μέγιστον· καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ μείζω καὶ
ἐλάσσω,⁴ πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ· καὶ τῆς περιχωρή-
σιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχω-
ρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ⁵ σμικροῦ

¹ μέτεχει DE: ἔχει F ² μετεῖχεν ἂν ed Ald.: μετεῖχε
μὲν mss. ³ ἰσχει Simpl. 156.20: ἔχει 177.1

ANAXAGORAS

Mind (D26–D28)

D26 (B11), Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

In every thing there is a portion of every thing except of mind,¹ but there are things in which mind too is present.

¹ Or: “in every thing except mind there is a portion of every thing.”

D27 (B12) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

The other things possess a portion of every thing, but mind is unlimited and master of itself, it has not been mixed with any thing, but is the only one to be itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with some other thing, it would participate in all things, if it had been mixed with any; for in every thing is present a part of every thing, as I said earlier. And the things that would be mixed with it would prevent it from having control over any thing in the same way as it does being alone by itself. For it is at the same time both the thinnest of all things and the purest, and in particular it retains the full decision [or: understanding] concerning every thing and possesses the greatest power; and of the things that have life, whether they are larger or smaller, of these mind is master; and mind has been master of the whole rotation, so that there would be rotation at the beginning. And the rotation began at

⁴ μείζω καὶ ἐλάσσω 156.21: τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω 177.2

⁵ τοῦ mss.: του Diels

ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἔπειτέ⁶ πλείον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμिशγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὅποια ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὅποια ἦν ἄσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα⁷ νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται,⁸ πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην, ἣν νῦν περιχωρεῖ τά τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀῆρ καὶ ὁ αἰθήρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πνικνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὁμοίος ἔστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὁμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτῳ⁹ πλείστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔστι καὶ ἦν.

⁶ ἔπειτε Ritter: ἐπεὶ δὲ mss. ⁷ ὅσα] ὅποια Sider

⁸ ἄσσα . . . ἔσται Diels: καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἔστι καὶ ὅποια ἔσται 156.26, καὶ ὅποια νῦν ἔστι καὶ ἔσται 165.33, ὅσα (ὅσσα I³H) νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅποια ἔσται 174.8, ἄσσα (ὅσσα H) νῦν μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὅποια ἔσται 177.5 ⁹ ἀλλ' ὅτῳ edd.: ἀλλ' ὅτῳ DE: ἄλλω τῷ F: ἀλλ' ὅτων Diels

D28 (B14) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 157.7–9

ὁ δὲ νοῦς †ὅσα ἐστί τε κάρτα†¹ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῷ πολλὰ περιέχοντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς προσκριθείσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις.²

first from the small, then it rotates more broadly, and it will continue to become even broader. And the things that mix as well as those that are detached and separate out—all these mind decided [or: knew]. And as things were going to be and as all things were that now are not, and as all things are now and as they will be, mind separated and ordered them all, as well as this rotation, which is being performed now by the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, the air, and the aether, which are separating out. And the rotation itself caused the detachment. And from the rarefied the dense separates out, from the cold the warm, from the dark the bright, and from the moist the dry. Numerous are the parts of numerous things; yet nothing is completely detached or separates out from one another, except mind. But all mind is similar, the larger and the smaller, and nothing else is similar to anything else, but that of which each thing contains the most, this is what each thing is and was most manifestly.

D28 (B14) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Mind †. . . † is now too where all the other things are as well, in the surrounding mass, in the things that have separated more (?) and in those that are separating.

¹ ὥς αἰεί ποτε, κάρτα coni. Diels: ὅσα ἐστί τε ἐκράτησε Sider, alii alia ² προσκριθείσι . . . ἀποκεκριμένοις mss.: ἀποκριθείσι . . . ἀποκρινομένοις Adam

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Cosmogony (D29–D32)

D29

a (A59* Lanza) Arist. *Phys.* 8.1 250b24–26

[...] φησὶν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ ἡρεμούντων τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, κίνησιν ἐμποιῆσαι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διακρίναι [... cf. EMP. D84a].

b (B13) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 300.31–301.1

καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.

D30 (B15) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 179.3–6 [μετ' ὀλίγα]

τὸ μὲν πυκνόν [. . .] καὶ <τὸ>¹ διερὸν καὶ τὸ² ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζοφερὸν ἐνθάδε συνεχώρησεν ἔνθα νῦν γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν³ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ αἰθέρος.

¹ <τὸ> Diels ² τὸ ΔW: om. cett.

³ <καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν> post θερμὸν Schorn

ANAXAGORAS

Cosmogony (D29–D32)

D29

a (\neq DK) Aristotle, *Physics*

[...] For he says that, when all things were together and at rest for an infinite time, mind introduced motion and separated them [...].

b (B13) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And when mind began to cause motion, there was separating out from all that was moving, and whatever mind moved, all this was separated. But the rotation of the things that were moving and separating resulted in the production of a much greater separating.

D30 (B15) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* ["shortly after" **D27**]

What is dense and what is moist and what is cold and what is dark came together to where earth [or: the earth] is now, while what is thin and what is warm and what is dry went outward to the farthest part of the aether.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D31 (B16) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 179.8–10 (ἀπὸ τουτέων . . . ψυχροῦ) et 155.21–23 (ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν . . . μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος) [ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν 155.21]

ἀπὸ τουτέων ἀποκρinoμένων συμπήγνυνται γῇ· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν ὕδωρ ἀποκρίνεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος γῇ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς γῆς λίθοι συμπήγνυνται¹ ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, οὗτοι δὲ ἐκχωρεύουσι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος.

¹ λίθοι συμπήγνυνται 179.10: λίθος συμπήγνυνται 155.22

D32 (< A67) Aët. 2.8.1 (Ps.-Plut.) [τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐγκλιθῆναι]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας μετὰ τὸ συστήναι τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐγκλιθῆναί πως τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἰς τὸ μεσημβρινὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος [. . . = **R30**].

Cosmology (D33–D52)
The World Order (D33–D35)

D33 (< A63) Aët. 2.1.2 (Stob.) [περὶ κόσμον]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] εἶνα τὸν κόσμον.

D34 (A64) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 154.29–31

[. . .] τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν λέγειν ἅπαξ γενόμενον τὸν

ANAXAGORAS

D31 (B16) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* ["in the first book of the *Physics*"]

Out of these things, as they separate out, earth solidifies: for from the clouds water separates out, and from the water earth; and from earth stones solidify by the effect of the cold, and these go farther outward than water.¹

¹ Probably referring to the distance of the heavenly bodies.

D32 (< A67) Aëtius

[. . .] Anaxagoras: after the world had been formed and animals had come out of the earth, the world inclined somehow on its own toward its southern part [. . .].

Cosmology (D33–D52)
The World Order (D33–D35)

D33 (< A63) Aëtius

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: there is [scil. only] one world.

D34 (A64) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] Anaxagoras says that the world, once it has come

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος διαμένειν λοιπὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ
ἐφ'εστῶτος διοικούμενόν τε καὶ διακρινόμενον [. . .].

D35

a (< A65) Aët. 2.4.6 (Stob.) [εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] φθαρτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

b (≠ DK) Alex. *In Phys.* 539 ad 8.1 250b18, p. 487 Rashed

ἓνα κόσμον γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν¹ ἐξ ἡσυχίας [. . .].

¹φθαρτὸν] ἄφθαρτον Rashed

Astronomy (D36–D52)

Aether (D36–D37)

D36 (A71) Aët. 2.13.3 (Stob.) [τίς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἄστρον,
πλανητῶν καὶ ἀπλανῶν]

Ἀναξαγόρας τὸν περικείμενον αἰθέρα πύρινον μὲν εἶ-
ναι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τῇ δὲ εὐτονία τῆς περιδινησεως
ἀναρπάσαντα πέτρους ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ καταφλέ-
ξαντα τούτους ἡσπερωκέναι.

D37

a (A73* Lanza) Arist. *Meteor.* 1.3 339b21–24

[. . .] ὁ γὰρ λεγόμενος αἰθὴρ παλαιὰν εἴληφε τὴν
προσηγορίαν, ἣν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν τῷ πυρὶ ταῦτὸν

ANAXAGORAS

about out of the mixture, continues thereafter to be administered and to separate by the controlling mind [. . .].

D35

a (< A65) Aëtius

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: the world is destructible.

b (≠ DK) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Scholia on Aristotle's *Physics*

one world, generated and destructible, coming from inactivity [. . .].

Astronomy (D36–D52)
Aether (D36–D37)

D36 (A71) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: the surrounding aether is of fire according to its substance and, having snatched up stones from the earth by the vigor of its rotation and having ignited them, it has turned them into heavenly bodies.

D37

a (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Meteorology*

[. . .] for what is called ‘aether’ received in ancient times its name, which Anaxagoras, I believe, thought meant the

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἡγήσασθαι μοι δοκεῖ σημαίνειν· τά τε γὰρ ἄνω
πλήρη πυρὸς εἶναι κακείνους¹ τὴν ἐκεῖ δύναμιν αἰθέρα
καλεῖν ἐνόμισεν [. . .].

¹ κακείνος mss., corr. Thurot

b (A73) Arist. *Cael.* 1.3 270b24

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ καταχρῆται τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ οὐ κα-
λῶς· ὀνομάζει γὰρ αἰθέρα ἀντὶ πυρός.

c (A73) Simpl. *In Cael.*, p. 119.2–4

αἰτιάται δὲ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν οὐ καλῶς ἐτυμολογή-
σαντα τὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵθειν, ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ
καίειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς αὐτῷ χρώμενον.

Sun and Moon (D38–D45)

D38 (< A18) Plut. *Nic.* 23

ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν τε¹ πάντων καὶ θαρρα-
λεώτατον περὶ σελήνης καταυγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λό-
γον εἰς γραφὴν καταθέμενος Ἀναξαγόρας [. . . cf.
P25b].

¹ γε mss., corr. Reiske

ANAXAGORAS

same thing as ‘fire.’ For he considered that the upper regions are full of fire and that they [i.e. the ancients] had called the property (*dunamis*) that is found there ‘aether’ [. . .].

b (A73) Aristotle, *On the Heavens*

Anaxagoras uses this word [i.e. ‘aether’] incorrectly; for he says ‘aether’ instead of ‘fire.’¹

¹ For Aristotle, aether is the element that ‘continually runs’ (*aei thein*) and not the one that ‘burns’ (*aithein*).

c (A73) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens*

He accuses Anaxagoras of mistakenly deriving the word ‘aither’ from *aithein*, that is, ‘to burn,’ and using it for this reason for ‘fire.’

Sun and Moon (D38–D45)

D38 (< A18) Plutarch, *Nicias*

Anaxagoras, the first person to have put into writing the clearest and boldest explanation of all concerning the illuminations and darkenings of the moon [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D39 (< A75) Procl. *In Tim.* 4 ad 38d (vol. 3, p. 63.26–30 Diehl)

[. . .] καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτης ἦρξεν αὐτὸς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλ' Ἀναξαγόρας τοῦτο πρῶτος ὑπέλαβεν, ὡς ἱστορήσεν Εὐδήμος [Frag. 147 Wehrli].

D40 (B18) Plut. *Fac. orb. lun.* 16 929B

ἥλιος ἐντίθησι τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ λαμπρόν.

D41 (A76) Plat. *Crat.* 409a–b

[. . .] ὁ ἐκεῖνος νεωστὶ ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχει τὸ φῶς [. . .]. νέον δέ που καὶ ἔνον αἰεὶ ἐστι περὶ τὴν σελήνην τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι λέγουσι· κύκλῳ γάρ που αἰεὶ αὐτὴν περιῶν νέον αἰεὶ ἐπιβάλλει, ἔνον δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ τοῦ προτέρου μηνός.

D42 (< A77) Aët. 2.25.9 (Ps.-Plut., Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας σελήνης]

Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] στερέωμα διάπυρον ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ πεδία καὶ ὄρη καὶ φάραγγας.

D43 (A77) Schol. in Apoll. Rhod. 1.498

τὴν δὲ σελήνην ὁ αὐτὸς Ἀναξαγόρας χώραν πλατεῖαν ἀποφαίνει,¹ ἐξ ἧς δοκεῖ ὁ Νεμεαῖος λέων πεπτωκέναι.

ANAXAGORAS

D39 (< A75) Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*

[. . .] but he [i.e. Plato] was not the originator of this doctrine [scil. the 'conjunctive introduction' of the sun and moon in the world] either: Anaxagoras was the first person to have thought of this, as Eudemus has reported.

D40 (B18) Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon*

The sun puts brightness into the moon.

D41 (A76) Plato, *Cratylus*

[. . .] what that man [i.e. Anaxagoras] recently said, viz. that the moon receives its light from the sun [. . .]. And this light in the case of the moon is always in some way both new (*neon*) and old (*henon*), if what the Anaxagoreans say is true; for since it [i.e. the sun] is always going around it in a circle, it always casts a new [scil. light] upon it, while the one [scil. the light] of the previous month is old.¹

¹ It is uncertain whether the latter point goes back to Anaxagoras himself.

D42 (< A77) Aëtius

Anaxagoras [. . .]: [scil. the moon is] a fiery solid possessing in itself plains, mountains, and precipices.

D43 (A77) Scholia on Apollonius Rhodius

The same Anaxagoras declares that the moon is a flat place, from which he [or: one] thinks that the Nemean lion fell.

¹ ἀποφαίνει Meineke: ἀποφαίνεται L: ἔφη P

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D44 (< A77) Aët. 2.30.2 (Stob.) [περὶ ἐμφάσεως αὐτῆς καὶ διὰ τί γεῶδες φαίνεται]

Ἀναξαγόρας ἀνωμαλότητα συγκρίματος διὰ τὸ ψυχρομιγῆς ἅμα καὶ γεῶδες, τὰ μὲν ἐχούσης ὑψηλὰ τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ τὰ δὲ κοῖλα [. . .].

D45 (A77) Aët. 2.29.6, 7 (Stob.) [περὶ ἐκλείψεως σελήνης]

a

[6] [. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] τὰς μὲν μηνιαίους ἀποκρύψεις συνοδεύουσαν αὐτὴν ἡλίῳ καὶ περιλαμπομένην ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δ' ἐκλείψεις εἰς τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς ἐμπίπτουσιν, μεταξὺ μὲν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀστέρων γενομένης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἀντιφραττομένης.

b

[7] Ἀναξαγόρας, ὥς φησι Θεόφραστος [Frag. 236 FSH&G], καὶ τῶν ὑποκάτω τῆς σελήνης ἔσθ' ὅτε σωμάτων ἐπιπροσθούντων.

Other Heavenly Bodies (D46–D49)

D46 (< A12) Plut. *Lys.* 12

[. . . = **P7**] εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἕκαστον οὐκ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε χώρα· λιθώδη γὰρ ὄντα καὶ βαρέα λάμπειν μὲν ἀντερείσει καὶ περικλάσει τοῦ αἰθέρος, ἔλκεσθαι

ANAXAGORAS

D44 (< A77) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: [scil. the reason the moon has the same appearance as the earth is] the irregularity of its aggregate, because it is mixed with cold and at the same time is earthy, itself having some places that are high, others low, and others hollow [. . .].¹

¹ The continuation of this notice is almost identical with the entry on Parmenides in this same chapter (= **PARM. D31**); its presence in the entry on Anaxagoras is probably due to an error.

D45 (< A77) Aëtius

a

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: [scil. the moon] disappears every month because it follows the sun's path and is illuminated [scil. by it], and it undergoes eclipses because it falls into the shadow of the earth when this latter comes between the two heavenly bodies, or rather when the moon is occulted [scil. by the earth].

b

Anaxagoras, as Theophrastus says, [scil. says that eclipses occur] also when it happens that the bodies that are below the moon are sometimes interposed.

Other Heavenly Bodies (D46–D49)

D46 (< A12) Plutarch, *Lysander*

[. . .] Each of the heavenly bodies is not in its natural place. For, being made of stone and heavy, they shine because of the resistance and refraction (*periklasis*) of the aether, but

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

δὲ ὑπὸ βίας σφινγγόμενα δίνη καὶ τόνῳ τῆς περιφο-
ρᾶς, ὥς που καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκρατήθη μὴ πεσεῖν δεῦρο
τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ βαρέων ἀποκρινομένων τοῦ παντός
[...].

D47 (< A78) Aët. 2.16.1 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀστέ-
ρων φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως]

Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ἀπ' ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς φέρεσθαι
πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας.

D48 (< A79) Ach. Tat. *Introd. Arat.* 1.13

τοὺς ἀστέρας δὲ ζῶα εἶναι οὔτε Ἀναξαγόρα οὔτε [. . .
cf. **ATOM. D90**] δοκεῖ.

D49 (< A80) Arist. *Meteor.* 1.8 345a25–31

οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ [. . . cf. **ATOM. D97**] φῶς
εἶναι τὸ γάλα λέγουσιν ἄστρον τινῶν· τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον
ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν φερόμενον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἔνια τῶν ἄστρον.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν περιορᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τούτων μὲν οὐ
φαίνεσθαι τὸ φῶς (κωλύεσθαι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου
ἀκτίνων)· ὅσοις δ' ἀντιφράττει ἡ γῆ ὥστε μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὸ τούτων οἰκείον φῶς εἶναι φασὶ τὸ
γάλα.

Comets and Meteors (D50–D52)

D50 (< A81) Arist. *Meteor.* 1.6 342b27–29

Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν καὶ [. . . cf. **ATOM. D99**] φασιν

ANAXAGORAS

they are dragged along by force, bound by the vortex and the tension of the revolution, just as at the beginning they were dominated so that they did not fall here when the cold and heavy things were being detached from the whole [. . .].

D47 (< A78) Aëtius

Anaxagoras [. . .]: all the heavenly bodies move from east to west.

D48 (A79) Achilles Tatius, *Introduction to Aratus' Phaenomena*

Neither Anaxagoras nor [. . .] thinks that the heavenly bodies are living beings.

D49 (< A80) Aristotle, *Meteorology*

The followers of Anaxagoras and [. . .] say that the Milky Way is the light of certain heavenly bodies; for the sun, when it moves under the earth, does not see certain heavenly bodies. The light of the ones it sees is not visible (for this is prevented by the sun's rays); but the light belonging to those in front of which the earth is interposed in such a way that the sun does not see them is, they say, the Milky Way.

Comets and Meteors (D50–D52)

D50 (< A81) Aristotle, *Meteorology*

Anaxagoras and [. . .] say that comets are the conjunctive

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

εἶναι τοὺς κομήτας σύμφασιν τῶν πλανήτων ἀστέρων,
ὅταν διὰ τὸ πλησίον ἐλθεῖν δόξωσι θιγγάνειν ἀλ-
λήλων.

D51 (A83) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 7.5.3

Charmander quoque in eo libro, quem de cometis com-
posuit, ait Anaxagorae visum grande insolitumque caelo
lumen magnitudine amplae trabis, et id per multos dies
fulsisse.

D52 (A82) Aët. 3.2.9 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ κομητῶν καὶ
διαττόντων καὶ δοκίδων]

Ἀναξαγόρας τοὺς καλουμένους διάττοντας ἀπὸ τοῦ
αἰθέρος σπινθήρων δίκην καταφέρεισθαι διὸ καὶ παρ-
αυτίκα σβέννυσθαι.¹

¹ σβέννυσθαι m: κατασβέννυσθαι ΜΠ

Meteorology (D53–D57)
Thunder, Lightning, and Related
Phenomena (D53)

D53

a (A84) Arist. *Meteor.* 2.9 369b11–19

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τοῦ ἄνωθεν αἰθέρος, ὃ δὴ ἐκεῖνος κα-
λεῖ πῦρ, κατενεχθὲν ἄνωθεν κάτω. τὴν μὲν οὖν διά-
λαμψιν ἀστραπὴν εἶναι τὴν τούτου τοῦ πυρός, τὸν δὲ

ANAXAGORAS

shining of the planets when, by coming close together, they seem to touch one another.

D51 (A83) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

Charmander too, in the book he wrote about comets, says that Anaxagoras saw in the sky a large and unusual light, of the size of a large plank, and that it shined brightly for many days.

D52 (A82) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: the so-called shooting stars descend from the aether like sparks, and that is why they are extinguished at once.

Meteorology (D53–D57)
Thunder, Lightning, and Related
Phenomena (D53)

D53

a (A84) Aristotle, *Meteorology*

Anaxagoras [scil. says that the fire that is found in the clouds comes] from the higher aether, which he calls ‘fire,’ descended from above downward. The flash of this fire,

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ψόφον ἐναποσβεννυμένου καὶ τὴν σίξιν βροντὴν, ὡς καθάπερ φαίνεται καὶ γιγνόμενον οὕτως, καὶ πρότερον τὴν ἀστραπὴν οὖσαν τῆς βροντῆς.

b (A84) Aët. 3.3.4 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν πρηστήρων τε καὶ τυφῶνων]

ὅταν τὸ θερμὸν εἰς τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμπέσῃ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αἰθέριον μέρος εἰς ἀερῶδες), τῷ μὲν ψόφῳ τὴν βροντὴν ἀποτελεῖ, τῷ δὲ παρὰ τὴν μελανίαν τοῦ νεφώδους χρώματι τὴν ἀστραπὴν, τῷ δὲ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει τοῦ φωτὸς τὸν κεραυνόν, τῷ δὲ πολυσωματωτέρῳ πυρὶ τὸν τυφῶνα, τῷ δὲ νεφελομιγεί¹ τὸν πρηστήρα.

¹ νεφελομιγεί m: νεφελοειδεῖ ΜΠ

Clouds, Snow, and Hail (D54)

D54

a (A85) Arist. *Meteor.* 1.12 348a14–20

τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ τοῦ πάθους αἴτιον εἶναι τούτου καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, ὅταν ἀπωσθῇ τὸ νέφος εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον μᾶλλον ὄντα ψυχρὸν διὰ τὸ λήγειν ἐκεῖ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνακλάσεις, ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκεῖ πῆγνυσθαι τὸ ὕδωρ· διὸ καὶ θέρους μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλεσιναῖς χώραις γίγνεσθαι τὰς χαλάζας, ὅτι ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ θερμὸν ἀνωθεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τὰς νεφέλας.

ANAXAGORAS

then, is lightning, the noise and the hissing when it is extinguished inside is thunder—on the idea that this happens just as it appears—and that lightning precedes thunder.

b (A84) Aëtius

When what is warm falls onto what is cold (that is, the part of aether onto the part of air), this produces thunder by its noise, lightning by its color in contrast against the blackness of the cloud, the thunderbolt by the quantity and size of the light, the whirlwind by fire containing a much more abundant bodily mass, and the lightning storm (*prêstêr*) by the mixture of the cloudy matter.

See also **D63**

Clouds, Snow, and Hail (D54)

D54

a (A85) Aristotle, *Meteorology*

Some people¹ think that the cause of this phenomenon [i.e. hail] and of its formation is that a cloud is repelled toward the higher region, which is colder because the reflections of the rays coming from the earth stop there, and the water that arrives there solidifies. That is why hailstorms occur more during the summer and in torrid areas, because the heat pushes the clouds up all the higher away from the earth.

¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias names Anaxagoras in his commentary on this passage (p. 49.13).

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

b (A85) Aët. 3.4.2 (Stob.) [περὶ νεφῶν ὁμίχλης ὑετῶν δρόσου χιόνος πάχνης χαλάζης]

Ἀναξαγόρας νέφη μὲν καὶ χιόνα παραπλησίως· χάλαζαν δ' ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν παγέντων νεφῶν προωσθῇ τινα πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ἃ δὴ¹ ταῖς καταφοραῖς ἀποψυχρούμενα στρογγυλοῦται.

¹ ἃ δὴ Usener: ἤδη mss.

Rainbows and Related Phenomena (D55–D56)

D55 (B19) Schol. BT in *Il.* 17.547

Ἴριν δὲ καλέομεν τὸ ἐν τῇσι νεφέλῃσι ἀντιλάμπον τῷ ἡλίῳ. χειμῶνος οὖν ἐστὶ σύμβολον· τὸ γὰρ περιχεόμενον¹ ὕδωρ τῷ νέφει ἄνεμον ἐποίησεν ἢ ἐξέχεεν ὄμβρον.²

¹ περιεχόμενον Solmsen

² χειμῶνος . . . ὄμβρον abiudic. Anaxag. Jöhrens

D56 (A86) Aët. 3.5.11 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ ἱριδος]

Ἀναξαγόρας ἀνάκλασιν ἀπὸ νέφους πυκνοῦ τῆς ἡλιακῆς περιφεγγείας, καταντικρὺ δὲ τοῦ κατοπτρίζοντος αὐτὴν¹ ἀστέρος διὰ παντὸς ἴστασθαι. παραπλησίως δὲ αἰτιολογεῖται² τὰ καλούμενα παρήλια, γινόμενα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Πόντον.

¹ αὐτὴν Mm: αὐτὸν Π: αὐτὸ Reiske

² αἰτιολογεῖται Mm: φυσιολογεῖται Π

ANAXAGORAS

b (A85) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: clouds and snow [scil. occur] in the same way [scil. as Anaximenes says, cf. **ANAXIMEN. D21**], and hail [scil. occurs] when some [scil. drops of water] are expelled from solidified clouds toward the earth and become spherical when they cool down during their descent.

Rainbows and Related Phenomena (D55–D56)

D55 (B19) Scholia on Homer's *Iliad*

We call 'iris' [i.e. the rainbow] what shines in return in the clouds facing the sun. Therefore it is a sign of a storm: for the water pouring around the cloud causes wind or pours out rain.¹

¹ Some scholars assign only the first sentence to Anaxagoras.

D56 (A86) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: [scil. the rainbow is] the reflection of the radiance of the sun by a dense cloud, and it is always located exactly opposite to the heavenly body that shows it as in a mirror. It is in the same way that he explains the so-called 'parhelia' that occur in the region of the Black Sea.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Winds (D57)

D57 (< A86a) Schol. in Aesch. *Prom.* 88

οἱ ἄνεμοι κατὰ μὲν Ἀναξαγόραν ἐκ τῆς γῆς γίνονται
[...].

The Earth (D58–D67)

The Earth Rests Upon Air (D58–D61)

D58 (< 13 A20, A88* Lanza) Arist. *Cael.* 2.13 294b13–23

[. . . cf. **ANAXIMEN. D19**] καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ [. . . cf. **ATOM. D110**] τὸ πλάτος αἷτιον εἶναί φασι τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωμάζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν, ὅπερ φαίνεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνέμους ἔχει δυσκινήτως διὰ τὴν ἀντέρεισιν. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ πλάτει φασὶ τὴν γῆν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ἀέρα, (τὸν δ' οὐκ ἔχοντα¹ μεταστῆναι τόπον ἱκανὸν² ἀθρόως³ κάτωθεν ἡρεμεῖν), ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κλειψύδραις ὕδωρ. ὅτι δὲ δύναται πολὺ βάρος φέρειν ἀπολαμβανόμενος καὶ μένων ὁ αἶρ, τεκμήρια πολλὰ λέγουσιν.

¹ ἔχοντα <τοῦ> Diels

² an τόπον ἱκανὸν μεταστῆναι?

³ τῷ post ἀθρόως utrum delendum an ante ἀθρόως ponendum dub. Moraux

D59 (< A68) Arist. *Cael.* 4.2 309a19–21

ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν τῶν μὴ φασκόντων εἶναι κενὸν οὐδὲν

ANAXAGORAS

Winds (D57)

D57 (< A86a) Scholia on Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*

The winds, according to Anaxagoras, come about from the earth [. . .].

The Earth (D58–D67)

The Earth Rests Upon Air (D58–D61)

D58 (< 13 A20) Aristotle, *On the Heavens*

[. . .] and Anaxagoras and [. . .] say that its [i.e. the earth's] flatness is the cause for its stationary position. For it does not cut the air beneath it but covers it like a lid, which is what one sees bodies possessing flatness to do; for winds have difficulty moving these bodies too, because of their resistance. And they say that it is in exactly the same way that the earth acts with regard to the air underlying it, because of its flatness, and that since it [i.e. the air] does not have sufficient room to move, it remains motionless below [scil. the earth] in a dense mass, just like the water in clepsydras. And for the fact that air that is enclosed and stationary can bear a great weight, they provide many proofs.

D59 (< A68) Aristotle, *On the Heavens*

Some of those people who deny the existence of the void

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

διώρισαν περὶ κούφου καὶ βαρέος, οἷον Ἀναξαγόρας
[. . .].

D60 (< A68) Arist. *Phys.* 4.6 213a22–27

οἱ μὲν οὖν δεικνύναι πειρώμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐχ ὁ
βούλονται λέγειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κενόν, τοῦτ' ἐξελέγχου-
σιν [. . .], ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρό-
πον ἐλέγχοντες. ἐπιδεικνύουσι γὰρ ὅτι ἔστι τι ὁ ἀήρ,
στρεβλοῦντες τοὺς ἀσκοὺς καὶ δεικνύντες ὡς ἰσχυρὸς
ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ ἐναπολαμβάνοντες ἐν ταῖς κλειψύδραις.

D61 (< A69) Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 16.8 914b9–15

τῶν περὶ τὴν κλειψύδραν συμβαινόντων τὸ μὲν ὅλον
ἔοικεν εἶναι αἷτιον καθάπερ Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει· ὁ γὰρ
ἀήρ ἐστὶν αἷτιος ἐναπολαμβανόμενος ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ μὴ
εἰσιέναι τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπιληφθέντος τοῦ αὐλοῦ¹ [. . . cf.
R22].

¹ ἄλλου mss., corr. Bussemaker

Earthquakes (D62–D63)

D62 (A89)

a Arist. *Meteor.* 2.7 365a19–25

Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν φησι τὸν αἰθέρα πεφυκότα φέ-
ρεσθαι ἄνω, ἐμπίπτοντα δ' εἰς τὰ κάτω τῆς γῆς καὶ
κοῖλα κινεῖν αὐτήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄνω συναληλείφθαι

ANAXAGORAS

did not define anything about what is light and heavy, like Anaxagoras [. . .].

D60 (< A68) Aristotle, *Physics*

Those people who try to prove that it [i.e. the void] does not exist do not refute what men mean by 'void' [. . .]; this is the case of Anaxagoras and of those people who refute in this way. For they demonstrate that air is something by twisting wineskins, showing that air is strong, and by enclosing it in clepsydras.

D61 (< A69) Ps.-Aristotle, *Problems*

For on the whole, the cause for what happens with the clepsydra seems to be what Anaxagoras says. For the air enclosed within it is the cause for the water's not penetrating when the tube is closed [. . .].

Earthquakes (D62–D63)

D62 (A89)

a Aristotle, *Meteorology*

Anaxagoras says that aether moves upward by nature and that, when it collides with the lower parts of the earth and its cavities, it shakes it: for the upper parts have been

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

διὰ τοὺς ὄμβρους (ἐπεὶ φύσει γε ἅπασαν ὁμοίως εἶναι
σομφήν), ὥς ὄντος τοῦ μὲν ἄνω τοῦ δὲ κάτω τῆς ὅλης
σφαίρας, καὶ ἄνω μὲν τούτου ὄντος τοῦ μορίου ἐφ' οὗ
τυγχάνομεν οἰκοῦντες, κάτω δὲ θατέρων.

b Aët. 3.15.4 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ σεισμῶν γῆς]

Ἀναξαγόρας ἀέρος ὑποδύσει τῇ μὲν πυκνότητι τῆς
ἐπιφανείας προσπίπτοντος, τῷ δ' ἔκκρισιν λαβεῖν μὴ
δύνασθαι τρόμφῳ τὸ περιέχον κραδαίνοντος.¹

¹ κραδαίνοντος Π: κραδαίνεσθαι Mm

D63 (A89) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 6.9.1

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .] existimat simili paene ex causa et
aëra concuti et terram, cum in¹ inferiore parte spiritus
crassum aëra et in nubes coactum eadem vi, qua² apud nos
quoque nubila frangi solent, rupit,³ et ignis ex hoc collisu
nubium cursuque elisi aëris emicuit, hic ipse in obvia
incurrit exitum quaerens, ac divellit repugnantia, donec
per angustum⁴ aut nactus est viam exeundi ad caelum aut
vi et iniuria fecit.

¹ in *Cam DEST*, om. *cett.*

² eadem vi qua *Fortunatus*:
eadem via qua *Zθπ*: cadere in aqua *AB*: eadem in aqua *V*

³ rumpit *mss.*, corr. *Gertz*

⁴ angustum *T*: -tam *AVθπ*:
-ta *B*: -tiam *Z*

ANAXAGORAS

clogged by the rains (since by nature at least it is all equally porous)—on the idea that there is a higher part and a lower one of the totality of the sphere and that the higher part is the one on which we happen to live, while the other is the lower one.

b Aëtius

Anaxagoras: [scil. earthquakes occur] because the air that has penetrated [scil. under the earth] collides with its dense surface and, not finding an exit, shakes what surrounds it with a tremor.

D63 (A89) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .] thinks that the earth is shaken for almost a similar reason as air is, when, in the lower part [i.e. under the earth], wind has broken a thick air condensed into clouds with the same force as, where we are, a cloudy formation too customarily breaks apart, and that the fire has flashed because of this collision of clouds and the expulsion of the air that is driven out, that this latter, seeking an exit, encounters obstacles and tears apart whatever opposes it, until, by a narrow passage, it either finds a way to escape to the sky or else creates one by force and violence.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Sea (D64–D65)

D64 (A90) Aët. 3.16.2 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ θαλάττης πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστὶ πικρά]

Ἀναξαγόρας τοῦ κατ' ἀρχὴν λιμνάζοντος ὕγροῦ περι-
καέντος ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ λεπτο-
τάτου¹ ἐξατμισθέντος εἰς ἀλυκίδα καὶ πικρίαν τὸ λοι-
πὸν ὑποστήναι.

¹ λιπαροῦ mss., corr. Gomperz, alii alia

D65 (A 90) Alex. In Meteor., p. 67.17–21

τρίτη δὲ δόξα περὶ θαλάσσης ἐστὶν ὡς ἄρα τὸ ὕδωρ
τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς διηθούμενον καὶ διαπλῦνον αὐτὴν ἀλ-
μυρὸν γίνεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν γῆν τοιούτους χυμοὺς ἐν
αὐτῇ· οὗ σημεῖον ἐποιοῦντο τὸ καὶ ἅλας ὀρύττεσθαι
ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ νίτρα· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὀξεῖς χυμοὺς πολλα-
χοῦ τῆς γῆς. ταύτης πάλιν τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο Ἀναξα-
γόρας [. . .].

The Flooding of the Nile (D66)

D66

a (A91) Aët. 4.1.3 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ Νείλου ἀναβάσεως]

Ἀναξαγόρας¹ ἐκ τῆς χιόνος τῆς ἐν τῇ Αἰθιοπία τηκο-
μένης μὲν τῷ θέρει, ψυχομένης δὲ τῷ χειμῶνι.

ANAXAGORAS

The Sea (D64–D65)

D64 (A90) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: when the stagnant water at the beginning was strongly heated by the sun's revolution and its thinnest part evaporated, the remaining residue became salty and bitter.

D65 (A90) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's Meteorology*

The third doctrine about the sea is that the water that filters through the earth and cleans it becomes brackish because the earth contains within itself these kinds of flavors; they have cited as evidence the extraction of salts and soda from it and the existence of acidic fluids in many places of the earth. Of this opinion in turn was Anaxagoras [. . .].

The Flooding of the Nile (D66)

D66

a (A91) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: [scil. the Nile floods] because of the snow in Ethiopia, which melts in the summer and becomes cold in the winter.

¹ Ἀναξιμένης m

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

b (A91) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 4a.2.17

Anaxagoras ait ex Aethiopiae iugis solutas nives ad Nilum usque decurrere.

c (A91* Lanza) Anon. Flor. *Inund. Nili* (cod. Laur. 56.1), p. 538 Landi

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ φυσικός φησι τῆς χιόνος τηκομένης τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν τοῦ Νείλου γίνεσθαι [. . .].

d (≠ DK) Tzetz. *In Il.* 1.427 (p. 188 Lasserre)

Ἀναξαγόρας πάλιν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου
καί τις ἀνὴρ Ἀρχέλαος [. . .]

[. . .] συντρέχουσιν Ὀμήρῳ·

[. . .]

ἐξ ὄμβρων καὶ χιόνος τε τῆς ἐν Αἰθιοπία
συντηκομένης λέγοντες κατάρδεσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον.

Stones (D67)

D67 (< A98a) Psell. *Lapid.* 26 (p. 119.105–7 Duffy)

τούτων δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς λίθοις δυνάμεων αἰτίας πολλοὶ ἐθάρρησαν ἀποδοῦναι, τῶν μὲν ἀρχαιοτέρων σοφῶν Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .].

ANAXAGORAS

b (A91) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

Anaxagoras says that melted snows flow down from the mountains of Ethiopia all the way to the Nile.

c (\neq DK) Anonymous, *On the Flooding of the Nile*

Anaxagoras the natural philosopher says that the flooding of the Nile occurs when the snow melts [. . .].

d (\neq DK) Tzetzes, *Commentary on Homer's Iliad*

Anaxagoras in turn with Democritus
and a certain Archelaus [. . .]

[. . .] they agree with Homer:

[. . .]

When they say that it is from rains and the snow

That melts in Ethiopia that the Nile is watered. [cf.

ATOM. D120; ARCH. D17; Hom. *Od.* 4.581]

Stones (D67)

D67 (< A98a) Psellus, *On the Powers of Stones*

Many people have ventured to explain the causes for these powers of stones: among the more ancient sages Anaxagoras [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Biology (D68–D95)

Zoogony (D68)

D68 (< A113) Iren. *Adv. haer.* 2.14.2

Anaxagoras autem [. . .] dogmatizavit facta animalia decidentibus e caelo in terram seminibus.

Soul (D69)

D69 (< A93) Aët. 4. 3. 2 (Stob.) [εἰ σῶμα ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἢ οὐσία αὐτῆς]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ἀερώδη.

Sensations (D70–D79)

General Principles (D70–D71)

D70 (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 27

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ γίνεσθαι μὲν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον ἀπαθὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. καθ' ἐκάστην δ' ἰδίᾳ πειρᾶται διαριθμεῖν [. . . = **D72**].

D71 (A93* Lanza) Aët. 4.9.6 (Stob., Ps.-Plut.) [εἰ ἀληθεὶς αἰ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας¹ [. . .] παρὰ τὰς συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων τὰς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι, τοῦ οὐκ οὐκ αἰσθητῶν ἐκάστου ἐκάστη ἐναρμόττοντος.²

ANAXAGORAS

Biology (D68–D95)

Zoogony (D68)

D68 (< A113) Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*

But Anaxagoras [. . .] maintained that animals were produced by seeds that fell from the sky onto the earth.

Soul (D69)

D69 (< A93) Aëtius

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: [scil. the soul is made] of air.

Sensations (D70–D79)

General Principles (D70–D71)

D70 (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

Anaxagoras [scil. says that sensations] occur by means of contraries: for what is similar is not affected by what is similar. He tries to go through each one [i.e. sense] separately [. . .].

D71 (≠ DK) Aëtius

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: particular sensations occur as a function of the adaptation of the passages, each of the appropriate perceptibles adjusting to each one of them.

¹ Ἀναξαγόρας non hab. Plut.
ἀναρμόττοντος Stob.: ἀρμόζοντος Plut.

² ἐναρμόττοντος Diels:

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Sight (D72)

D72 (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 27

[. . . = **D70**] ὁρᾶν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἐμφάσει τῆς κόρης, οὐκ ἐμφαίνεσθαι δὲ εἰς τὸ ὁμόχρων, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ διάφορον· καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς μεθ' ἡμέραν, ἐνίοις δὲ νύκτωρ εἶναι τὸ ἀλλόχρων, διοξνωπεῖν δέ¹ ἀπλῶς δὲ τὴν νύκτα μᾶλλον ὁμόχρων εἶναι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς. ἐμφαίνεσθαι δὲ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ὅτι τὸ φῶς συναίτιον τῆς ἐμφάσεως² τὴν δὲ χροᾶν τὴν κρατοῦσαν μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν ἐμφαίνεσθαι [. . . = **D73**].

¹ διοξνωπεῖν δὲ mss.: διὸ ὀξνωπεῖν τότε Schneider

² ἐπιφάσεως mss., corr. Schneider

Touch and Taste (D73)

D73 (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 28

[. . . = **D72**] τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἀφήν καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν κρίνειν· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίως θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμαίνειν οὔτε ψύχειν πλησιάζον οὐδὲ δῆ¹ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ δι' αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρὸν, τῷ δ' ἀλμυρῷ τὸ πότιμον, τῷ δ' ὀξεῖ τὸ γλυκὺ κατὰ τὴν ἑλλειψιν τὴν ἐκάστου· πάντα γὰρ ἐννύπρχειν ἐστὶν² ἐν ἡμῖν. [. . . = **D74**]

¹ δεῖ mss., corr. Stephanus

² ἐστὶν secl. Philippson: πάντη Usener: φησὶν Diels

ANAXAGORAS

Sight (D72)

D72 (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] For seeing is due to reflection in the pupil, but reflection does not occur in what is of the same color, but in what is different. And in most [scil. animals] it is by day, but in some at night, that the difference in color occurs and that their vision is keen. But in general it is rather the night that is of the same color as the eyes; reflection occurs by day because light is a concomitant cause of the reflection, and it is the dominant color that is reflected more in the other [. . .].

Touch and Taste (D73)

D73 (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] It is in the same way that touch and taste discern: for things that are hot or cold to the same degree do not heat or cool when they come near one another; and it is not by themselves that we know what is sweet or bitter either, but the cold by the hot, the drinkable by the brackish, the sweet by the bitter, as a function of what each one lacks; for it is possible that everything is present in us. [. . .]

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Smell and Hearing (D74–D77)

D74 (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 28

[. . . = **D73**] ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν τὸ μὲν ἅμα τῇ ἀναπνοῇ, τὸ δὲ τῷ διικνεῖσθαι τὸν ψόφον ἄχρι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον ὅστουν εἶναι κοῖλον, εἰς ὃ ἐμπίπτειν τὸν ψόφον. [. . . = **D79b**]

D75 (A106) Aët. 4.19.5 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ φωνῆς]

Ἀναξαγόρας τὴν φωνὴν γίνεσθαι πνεύματος ἀντιπεί-
σόντος μὲν στερεμνίῳ ἀέρι, τῇ δ' ὑποστροφῇ τῆς
πλήξεως μέχρι τῶν ἀκοῶν προσενεχθέντος· καθὼ καὶ
τὴν λεγομένην ἡχὴν γίνεσθαι.

D76 (A74) Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 11.33 903a7–10

διὰ τί εὐηκοωτέρα ἢ νύξ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐστίν; πότερον,
ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας φησί, διὰ τὸ τῆς μὲν ἡμέρας σί-
ζειν καὶ ψοφεῖν τὸν ἀέρα θερμαινόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ
ἡλίου, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν ἅτε ἐκλελοιπότες
τοῦ θερμοῦ [. . .];

D77 (A74) Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 8.3.3 722A

[. . .] τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου λέγοντα κινεῖ-
σθαι τὸν ἀέρα κίνησιν τρομώδη καὶ παλμούς ἔχου-
σαν, ὥς δηλόν ἐστι τοῖς διὰ τοῦ φωτὸς αἰεὶ διάττουσι
ψήγμασι μικροῖς καὶ θραύσμασιν, ἃ δὴ τινες τίλας

ANAXAGORAS

Smell and Hearing (D74–D77)

D74 (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] It is in the same way that smell and hearing occur, the former together with breathing, the latter by sound (*psophos*) penetrating to the brain, for the bone that surrounds it is hollow, and it is into this that sound falls. [. . .]

D75 (A106) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: sound (*phônê*) occurs when breath encounters compact air, and because of its recoil from the blow it is carried as far as the ears; it is in this way too that what is called the echo occurs.

D76 (A74) Ps.-Aristotle, *Problems*

Why is hearing easier at night than during the day? Is it, as Anaxagoras says, because during the day the air hisses and buzzes because it is heated by the sun, whereas at night it is quiet, since the heat has ceased [. . .]?

D77 (A74) Plutarch, *Table Talk*

[. . .] Anaxagoras, who says that the sun makes the air tremble and vibrate, as is clear from the bits of dust and the particles that are always flying through the light, and which some people call ‘motes.’ That man says that during

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

καλοῦσιν· ταῦτ' οὖν φησιν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸς τὴν θερμότητα σίζοντα καὶ ψοφούντα δι' ἡμέρας δυσηκόους τῷ ψόφῳ τὰς φωνὰς ποιεῖν, νυκτὸς δὲ †φαίνεσθαι†¹ τὸν σάλον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸν ἦχον.

¹ μαραίνεισθαι Bernardakis: ἀφανίζεσθαι Castiglioni: ἀφθίνεσθαι?

Relation between an Animal's Size and the Acuity of Its Perception (D78)

D78 (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 29–30

[. . . = **D79b**] [29] αἰσθητικώτερα δὲ τὰ μείζω ζῶα καὶ ἀπλῶς εἶναι κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν αἴσθησιν.¹ ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μεγάλους καὶ καθαρὸς καὶ λαμπροὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχει, μεγάλα τε καὶ πόρρωθεν ὁρᾶν, ὅσα δὲ μικροὺς, ἐναντίως. [30] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ μεγάλα τῶν μεγαλῶν καὶ τῶν πόρρωθεν ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἐλάττω λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ τῶν μικρῶν καὶ τῶν ἐγγύς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ὁμοίως· ὅξειν μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα, θερμαινόμενον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μανούμενον ὅξειν. ἀναπνέον δὲ τὸ μὲν μέγα ζῶον ἅμα τῷ μανῶ καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἔλκειν, τὸ δὲ μικρὸν αὐτὸ τὸ μανόν, διὸ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὀσμὴν ἐγγύς εἶναι μᾶλλον² ἢ πόρρω διὰ τὸ πυκνοτέραν³ εἶναι, σκεδαννυμένην δὲ ἀσθενῆ. σχεδὸν δὲ ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ μὲν μεγάλα τῆς λεπτῆς ἀέρος,⁴ τὰ δὲ μικρὰ τῆς πυκνῆς. [. . . = **R23**]

ANAXAGORAS

the day these things, hissing and buzzing because of the heat, make sounds hard to hear because of the noise, whereas at night their agitation and resonance †appear†.¹

¹ One expects a word like ‘disappear.’

Relation between an Animal's Size and the Acuity of Its Perception (D78)

D78 (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[29] The larger animals have better perception, and in general perception depends on size. For those that have large, clear, and bright eyes see large and distant objects, while the inverse is the case for those that have small ones. [30] The same applies to hearing. For large ones hear what is large and distant while they do not notice what is smaller, while small ones hear what is small and nearby. The same applies to smell. For thin air has a stronger odor, for it is when it is heated and becomes rarefied that it emits an odor. And when a large animal breathes it inhales the dense together with the rarefied, while a small one inhales just the rarefied; that is why large ones have a more intense perception. For it is because it is denser that a nearby odor is stronger than a distant one, while when it is dispersed it is weak. One could almost say that large animals do not perceive thin air, small ones dense air.

¹ αἰσθησιν <τῶν αἰσθητηρίων> Schneider
<ἰσχυράν> vel <κρῖναι> μάλλον coni. Diels
mss., corr. Camotius
² μάλλον
³ πυκνότερα
⁴ ἄερος ut glossema del. Diels: ὁσμῆς
Philippson

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Sensation Is Painful (D79)

D79

a (> A94) Arist. *EN* 7.15 1154b7–9

ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι¹
μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν,² τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυ-
πηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασιν.

¹ φυσιολόγοι Aspasius *In EN*, p. 156.13: φυσικοὶ K^b: φυσι-
κοὶ λόγοι cett. ² post ὁρᾶν add. καὶ M^b

b (< A92) Theophr. *Sens.* 29

[. . . = **D74**] ἅπασαν δ' αἰσθησιν μετὰ λύπης, ὅπερ ἂν
δόξειεν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι τῇ ὑποθέσει· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ
ἀνόμοιον ἀπτόμενον πόνον παρέχει. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο
τῷ τε τοῦ ὕπνου¹ πλήθει καὶ τῇ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπερ-
βολῇ. τά τε γὰρ λαμπρὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς ὑπερβάλ-
λοντας ψόφους λύπην ἐμποιεῖν καὶ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον
δύνασθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένειν. [. . . = **D78**]

¹ ὕπνου mss.: χρόνον Schneider

c (A94) Aët. 4.9.16 (Stob.) [εἰ ἀληθεὶς αἰ αἰσθήσεις]

Ἀναξαγόρας πᾶσαν αἰσθησιν μετὰ πόνον.

ANAXAGORAS

Sensation Is Painful (D79)

D79

a (> A94) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

A living being is always experiencing suffering, as is testified to by the natural philosophers, who say that seeing, hearing are painful; but we have now become accustomed to this, as they say.¹

¹ As is shown by **D79b** and **c** (and by Aspasius' commentary on this passage in Aristotle), Aristotle is generalizing here to all the natural philosophers a typically Anaxagorean doctrine.

b (< A92) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] Every sense perception is accompanied by pain, which would seem to correspond to the hypothesis: for everything that is dissimilar causes suffering when it comes into contact. This is clear both from the quantity of sleep and from the excess of perceptible objects: for bright colors and excessive sounds cause a pain and it is impossible to remain exposed for a long time to the same ones [scil. impressions of this sort].

c (A94) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: every sensation is accompanied by pain.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Humans and Animals (D80–D81)

D80 (< A102) Arist. *PA* 4.10 687a7–9

Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν φησι διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπον [. . .].

D81 (B21b) Plut. *Fort.* 3 98F

ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀτυχέστεροι τῶν θηρίων ἐσμέν· ἐμπειρία δὲ καὶ μνήμη καὶ σοφία καὶ τέχνη κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν †σφῶν τι†¹ αὐτῶν χρώμεθα καὶ βλέπτομεν καὶ ἀμέλγομεν καὶ φέρομεν² καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες [. . .].

¹ ἐρίῳ τε Bernardakis: <τῶ> τε σφῶν Fränkel, alii alia

² φέρομεν corrupt. videtur

Sleep and Death (D82)

D82 (A103) Aët. 5.25.2 (Ps.-Plut.; cf. Ps.-Gal.) [ποτέρου ἐστὶν ὕπνος καὶ θάνατος, ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος]

Ἀναξαγόρας κατὰ κόπον¹ τῆς σωματικῆς ἐνεργείας γίνεσθαι τὸν ὕπνον· σωματικὸν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάθος, οὐ ψυχικόν· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς θάνατον τὸν διαχωρισμόν.

¹ κατὰ κόπον Gal.: om. Plut.

ANAXAGORAS

Humans and Animals (D80–D81)

D80 (< A102) Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*

Anaxagoras says that the human being is the most intelligent of the animals because he has hands [. . .].

D81 (B21b) Plutarch, *On Fortune*

In all these regards [scil. relative to physical strength] we are less fortunate than the wild beasts, but, according to Anaxagoras, thanks to experience, memory, cleverness, and skill we make use of their †. . .†,¹ we collect their honey and take their milk, and, gathering them together, we drive (?) and lead them away [. . .].²

¹ Many conjectures have been suggested, e.g. “wool.”

² Diels considered the whole sentence beginning “thanks to experience” to be a verbal citation from Anaxagoras, but it is likelier to be a paraphrase.

Sleep and Death (D82)

D82 (A103) Aëtius

Anaxagoras: sleep occurs on account of fatigue caused by bodily activity, for it is a process belonging to the body, not to the soul. But complete separation is the death of the soul too.¹

¹ Starting from “not to the soul,” this is probably the doxographer’s commentary.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Respiration (D83)

D83 (A115) Arist. *Resp.* 2 470b30–471a2

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ καὶ Διογένης, πάντα φάσκοντες ἀναπνεῖν, περὶ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ὀστρέων λέγουσι τίνα τρόπον ἀναπνεύουσιν. καὶ φησιν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν, ὅταν ἀφῶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν βραγχίων, τὸν ἐν τῷ στόματι γινόμενον ἀέρα ἔλκοντας ἀναπνεῖν τοὺς ἰχθύς· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν οὐδέν. [. . . = **DIOG. D46**]

Reproduction (D84–D92)

Origin of the Semen (D84)

D84 (< A107; < 24 A13) Cens. *Die nat.* 5.3–4

sed hanc opinionem nonnulli refellunt, ut Anaxagoras [. . .]; hi enim post gregum¹ contentionem² non medullis modo, verum et adipe multaque carne mares exhauriri respondent [. . . = **D85**].

¹gregum *H*: graecam (gre- *V*) *C*: crebram *coni. Ald.*

²conventionem *Gruber*: coitionem *coni. Ald.*

Respective Contributions of the Father and the Mother (D85–D87)

D85 (< A107; < 24 A13) Cens. *Die nat.* 5.3–4

[. . . = **D84**] illud quoque ambiguum facit inter auctores opinionem, utrumne ex patris tantummodo semine partus

ANAXAGORAS

Respiration (D83)

D83 (A115) Aristotle, *On Respiration*

Anaxagoras [. . .] and Diogenes, who say that all [scil. Animals] breathe, explain in what way fish and oysters breathe. According to Anaxagoras, fish breathe when they expel water through their gills and draw in the air that is formed in their mouths: for there does not exist any void.

Reproduction (D84–D92)

Origin of the Semen (D84)

D84 (< A107; < 24 A13) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

But some people, like Anaxagoras [. . .] refute this opinion [scil. that semen comes from the marrow]: they object that after the exertion [i.e. the copulation] of the flocks, the males are drained not only of their marrow but also of their fat and of much of their flesh [. . .].

Respective Contributions of the Father and the Mother (D85–D87)

D85 (< A107; < 24 A13) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

[. . .] The following question too causes a difference of opinion among the authorities: whether the offspring is

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

nascatur, [. . .], an etiam ex matris, quod Anaxagorae [. . .] visum est.

D86 (A107) Arist. *GA* 4.1 763b30–764a1

φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἐναντίωσιν εὐθύς, οἷον Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ἕτεροι τῶν φυσιολόγων· γίνεσθαι τε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἄρρενος τὸ σπέρμα, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ παρέχειν τὸν τόπον, καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἐκ τῶν ἀριστερῶν, καὶ τῆς ὑστέρας τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς εἶναι τὰ δὲ θήλεα ἐν τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς.

D87 (A111) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.8

Anaxagoras autem eius parentis faciem referre liberos iudicavit, qui seminis amplius contulisset.

Embryology (D88–D90)

D88 (A109) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.2

sunt qui aetherium calorem inesse arbitrentur, qui membra disponat, Anaxagoran secuti.

D89 (A108) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.1

Anaxagoras cerebrum, unde omnes sunt sensus.

ANAXAGORAS

born only from the father's seed [. . .] or also from the mother's, as was Anaxagoras' view [. . .]?

D86 (A107) Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*

Some people, like Anaxagoras and other natural philosophers, say that this opposition [scil. between male and female] exists from the outset in the semen. For the semen comes from the male, while the female provides the place; and the male comes from the right side, the female from the left, and in the womb the males are on the right side, and the females on the left.

See also **EMP. D175**

D87 (A111) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Anaxagoras believed that children have the facial features of that parent who contributed more of the seed.

Embryology (D88–D90)

D88 (A109) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Some people, who follow Anaxagoras, think that there exists inside [scil. the semen] an aethereal heat that orders the limbs.

D89 (A108) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Anaxagoras [scil. says that the first part formed in the embryo is] the brain, from which all the senses come.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D90 (A110) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.3

Anaxagorae enim ceterisque conpluribus per umbilicum
cibus administrari videtur.

Peculiarities of Animal Reproduction (D91–D92)

D91 (< A114) Arist. *GA* 3.6 756b13–17

εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγουσι κατὰ τὸ στόμα μίγνυσθαι
τούς τε κόρακας καὶ τὴν ἰβιν καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων
τίκτειν κατὰ τὸ στόμα τὴν γαλῆν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ
Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς φυσικῶν λέγουσι
[. . .].

D92 (B22) **Athen. *Deipn.*** *Epit.* 2.57D

Ἀναξαγόρας¹ ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς τὸ καλούμενόν φησιν
ὄρνιθος γάλα τὸ ἐν τοῖς ῥοῖς εἶναι λευκόν.

¹ Ἀλκμαίων coni. Sider

Botany (D93–D95)

D93 (A116) Plut. *Quaest. nat.* 1 911D

ζῶον γὰρ ἔγγαιον τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι [. . .] οἱ περὶ [. . .]
Ἀναξαγόραν [. . .] οἴονται.

ANAXAGORAS

D90 (A110) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Anaxagoras and many other people think that nourishment is supplied through the umbilical cord.

Peculiarities of Animal Reproduction (D91–D92)

D91 (< A114) Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*

Some people say that ravens and the ibis have sexual congress through the mouth, and that among four-footed animals the weasel gives birth through the mouth. This is what both Anaxagoras and some of the other natural philosophers say [. . .].

D92 (B22) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*, *Epitome*

Anaxagoras says in his books *On Nature* that what is called ‘bird’s milk’ is the white of eggs.

Botany (D93–D95)

D93 (A116) Plutarch, *Natural Questions*

[. . .] Anaxagoras’ followers [. . .] think that a plant is an animal in the earth.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D94 (A117) Theophr. *HP* 3.1.4

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν τὸν ἀέρα πάντων φάσκων ἔχειν σπέρματα καὶ ταῦτα συγκαταφερόμενα τῷ ὕδατι γεννᾶν τὰ φυτά [. . .].

D95 (cf. A117) Nic. Dam. *Plant*.

a 1.3, p. 127 Drossaart Lulofs (cf. Ps.-Arist. *Plant*. 1.1 815a15–21)

أما أنكساغورس وهمفدوقلس فزعم أن للنبات شهوة وحسا وغما ولذة وزعم
أنكساغورس أنه حيوان وأنه يفرح ويحزن وزعم أن دليله على ذلك انتشار ورقه
في حينه

b p. 449.54–56 Drossaart Lulofs

אמר אמנם אנכסגוריש ואבן דקליס חשבו שלצמח תאוה והרגש וצער
והנאה. וחשב אנכסגוריש שהוא בעל חיים ושמח ויתאבל. וחשב
שראיתו על זה התפשט עליו וענפיו לשעתו אל הלחות וברחו מההפך

c 1.10, p. 129 (cf. Ps.-Arist. *Plant*. 1.1 815b16–17)

فأما أنكساغورس وهمفدوقلس وديمقراطيس فزعموا أن للنبات عقلا وفهما

d 1.44, p. 141

أنكساغورس زعم أن بزره من الهواء [. . .].

ANAXAGORAS

D94 (A117) Theophrastus, *History of Plants*

[. . .] Anaxagoras, who asserts that the air contains seeds of all things and that these, when they descend together with water, generate plants [. . .].

D95 (cf. A117) Nicolaus of Damascus, *On Plants*

a

Now, Anaxagoras and Empedocles assert that plants have desire and sensation, pain and pleasure, and Anaxagoras asserts that they are animals and that they feel joy and sorrow, and he cites as evidence that they shed their leaves in due season.

b

He [i.e. Aristotle as cited by Nicolaus of Damascus] says that Anaxagoras and Empedocles assert that plants have desire, sensation, pain, and pleasure. Anaxagoras asserts that they are animals, and that they feel joy and sorrow. And he says that his evidence for this is that they stretch out their leaves and branches at the due season toward moisture and withdraw from the opposite.

c

Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus maintained that plants possess reason and understanding.

d

Anaxagoras maintains that their [i.e. plants'] seeds are carried down from the air [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

e pp. 449.65–66

וההבדל בין אנכסגוריש ואבן דקליס שאנכסגוריש לא יניח בצמח זכרים
ונקבות שהעושים פרי כל המין עושה פרי [. . . = **EMP. 250b**]

Mathematics (D96–D97)

D96 (< A9) Procl. *In Eucl., Prol.* 2, p. 65.21–66.1

μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] πολλῶν ἐφήψατο
τῶν κατὰ γεωμετρίαν [. . .].

D97 (< A39) Vitruv. 7 *Praef.* 11

[. . .] Democritus et Anaxagoras de eadem re scripserunt,
quemadmodum oporteat ad aciem oculorum radiorumque
extentionem certo loco centro constituto lineas ratione
naturali respondere, uti de incerta re certae imagines
aedificiorum in scaenarum picturis redderent speciem et
quae in directis planisque frontibus sint figurata, alia
abscedentia alia prominentia esse videantur.

e

The difference between Anaxagoras and Empedocles is that Anaxagoras did not allow that plants have males and females, since the whole species of those [scil. plants] that bear fruit is fructiferous [. . .].¹

¹ Texts **a** (modified), **c**, and **d** translated by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, **b** and **e** by Elisa Coda.

Mathematics (D96–D97)

D96 (< A9) Proclus, *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements*

After him [i.e. Pythagoras], Anaxagoras [. . .] applied himself to many questions of geometry [. . .].

D97 (< A39) Vitruvius, *On Architecture*

[. . .] Democritus [= **ATOM. D216**] and Anaxagoras wrote about the same subject [scil. as Agatharchus, viz. scene painting]: how, by taking a certain point as the center, to make the lines correspond by a natural ratio to the visual angle and the projection of the rays, in such a way that, in virtue of an object without reality, real images would produce the appearance of buildings on the scene painting, and so that what was represented on vertical and plane surfaces would seem in some cases to recede and in others to project outward.

See also **P26a**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

A Moralizing Interpretation of Homer (D98)

D98 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.11

δοκεῖ δὲ πρῶτος, καθά φησι Φαβωρίνος ἐν Παντο-
δαπῇ ἱστορία [Frag. 66 Amato], τὴν Ὅμηρου ποίησιν
ἀποφύνασθαι εἶναι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης· ἐπὶ
πλείον δὲ προστῆναι τοῦ λόγου Μητρόδωρον τὸν
Λαμψακηνόν, γνώριμον ὄντα αὐτοῦ, ὃν καὶ πρῶτον
σπονδάσαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ φυσικὴν πραγμα-
τείαν.

ANAXAGORAS

A Moralizing Interpretation of Homer (D98)

D98 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

According to what Favorinus says in his *Miscellaneous History*, he seems to have been the first person to declare that the poetry of Homer is about virtue and justice; and Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who was his student [cf. **P27**], defended this interpretation further and was the first person to study the poet's treatment of nature.¹

¹ Metrodorus of Lampsacus, mentioned for the first time by Plato, *Ion* 530c, is known for his physical exegeses of Homer [61 DK].

ANAXAGORAS [59 DK]

R

*Earliest References and Allusions to
Anaxagoras (R1–R3)
Democritus (R1–R2)*

R1 (< A5) Diog. Laert. 9.34–35

Φαβωρίνος δέ φησιν ἐν Παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ [Frag. 81 Amato] λέγειν Δημόκριτον περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου ὡς οὐκ εἴησαν αὐτοῦ αἱ δόξαι αἷ τε περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχαῖαι, τὸν δὲ ὑφηγήσθαι [35] διασύρειν τε αὐτοῦ τὰ περὶ τῆς διακοσμῆσεως καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ἐχθρῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι δὴ μὴ προσήκατο αὐτόν. πῶς οὖν κατὰ τινὰς ἀκήκοεν αὐτοῦ;

R2 (B21a) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.140

ὅψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα, ὥς φησιν Ἀνα-
ξαγόρας [D6], ὃν ἐπὶ τούτῳ Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ [. . .].

ANAXAGORAS

R

*Earliest References and Allusions to
Anaxagoras (R1–R3)
Democritus (R1–R2)*

R1 (< A5) Diogenes Laertius

Favorinus reports in his *Miscellaneous History* that Democritus said about Anaxagoras that the opinions he expressed about the sun and moon were not his own but were ancient, and that he had stolen them; and that he [i.e. Democritus] tore to pieces what he [i.e. Anaxagoras] said about the cosmic ordering and mind, displaying hostility toward him because he [i.e. Anaxagoras] had not accepted him to his company. So how could he have been his student, as some people maintain?¹

¹ The relation between this report and **P10** (cf. **ATOM. R8**) is problematic: was it Anaxagoras who rejected Democritus, or was it the other way around?

R2 (B21a) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

For “**appearances: vision of things that are invisible**” [**D6**], as is said by Anaxagoras, whom Democritus praises for this [. . .] [cf. **ATOM. D14–D23**].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Herodotus (R3)

R3 (A91) Hdt. 2.22

ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ὁδῶν πολλὸν ἐπιεικεστάτη ἐοῦσα μάλισ-
τα ἔψευσται· λέγει γὰρ δὴ οὐδ' αὕτη οὐδέν, φασμένη τὸν
Νεῖλον ῥέειν ἀπὸ τηκομένης χιόνος.

Euripides

See **DRAM. T75–T80**

Aeschines the Socratic

See **PROD. R3**

*Plato's and Xenophon's Evaluations of
Anaxagoras' Teleology (R4–R7)
Plato (R4–R6)*

R4 (A35) Plat. *Apol.* 26d–e

[ME.] [. . .] ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ
σελήνην γῆν.

[ΣΩ.] Ἀναξαγόρου οἷε κατηγορεῖν [. . .] καὶ οἷε αὐτοὺς
ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ
Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν
λόγων [. . .], καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαν-
θάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς ἐκ

ANAXAGORAS

Herodotus (R3)

R3 (A91) Herodotus, *Histories*

The third way [scil. in which people explain the floods of the Nile], though it is by far the most plausible, is the most mistaken: for it too does not say anything worthwhile when it asserts that the Nile's flow comes from melting snow [cf. **D4[5]**, **D66**].

Euripides

See **DRAM. T75–T80**

Aeschines the Socratic

See **PROD. R3**

*Plato's and Xenophon's Evaluations of
Anaxagoras' Teleology (R4–R7)
Plato (R4–R6)*

R4 (A35) Plato, *Apology*

[Meletus:] [. . .] for he [i.e. Socrates] says that the sun is a stone and that the moon is earth.

[Socrates:] You think that you are accusing Anaxagoras [. . .] and you think that they [i.e. the jurors] are so illiterate that they do not know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are filled with such assertions [. . .]. And what is more, I suppose that it is from me that the young learn these things—when they can buy them at the marketplace

τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῇται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι [. . .].

R5 (> A47) Plat. *Phaed.* 97b–98c

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, [97c] καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἦσθην καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πᾶσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· [97d] ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι. τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.

ταῦτα δὲ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἠύρηκέναι ὥμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῇ πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη, [97e] ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν,

ANAXAGORAS

for sometimes barely a drachma and make fun of Socrates if he pretends that these are his own ideas [. . .].¹

¹ The Platonic Socrates is imagining possible speeches to the jury by, first, his accuser Meletus, and, then, himself.

R5 (> A47) Plato, *Phaedo*

[Socrates:] But once, having heard someone reading from a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, [97c] and saying that mind is what orders and causes all things, I was pleased at this causality. It seemed to me to be right in a certain way that mind be the cause of all things; and I supposed that, if this was right, then ordering mind orders all things and establishes each one in the best way possible. If then someone wanted to find the cause for each thing—why it comes about, or is destroyed, or is—he would have to find out why it is best for it to be or to undergo or to do anything whatsoever. [97d] It follows from this argument that it is appropriate for a human being to investigate nothing else, both about this very question and about all other ones, than what is best and finest; and this same man must necessarily know what is worse too. For it is the same science that deals with both of these things.

While I was reflecting in this way, I was pleased because I thought that I had found in Anaxagoras someone who would teach me the cause of the things that are in accord with [or: with my] mind, and who would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, [97e] and then, once he had indicated this, would add the detailed explanation of the cause and the necessity, speaking of what is better and saying that it was better that it be like this. And if he said that it is in the center, he would add the detailed

ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι·
καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκ ἐτι
ποθεσόμενος¹ αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. [98a] καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ
ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ
σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς
ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε
ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἂ
πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὥμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ
νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμησθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν
ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν
ὥσπερ ἔχει. [98b] ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν
αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ὥμην καὶ τὸ
κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐκδιηγῆσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν
ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάννυ σπουδῇ
λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον,
ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. ἀπὸ
δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὥχόμεν φερόμενος,
ἐπειδὴ προῖών καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ
οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ
διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, [98c] ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας
καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.

¹ ποθεσόμενος T: ὑποθέμενος B

R6 (≠ DK) Plat. *Phil.* 28c–e

[ΣΩ.] πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς
ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ
τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. [. . .] [28d] πότερον, ὦ

ANAXAGORAS

explanation of the reason why it is better for it to be in the center. And if he showed me this, I would be ready to desire no other kind of cause any longer. [98a] And then I was ready to allow myself to be taught in the same way, regarding the sun, the moon, and the other heavenly bodies, about their relative speeds, their returns [i.e. solstices], and other vicissitudes, the reason for which it is better that each one both do and undergo what it undergoes. For I would never have thought that this man, who said that these things are put in order by mind, would attribute any other cause to them than that it is best that they be as they are. [98b] So I thought that he would explain in detail, assigning the cause to each of them and to all in common, what is best for each one and what is the common good for all. And I would not have sold my hopes for any price, and getting hold of the books with great eagerness, I read them as quickly as I could, in order to find out as quickly as possible what is best and what is worse. But from this marvelous hope, my friend, I fell far, when, going further in my reading, I saw that this man made no use at all of mind and that he did not make certain causes responsible for putting things in order, [98c] but instead attributed the responsibility to airs, aethers, waters, and many other strange things.

R6 (\neq DK) Plato, *Philebus*

[Socrates:] For all the sages agree (taking themselves very seriously indeed) that mind reigns for us over heaven and earth. And perhaps they are right. [. . .] [28d] Should we

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Πρώταρχε, τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπη ἔτυχεν, ἥ τὰναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν; [28e]

[ΠΡΩ.] οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες· ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, οὐδὲ ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδ' ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

Xenophon (R7)

R7 (A73) *Xen. Mem.* 4.7.6–7

ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἥ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· [. . .] κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι. [7] ἐκείνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἡγνόει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥαδίως καθορώσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὐ· ἡγνόει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα

ANAXAGORAS

say, Protarchus, that it is the force of irrationality and of randomness and chance that administer the totality of things and what is called the whole, or on the contrary, as our predecessors used to say, that mind and a marvelous intelligence put them in order and govern them? [28e]

[Protarchus:] It is not at all the same thing, my marvelous Socrates, for what you were saying just now does not seem to me pious either. But to say that it is mind that organizes all these things is justified by the spectacle presented by the cosmos, sun, moon, heavenly bodies and the whole rotation, and I for one would never think or speak otherwise about them.

Xenophon (R7)

R7 (A73) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

Generally speaking, he [i.e. Socrates] refused to reason about the way in which god succeeds in regulating the mechanism of each of the celestial phenomena. [. . .] He said that someone who worries about these matters even runs the risk of going crazy, not less than Anaxagoras, who reasoned most of all about the explanation of the mechanisms the gods employ. [7] For when he said that fire and the sun are identical, he failed to recognize that human beings easily watch a fire but cannot look directly at the sun; and that the color of the skin of those on whom the sun shines is darker, while this is not the case with fire; and he failed to recognize that none of the things that grow from the earth can increase properly without the sun's shining, while everything that is heated by fire is de-

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι
καὶ τοῦτο ἡγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὦν οὔτε λάμπει
οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος τὸν πάντα χρόνον
πάντων λαμπρότατος ὦν διαμένει.

*Peripatetic Reconstructions and Evaluations of
Anaxagoras' Doctrines (R8–R23)
Comparison with Anaximander (cf. R19)
Comparison with Empedocles (R8)*

R8 (< A43) Arist. *Metaph.* A3 984a11

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότε-
ρος ὦν τούτου, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὕστερος [. . . = **D18**].

Teleology (R9–R10)

R9 (A58) Arist. *Metaph.* A3 984b15–18

νοῦν δὴ τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ ἐν
τῇ φύσει τὸν αἷτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης
οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.
φανερῶς μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν ἴσμεν ἀψάμενον τούτων
τῶν λόγων, αἰτίαν δ' ἔχει πρότερον Ἑρμότιμος ὁ Κλα-
ζομένιος εἰπεῖν.

ANAXAGORAS

stroyed. And when he said that the sun is a fiery stone he failed to recognize that a stone placed in a fire does not shine or resist for long, while the sun remains for all time as the brightest thing of all.

*Peripatetic Reconstructions and Evaluations of
Anaxagoras' Doctrines (R8–R23)
Comparison with Anaximander (cf. R19)
Comparison with Empedocles (R8)*

R8 (< A43) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was earlier than him [i.e. Empedocles] in age but more advanced with regard to his works [. . .].¹

¹ The meaning of this sentence is controversial. According to the most plausible interpretation, Aristotle is judging Anaxagoras to be superior to Empedocles by reason of his doctrine of mind (*nous*). Others take it to mean that Anaxagoras' writings are posterior to Empedocles'.

See also **D95e**, **R15**, **R16**, **R23[35]**, **R33**; **EMP. D81**, **D84a**

Teleology (R9–R10)

R9 (A58) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

That man, whoever he was, who said that mind is present in nature too, just as in living beings, as the cause of the world and of all order, appeared like a sober man compared to his predecessors who were speaking at random. We know that Anaxagoras manifestly broached these arguments, but it is imputed to Hermotimus of Clazomenae to have said it first.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

R10 (A47) Arist. *Metaph.* A4 985a18–21

Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν.

Mind (R11–R13)

R11 (A56) Arist. *Phys.* 8.5 256b24–27

διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι ποιεῖ· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἂν κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγῆς ὢν.

R12 (A100) Arist. *An.* 1.2 404b1–7

Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἦττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν· πολλὰ χοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἐτέρωθι δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ταῦτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἐν ἅπασιν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις· οὐ φαίνεται δ' ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζώοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.

ANAXAGORAS

R10 (A47) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

The use that Anaxagoras makes of the mind for the organization of the world is that of an artificial device,¹ and he drags it in whenever he is at a loss to explain for what cause something is of necessity; but in the other cases he attributes the cause of what belongs to becoming to everything rather than to mind.

¹ Perhaps Aristotle has in mind the theatrical *deus ex machina*.

Mind (R11–R13)

R11 (A56) Aristotle, *Physics*

That is why Anaxagoras is right when he says that mind is impassible and unmixed, since he makes it the principle of motion: for it is only in this way that it could cause motion, by itself being immobile, and that it could dominate, by being unmixed itself.

R12 (A100) Aristotle, *On the Soul*

Anaxagoras is less clear [scil. than Democritus] about them [i.e. soul and thought]: for he often says that mind is the cause of what is fine and correct, but elsewhere he says that mind is the same thing as the soul; for it is present in all the animals, big ones and little ones, honored ones and less honored ones. But it does not appear to be the case that mind, at least that which is spoken of in relation to wisdom (*phronêsis*), is equally present in all animals—for that matter, not even in all human beings.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

R13 (A55) Arist. *An.* 1.2 405a13–19

Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχὴν τε καὶ νοῦν [. . .], χρηταὶ δ' ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχὴν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων· μόνον γοῦν φησιν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἀπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρὸν. ἀποδίδωσι δ' ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινήσαι τὸ πᾶν.

*Anaxagoras' Ultimate Components Identified with
Aristotelian 'Homeomers' (R14–R15)*

R14 (A46) Arist. *GC* 1.1 314a18–20

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῇ στοιχεῖα τίθησιν, οἷον ὀστοῦν σάρκα μυελὸν¹ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἐκάστῳ συνώνυμον τὸ μέρος ἐστίν [. . .].

¹ μυελὸν καὶ ξύλον HW

R15 (A43) Arist. *Cael.* 3.3 302a28–b5

Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἐναντίως Ἐμπεδοκλεί λέγει περὶ τῶν στοιχείων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις στοιχεῖα φησιν εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ συγκεῖσθαι πάντ' ἐκ τούτων, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τοῦναντίον· τὰ γὰρ ὁμοιομερῇ στοιχεῖα (λέγω δ' οἷον σάρκα¹ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον), ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μίγματα τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σπερμάτων πάντων· εἶναι γὰρ ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν

ANAXAGORAS

R13 (A55) Aristotle, *On the Soul*

Anaxagoras seems to say that soul is different from mind [. . .] but he makes use of both of them as though of a single nature, except that, at least with regard to the principle of all things, it is mind that he posits most of all—at least he says that this, alone of the things that are, is simple, unmixed, and pure. He assigns to the same principle both things, knowing and causing motion, saying that it is mind that moves the whole.

Anaxagoras' Ultimate Components Identified with Aristotelian 'Homeomers' (R14–R15)

R14 (A46) Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*

For he posits as elements the homeomers, for example bone, flesh, marrow, and the other things of which the part has the same name as each one [. . .].

R15 (A43) Aristotle, *On the Heavens*

Anaxagoras maintains the opposite to Empedocles with regard to the elements. For the latter says that fire, earth, and the terms belonging to the same series are the elements of bodies and that all things are composed out of them [cf. e.g. **EMP. D73.269**]. But Anaxagoras says the opposite: for the homeomers are the elements, I mean for example flesh, bone, and each of the things of this sort; while air and fire are mixtures of these things and of all the other seeds, for each of these is an aggregate of all the invisible homeomers. That is why all things come from

¹ σάρκα EHS^p: ξύλα σάρκα J

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

πάντων ἡθροισμένον. διὸ καὶ γίγνεσθαι πάντ' ἐκ τούτων· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα προσαγορεύει ταῦτό.

Aristotle's Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Infinitism (R16–R17)

R16 (< A52* Lanza) Arist. *Phys.* 1.4 187b7–188a18

εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον ἢ ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλήθος ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον πόσον τι, τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον ποῖόν τι. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλήθος καὶ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων. οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν.

[187b13] ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀνάγκη, οὗ τὸ μόνον ἐνδέχεται ὀπηλικονοῦν εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι (λέγω δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τι μορίων, εἰς ὃ ἐνυπάρχον διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον), εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον ζῶον ἢ φυτὸν ὀπηλικονοῦν εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων ὅτιοῦν· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ὁμοίως. σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη ζῶον, καὶ οἱ καρποὶ τῶν φυτῶν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ἀδύνατον σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὀπηλικονοῦν εἶναι τὸ μέγεθος ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον.

[187b22] ἔτι εἰ πάντα μὲν ἐνυπάρχει τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μὴ γίγνεται ἀλλ' ἐκκρίνεται ἐνόντα, λέγεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείονος, γίγνεται δὲ ἐξ ὅτουοῦν

ANAXAGORAS

these [i.e. from air and fire]; for he calls the same thing fire and aether [cf. **D37**].

Aristotle's Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Infinitism (R16–R17)

R16 (\neq DK) Aristotle, *Physics*

If, then, the unlimited inasmuch as unlimited is unknowable, then what is unlimited in quantity or in size is an unknowable quantity, and what is unlimited in form is an unknowable quality. If the principles are unlimited both in quantity and in form, it is impossible to know what comes from them. For we suppose that we know what is composed when we know out of what [scil. components] and in what quantity it is composed.

[187b13] Furthermore, if it is necessary that that of which the part can be of any extent whatsoever in size or smallness can also itself be [scil. of any extent whatsoever in size or smallness] (I mean one of those parts existing in the whole and into which it is divided), and if it is impossible for an animal or a plant to be of any extent whatsoever in size or smallness, it is clear that this will not be the case either of any one of its parts; for it will be the same for the whole too. Now flesh, bone, and things of this sort are parts of an animal, and fruits are those of plants. So it is clear that it is impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be of any extent whatsoever in size, whether this is toward the larger or toward the smaller.

[187b22] Furthermore, if all the things of this sort are present in each other, and they do not become but, present in the interior, they separate out, and if they are called

ότιοῦν (οἶον ἐκ σαρκὸς ὕδωρ ἐκκρινόμενον καὶ σὰρξ ἐξ ὕδατος), ἅπαν δὲ σῶμα πεπερασμένον ἀναιρεῖται ὑπὸ σώματος πεπερασμένου, φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐν ἐκάστω ἑκαστον ὑπάρχειν. ἀφαιρεθείσης γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος σαρκός, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλης γενομένης ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀποκρίσει, εἰ καὶ αἰὲ ἐλάττων ἔσται ἢ ἐκκρινομένη, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐχ ὑπερβαλεῖ μέγεθός τι τῇ μικρότητι. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν στήσεται ἢ ἐκκρισις, οὐχ ἅπαν ἐν παντὶ ἐνέσται (ἐν γὰρ τῷ λοιπῷ ὕδατι οὐκ ἐνυπάρξει σὰρξ), εἰ δὲ μὴ στήσεται ἀλλ' αἰὲ ἔξει ἀφαίρεσιν, ἐν πεπερασμένῳ μεγέθει ἴσα πεπερασμένα ἐνέσται ἅπειρα τὸ πλήθος· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

[187b35] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ ἅπαν μὲν σῶμα ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἔλαττον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ σαρκὸς ὥρισται τὸ ποσὸν καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, φανερόν ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἐλαχίστης σαρκὸς οὐθὲν ἐκκριθήσεται σῶμα· ἔσται γὰρ ἐλάττων τῆς ἐλαχίστης.

[188a2] ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις σώμασιν ἐνυρπάρχου ἂν ἤδη σὰρξ ἅπειρος καὶ αἷμα καὶ ἐγκέφαλος, κεχωρισμένα μέντοι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων <οὐ>,¹ οὐθὲν δ' ἦττον ὄντα, καὶ ἅπειρον ἑκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἄλογον.

[188a5] τὸ δὲ μηδέποτε διακριθήσεσθαι οὐκ εἰδότως μὲν λέγεται, ὀρθῶς δὲ λέγεται· τὰ γὰρ πάθη ἀχώριστα· εἰ οὖν μέμικται τὰ χρώματα καὶ αἱ ἔξεις, εἰς διακριθῶσιν, ἔσται τι λευκὸν καὶ ὑγιεινὸν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὃν οὐδὲ καθ' ὑποκειμένου. ὥστε ἄτοπος τὰ ἀδύνατα ζητῶν ὁ

¹<οὐ> Ross

ANAXAGORAS

according to what is most abundant, and anything whatsoever comes to be from anything whatsoever (for example, water that separates out from flesh, and flesh that separates out from water), and every limited body is abolished by a limited body, then it is clear that it is not possible that each thing be found in each thing. For if flesh is removed from water, and another flesh in turn comes from the rest by separation, even if that which separates out is always smaller, nonetheless it will not exceed a certain size in smallness. So that if the separation comes to a stop, everything will not be in everything (for in the remaining water there will not be any flesh); and if it does not come to a stop but there is always a subtraction, there will be in a limited size an unlimited number of limited equal [scil. components]—but this is impossible.

[187b35] Besides, if it is necessary that every body become smaller when something is removed from it, and that the quantity of flesh is defined in size and in smallness, it is clear that from the smallest flesh no body will be able to be extracted by separation: for it would be smaller than the smallest.

[188a2] Furthermore, in unlimited bodies there would already exist an unlimited flesh, blood, and brain, <not> separated from each other but nonetheless existing, and each one unlimited—and this is absurd.

[188a5] As for the assertion that there will never be complete separation, this is said without knowledge, but it is correct: for the affections are not separable. If then there is mixture of colors and of manners of being, then, if there is complete separation, there will be something white and healthy that will not be something else and will not be said of a substrate. So that mind that seeks the

νοῦς, εἴπερ βούλεται μὲν διακρίναι, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῆσαι ἀδύνατον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποσὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστον μέγεθος, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποιὸν ὅτι ἀχώριστα τὰ πάθη.

[188a13] οὐκ ὁρθῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν γένεσιν λαμβάνει τῶν ὁμοειδῶν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὁ πηλὸς εἰς πηλοὺς διαιρεῖται, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος, ὡς πλίνθοι ἐξ οἰκίας καὶ οἰκία ἐκ πλίνθων, οὕτω καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ ἐξ ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ γίγνονται.

[188a17] βέλτιόν τε ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

R17 (≠ DK) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 173.8–16

“ἀλλὰ μήποτε,” φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος, “οὐχ οὕτως χρὴ τὸν λόγον εὐθύνειν· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι μεμίχθαι οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἴσως ἔλεγεν Ἀναξαγόρας, ὡς ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν πάντων ὄντων (οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀρχαὶ ἂν ἦσαν ἔτι, εἴπερ συγκρίματα ἦν), ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν συγκεκριμένων πάντα ἔλεγε μεμίχθαι· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ ἐκκρίσεις· τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα τὰ εἰλικρινῇ μήτε αἰσθητὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ εἶναι καθ' αὐτά· μηδὲ γὰρ διακριθῆναι ταῦτα δύνασθαι.” ἀλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ μεταφέρει τὸν ἔλεγχον εἰς τὰ συγκρίματα [...].

ANAXAGORAS

impossible is an absurdity: since it wishes to separate completely, but it is impossible to do this both according to quantity and according to quality—according to quantity because what is smallest does not exist, according to quality because the affections are not separable.

[188a13] He does not conceive correctly the coming into being of things of the same species either. For in one way it is possible for mud to divide into mud, but in another way it is not. And it is not in the same way that bricks come from a building, and a building from bricks, and that water and air are [scil. constituted] and come to be from each other.

[188a17] And it is better to assume a smaller number [scil. of principles] and limited ones, which is what Empedocles does.

R17 (\neq DK) Alexander of Aphrodisias in Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

“But perhaps,” says Alexander, “it is not necessary to refute the argument in this way. For perhaps it was not with reference to the principles that Anaxagoras said that all things are mixed with all things, on the idea that all things are in each of the principles (for in this way they would no longer be principles, since they would be composites), but he was saying that all things are mixed in each of the perceptible bodies, which come from the principles by combination. For it is from these that come both comings-to-be and separations. For pure elements are absolutely imperceptible, and they do not exist by themselves either; for these cannot be completely separated either.” But to say this is to do nothing other than to transfer the refutation to the composites [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Anaxagoras' Principles Can Be Reduced to Two (R18–R19)

R18 Arist. *Metaph.*

a (A61) A8 989a30–33

Ἀναξαγόραν δ' εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι δύο λέγειν στοιχεῖα, μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ λόγον, ὃν ἐκείνος αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ διήρθρωπεν, ἠκολούθησε μὲντ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς λέγουσιν¹ αὐτόν.

¹ λέγουσιν E: ἐπάγουσιν A^b

b (> A61) Λ2 1069b18–23

[. . .] ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἔν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ ὁμοῦ πάντα [cf. **D9**] [. . .] “ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐ.”

R19 (12 A9a) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 154.14–23

καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ [Frag. 228B FSH&G] τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν εἰς τὸν Ἀναξίμανδρον συνωθῶν καὶ οὕτως ἐκλαμβάνει τὰ ὑπὸ Ἀναξαγόρου λεγόμενα, ὡς δύνασθαι μίαν αὐτὸν φύσιν λέγειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. γράφει δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἱστορίᾳ· “οὕτω μὲν οὖν λαμβανόντων δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους, ὥσπερ εἶρη-

ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras' Principles Can Be Reduced to Two (R18–R19)

R18 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

a (A61)

If someone were to suppose that Anaxagoras was speaking of two elements [scil. mind and matter], his supposition would be completely in accordance with an argument that he himself did not articulate but would necessarily have accepted from those who would have stated it.

b (> A61)

[. . .] so that not only is it possible for something to come about accidentally from what is not, but also everything comes about from what is—from what is potentially, however, and is not actually. And this is the ‘one’ of Anaxagoras; for better than “**all things together**” [cf. **D9**] [. . .] [scil. would be] “all things were together potentially, but not actually.”

R19 (12 A9a) Theophrastus in Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And Theophrastus, pushing Anaxagoras toward Anaximander, understands in this way too what Anaxagoras says, viz. that it is possible that he is saying that the substrate is a single nature. He writes as follows in his *Inquiry on Nature*: “If we take him in this way, he would seem to posit material principles that are unlimited [scil. in number], as

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ται, τὴν δὲ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν μίαν.
εἰ δέ τις τὴν μῆξιν τῶν ἀπάντων ὑπολάβοι μίαν εἶναι
φύσιν ἀόριστον καὶ κατ' εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος, ὅπερ
ἂν δόξειε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, συμβαίνει δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς
αὐτῷ λέγειν, τὴν τε τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν,
ὥστε πάντως φαίνεται τὰ σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα παραπλη-
σίως ποιῶν Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ.”

The Beginning of the Cosmogonic Process (R20–R21)

R20 (< A50) Arist. *Phys.* 3.5 205b1–2

Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἀτόπως λέγει περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου
μονῆς [. . . = **D17**].

R21 (A59) Simplicius. *In Phys.*, p. 1185.9–15

ὁ δὲ Εὐδημος [Frag. 111 Wehrli] μέμφεται τῷ Ἀναξαγόρῳ
οὐ μόνον ὅτι μὴ πρότερον οὖσαν ἄρξασθαι ποτε λέγει
τὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαμένειν ἢ λήξειν
ποτὲ παρέλιπεν εἰπεῖν, καίπερ οὐκ ὄντος φανεροῦ. “τί
γὰρ κωλύει,” φησί, “δόξαι ποτὲ τῷ νῷ στῆσαι πάντα
χρήματα, καθάπερ ἐκείνος εἶπεν κινήσαι;” καὶ τοῦτο δὲ
αἰτιᾶται τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ὁ Εὐδημος· “πῶς ἐνδέχεται
στέρησιν τινα προτέραν εἶναι τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἕξεως;
εἰ οὖν ἡ ἡρεμία στέρησις κινήσεώς ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸ
τῆς κινήσεως.”

ANAXAGORAS

has been said, but a single cause of motion and of generation. But if one supposed that the mixture of all things is a single nature, undefined both in shape and in size, which is what he would seem to have meant, then the result is that he is saying that there are two principles, the nature of the unlimited and mind, so that he seems indeed to conceive of corporeal elements in the same way as Anaximander” [= **ANAXIMAND. R8**].

The Beginning of the Cosmogonic Process (R20–R21)

R20 (< A50) Aristotle, *Physics*

What Anaxagoras says about the lack of motion of the unlimited is absurd [. . .].

R21 (A59) Eudemus in Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Eudemus blames Anaxagoras not only because he says that the motion that did not exist previously began at a certain moment, but also because he has neglected to say whether it would continue or would stop sometime, even though this is not evident. For he says, “What prevents us from thinking that all things are brought to a stop sometime by mind, just as he said that it set them in motion?” And Eudemus also criticizes this point of Anaxagoras: “How is it possible for a privation to exist before the state to which it is opposed? If then rest is a privation of motion, then it could not exist before motion.”

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Clepsydra (R22)

R22 (< A69) Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 16.8 914b9–15

τῶν περὶ τὴν κλεψύδραν συμβαινόντων τὸ μὲν ὅλον
ἔοικεν αἴτιον εἶναι καθάπερ Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει· [. . . cf.
D61] οὐ μὴν ἀπλῶς γε αἴτιος· κἂν γάρ τις αὐτὴν
πλαγίαν ἐνῇ εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐπιλαβὼν τὸν αὐλόν, ἔσσεισι
τὸ ὕδωρ. διόπερ οὐ λέγεται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἰκανῶς ἢ αἴτιον
ἔστιν.

Theophrastus' Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Theory of Sensations (R23)

R23 (≠ DK) Theophr. *Sens.* 31–37

[On the principle of the theory]

[31] τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ποιεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν
ἔχει τινὰ λόγον [. . .]· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις οὐχ ὑπὸ
τῶν ὁμοίων, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι. καίτοι καὶ
τοῦτο δέεται πίστεως, εἰ¹ ἀλλοίωσις ἡ αἴσθησις εἴ τε²
τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου κριτικόν.

¹ ἡ mss., corr. Schneider

² οὐτε mss., corr. Schneider

[On the assertion that every sensation is
accompanied by pain]

τὸ δὲ μετὰ λύπης ἅπασαν εἶναι¹ οὐτ' ἐκ τῆς χρήσεως
ὁμολογείται (τὰ μὲν <γὰρ>² μεθ' ἡδονῆς τὰ δὲ πλεί-

ANAXAGORAS

The Clepsydra (R22)

R22 (< A69) Ps.-Aristotle, *Problems*

For on the whole the cause of what happens with the clepsydra seems to be what Anaxagoras says. [. . .] And yet this is not the cause speaking absolutely: for if one closes the tube and puts it into the water aslant, the water will penetrate in. That is why he does **not** explain sufficiently to what extent this is the cause.

Theophrastus' Criticisms of Anaxagoras' Theory of Sensations (R23)

R23 (≠ DK) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[On the principle of the theory]

[31] That he explains sensation by the contraries has a certain degree of reasonableness [. . .]: for it seems that there is alteration by the effect not of the similar but of the contraries. Nonetheless, whether sensation is an alteration and whether the contrary is able to discern the contrary—this too requires confirmation.

[On the assertion that every sensation is
accompanied by pain]

As for the assertion that every sensation is accompanied by pain, this cannot be accepted either on the basis of experience (for some of them are accompanied by plea-

¹ $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma$ post $\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ hab. mss, secl. Wimmer

² < $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ > Diels

στα ἄνευ λύπης ἐστίν), οὐτ' ἐκ τῶν εὐλόγων. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν φύσει βίᾳ καὶ μετὰ λύπης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον. τὰ³ γὰρ πλείω καὶ πλεονάκεις ἡδόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ⁴ δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι χωρὶς τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιθυμίας διώκομεν. [32] ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη γίνεται διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἅπαν δὲ φύσει πρὸς τὸ βέλτιόν ἐστι, καθάπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη,⁵ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ μετὰ λύπης. ἀπλῶς δ' εἶπερ μηδὲ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι μετὰ λύπης, οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ⁶ ἔχει λόγον ἑκάτερον πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν χρεῖαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ τὸ τοῦ χρόνου πλήθος οὐδὲν σημεῖον ὡς μετὰ λύπης ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐν συμμετρίᾳ τινὶ καὶ κράσει⁷ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ αἴσθησις. διόπερ ἴσως τὸ μὲν ἐλλείπον ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ' ὑπερβάλλον λύπην τε ποιεῖ καὶ φθείρει. [33] συμβαίνει τοίνυν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν σκοπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ παρὰ φύσιν. ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀπ' ἐνίων καὶ ἐνίοτε λυπεῖσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἡδεσθαι, φανερόν καὶ ὁμολογούμενον· ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον διὰ γε τοῦτο μετὰ λύπης ἢ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἴσως μετ' οὐδετέρου κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο κρίνειν,

³ τῇ mss., corr. Schneider⁴ αὐτὸ Schneider⁵ καθάπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη del. Schneider: καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη prop. Diels⁶ γὰρ F: om. P⁷ πράξει mss., corr. Korais

sure, while most of them are free of pain) or on that of plausible arguments. For sensation occurs by nature; now, nothing of what is by nature occurs by violence or together with pain, but rather it occurs together with pleasure, and it is evident too that this is what occurs. For in most cases and for most of the time, we feel pleasure and we ourselves pursue sensation for itself independently of the desire for each of its objects. [32] Furthermore, given that pleasure as well as pain occur by means of sensation, and that every thing tends by nature toward what is better, like knowledge, it [scil. sensation] would be accompanied by pleasure rather than by pain. In general, if thinking is not accompanied by pain either, then neither is perceiving, for each of the two has the same relation with regard to the same usage. Moreover, the excesses of the perceptibles and the quantity of time does not supply the slightest indication that sensation is accompanied by pain, but rather that sensation resides in a certain adaptation and blending with regard to the perceptible. This is surely why the perceptible is not perceived when it is insufficient, whereas it causes pain and destroys when it is excessive. [33] So it comes about that he examines what is by nature according to what is against nature: for excess is against nature. For the fact that, from some things and sometimes, one feels pain, like pleasure too, is evident and is generally recognized; so that, on account of this at least, sensation is not any more accompanied by pain than by pleasure, but doubtless neither by the one nor by the other, at least according to the truth. For it would not be able to discern, and neither would thought either, if it were continually

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια συνεχῶς οὔσα μετὰ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐφ' ὅλην μετήνεγκε τὴν αἴσθησιν.

[The criterion of size]

[34] ὅταν δὲ λέγῃ τὰ μείζω μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν αἰσθητηρίων εἶναι τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔχει¹ τινὰ ἀπορίαν, οἷον πότερον τὰ μικρὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα τῶν ζώων αἰσθητικά· δόξειε² γὰρ ἂν ἀκριβεστέρας αἰσθήσεως εἶναι τὰ μικρὰ μὴ λανθάνειν, καὶ ἅμα τὸ τὰ ἐλάττω δυνάμενον καὶ τὰ μείζω κρίνειν οὐκ ἄλογον. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ ἐνίας³ αἰσθήσεις βέλτιον ἔχειν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μεγάλων, ὥστε ταύτη μὲν χείρων ἢ τῶν μειζόνων αἴσθησις. [35] εἰ δ' αὖ φαίνεται καὶ πολλὰ λανθάνειν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μειζόνων⁴ οἷον οἱ ψόφοι, χρώματα,⁵ βελτίων ἢ τῶν μειζόνων· ἅμα δὲ καὶ εὐλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ὅλην τοῦ σώματος κρᾶσιν, ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, εἰ ἄρα καὶ δεῖ λέγειν οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις γένεσιν ἀφώρισται κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ κυριώτατα ἴσως ἢ τοῦ σώματος διάθεσις τε καὶ κρᾶσις. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μεγέθη τὴν συμμετρίαν ἀποδιδόναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔοικεν ὁμοίως λέγειν Ἐμπε-

¹ ἔχειν mss., corr. Vossianus et Camotius ² δόξει mss.
corr. Stephanus ³ περὶ ἐνία mss., corr. Stephanus: πρὸς ἐνίας coni. Usener

⁴ τῶν μειζόνων del. Schneider

⁵ οἷον οἱ ψόφοι, χρώματα del. Philippson

ANAXAGORAS

accompanied by pain or by pleasure. With regard to this idea, then, he started from a tenuous starting point and transferred it to the totality of sensation.

[The criterion of size]

[34] But when he asserts that larger animals have better sensation and that, in general, sensation depends on the size of the sense organs, the former assertion comports a difficulty, viz. whether it is not the small ones among animals that perceive more than the large ones. For it would seem to be the case that what belongs to a more precise sensation is that small things do not escape it, and it is not unreasonable either to think that one who can discern the smaller things can equally discern the larger ones. At the same time, it does indeed seem to be the case that, in the case of certain sensations, small animals are superior to large ones, so that, in this regard, the sensation of the larger ones is inferior. [35] But if, inversely, it appears that likewise many of the larger objects escape the notice of the small ones, for example sounds, colors, that of the larger ones is superior; now at the same time it is also reasonable to think that the sensations are in the same state as the entire mixture of the body. On this point then, as has been said, one could raise a difficulty, viz. whether one must really express oneself as he does: for in similar species, the distinction is not made according to size, and the most important things are doubtless the arrangement and mixture of the body. As for explaining the adaptation (*summetria*) of the perceptibles with reference to sizes, he seems to say the same things as Empedocles; for the fact

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

δοκλεῖ· τῷ⁶ γὰρ ἐναρμόττειν τοῖς πόροις ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν. πλὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἴδιον συμβαίνει δυσχερές· ὅζειν μὲν γάρ φησι τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα μᾶλλον, ὀσφραίνεσθαι δὲ ἀκριβέστερον ὅσα τὸν πυκνὸν ἢ τὸν μακρὸν⁷ ἔλκει.

⁶ τὸ mss., corr. Philippson

⁷ μακρὸν Wimmer: μικρὸν mss.

[On the theory of reflection]

[36] περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐμφάσεως κοινή τίς ἐστίν ἡ δόξα· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσι διὰ τὴν γινομένην ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔμφασιν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκέτι συνείδον ὥς οὔτε τὰ μεγέθη σύμμετρα τὰ ὀρώμενα τοῖς ἐμφαινομένοις οὔτε ἐμφαίνεσθαι πολλὰ ἅμα καὶ τὰναντία δυνατόν, ἔτι δὲ κίνησις καὶ διάστημα καὶ μέγεθος ὁρατὰ μὲν, ἔμφασιν δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν ἐμφαίνεται,¹ καθάπερ τοῖς σκληροφθάλμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐνύδροις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων διὰ γε τοῦτο πολλὰ ἂν ὁρῶεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι καὶ χαλκῷ καὶ ἑτέροις πολλοῖς ἐστὶν ἀνάκλασις. [37] φησὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμφαίνεσθαι μὲν εἰς ἄλληλα <τὰ>² χρώματα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν εἰς τὸ ἀσθενές· ὥστε ἐκάτερον μὲν ἐχρῆν ὁρᾶν, μᾶλλον δὲ <τὸ>³ μέλαν καὶ ὅλως <τὸ>⁴ ἀσθενέστερον. διὸ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν ὁμόχρων ποιεῖ τῇ νυκτὶ καὶ τὸ φῶς αἴτιον τῆς ἐμφάσεως. καίτοι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ φῶς ὀρώμεν αὐτὸ δι' οὐδεμιᾶς ἐμφάσεως, ἔπειτα οὐδὲν ἦττον τὰ μέλανα

ANAXAGORAS

of being adapted (*enarmottein*) to the passages produces sensation. Except that, in the case of smelling, a difficulty arises which is peculiar to him: for he says that thin air has a stronger odor, but he states that those that inhale dense air have a more precise sense of smell than do those that inhale rarefied air.

[On the theory of reflection]

[36] With regard to reflection (*emphasis*) there is a common opinion: for most people suppose that sight occurs in this way, by the reflection that is produced in the eyes. But what they have not seen is that neither do the sizes that one sees correspond to the objects reflected nor is it possible that things that are multiple and opposed be reflected simultaneously; furthermore, motion, distance, and size are quite visible but do not produce a reflection. And in certain animals nothing is reflected, as in those that have hard eyes or live in water. Furthermore, to follow this idea, many inanimate things would possess sight, for there is also refraction in water, on bronze, and in many other kinds of material. [37] And he himself says that colors are reflected in each other, but the strong one more in the weak one; so that each of these two ought to see, but the dark one more, and, in general, the weaker one. That is why he makes the eye to be of the same color as the night, and makes light the cause of reflection. However, to begin with, we see light itself, without this happening by means of a reflection; and then, dark-colored objects are not less

¹ *φαίνεται* mss., corr. Schneider

² <τὰ> Schneider

³⁻⁴ <τὸ> bis Schneider

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

τῶν λευκῶν οὐκ ἔχει φῶς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ⁵ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰ-
τὴν ἔμφασιν ὀρώμεν εἰς τὸ λαμπρότερον καὶ καθα-
ρώτερον γινομένην, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς λέγει τοὺς ὑμέ-
νας τῶν ὀμμάτων λεπτοὺς εἶναι καὶ λαμπροὺς. τιθέ-
ασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτὴν οἱ πολλοὶ πυρός, <ὡς>⁶
τούτου⁷ τὰς⁸ χροᾶς μετεχούσας μᾶλλον.

Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, κοινήν τινα ταύτην καὶ παλαιὰν δόξαν ἀναφέρει. πλὴν ἰδίως⁹ ἐπὶ πάσαις λέγει ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει, διότι τὸ μέγα¹⁰ αἰσθανόμενόν ἐστιν, οὐ δηλοῖ δὲ τὰς σωματικωτέρας¹¹ αἰσθήσεις.

⁵ *κάν* Diels: *γ' ἐν* mss. ⁶ *<ὥς>* Diels ⁷ *ταύτης*
 mss., corr. Usener ⁸ *τῆς* mss., corr. Schneider ⁹ *ἰδιον*
 mss., corr. Diels ¹⁰ *μὲν* mss., corr. Diels ¹¹ *σωματι-*
κωτάτας mss., corr. Diels et Usener

*Various Doxographical Reports Influenced by
Later Doctrines (R24–R30)
Platonico-Aristotelian Interpretations (R24–R25)*

R24 (A93) Aët.

a 4.7.1 (Theod. 5.23) [*περὶ ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς*]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφώναντο.

ANAXAGORAS

deprived of light than bright-colored ones are. Furthermore, in other cases we always see the reflection occurring in what is more brilliant and purer, as he himself says that the membranes of the eyes are fine and brilliant. And most people posit that sight itself belongs to fire, on the idea that colors participate more in this latter.

So Anaxagoras, as has been said, takes up a common and ancient opinion in this case. Except that he says something peculiar to himself about all the sensations, and especially about sight, viz. that it is the large [scil. animal] that perceives. But he does not explain the sensations that are of a more corporeal nature.

*Various Doxographical Reports Influenced by
Later Doctrines (R24–R30)
Platonico-Aristotelian Interpretations (R24–R25)*

R24 (A93) Aëtius

a

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .] asserted that the soul is imperishable.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

b 4.5.11 (Stob.) [περὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ]

[. . .] Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν.

R25 (A86a) Schol. in Aesch. *Prom.* 88

οἱ ἄνεμοι κατὰ μὲν Ἀναξαγόραν ἐκ τῆς γῆς γίνονται [. . .], καθ' Ὅμηρον δὲ “πατὴρ Διὸς ἐκ νεφελῶν.” ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ ὑλικόν φησιν αἴτιον τῶν ἀνέμων, Ὅμηρος δὲ τὸ ποιητικόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀμφοτέρω τὸ τε ὑλικόν καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν.

*The Skeptic Arcesilaus Includes Anaxagoras
Among His Predecessors (R26)*

R26 (< A95) Cic. *Acad.* 1.12.44

[. . .] earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante Socratem [. . .] Anaxagoram [. . .] omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt, angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae [. . .].

An Eclectic Reading (R27)

R27 (A66) Aët. 1.29.7 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ τύχης]

Ἀναξαγόρας [. . .] ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ· ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον.

ANAXAGORAS

b

[. . .] Anaxagoras [. . .]: [scil. mind] enters from outside.

R25 (A86a) Scholia on Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*

Winds, according to Anaxagoras, come from the earth [. . .], but, according to Homer, "from the clouds of Father Zeus" (*Il.* 2.146). But Anaxagoras is speaking about the material cause of winds, Homer about the efficient cause, or more exactly about both of them, the material cause and the efficient cause.

The Skeptic Arcesilaus Includes Anaxagoras Among His Predecessors (R26)

R26 (< A95) Cicero, *Posterior Academics*

[. . .] by the obscurity of these matters, which led Socrates to confess his ignorance and, even before Socrates, [. . .] Anaxagoras, [. . .] and almost all the ancients, who said that nothing can be recognized, or perceived, or known; that the senses are constricted, the spirit weak, the course of life brief [. . .].¹

¹ Cicero also names Democritus (**ATOM.** **R100**) and Empedocles (cf. also **EMP.** **R38**).

An Eclectic Reading (R27)

R27 (A66) Aëtius

Anaxagoras [. . .]: [scil. chance is] a cause that is unclear to human reason; for some things happen by necessity, others according to fate, others by choice, others by chance, and others spontaneously.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Epicureans (R28–R29)

Epicurus (R28)

R28 (A26) Diog. Laert. 10.12

μάλιστα δὲ ἀπεδέχετο, φησὶ Διοκλῆς, τῶν ἀρχαίων
Ἀναξαγόραν, καίτοι ἔν τισιν ἀντειρηκῶς αὐτῷ [. . . cf.
ARCH. R3].

Lucretius (R29)

R29 (> A44) Lucr. 1.859–96

860 praeterea quoniam cibus auget corpus alitque,
scire licet nobis venas et sanguen et Ossa
< . . . >
sive cibos omnis commixto corpore dicent
esse et habere in se nervorum corpora parva
ossaque et omnino venas partisue cruoris,
fiet uti cibus omnis, et aridus et liquor ipse,
865 ex alienigenis rebus constare putetur,
ossibus et nervis sanieque et sanguine mixto.
praeterea quaecumque e terra corpora crescunt
si sunt in terris, terram constare necessest

post 860 lac. pos. Lambinus

866 mixto Lachmann: mixta OQG: misto Lambinus

ANAXAGORAS

The Epicureans (R28–R29)

Epicurus (R28)

R28 (A26) Diogenes Laertius

More than anyone else, says Diocles, he [i.e. Epicurus] preferred Anaxagoras among the ancients, even if he contradicted him on certain points [. . .].

Lucretius (R29)

R29 (> A44) Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*

Furthermore, since food makes the body grow and
nourishes it,
We can know that veins, blood, bones, 860
<and sinews are made up of heterogeneous parts>;¹
Or if they say that all foodstuffs are made up of a
mixed body
And contain corpuscles of sinews,
Bones, and moreover veins and parts of blood,
Then the result will be that one must think that every
foodstuff,
Both dry and liquid, is made up of heterogeneous 865
things,
Bones, sinews, humors, and blood mixed together.
Furthermore, if all the bodies that grow from the
earth
Already exist in the earth, then the earth must be
made

¹ At least one verse seems to have been lost; the words in brackets indicate the probable meaning.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ex alienigenis, quae terris exoriuntur.

870 transfer item, totidem verbis utare licebit:

in lignis si flamma latet fumusque cinisque,

ex alienigenis consistent ligna necessest

[874] ex alienigenis, quae lignis exoriuntur.

[873] praeterea tellus quae corpora cumque alit auget

< . . . >

875 linquitur hic quaedam latitandi copia tenuis,

id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnis

res putet immixtas rebus latitare, sed illud

apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta

et magis in promptu primaque in fronte locata.

880 quod tamen a vera longe ratione repulsumst.

conveniebat enim fruges quoque saepe, minaci

robore cum saxi franguntur, mittere signum

sanguinis aut aliquid, nostro quae corpore aluntur,

cum lapidi in lapidem terimus, manare cruorem.

885 consimili ratione herbas quoque saepe decebat

et latices dulcis guttas similique sapore

873–74 transp. Diels et lac. post 874 pos.: post 873 lac. pos.
Munro: 873 secl. Lambinus, 873–74 Marullus

882 post cum hab. OQ in, del. Marullus

885 herbis OQ, corr. Marullus

² This passage is corrupt; one or more verses seem to have been lost. The words in brackets indicate the probable meaning.

ANAXAGORAS

Of the heterogeneous things that arise from the
earth.

Apply this to another case and you can use the very
same words: 870

If flame, smoke, and ash lie concealed in logs,
Then it is necessary that logs are made of
heterogeneous things,

Of heterogeneous things that arise from the wood. [874]

Furthermore, whatever bodies the earth nourishes,
makes grow, [873]

<must consist of heterogeneous things containing
other heterogeneous things.>²

There remains here a slight possibility of hiding,
To which Anaxagoras has recourse: to think that all
things 875

Are mixed, hiding, in every thing, but that the one
That appears is the one of which there is the most in
the mixture

And that is located most visibly and in the very front.
But this is very far distant from right reasoning. 880

For in that case wheat too, when it is crushed
By the threatening force of a stone, should often emit
a trace

Of blood or one of the things that are nourished in
our body,

And when we rub it on one stone against another,
blood should flow forth.

According to the same reasoning, grass too and pools
of water 885

Should often send forth sweet drops with a taste
similar

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

mittere, lanigerae quali sunt ubere lactis,
scilicet et glebis terrarum saepe friatis
herbarum genera et fruges frondisque videri
890 dispertita inter terram latitare minute,
postremo in lignis cinerem fumumque videri,
cum prae fracta forent, ignisque latere minutos.
quorum nil fieri quoniam manifesta docet res,
scire licet non esse in rebus res ita mixtas,
895 verum semina multimodis inmixta latere
multarum rerum in rebus communia debent.

A Stoicizing Interpretation (R30)

R30 (< A67) Aët. 2.8.1 (Ps.-Plut.) [τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τὸν
κόσμον ἐγκλιθῆναι]

[. . .] ἐγκλιθῆναί πως τὸν κόσμον [. . . cf. **D32**], ἴσως
ὑπὸ προνοίας, ἵνα ᾧ μὲν¹ αἰοίκητα γένηται, ᾧ δὲ² οἰ-
κητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ
εὐκρασίαν.

¹ post ᾧ μὲν hab. mss. *τινα*, ut glossema del. Diels: τὰ μὲν
Eus. 15.39.1 ² ᾧ δὲ mss.: τὰ δὲ Eus.

Anaxagoras in Simplicius (R31–R34) *Simplicius Nuances Plato's Criticism of* *Anaxagoras (R31)*

R31 (≠ DK) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 177.9–17

καὶ ὅπερ δὲ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Ἀνα-
ξάγῳρα,

ANAXAGORAS

To the richness of the milk from the udder of fleece-
bearing animals;

And indeed, when clods of earth are crumbled
Kinds of grass, wheat, and leaves should often
become visible,

Their minute parts hiding, scattered throughout the 890
earth;

And finally ash and smoke should become visible in
logs

When they are broken, and minute flames hiding.

But since reality manifestly indicates that none of this
happens,

We can know that things are not mixed in this way in
other things,

But rather that seeds common to many things 895
Must lie hidden intermingled in things in many ways.

A Stoicizing Interpretation (R30)

R30 (< A67) Aëtius

[. . .] the world inclined [. . .], perhaps from providence,
so that some parts of the world would become uninhabited
and others inhabited, as a function of extreme cold or heat,
or of a temperate climate.

Anaxagoras in Simplicius (R31–R34) *Simplicius Nuances Plato's Criticism of* *Anaxagoras (R31)*

R31 (≠ DK) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's* *Physics*

And what Socrates reproaches Anaxagoras with in the

Ξαγόρα τὸ ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις μὴ τῷ νῶ κεχρηῆσθαι ἀλλὰ ταῖς ὑλिकाῖς ἀποδόσεσιν, οἰκείον ἦν φυσιολογία. Τοιγαροῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ τὴν ποιητικὴν πάντων αἰτίαν ὀλικῶς παραδούς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος διαφορὰς ὄγκων καὶ σχημάτων αἰτιᾶται τῆς τε θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. ὁ μέντοι Σωκράτης τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τελικοῦ ἀπόδοσιν ὑποδείξει βουλόμενος ἐμνημόνευσεν Ἀναξαγόρου ὡς τῇ ὑλικῇ μᾶλλον ἀλλ' οὐ τελικῇ αἰτία χρωμένου.

*Simplicius Defends Anaxagoras Against
Aristotle's Criticisms (R32–R33)*

R32 (> A53) *Simpl. In Phys.*, p. 461.10–16, 20–27

ὅτι δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ προφαινόμενον ἱστορεῖ τῆς Ἀναξαγόρου δόξης, ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας σοφὸς ὢν διττὴν ἡνίττετο τὴν διακόσμησιν, τὴν μὲν ἡνωμένην καὶ νοητὴν προυπάρχουσιν οὐ χρόνῳ¹ (οὐ γὰρ ἔγχρονος ἐκείνη), ἀλλ' ὑπεροχῇ οὐσίας καὶ δυνάμεως, τὴν δὲ διακεκριμένην ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ὑφίστασθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ, εἴρηται καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχολαῖς, ἐν αἷς τὰς πίστεις ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐπειράθη παραγράψαι τῶν Ἀναξαγόρου ῥημάτων. [. . .] διό φησιν Ἀναξαγόρας μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι πάντα διακριθῆναι· οὐ γὰρ παντελὴς διασπασμός ἐστιν ἢ διάκρισις. διό οὐχ οἷόν τε βάδισιν ἢ χροῶν ἢ ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις

¹ οὐ χρόνῳ Diels: οὐ χροῦμο sic E: om. F

ANAXAGORAS

Phaedo [cf. **R5**], viz. that he made use not of mind but of material reasons in the causal explanation of particular phenomena—this was appropriate for natural science. Indeed, Plato himself in the *Timaeus*, having begun by indicating universally the efficient cause of all things, then when he comes to particular things makes differences of volume and shape the cause of heat and cold, and so too in the other cases [cf. *Timaeus* 53c]. But Socrates, who wanted to indicate explanation on the basis of finality, has mentioned Anaxagoras as someone who had recourse rather to the material cause and not to the final cause.

Simplicius Defends Anaxagoras Against Aristotle's Criticisms (R32)

R32 (> A53) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

As I already said as well in my lectures on Book 1, in which I made an effort to cite evidence drawn from Anaxagoras' own words [cf. **R34**], Aristotle reports the visible surface of Anaxagoras' doctrine; but Anaxagoras, in his wisdom, alludes enigmatically to a double organization of the world, the one unified and intelligible, preceding not in time (for it is not within time) but by superiority of being and power, the other divided, which derives from this one and is in conformity with it, and whose existence is due to a demiurgic mind. [. . .] That is why Anaxagoras says that it is not possible either for all things to be completely separated: for dissociation is not a complete disintegration. That is why it is impossible that walking, color, or in general affections and conditions be separated from the

χωρισθῆναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. τὸ δὲ χρονικὴν δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι τὴν τῆς διακρίσεως ἀρχὴν σύνητες ἦν τοῖς πάλαι φυσιολόγοις τε καὶ θεολόγοις συγκαταβαίνουσι τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῆς ἡμετέρας νοήσεως· οὐ γὰρ δυνάμεθα τῇ αἰδίῳ παρατάσει συμπαρατείνειν τὴν νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἀπαιτοῦμεν ἀρχῆς τινος ὑποτιθεμένης ἐφεξῆς θεωρεῖν τὰ ἀκόλουθα.²

² τὰ ἀκόλουθα F: τὰ καθόλου E

R33 (ad B16, B15) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 178.28–179.12

ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐχ οὕτως ἄπειρα ὡς ἀπεριήγητα τῷ πλήθει καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας τὰ στοιχεῖα φησι, πρότερον ἐπειράθησαν πιστώσασθαι [cf. p. 174.14]. καὶ πεπερασμένα δὲ κατὰ τὰ εἶδη φησίν, ἀλλ' ἀρχοειδέστερον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἀπλούστερα τῶν γινομένων στοιχεῖα γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ὑπέθετο τοῦ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως ἔχειν τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν συντεθείσιν νομίσαντος. εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας τὰς ἀπλᾶς καὶ ἀρχοειδεῖς ποιότητας ὑπέθετο στοιχεῖα, ἄλλα¹ τὰ σύνθετα ἐν οἷς φησιν “ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις [. . .] καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν” [cf. D27]. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα δὲ “τὸ μὲν πυκνόν [. . .] τοῦ αἰθέρος” [D30]. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀρχοειδῇ ταῦτα καὶ ἀπλούστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι λέγει, ἄλλα δὲ τούτων συνθετώτερα ποτὲ μὲν συμπήγνυσθαι λέγει ὡς σύνθετα, ποτὲ δὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὡς τὴν γῆν. οὕτως γάρ φησιν “ἀπὸ τουτέων ἀποκρino-

¹ ἄλλα coni. Diels: ἀλλ' οὐ ed. Ald.: ἀλλὰ mss.

substrates. As for seeming to say that the beginning of the dissociation is temporal, this was a habit among the ancient natural philosophers and theologians, for they were accommodating themselves to the weakness of our thought: for we are not able to extend our own thought to the extension of eternity, but we need to posit a certain beginning in order to consider what follows from it step by step.

R33 (ad B16, B15) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

I tried to demonstrate earlier that Anaxagoras too says that the elements are **not** unlimited in the sense of a quantity that cannot be traversed. But even if he says that they are limited according to their forms, nonetheless Empedocles has posited in a way more appropriate for principles elements that are simpler for the things that come about (earth, water, air, and fire) than he [i.e. Anaxagoras] has done, who thinks that these latter are constituted in the same way as what is composed out of them—if Anaxagoras too was not positing as elements the simple elements, the ones that are principles, and the composites as different, when he says, “**And the rotation** [. . .] **and from the moist the dry**” [cf. **D27**], and a little later, “**What is dense** [. . .] **of the aether**” [**D30**]; and he says that these things, which are principles and are the simplest, separate, while for others, which are more complex, he says that sometimes they coalesce like composites, while at other times they separate, like earth. For he says, “**Out of these**

μένων [. . .] ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ” [cf. **D31**]. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ εἶδη ἀναδραμῶν Ἀναξαγόρας ἀρχοειδέστερον δόξει τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὰ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων φιλοσοφεῖν.

*The Transmission of the Fragments of
Anaxagoras: An Example (R34)*

R34 (cf. ad B1, B2) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 155.23–157.24

ὅτι δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ἑνὸς¹ μίγματος ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει ὁμοιομερῇ ἀποκρίνεσθαι φησιν πάντων μὲν ἐν παντὶ ἐόντων, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζομένου, δηλοῖ διὰ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Φυσικῶν λέγων ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς “ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν [. . .] καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει” [**D9**]. καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγον “καὶ γὰρ ἀήρ [. . .] ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πλήθος” [**D10**]. καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα “τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων [. . .] χροιάς καὶ ἡδονάς” [cf. **D13**]. “πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι,” φησί, “πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων [. . .] τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ” [cf. **D12**].

ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ γίνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται τι τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστι, δηλοῖ λέγων “τούτων δὲ οὕτω διακεκριμένων [. . .] πάντα ἴσα αἰεὶ” [**D16**].

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ μίγματος καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ τάδε γέγραφε· “νοῦς δὲ ἐστὶν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς [. . .] ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἑκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν” [cf. **D27**].

¹ ἐξ ἑνὸς DE: ἐκ τινος F

things [. . .] of the cold" [cf. D31]. And in this way Anaxagoras, going back to the simple forms, will seem to provide a philosophical account with regard to the elements in a way that is more appropriate for principles than Empedocles does.

*The Transmission of the Fragments of
Anaxagoras: An Example (R34)*

R34 (cf. ad B1, B2) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

The fact that Anaxagoras says that homeomers unlimited in quantity separate out from a single mixture and that, all things being in every thing, each one is characterized according to what predominates—he makes this clear throughout book 1 of his *Physics*, saying at the beginning, **"All things were together [. . .] both in quantity and in magnitude"** [D9]; and shortly after, **"For both the air [. . .] unlimited in quantity"** [D10]; and shortly after, **"These things being so [. . .] colors and flavors"** [cf. D13]; **"Before these things separated out,"** he says, **"all things being together [. . .] to each other"** [cf. D12].

The fact that none of the homeomers ever comes to be or is destroyed, but that they are always the same, he makes clear by saying, **"Since it is in this way that these things have separated [. . .] the totality of things is always equal"** [D16].

This then is what he says about the mixture and the homeomers. As for mind, he has written the following: **"but mind is unlimited and master of itself [. . .] this is and was most manifestly each thing"** [cf. D27].

ὅτι δὲ διττὴν τινα διακόσμησιν ὑποτίθεται τὴν μὲν νοεράν, τὴν δὲ αἰσθητὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνης, δῆλον μὲν καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε· “ὁ δὲ νοῦς [. . .] ἐν τοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοις” [D28]. καὶ μέντοι εἰπὼν “ἐνείναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα [. . .] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει” [cf. D13], ἐπάγει “καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν [. . .] χρώνται” [cf. D13]. καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἑτέραν τινὰ διακόσμησιν παρὰ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν αἰνίττεται, δηλοῖ τὸ “ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν” οὐχ ἅπαξ μόνον εἰρημένον. ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ αἰσθητὴν μὲν ἐκείνην οἶεται, τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ ταύτης προηγησαμένην, δηλοῖ τὸ “ὧν ἐκείνοι τὰ ὀνήιστα συνενεικάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἴκησιν χρώνται.” οὐ γὰρ “ἐχρώντο” εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ “χρώνται.” ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὡς νῦν κατ' ἄλλας τινὰς οἰκῆσεις ὁμοίας οὔσης καταστάσεως τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἶπε “τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην εἶναι καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ὥσπερ καὶ² παρ' ἡμῖν,” ἀλλ' “ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν” ὡς δὴ περὶ ἄλλων λέγων.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, ζητεῖν ἄξιον.

² καὶ om. DE

The fact that he accepts a double organization of the world, the one intelligible and the other perceptible deriving from the former, is clear both from what I have already said and also from the following: **“Mind [. . .] in those that are separating”** [D28]. Furthermore, having said, **“that many things and of all kinds, are present [. . .] and all the other living things that possess soul”** [cf. D13], he adds, **“and that these human beings [. . .] make use of them”** [cf. D13]. And the fact that he is alluding enigmatically to a different organization of the world from the one among us is made clear by the phrase **“just as among us,”** which is said more than once. And the fact that he thinks that that one is not perceptible, but that it precedes this one in time, is made clear by the phrase, **“of which they gather the most useful ones into their household and make use of them.”** For he did not say “made use,” but rather **“make use.”** But he did not speak either as though the state of things in the other households was similar to the one among us now; for he did not say, “they have the sun and the moon, just as among us,” but rather, **“a sun and a moon, just as among us,”** which suggests that he is speaking about other ones [i.e. sun and moon].

But whether these matters are like this or different would be worth investigating.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

A Judgment on Anaxagoras' Style (R35)

R35 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.6

[. . .] ἀρξάμενος οὕτω τοῦ συγγράματος, ὃ ἐστὶν ἡδέως καὶ μεγαλοφρόνως ἡρμηνευμένον [. . . cf. **P42**].

*An Aphorism Attributed to Anaxagoras
in Syriac (R36)*

R36 (B23) *Studia Sinaitica* 1, p. 33

[illegible]

O = Oxford, New College, Syr. 331, fol. 97v

S = Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai, Syr. 16, fol. 147v

¹ *ibid.* 3 O om. S

ANAXAGORAS

A Judgment on Anaxagoras' Style (R35)

R35 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] beginning in the following way his treatise, which is written in an agreeable and elevated style [. . .].

An Aphorism Attributed to Anaxagoras in Syriac (R36)

R36 (B23) From a Syriac collection of Greek sayings

Anaxagoras said, "Death, which seems at first sight to humans to be bitter, is, when things are examined more closely, very beautiful: it grants peace to old age, which lacks strength, to youth, which pains assail, and to childhood, which it prevents from tormenting and exhausting itself, from constructing, planting, and installing for other people; it frees debtors from their creditors, who demand capital and interest. We should not grieve because of something that is fixed and determined, for grief cannot eliminate it, whereas a good mood can conceal it, even if only for a certain time, for there is no suffering in the port when one spends time there. And even if the sight of death is hateful to the eyes of those who see it, then close your eyes for a moment. And so: you have seen how beautiful death is—death, which those who are afflicted and tormented call for. This provides testimony for how calm and marvelous the habitation of the Underworld is."¹

¹ Translated from the French translation by Henri Hugonnard-Roche.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Anaxagoras in The Assembly of Philosophers (R37)

R37 (\neq DK) *Turba Phil.* Sermo III, pp. 354.10-356.5
Lacaze

ait Anaxagoras: “dico quod principium omnium, quae Deus creavit, est pietas et ratio, eo quod pietas regit omnia, et in ratione apparuit pietas et spissum terrae; pietas autem non videtur nisi in corpore. et scitote, omnis Turba, quod spissitudo quatuor elementorum in terra quiescit, eo quod ignis spissum in aëra cadit, aëris vero spissum et quod ex ignis spisso congregatur, in aquam incidit, aquae quoque spissum et quod ex ignis et aëris spisso coadunatur, in terra quiescit.”

ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras in The Assembly of Philosophers (R37)

R37 (≠ DK) *The Assembly of Philosophers*

Anaxagoras said: “I say to you that the beginning of all things that God **has** created **d** is piety and reason, since piety rules all things and it is in reason that piety and **what earth has of** density appeared; but piety manifests itself only in a body. And know, you the whole Assembly, that the density of the four elements rests **i** in earth, because **what** fire **has of density** falls onto air, while **what air has of** density **as well as** what is aggregated from the dense **part** of fire falls onto water, and **what water has of** density **as well as** the dense **part** of **the** fire and of **the** air **that is united with it also** rests in earth.”

26. ARCHELAUS [ARCH.]

Archelaus' dates are not indicated by any ancient source, so he can be situated only relatively, as Anaxagoras' disciple and as Socrates' teacher (**P1**). Thus he may be supposed to have been active at the beginning of the second half of the fifth century BC. What we can tell about his doctrine allows us to characterize it as a revision regarding the two neuralgic points of Anaxagoras' system: the elementary constituents that Aristotle calls 'homeomers' and the role of Mind (*nous*). From this point of view, he belongs to the same post-Anaxagorean movement as does Diogenes of Apollonia, who is surely younger than him and who shares with him the importance assigned to air in the cosmogonic process. The fact that ancient sources present him as the last natural philosopher is surely only the counterpart of the statement that he already concerned himself with ethical questions (**R2**), making him a kind of bridge between Anaxagoras and Socrates. But even if this information should happen to be correct, it is no longer possible to provide anything more than a very sketchy outline of his thought.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

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OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Origin and Intellectual Lines of Descent (P1–P4)
Socrates’ Lover (P5–P6)

D

Writings (D1)
Two General Summaries Going Back Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D3)
The Principles (D4–D8)
 The First Principles (D4–D5)
 Further Principles (D6–D8)
The Formation of the World and the Role of Mind (D9–D11)
Infinity of Worlds (D12)

ARCHELAUS

The Formation of the Earth (D13)

The World is Destructible (D14)

The Heavenly Bodies (D15)

Thunder and Lightning (D16)

The Flooding of the Nile (D17)

Earthquakes (D18)

The Birth of Animals (D19)

The Soul (D20)

Politics and Ethics (D21–D22)

R

Earliest Attestation: Ion of Chios (cf. P4)

Theophrastus' Judgment (R1)

The Construction of a Philosophical Succession (R2)

Epicurus, a Reader of Archelaus (R3)

An Objection by Seneca to Archelaus' Explanation of Earthquakes (R4)

Elegiac Poems? (R5)

Alchemical Forgeries (R6)

Archelaus in The Assembly of Philosophers (R7)

ARCHELAUS [60DK]

P

Origin and Intellectual Lines of Descent (P1–P4)

P1 (<A1) Diog. Laert. 2.16

Ἀρχέλαος Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Μιλήσιος, πατὴρ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς δέ τινες, Μίδωνος, μαθητῆς Ἀναξαγόρου, διδάσκαλος Σωκράτους. οὗτος πρῶτος ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνίας τὴν φυσικὴν φιλοσοφίαν μετήγαγεν Ἀθήναζε¹ καὶ ἐκλήθη φυσικός [. . . = **R2**].

¹ οὗτος . . . Ἀθήναζε ut glossema ad Anaxagoram referens secl. Menagius

P2 (≠ DK) Eus. *PE* 10.14.13

Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ ἐγένοντο γνώριμοι τρεῖς, Περικλῆς, Ἀρχέλαος, Εὐριπίδης. [. . .] ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέλαος ἐν Λαμψάκῳ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, μεταβὰς δ' εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐκεῖ ἐσχόλασε καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχεν Ἀθηναίων γνωρίμους, ἐν οἷς καὶ Σωκράτην.

ARCHELAUS

P

Origin and Intellectual Lines of Descent (P1–P4)

P1 (<A1) Diogenes Laertius

Archelaus of Athens or of Miletus; his father was Apollodorus or, as some say, Midon; disciple of Anaxagoras, teacher of Socrates. This man was the first to transfer natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens¹ and he was called a ‘natural philosopher’ (*phusikos*) [. . .].

¹ Some scholars believe that this last phrase refers to Anaxagoras (cf. **ANAXAG. P13**).

P2 (≠ DK) Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*

Anaxagoras had three disciples: Pericles, Archelaus, and Euripides. [. . .] Archelaus was the successor at the school of Anaxagoras in Lampsacus, and after he moved to Athens he taught there and had many Athenian pupils, including Socrates.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

P3 (< A2) *Suda* A.4084

Ἀρχέλαος, Ἀπολλοδώρου ἢ Μίδωνος, Μιλήσιος, φιλόσοφος, φυσικὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν κληθείς ὅτι ἀπὸ Ἴωνίας πρῶτος τὴν φυσιολογίαν ἤγαγεν, Ἀναξαγόρου μαθητῆς τοῦ Κλαζομενίου, τοῦ δὲ μαθητῆς Σωκράτης· οἱ δὲ καὶ Εὐριπίδην¹ φασίν.

¹ Εὐριπίδην Kuster: Εὐριπίδης A: Εὐριπίδου ITM

P4 (A3) *Diog. Laert.* 2.23

Ἴων δὲ ὁ Χίος [Frag. 11 Blumenthal] καὶ νέον ὄντα εἰς Σάμον σὺν Ἀρχελάῳ ἀποδημῆσαι.

Socrates' Lover (P5–P6)

P5 (> A3) *Suda* Σ.829

Ἀριστόξενος δὲ Ἀρχελάου πρῶτον αὐτὸν διακοῦσαι λέγει [Frag. 52b Wehrli]· γεγονέναι δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ παιδικά, σφοδρότατόν τε περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια [. . . = **P6b**].

P6 *Porph. Hist. phil.*

a (A3) *Theod. Cur.* 12.66 [= *Porph. Frag.* 215 Smith]

ἐλέγετο δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὥς ἄρα παῖς ὢν οὐκ εἶ βιώσειεν οὐδὲ εὐτάκτως [. . .]. ἤδη δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐπτακαίδεκα ἔτη προσελθεῖν αὐτῷ Ἀρχέλαον, τὸν Ἀναξαγόρου μαθητήν, φάσκοντα ἐραστήν εἶναι· τὸν δὲ Σωκράτην οὐκ

ARCHELAUS

P3 (< A2) *Suda*

Archelaus, son of Apollodorus or of Midon, from Miletus, a philosopher, called ‘natural’ with regard to his school, because he was the first to bring the philosophy of nature (*phusiologia*) from Ionia; disciple of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae; Socrates was his disciple, some say that Euripides was too.

P4 (A3) Ion of Chios in Diogenes Laertius

Ion of Chios also [scil. says that] when he [i.e. Socrates] was young he traveled to Samos with Archelaus.

Socrates’ Lover (P5–P6)

P5 (> A3) *Suda*

Aristoxenus says that he [scil. Socrates] at first studied with Archelaus, and that he also became his beloved, with a very passionate sexual love [. . .].

P6 Porphyry, *History of Philosophy*

a (A3) Theodoret, *Greek Maladies*

It was said of him [i.e. Socrates] that when he was very young he did not live in a proper or well-ordered way [. . .]. When he was already about seventeen years old [= 452 BC], Archelaus, Anaxagoras’ disciple, came to him, saying that he was in love with him. Socrates did not refuse these

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἀπώσασθαι τὴν ἔντευξίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Ἀρχέλαον, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτῷ ἔτη συχνά. καὶ οὕτως¹ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρχελάου προτραπῆναι ἐπὶ τὰ φιλόσοφα.

¹ οὕτως Mgr.: ὅπως L: πως KM

b (≠ DK) *Suda* Σ.829 [= Porph. Frag. 215a Smith]

[. . . = **P5**] ἀλλὰ ἀδικήματος χωρίς, ὡς Πορφύριος ἐν τῇ Φιλοσόφῳ ἱστορίᾳ φησίν.

ARCHELAUS

advances or Archelaus' company, but spent a number of years with him. And it was in this way that he was directed toward philosophical questions by Archelaus.

b (\neq DK) *Suda*

[. . . a very passionate sexual love, cf. **P5**], but one that was free of wrongdoing, as Porphyry says in his *History of Philosophy*.

ARCHELAUS [60 DK]

D

Writings (D1)

D1 (< A2) *Suda* A.4084

συνέταξε δὲ φυσιολογίαν [. . .]. συνέταξε καὶ ἄλλα
τινά.

*Two General Summaries Going Back
Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D3)*

D2 (< A4) (Ps.-?) *Hippol. Ref.* 1.9

[1] [. . .] οὗτος ἔφη τὴν μῖξιν τῆς ὕλης ὁμοίως Ἀναξα-
γόρα τάς τε ἀρχὰς ὡσαύτως· οὗτος δὲ τῷ νῷ ἐννύπαρ-
χειν τι εὐθέως μίγμα. [2] εἶναι <δ>¹ ἀρχὰς² τῆς κινή-
σεως <τῷ>³ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ
τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν
ἡρεμεῖν· τηκόμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς μέσον ῥεῖν, ἐν ᾧ
καὶ κατακαιόμενον ἀέρα γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν, ὧν τὸ μὲν

ARCHELAUS

D

Writings (D1)

D1 (< A2) *Suda*

He composed a treatise on nature (*phusiologia*) [. . .]. He also composed some other works.

Two General Summaries Going Back Ultimately to Theophrastus (D2–D3)

D2 (< A4) (Ps.-?) Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies*

[1] [. . .] This man spoke of the mixture of matter in a way similar to Anaxagoras, and so too of the principles. But as for himself he said that a certain mixture was present in mind (*nous*) from the beginning. [2] The principles of motion are the hot and the cold, by separating from each other; and the hot moves, while the cold remains at rest. Water melts and flows toward the center, where, when it is also burned, air and earth come to be, of which the

¹ <δ'> Schneidewin-Duncker ² ἀρχὰς mss.: ἀρχὰς
τῆς κινήσεως <δύο ἄς> ἀποκρίνεσθαι Diels: ἀρχὴν Roeper
³ <τῷ> nos: <τὸ> Ritter

ἄνω φέρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑφίστασθαι κάτω. [3] τὴν μὲν οὖν γῆν ἡρεμεῖν καὶ γενέσθαι διὰ ταῦτα, κεῖσθαι δ' ἐν μέσῳ οὐδὲν μέρος οὔσαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, τοῦ παντός· <τὸν δ' αέρα>⁴ ἐκδεδομένον ἐκ τῆς πυρώσεως, ἀφ' οὗ πρῶτον ἀποκαιομένον τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων εἶναι φύσιν, ὧν μέγιστον μὲν ἥλιον, δεύτερον δὲ σελήνην, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μείζω. [4] ἐπικλιθῆναι δὲ τὸν οὐρανόν φησι, καὶ οὕτως τὸν ἥλιον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ποιῆσαι φῶς καὶ τὸν τε αέρα ποιῆσαι διαφανῆ καὶ τὴν γῆν ξηράν. λίμνην γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον, ἅτε κύκλῳ μὲν οὔσαν ὑψηλήν, μέσον δὲ κοίλην. σημείον δὲ φέρει τῆς κοιλότητος, ὅτι ὁ ἥλιος οὐχ ἅμα ἀνατέλλει τε καὶ δύεται πᾶσιν, ὅπερ ἔδει συμβαίνειν, εἴπερ ἦν ὁμαλή. [5] περὶ δὲ ζώων φησί, ὅτι θερμαινομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει,⁵ ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμισγέτο, ἀνεφαίνετο τὰ τε ἄλλα ζῶα πολλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἅπαντα⁶ τὴν αὐτὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντα ἐκ τῆς ἰλύος τρεφόμενα—ἦν δὲ ὀλιγοχρόνια—ὑστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡ⁷ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσις συνέστη.⁸ [6] καὶ διεκρίθησαν ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡγεμόνας καὶ νόμους καὶ τέχνας καὶ πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστησαν. νούν δὲ λέγει πᾶσιν ἐμφύεσθαι ζώοις ὁμοίως. χρῆσθαι⁹ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν σωματίων ὅσῳ <δυνατόν>,¹⁰ τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως.

⁴ <τὸν δ' αέρα> [scil. γενέσθαι] nos post Roeper, qui <τὸν δ' αέρα κρατεῖν τοῦ παντός> suppl.

⁵ κάτω μέρει Cedrenus 1.278 (ex Hipp.): κατὰ μέρος mss.

ARCHELAUS

former rises upward while the latter sinks downward. [3] Thus the earth remains at rest and comes to be for these reasons, and it lies in the center since it is not at all, as it were, a part of the whole. <The air> [scil. comes to be] once it has been restored from the conflagration; from its burning comes first the nature of the heavenly bodies, of which the largest is the sun, then the moon; and as for the other heavenly bodies, some are smaller and others larger. [4] He says that the heavens inclined and that in this way the sun produced light on the earth and made the air transparent and the earth dry. For at first it was a marsh, being elevated in its circumference and sunken in the center. He cites as evidence for its being sunken the fact that the sun does not rise and set at the same time for everyone, something that would have to be the case if it were uniform. [5] With regard to animals, he says that, the earth having been warmed at first in its lower part, where the warm and the cold mixed, there appeared, together with many other animals, also human beings, and that they all lived in the same way, nourishing themselves from the mud (they lived only a short time), but that afterward their reproduction was from each other. [6] And the humans separated from the other ones [scil. animals] and established leaders, laws, arts, cities, and the rest. He says that mind (*nous*) is equally present by nature in all animals. For each of their bodies uses as much of it <as is possible>, the ones more slowly, the others more quickly.

⁶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἅπαντα Cedrenus: ἀνόμοια πάντα mss.

⁷ ἡ Cedrenus: καὶ mss.

ἐπηκολούθησεν Cedrenus

LO: χρήσεσθαι B

⁸ συνέστη OT: ἀνέστη LB:

⁹ χρήσθαι Zeller: χρήσασθαι

¹⁰ τῶν σωμάτων ὅσω <δυνατόν> e.g. nos: τῶν σωμάτων ὅσω (ὅσα BO) mss.: τῶν ζώων τῷ νῷ Diels

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D3 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.17

τηκόμενόν φησι τὸ ὕδωρ¹ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ, καθὸ μὲν εἰς τὸ <μέσον διὰ τὸ>² πυρῶδες συνίσταται, ποιεῖν γῆν· καθὸ δὲ περιρρεῖ, ἀέρα γεννᾶν. ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς περιφορᾶς κρατεῖται. γεννᾶσθαι δέ φησι τὰ ζῶα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἰλὺν παραπλησίαν γάλακτι οἶον τροφὴν ἀνιείσης· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιῆσαι. πρῶτος δὲ εἶπε φωνῆς γένεσιν τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος πληξίν. τὴν δὲ θάλατταν ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις διὰ τῆς γῆς ἡθουμένην συνεστάναι. μέγιστον τῶν ἀστρῶν τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον.

¹ ὕδωρ P: ὑγρὸν B

² <μέσον διὰ τὸ> Kranz, alii alia

The Principles (D4–D8) *The First Principles (D4–D5)*

D4 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 27.26–28

[. . . = **R1**] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσι, τὰς ὁμοιομερείας τιθέντες ἀρχάς.

D5 (A10) August. *Civ. Dei* 8.2

Anaxagorae successit auditor eius Archelaus. etiam ipse de particulis inter se similibus, quibus singula quaeque fierent, ita putavit constare omnia, ut inesse etiam mentem

ARCHELAUS

D3 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He says that the water, melting by the effect of heat, produced the earth <because of the> fiery element to the extent that it reached the <center>, and that it generated the air to the extent that it flowed around the periphery. That is why the one is dominated by the air, the other by the revolution of the fire. He says that the animals were generated out of the warm earth, which sent up a mud similar to milk as a form of nourishment. It is in this way too that it [i.e. the earth] made humans. He was the first person to say that it is the striking of air that produces sound. The sea was filtered through the earth and was deposited in its cavities. The largest of the heavenly bodies is the sun, and the whole is unlimited.

The Principles (D4–D8)
The First Principles (D4–D5)

D4 (< A5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

These people [i.e. Anaxagoras and Archelaus] say that the principles are unlimited in number and are not homogeneous; they posit that the homoeomeries are principles.

D5 (A10) Augustine, *City of God*

Anaxagoras was followed by his disciple Archelaus: he too thought that all the things that come to be are composed of particles similar to each other, but in such a way, he said, that mind (*mens*) is also present in them; these eternal

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

diceret, quae corpora aeterna, id est illas particulas, coniungendo et dissipando ageret omnia.

Further Principles (D6–D8)

D6 (< A7) Aët. 1.3.6 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ ἀρχῶν τί εἰσιν]

Ἀρχέλαος [. . .] ἀέρα ἄπειρον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν πυκνότητα καὶ μάνωσιν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι πῦρ τὸ δ' ὕδωρ.

D7 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.16

ἔλεγε δὲ δύο αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν [. . . = **D19**].

D8 (< A9) Epiph. *Pan.* 3.2.9.5

Ἀρχέλαος [. . .] ἐκ γῆς τὰ πάντα λέγει γεγενῆσθαι. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων ἐστίν, ὥς φησι.

The Formation of the World and the Role of Mind (D9–D11)

D9 (A12) Aët. 1.7.14 (Stob.) [τίς ὁ θεός;]

Ἀρχέλαος ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεόν, οὗ μέντοι κοσμοποιὸν τὸν νοῦν.

ARCHELAUS

bodies, that is, those particles, direct all things by combining and separating.

Further Principles (D6–D8)

D6 (< A7) Aëtius

Archelaus [. . .]: [scil. the principle is] unlimited air and the condensation and rarefaction it undergoes; of these, the one is fire, the other water.

D7 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He said that the causes of generation are two, hot and cold [. . .].

D8 (< A9) Epiphanius, *Against Heresies*

Archelaus [. . .] says that everything is generated out of the earth. For it is this that is the origin of all things, as he says.

The Formation of the World and the Role of Mind (D9–D11)

D9 (A12) Aëtius

Archelaus: god is air and mind, but mind is not what made the world.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D10 (A14) Aët. 2.4.5 (Stob.) [εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος]

Ἀρχέλαος ὑπὸ θεοῦ¹ καὶ ἐμψυχίας² συστήναι τὸν κόσμον.

¹θερμοῦ Heeren

²ἐμψυχρίας Meineke

D11 (A11) Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 5.66.1

τούτῳ μὲν γε ἄμφω τὸν νοῦν ἐπεστησάτην τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ.

Infinity of Worlds (D12)

D12 (< A13) Aët. 2.1.3 (Stob.; cf. Ps-Plut.) [περὶ κόσμου]

[. . .] Ἀρχέλαος [. . .] ἀπείρους κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατὰ πᾶσαν περίστασιν.¹

¹περίστασιν Plut.: περιαγωγὴν Stob.

The Formation of the Earth (D13)

D13 (< B1a) Plut. *Prim. frig.* 21.6 954F

[. . .] ἥς ἡ ψυχρότης δεσμός ἐστιν, ὡς Ἀρχέλαος ὁ φυσικὸς εἶπεν [. . .].

ARCHELAUS

D10 (A14) Aëtius

Archelaus: the world was formed by god and animation.¹

¹ Or, emending the text: “by heat and cooling.” But the god that creates the world can be air, rather than mind, cf. **D9**, and air is a principle of animation (cf. **D20**).

D11 (A11) Clement of Alexandria, *Protreptic*

These two [i.e. Anaxagoras and Archelaus] both set mind in control over the infinite.

Infinity of Worlds (D12)

D12 (< A13) Aëtius

[. . .] Archelaus [. . .]: the worlds are unlimited [scil. in number] in the unlimited throughout the entire surrounding area.

The Formation of the Earth (D13)

D13 (B1a) Plutarch, *On the Principle of Cold*

[. . .] the cold is the **bond** [scil. of the earth], as Archelaus the natural philosopher says [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The World is Destructible (D14)

D14

a (< A14) Aët. 2.4.6 (Stob.) [εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος]

[. . .] Ἀρχέλαος [. . .] φθαρτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

b (≠ DK) Alex. *In Phys.* 539 ad 8.1 250b18, p. 487 Rashed

ἓνα κόσμον γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν¹ ἐξ ἡσυχίας. [. . .]
Ἀρχέλαος [. . .].

¹ φθαρτὸν] ἄφθαρτον Rashed

The Heavenly Bodies (D15)

D15 (A15) Aët. 2.13.6 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας ἀστρων]

Ἀρχέλαος μύδρους ἔφησεν εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας, δια-
πύρους δέ.

Thunder and Lightning (D16)

D16 (A16) Aët. 3.3.5 (Stob.) [περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν
κεραυνῶν πρηστήρων τε καὶ τυφώνων]

Ἀρχέλαος ταὐτὸ¹ λέγει παρατιθείς τὸ τῶν διαπύρων
λίθων καθειμένων εἰς ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ πάθος.

¹ τοῦτο mss., corr. Meineke

ARCHELAUS

The World is Destructible (D14)

D14

a (< A14) Aëtius

[. . .] Archelaus [. . .]: the world is destructible.

b (≠ DK) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Scholia on Aristotle's *Physics*

One world, generated and destructible, coming from a state of rest: [. . .] Archelaus [. . .].

The Heavenly Bodies (D15)

D15 (A15) Aëtius

Archelaus said that the heavenly bodies are lumps of stone, and that they are on fire.

Thunder and Lightning (D16)

D16 (A16) Aëtius

Archelaus says the same thing [scil. as Anaxagoras about thunder, lightning, etc.], comparing them to what happens to red-hot stones when they are plunged into cold water.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Flooding of the Nile (D17)

D17 (≠DK) Tzet. *In Il.* 1.427 (p. 188 Lasserre)

[. . . = **ANAXAG. D66d**]

καὶ τις ἀνὴρ Ἀρχέλαος [. . .]

[. . .] συντρέχουσιν Ὀμήρῳ·

[. . .]

ἐξ ὄμβρων καὶ χιόνος τε τῆς ἐν Αἰθιοπία
συντηκομένης λέγοντες κατάρδεσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον.

Earthquakes (D18)

D18 (A16a) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 6.12.1–2

Archelaus †antiquitatis†¹ diligens ait ita: “venti in concava terrarum deferuntur; deinde, ubi iam omnia spatia plena sunt et in quantum aër potuit densatus est, is qui supervenit spiritus priorem premit et elidit ac frequentibus plagis primo cogit, deinde proturbat; [2] tunc ille quaerens locum omnes angustias dimovet et claustra sua conatur effringere: sic evenit, ut terrae spiritu luctante et fugam quaerente moveantur. itaque cum terrae motus futurus est, praecedit aëris tranquillitas et quies, videlicet quia vis spiritus, quae concitare ventos solet, in inferna² sede retinetur.”

¹ inter antiquos satis Gertz: auctor ueritatis *Schultess*

² in (in *om.* λ) inferni *mss.*, *corr.* *Fortunatus*

ARCHELAUS

The Flooding of the Nile (D17)

D17 (≠ DK) Tzetzes, *Commentary on Homer's Iliad*

[. . .]

And a certain Archelaus [. . .]

[. . .] they agree with Homer:

[. . .]

When they say that it is from rains and the snow

That melts in Ethiopia that the Nile is watered. [cf.

ANAXAG. D66d]

Earthquakes (D18)

D18 (A16a) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

Archelaus, esteeming †. . . †, says the following: “winds penetrate into the cavities of the earth; then, when all the spaces are full and the air has been condensed as far as is possible, the air that arrives subsequently presses the air that was already there and strikes it, and by means of frequent blows first it forces it, then it repels it. Then the earlier one, trying to find some room, splits open all the narrow passageways and tries to break open the barriers that enclose it: and so it comes about that the earth moves, as the air struggles and tries to escape. And this is why, when an earthquake is about to happen, the air is calm and tranquil beforehand, since the force of the air, which usually stirs up the winds, is being kept back in the subterranean region.”

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Birth of Animals (D19)

D19 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.16

[. . . = **D7**] καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἀπὸ τῆς ἰλύος γεννηθῆναι.

The Soul (D20)

D20 (< A17) Aët. 4.3.2 (Stob.) [εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς]

[. . .] Ἀρχέλαος [. . .] ἀερώδη.

Politics and Ethics (D21–D22)

D21 (A6) Sext. Adv. Math. 7.14

[. . .] Ἀρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν.

D22 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 2.16

[. . . cf. **R2**] καὶ γὰρ περὶ νόμων πεφιλοσόφηκε καὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων [. . . = **R2**] καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺς οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.

ARCHELAUS

The Birth of Animals (D19)

D19 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] and the animals were born from mud.

The Soul (D20)

D20 (< A17) Aëtius

[. . .] Archelaus [. . .]: it [scil. the soul is] of air.

Politics and Ethics (D21–D22)

D21 (A6) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

[. . .] Archelaus of Athens [scil. broached] questions of physics and ethics.

D22 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] for he also philosophized about laws and what is fine and just; [. . .] what is just and what is shameful exist not by nature but by convention.

ARCHELAUS [60 DK]

R

Earliest Attestation: Ion of Chios

See **P4**

Theophrastus' Judgment (R1)

R1 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 27.23–26 [cf. Theophr. Frag. 228A FSH&G]

καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος [. . .] ἐν μὲν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πειρᾶται τι φέρειν ἴδιον, τὰς ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδίδωσιν ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας [. . . = **D4**].

*The Construction of a Philosophical
Succession (R2)*

R2 (<A1) Diog. Laert. 2.16

[. . . = **P1**] παρὸ καὶ ἔληξεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία, Σωκράτους τὴν ἠθικὴν εἰσαγαγόντος. ἔοικε δὲ

ARCHELAUS

R

Earliest Attestation: Ion of Chios

See **P4**

Theophrastus' Judgment (R1)

R1 (< A5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Archelaus of Athens too [. . .] tries to say something of his own on the generation of the world and on other matters, but he assigns the same principles as Anaxagoras does.

*The Construction of a Philosophical
Succession (R2)*

R2 (<A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] that is also why natural philosophy came to an end with him, with Socrates introducing ethics. But it seems

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

καὶ οὗτος ἄψασθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς [. . . = **D22**]. παρ' οὗ λαβὼν Σωκράτης τῷ αὐξῆσαι εἰς ὁ εὐρὼν¹ ὑπελήφθη.

¹ εἰς ὁ εὐρὼν nos: εἰς τὸ εὐρεῖν mss.: εἰς τὸ <ἄκρον> εὐρεῖν Diels

Epicurus, a Reader of Archelaus (R3)

R3 (< 59 A26) Diog. Laert. 10.12

μάλιστα δὲ ἀπεδέχετο [Epic. Frag. 240 Usener], φησὶ Διοκλῆς, τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξαγόραν [. . . cf. **ANAXAG. R28**] καὶ Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Σωκράτους διδάσκαλον.

An Objection by Seneca to Archelaus' Explanation of Earthquakes (R4)

R4 (≠ DK) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 6.12.3

[. . . = **D18**] “quid ergo? numquam flante vento terra concussa est?” “admodum raro: <nam raro>¹ duo simul flavere venti: fieri tamen et potest et solet. quod si recipimus, et constat duos ventos rem simul gerere, quidni² accidere possit, ut alter superiorem aëra agitet, alter infernum?”

¹ <nam> *Hine*, <raro> *Shackleton Bailey*

² quidni *Erasmus*: quidnam *Zθπ*: quid (quod *B*) inde *δ*

ARCHELAUS

that he too touched upon ethics. [. . .] Socrates took it over from him, but was considered to have been its sole discoverer because he had developed it.

Epicurus, a Reader of Archelaus (R3)

R3 (< 59 A26) Diogenes Laertius

More than anyone else, says Diocles, he [i.e. Epicurus] preferred Anaxagoras among the ancients [. . .], and Archelaus, Socrates' teacher.

An Objection by Seneca to Archelaus' Explanation of Earthquakes (R4)

R4 (≠ DK) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

[. . .] "Well then? Has there never been an earthquake while the wind was blowing?" "It is very rare: for it is rare that two winds blow at the same time. But this can happen and it does happen customarily. If we accept that, and it is a fact that two winds are acting at the same time, why then could it not happen that one agitates the higher air, the other the lower air?"

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Elegiac Poems? (R5)

R5 (< B1) Plut. *Cim.* 4.8

[. . .] εἴ τι δέῃ τεκμαίρεσθαι [. . .] ταῖς γεγραμμέναις ἐπὶ παρηγορίᾳ τοῦ πένθους ἐλεγείαις πρὸς αὐτόν, ὧν Παναίτιος ὁ φιλόσοφος οἶεται [Frag. 125 van Straaten] ποιητὴν γεγονέναι τὸν φυσικὸν Ἀρχέλαον, οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοῖς χρόνοις εἰκάζων.

Alchemical Forgeries (R6)

R6 (< B2) *Coll. Alchim.* I, p. 25.6–13

γίνωσκε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ποιητῶν [. . .] Ἀρχέλαος [. . .].

Archelaus in The Assembly of Philosophers (R7)

R7 (≠ DK) *Turba Phil.*

a p. 109.1–9 Ruska

initium libri turbae qui dicitur codex veritatis, libri scilicet in quo Arisleus, cum Pitagoras, qui dicitur artifex, discipulorum suorum prudentiores congregavisset in tertia synodo pitagorica, sapientum verba coadunavit.¹

ARCHELAUS

Elegiac Poems? (R3)

R5 (< B1) Plutarch, *Cimon*

[. . .] if one must judge [. . .] from the elegiac poems written to console him [scil. Cimon] for his grief [scil. for the death of his lover Isodice], of which the philosopher Panaetius, conjecturing not implausibly on the basis of the chronology, thinks that the natural philosopher Archelaus was the author.

Alchemical Forgeries (R6)

R6 (< B2) *Collection of Ancient Greek Alchemists*

Learn as well, dear friend, the names of those who make [scil. gold]: [. . .] Archelaus [. . .].¹

¹ Archelaus' name appears twenty-second in a list of twenty-seven names (including those of Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, etc.). A collection of 336 early Byzantine iambs is preserved in Archelaus the Philosopher, *On the Same Sacred Art* [scil. of making gold], cf. DK I, p. 48.

Archelaus in The Assembly of Philosophers (R7)

R7 (≠ DK) *The Crowd of Philosophers*

a The beginning

The beginning of the *Book of the Assembly*, which is called the *Codex of Truth*, namely the book in which Arisleus (i.e. Archelaus) collected the words spoken by the sages when Pythagoras, who is called 'the master of the art [i.e. alchemy],' gathered together the wiser among his students in the third Pythagorean synod.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

quem librum vix legit intellectum habens vel aliquantulum prius in hac arte investigans, qui in nobile propositum non pervenit.

huius autem codicis principium est:

Arisleus genitus Pitagorae, discipulus ex discipulis Hermetis gratia triplicis, expositionem scientiae dicens omnibus posteris residuis salutem et misericordiam.

¹ initium . . . coadunavit *textus valde incertus, ita Lacaze*

b Sermo V, pp. 360.11–362.4 Lacaze

ait Arisleus: scitote, quod terra est collis et non est plana, unde sol non ascendit super climata terrae una hora. nam si plana esset, uno ascenderet momento super totam terram.

inquit Parmenides: breviter locutus es, Arislee.

respondit: numquid Magister dimisit nobis aliquid dicendum? dico tamen, quod Deus unus est, numquam genuit nec genitus est; et quod omnium caput post se est terra et ignis, eo quod ignis tenuis et levis regit omnia, terra autem cum sit ponderosa et spissa, fert omnia, quae regit ignis.

ARCHELAUS

Scarcely anyone who has understanding or who has some prior experience in this art reads this book without arriving at his noble goal.¹

Of this codex the beginning is as follows:

Arisleus, the son of Pythagoras, a student from among the students of the thrice blessed Hermes [i.e. Hermes Trismegistus], **proclaiming** the exposition of his science: health and compassion for all posterity. [cf. **PYTHS. R73**]

¹ Our translation of this very difficult and probably corrupt text follows the **reconstruction of Lacaze, cf. pp. 191-94.**

b

Arisleus said: Know that the earth is a hill and not flat, which is why the sun does not rise above the regions of the earth at one time. For if it were flat, it would rise in one moment above the whole earth.

Parmenides said: You have spoken briefly, Arisleus.

He answered: Yes indeed, for has our Teacher left us anything to say? Nevertheless I say that God is one, He never begot nor was he ever begotten; and that the **principle** of all things after Him is earth and fire, since fire, being rarefied and light, rules over all things, while the earth, which is heavy and dense, bears all the things over which fire rules.

28. DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

[DIOG.]

For Diogenes' chronology we do not possess any precise dates, but an indication that goes back to Theophrastus presents him as one of the last, indeed as "virtually the youngest," of the natural philosophers (**P2**), and the very content of his doctrine allows us to consider him a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras. He is also one of the probable targets of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, which was staged in 423 BC. For a long time disparaged as an eclectic and naïve thinker, his importance is now recognized, for the teleological program he sketches out, for his explicit argumentation in favor of a monism of which the foundation is called 'air,' and for the detailed description he gives, in relation with his general theory, of the system of distribution of blood and air in the human body. His monism of air and the concrete turn of his thought suggest that Diogenes occupies a place analogous, with regard to Anaxagoras, to that which Anaximenes had occupied with regard to Anaximander. His central term, *noêsis* ('intelligence'), which clearly echoes Anaxagoras' *nous*, is difficult to translate univocally: in various contexts it can apply either to intelligence or to mind or to other forms of apprehension, like perception.

DIODES OF APOLLONIA

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OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

- Chronology and Philosophical Affiliations* (P1–P2)
City of Origin (P3)
Diogenes in Danger at Athens? (P4)

D

- More Than One Treatise?* (D1)
The Beginning of the Treatise: A Methodological Remark (D2)
The Principle (D3–D13)
 The Justification of Monism (D3)
 Eternity of the Principle (D4)
 Intelligence of the Principle (D5–D6)
 The Principle Is Air (D7–D8)
 Air Is the Principle of Life (D9–D12)
 Divinity of the Principle (D13)

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Cosmogony (D14–D17)

*The Formation of Worlds: Two General Summaries
(D14–D15)*

An Infinite Number of Worlds or Only One? (D16)

The Inclination of the Poles (D17)

Cosmology (D18–D22)

The Heavenly Bodies (D18)

The Sun (D19–D20)

The Moon (D21)

Comets (D22)

Meteorology: Thunder and Lightning (D23)

The Earth (D24–D26)

The Sea (D24)

The Floods of the Nile (D25)

The Magnet (D26)

Physiology (D27–D44)

The System of the Vessels in Humans (D27)

Semen (D28)

Embryology (D29–D32)

Respiration, Life, and Death (D33)

Physiology of Sensations (D34–D42)

The General Principle (D34)

The Particular Sensations (D35–D41)

Smelling (D35)

Hearing (D36–D37)

Sight (D38)

Taste (D39–D40)

Touch (D41)

*Intensity and Precision of the Different Sensations
(D42)*

Pleasure, Pain, and Other Affections (D43)

Thought (D44)

ADIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Animals (D45–D47)

Plants: Spontaneous Generation (D48)

An Ionic Form Without Context (D49)

R

Possible Pre-Aristotelian Echoes (MED. T10; DERV. Col. 17–19; DRAM. T10, T81)

Peripatetic Reactions (R1–R12)

Aristotle (R1–R7)

Praise for the Unicity of Diogenes' Principle (R1)

Various Criticisms (R2–R4)

An Exegetical Problem in Aristotle and Its Consequences for the Transmission of the Fragments (R5–R7)

Theophrastus (R8–R11)

His Book on Diogenes (R8)

Diogenes' Lack of Coherence (R9)

Should Diogenes Be Connected with Theories of the Similar? (R10)

Criticisms of Diogenes' Doctrine of Cognition (R11)

Another Peripatetic Criticism (R12)

Diogenes Among the Epicureans (R13–R14)

An Obvious Reference to Diogenes in a Report on Epicurus (R13)

A Criticism (R14)

Stoicizing Versions of Diogenes? (R15–R17)

Three Divergent Presentations of Diogenes in Christian Authors (R18–R20)

An Alchemical Utilization (R21)

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA [64 DK]

P

Chronology and Philosophical Affiliations (P1–P2)

P1 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.57

Διογένης Ἀπολλοθέμιδος¹ Ἀπολλωνιάτης, ἀνὴρ φυσικὸς καὶ ἄγαν ἐλλόγιμος. ἤκουσε δέ, φησὶν Ἀντισθένης [FGrHist 508 F15], Ἀναξιμένους. ἦν δὲ ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις κατ' Ἀναξαγόραν [. . . = **P4**].

¹ ἀπολλοθέμιδος F: -μιτος BP

P2 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 25.1–3 (cf. Theophr. Frag. 226A FHS&G)

καὶ Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης, σχεδὸν νεώτατος γεγρονὼς τῶν περὶ ταῦτα σχολασάντων, τὰ μὲν πλείστα συμπεφορημένως γέγραφε,¹ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ Λεύκιππον λέγων [. . . = **D8**].

¹ γέγραφε E^aF: ἔγραφε DE

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

P

Chronology and Philosophical Affiliations (P1–P2)

P1 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

Diogenes of Apollonia, son of Apollothemis, a natural philosopher and a man of great reputation. Antisthenes says that he studied with Anaximenes; but in chronological terms he lived at the time of Anaxagoras [. . .].

P2 (< A5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Diogenes of Apollonia, virtually the youngest of those who taught on this subject [i.e. the principle from which the world came], wrote about most subjects in a composite manner, sometimes following Anaxagoras, other times Leucippus.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

City of Origin (P3)

P3 (A3) Steph. Byz. *Ethn.* s.v. Ἀπολλωνία

Ἀπολλωνία. [. . .] κγ' Κρήτης, ἥ πάλαι Ἐλεύθερνα,
Λίνου πατρίς. ἐκ ταύτης ὁ φυσικὸς Διογένης.

Diogenes in Danger at Athens? (P4)

P4 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.57

[. . . = **P1**] τοῦτόν φησιν ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ
Σωκράτους ἀπολογία [Frag. 91 Wehrli] διὰ μέγαν φθό-
νον μικροῦ κινδυνεῦσαι Ἀθήνησιν.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

City of Origin (P3)

P3 (A3) Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnica*

Apollonia: [. . .] (23) of Crete, the former Eleutherna, the homeland of Linus; Diogenes the natural philosopher came from this city.¹

¹ This is not certain; there were many other cities named Apollonia, notably one in Thrace, on the Black Sea, to which Diogenes is connected most often.

Diogenes in Danger at Athens? (P4)

P4 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

[. . .] Demetrius of Phaleron says in his *Apology of Socrates* that he almost died at Athens because he was the object of great ill will.¹

¹ The “he”s could also refer to Anaxagoras, mentioned in the preceding sentence (**P1**). Cf. **ANAXAG. P23**.

DIOGENES OF
APOLLONIA [64 DK]

D

*More Than One Treatise?*⁹ (D1)

D1 (< A4) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 151.24–29

[. . .] ἵστέον ὥς γέγραπται μὲν πλείονα τῷ Διογένει
τούτῳ συγγράμματα (ὥς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως
ἐμνήσθη καὶ πρὸς φυσιολόγους ἀντειρηκέναι λέγων,
οὓς καλεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς σοφιστάς, καὶ Μετεωρολογίαν
γεγραφέναι, ἐν ᾗ καὶ λέγει περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰρηκέναι,
καὶ μέντοι καὶ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως), ἐν δέ γε τῷ
Περὶ φύσεως, ὃ τῶν αὐτοῦ μόνον εἰς ἐμὲ ἦλθε, προ-
τίθεται μὲν διὰ πολλῶν δείξαι ὅτι [. . . = **D5a, R7**].

*The Beginning of the Treatise:
A Methodological Remark* (D1)

D2 (B1) Diog. Laert. 9.57

λόγον παντὸς ἀρχόμενον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι εἶναι τὴν

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

D

More Than One Treatise? (D1)

D1 (< A4) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] one must know that this Diogenes wrote a number of treatises, as he himself says in his *On Nature*, when he says that he wrote a reply against the natural philosophers, whom he himself calls 'sophists' [or: 'wise men,' *sophistai*], and also wrote a *Meteorology*, in which he says that he has spoken about the principle, and also *On the Nature of Man*; but at least in his *On Nature*, which is the only book of his that has reached me, he proposes to demonstrate by means of numerous arguments that [. . .].¹

¹ The existence of more than one treatise by Diogenes is not attested elsewhere. This might be merely a hypothesis of Simplicius' intended to resolve an interpretative problem (see **R7**).

The Beginning of the Treatise: A Methodological Remark (D2)

D2 (B1) Diogenes Laertius

It is my view that it is necessary, when one begins (*arkhesthai*) any discourse, to provide a beginning

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι, τὴν δ' ἐρμηνείαν ἀπλήν καὶ σεμνήν.

The Principle (D3–D13)

The Justification of Monism (D3)

D3 (B2) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 151.31–152.7 [immediately after the proem; cf. **R7**]

ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο εὐδηλον· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἔόντα νῦν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἔόντα, εἰ τούτων τι ἦν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἕτερον ὃν τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔδον μετέπιπτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἡτεροιοῦτο, οὐδαμῇ οὔτε μίσγεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἡδύνατο, οὔτε ὠφέλησις τῷ ἑτέρῳ <γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου>¹ οὔτε βλάβη, οὐδ' ἂν οὔτε φυτὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φῦναι οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε ἄλλο γενέσθαι οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ οὕτω συνίστατο ὥστε ταῦτ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑτεροιοούμενα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοῖα γίνεται καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναχωρεῖ.

¹ <γενέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου> Diels

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

(*arkhê*) **cannot be disputed**, and a style that is simple and dignified.

The Principle (D3–D13)

The Justification of Monism (D3)

D3 (B2) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* [Immediately after the proem; cf. **R7**]

It is my view, to say it as a whole, that all the things that are are differentiated out of the same thing and are the same thing. And this is manifest: for if the things that exist now in this world—earth, water, air, fire, and all the other things of which it is visible that they exist in this world—if any one of these were different from the other, being different by its own nature, and it were not the case that it was transformed and was differentiated in many ways, being the same thing, then it would not be possible in any way either that things would mix with one another or that benefit or harm <would come about from the one> to the other, or that any plant could grow from the earth either, or any animal or anything else come to be, if they were not constituted in such a way that they were the same thing. But all these things come about, sometimes of one sort, sometimes of another, by being differentiated out of the same, and they return to the same.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Eternity of the Principle (D4)

D4 (B7) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 153.19–20

καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο καὶ αἰδίου καὶ ἀθάνατον σῶμα,
τῷ¹ δὲ τὰ μὲν γίνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀπολείπει.

¹ τῷ DE: τὸ F

Intelligence of the Principle (D5–D6)

D5 Simpl. *In Phys.*

a (cf. 3 Laks) p. 151.28–30

ἐν δέ γε τῷ Περὶ φύσεως [. . . cf. **D1**], προτίθεται μὲν
διὰ πολλῶν δείξαι ὅτι ἐν τῇ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τεθείσῃ ἀρχῇ
ἐστι “νόησις πολλή.”

b (B3) p. 152.11–16

ἐφεξῆς δὲ δείξας ὅτι ἐστὶ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ νόησις
πολλή—οὐ γὰρ ἄν, φησὶν, οἷόν τε ἦν οὕτω δεδάσθαι
ἄνευ νοήσιος ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός
τε καὶ θέρους καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ
ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἴ τις βούλεται
ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὐρίσκει ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα ὥς ἀνυσ-
τὸν κάλλιστα, ἐπάγει [. . . paraphrase and citation of
D9].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Eternity of the Principle (D4)

D4 (B7) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And this is itself a body both eternal and deathless, but it is by means of it that some things come to be and others cease to exist.

Intelligence of the Principle (D5–D6)

D5 Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

a (≠ DK)

[. . .] in his *On Nature* [. . .] he proposes to show by means of numerous arguments that in the principle which he posits there exists “**much intelligence** [or: cognitive activity, *noêsis*].”

b (B3)

Then, after having shown that there exists in this principle **much intelligence** (*noêsis*)—“for,” he says, “**without intelligence it would not be possible for it to be distributed in such a way as to possess the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of night and day, of rains and winds and fine weather; and the other things, if one wishes to think intelligently about them** (*ennoeisthai*), **one would find that they are arranged in the finest way that could be achieved**”—, he adds that: [. . . paraphrase and citation of **D9**].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

D6 (B8) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 153.20–22

ἀλλὰ τοῦτό μοι δῆλον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ μέγα καὶ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ αἰδιὸν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ πολλὰ εἶδός ἐστι.

The Principle Is Air (D7–D8)

D7 (13 A4) Arist. *Metaph.* A3 984a 5–7

Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ' ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων.

D8 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 25.4–8 (cf. Theophr. Frag. 226A FHS&G)

[. . . = **P2**] τὴν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἀέρα καὶ οὗτός φησιν ἄπειρον εἶναι καὶ αἰδιον, ἐξ οὗ πυκνουμένου καὶ μανουμένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος τοῖς πάθεσι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων γίνεσθαι μορφήν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Θεόφραστος ἱστορεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διογέους, καὶ τὸ εἰς ἐμὲ ἐλθὼν αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα Περὶ φύσεως ἐπιγεγραμμένον ἀέρα σαφῶς λέγει τὸ ἐξ οὗ πάντα γίνεται τὰ ἄλλα [. . . = **R6**].

Air Is the Principle of Life (D9–D12)

D9 (B4) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 152.18–21

ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τάδε μεγάλα σημεία· ἄνθρω-

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

D6 (B8) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

But this seems to me to be evident: that it is vast and powerful, eternal and deathless, and that it knows many things.

The Principle Is Air (D7–D8)

D7 (13 A4) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Anaximenes [ANAXIMEN. D4] as well as Diogenes posits air before water and as that one among the simple bodies that is most of all a principle.

D8 (< A5) Theophrastus in Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] As for the nature of the whole, he too [scil. like Anaximenes] says that it is unlimited and eternal air, from which, through condensation, rarefaction, and transformation of its conditions, comes the form of the other things. And this is what Theophrastus reports about Diogenes, and the latter's treatise that has reached me, entitled *On Nature*, states clearly that what all other things come from is air [. . .].

Air Is the Principle of Life (D9–D12)

D9 (B4) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Moreover, besides those [scil. proofs], there are also these important proofs: human beings and the other

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ποι γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις, ὡς δεδηλώσεται ἐν τῇδε τῇ συγγραφῇ ἐμφανῶς, καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀπαλλαχθῇ, ἀποθνήσκει καὶ ἡ νόησις ἐπιλείπει.

D10 (B5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 152.22–153.16

καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας¹ καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτὸ² γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς³ δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφίχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ὃ τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου· μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός⁴ εἰσιν· ἔστι γὰρ πολύτροπος, καὶ θερμότερος καὶ ψυχρότερος καὶ ξηρότερος καὶ ὑγρότερος καὶ στασιμώτερος καὶ ὀξύτερην κίνησιν ἔχων, καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ ἑτεροιώσιες ἔνεισι καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ χροιῆς ἄπειροι. καὶ πάντων τῶν ζώων δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστίν, ἀὴρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω ἐν ᾧ ἐσμεν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρότερος· ὅμοιον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ θερμὸν οὐδενὸς τῶν ζώων ἐστίν (ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλήλοις), ἀλλὰ διαφέρει μέγα μὲν οὐ, ἀλλ' ὥστε

¹ πάντα Panzebieter
mss., corr. Usener
D: κατὰ τῆς νοήσιός E

² ἀπὸ mss., corr. Usener
³ ἔθος
⁴ καὶ τῆς νοήσιός F: καὶ τῆς κινήσιός

animals that breathe live by means of air, and this is for them both life and mental activity (*noêsis*), as will be made manifestly clear in this treatise; and if this departs, they die and the mental activity (*noêsis*) ceases to exist.

D10 (B5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And it is my view that that what possesses cognitive activity (*noêsis*) is what humans call 'air,' and that it is by this that all are steered and at the same time dominate over all.¹ For it is my view that it is this itself that is god, and that it arrives everywhere, arranges all things, and exists in every thing. And there is not even one thing that does not have a share in this. But neither is there any one that has a share in the same way as another has, but there are many forms both of the air itself and of mental activity (*noêsis*), for it is multiform, hot and cold, dry and moist, immobile and possessing quick motion, and many other differentiations are in it, unlimited both in flavor (*hêdonê*) and in color. And for all the animals, the soul is the same thing: air that is warmer than the external one in which we exist, but much colder than the one that is near the sun. But this warmth is not similar in any of the animals (since it is not either among human beings compared with one another); but it differs not very much, but enough

¹ Or, emending: "it is by this that all is steered and that it [i.e. air] dominates over all."

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

παραπλήσια εἶναι· οὐ μέντοι γέ⁵ ἀτρεκέως γε ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οἶόν τε γενέσθαι τῶν ἑτεροιομένων ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ, πρὶν τὸ αὐτὸ γένηται. ἅτε οὖν πολυτρόπου ἐούσης τῆς ἑτεροιώσιος πολύτροπα καὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὔτε ιδέαν ἀλλήλοις εἰκότα οὔτε δίαιταν οὔτε νόησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἑτεροιώσεων· ὅμως δὲ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ζῇ καὶ ὀράῃ καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νόησιν ἔχει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα.

⁵ γε DE: om. F

D11 (< A20) Arist. An. 1.2 405a 21–25

Διογένης [. . .] τοῦτον οἶηθεις πάντων λεπτότατον¹ εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ἣ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, ἣ δὲ λεπτότατον,² κινητικὸν εἶναι [... = **HER. R43**].

¹ λεπτομερέστερον X

² λεπτότατον ESUX: λεπτομερέστατον CVWY

D12 (5b Laks) Aët. 4.3.8 (Stob.) [εἰ σῶμα ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἢ οὐσία αὐτῆς]

Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἐξ αἰέρος τὴν ψυχήν.

Divinity of the Principle (D13)

D13 (< A19) Theophr. Sens. 42

ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, σημείον εἶναι· [. . . = **D34b**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

that they are very similar—except that it is not possible for any of the things that are differentiated to become perfectly similar to another one, unless it becomes the same thing. Since therefore differentiation is multiform, multiform are the animals too and numerous, and they resemble one another neither in their shape nor in their way of life nor in their mental activity (*noêsis*), because of the multitude of differentiations. And yet they all live, see, and hear by means of the same thing, and they all possess from the same thing the rest of their mental activity (*noêsis*).

D11 (< A20), Aristotle, *On the Soul*

Diogenes [. . .] [scil. says that the soul is air,] thinking that this is of all things the one that is most rarefied and that it is a principle. And it is for this reason that the soul both knows and moves: because it is first and everything else comes from it, it knows, and because it is the most rarefied, it is able to impart motion [...].

D12 (≠ DK) Aëtius

Diogenes of Apollonia: the soul is [scil. made] of air.

Divinity of the Principle (D13)

D13 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

There is evidence that the inner air, **a small portion of god**, is what perceives [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Cosmogony (D14–D17)

The Formation of Worlds: Two General Summaries (D14–D15)

D14 (< A1) Diog. Laert. 9.57

ἐδόκει αὐτῷ τάδε· στοιχείον εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα, κόσμους ἀπείρους καὶ κενὸν ἄπειρον· τὸν τε ἀέρα πυκνούμενον καὶ ἀραιούμενον γεννητικὸν εἶναι τῶν κόσμων· οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι. τὴν γῆν στρογγύλην, ἡρεισμένην ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, τὴν σύστασιν εἰληφύϊαν κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ θερμοῦ περιφορὰν καὶ πῆξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ.

D15 (A6) Ps.-Plut. *Strom.* (in Eus. *PE* 1.8.12)

[12] Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα ὑφίσταται στοιχείον· κινεῖσθαι δὲ¹ τὰ πάντα, ἀπείρους τε εἶναι τοὺς κόσμους. κοσμοποιεῖ δὲ οὕτως· ὅτι τοῦ παντὸς κινουμένου καὶ ἥ μὲν ἀραιοῦ, ἥ δὲ πυκνοῦ γενομένου, ὅπου συνεκύρησεν τὸ πυκνὸν συστροφὴν ποιῆσαι, καὶ οὕτως τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· τὰ κουφότατα, τὴν ἄνω τάξιν λαβόντα, τὸν ἥλιον ἀποτελέσαι. [11] [. . .] πυκνούμενον δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα ποιεῖν νεφέλας, εἶτα ὕδωρ, ὃ καὶ κατιὸν ἐπὶ τὸν ἥλιον σβεννύναι αὐτόν· καὶ πάλιν ἀραιούμενον ἐξάπτεσθαι. χρόνῳ δὲ πῆγνυσθαι τῷ ξηρῷ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λαμπροῦ ὕδατος ἀστέρας, νύκτα τε καὶ ἡμέραν ἐκ τῆς σβέσεως καὶ ἐξάψεως καὶ καθόλου τὰς ἐκλείψεις ἀποτελεῖν.²

¹ δὲ AB: τε ONV ² πυκνούμενον . . . ἀποτελεῖν, quod in mss. ad Metrodorum pertinet (1.8.11), Diogeni attrib. Palmer

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Cosmogony (D14–D17)

*The Formation of Worlds: Two General
Summaries (D14–D15)*

D14 (< A1) Diogenes Laertius

He had the following views: the element is air, there exist an unlimited number of worlds and an unlimited void; the air is what generates the worlds by condensing and rarefying; nothing comes to be out of nonbeing or is destroyed into nonbeing; the earth is spherical, fixed firmly in the center; its shape is due to circular motion caused by heat and to solidification caused by cold.

D15 (A6) Ps.-Plutarch, *Stromata*

[12] Diogenes of Apollonia posits air as element; the totality of things is in motion; and the worlds are unlimited in number. This is how he conceives the formation of the world: the whole being in motion and becoming rarefied here and dense there, where the dense happened to come together it created a concentration, and so too everything else in the same way. The lightest elements, occupying the highest position, formed the sun. [11] [. . .] *By becoming dense, the aether produces clouds, then water, which, descending toward the sun, extinguishes it; and when it becomes rarefied, it is kindled again. With time, the sun was solidified by dryness and formed stars out of the bright water; it produced night and day out of extinction and illumination, and in general eclipses.*¹

¹ The passage printed in italics appears in the notice dedicated to Metrodorus of Lampsacus, but it is difficult to assign this doctrine to him. The transposition, proposed by Palmer, *Classical Quarterly* 51 (2001): 7–17, is plausible but not certain.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

*An Infinite Number of Worlds or Only One?*⁹ (D16)

D16

a (< A10) Aët. 2.1.3 (Stob.; cf. Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ κόσμους]

[. . .] Διογένης [. . .] ἀπείρους κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ
κατὰ πᾶσαν περίστασιν.¹

¹ περίστασιν Plut.: περιαγωγήν Stob.

b (< 13 A11) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 1121.12–15

γενητὸν δὲ καὶ φθαρτὸν τὸν ἓνα κόσμον ποιούσιν
ὅσοι ἀεὶ μὲν φασιν εἶναι κόσμον, οὐ μὴν τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλον γινόμενον κατὰ τινος χρόνων
περιόδους, ὥς [. . .] Διογένης [. . .].

The Inclination of the Poles (D17)

D17 (< A11, cf. 59 A67) Aët. 2.8.1 (Ps.-Plut.) [τίς ἡ αἰτία
τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐγκλιθῆναι]

Διογένης καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας [ANAXAG. D32] μετὰ τὸ
συστῆναι τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξαγα-
γεῖν ἐγκλιθῆναί πως τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἰς
τὸ μεσημβρινὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος [. . . = R15].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

*An Infinite Number of Worlds or Only One?*⁹ (D16)

D16

a (< A10) Aëtius

[. . .] Diogenes [. . .]: worlds unlimited [scil. in number] in the unlimited, throughout the entire surrounding area.

b (< 13 A11) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Those who say that the world always exists but without always being the same, but becoming different at different times according to certain periods of time—these people make the one world subject to generation and destruction, like [. . .] Diogenes [. . .].

The Inclination of the Poles (D17)

D17 (< A11, cf. 59 A67) Aëtius

Diogenes and Anaxagoras: after the world had been formed and the animals had emerged from the earth, the world inclined somehow on its own toward its southern part [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Cosmology (D18–D22) *The Heavenly Bodies (D18)*

D18 (< A12) Aët. 2.13.5 et 9 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας ἀστρων]

Διογένης κισηροειδῇ τὰ ἄστρον, διαπνοίας δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπυρα· συμπεριφέρεσθαι δὲ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἄστροις ἀφανεῖς λίθους καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀνωσύμους· πίπτοντα δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι, καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς πυρῶδως κατενεχθέντα ἀστέρα πέτρων.

The Sun (D19–D20)

D19 (A13) Aët. 2.20.10 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου]

Διογένης κισηροειδῇ τὸν ἥλιον, εἰς ὃν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἀκτῖνες ἐναποστηρίζονται.

D20 (A13) Aët. 2.23.4 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ τροπῶν ἡλίου]

Διογένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀντιπίπτοντος τῇ θερμότητι ψύχους σβέννυσθαι τὸν ἥλιον.

The Moon (D21)

D21 (A14) Aët. 2.25.10 (Stob.) [περὶ σελήνης οὐσίας]

Διογένης κισηροειδὲς ἀναμμα τὴν σελήνην.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Cosmology (D18–D22) *The Heavenly Bodies (D18)*

D18 (< A12) Aëtius

Diogenes: the stars are like pumice stone, and he thinks that they are the world's vents, and that they are aflame; and that stones that are invisible (and for this reason are nameless) accompany the visible heavenly bodies in their revolutions; and that they often fall and are extinguished on the earth, like the heavenly body made of stone that fell burning at Aegospotami.

The Sun (D19–D20)

D19 (A13) Aëtius

Diogenes: the sun is like pumice stone; the rays coming from the aether become fastened to it.

D20 (A13) Aëtius

Diogenes: the sun is extinguished by the cold that collides with the heat.

The Moon (D21)

D21 (A14) Aëtius

Diogenes: the moon is an ignited mass like pumice stone.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Comets (D22)

D22 (A15) Aët. 3.2.8 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ κομητῶν καὶ διαττόντων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων]

Διογένης ἀστέρας εἶναι τοὺς κομήτας.

Meteorology: Thunder and Lightning (D23)

D23

a (A16) Aët. 3.3.8 (Stob.) [περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν πρηστήρων τε καὶ τυφώνων]

Διογένης ἔμπτωσιν¹ πυρὸς εἰς νέφος ὑγρόν, βροντὴν μὲν τῇ σβέσει ποιοῦν, τῇ δὲ λαμπηδόνι τὴν ἀστραπήν. συναιτιᾶται δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα.

¹ ἔμπύρωσιν mss., corr. Canter

b (A16) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 2.20.1

Diogenes Apolloniates ait quaedam tonitrua igne, quaedam spiritu fieri; illa ignis facit quae ipse antecedit et nuntiat; illa spiritus quae sine splendore crepuerunt.

The Earth (D24–D26)

The Sea (D24)

D24 (< A17) Alex. *In Meteor.*, p. 67.11–14

[. . . = **ANAXIMAND. D35b**] ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο, ὥς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος [Frag. 221 FHS&G],

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Comets (D22)

D22 (A15) Aëtius

Diogenes: the comets are heavenly bodies.

Meteorology: Thunder and Lightning (D23)

D23

a (A16) Aëtius

Diogenes: the collision of fire with a moist cloud, producing thunder by extinguishing and lightning by flashing. But he also adduces wind as an auxiliary cause.

b (A16) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

Diogenes of Apollonia says that certain thunders occur because of fire, others because of wind; fire produces the ones that it precedes and announces, wind the ones that rumble without a flash of light.

The Earth (D24–D26)

The Sea (D24)

D24 (A17) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's Meteorology*

This opinion [scil. that the sea will dry out one day by the effect of the evaporation caused by the sun], as Theophrastus reports, was maintained by Anaximander [cf.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Ἀναξίμανδρός τε καὶ Διογένης. Διογένης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀλμυρότητος ταύτην αἰτίαν λέγει, ὅτι ἀνάγοντος τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ γλυκὺ τὸ καταλειπόμενον καὶ ὑπομένον ἀλμυρὸν εἶναι συμβαίνει.

The Floods of the Nile (D25)

D25

a (< T35c Laks) Arist. (?), *Inund. Nili* (= Frag. 248 Rose, p. 192.22–24)

Diogenes autem †Nakithemius† Apolloniates fontibus ait addi aquam attrahente terra propter arefieri a sole in estate: natum esse enim indigens trahere ex propinquo [. . . = **R4**].

b (A18) Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 4a.28–29

Diogenes Apolloniates ait: “sol umorem ad se rapit; hunc adsiccata tellus ex mari ducit, tum ex ceteris aquis. fieri autem non potest, ut alia sicca sit tellus, alia abundet; sunt enim perforata omnia et invicem pervia, et sicca ab umidis sumunt. alioquin, nisi aliquid terra acciperet, exaruisset. ergo undique sol trahit, sed ex his quae premit maxime; haec meridiana sunt. terra cum exaruit, plus ad se umoris adducit; ut in lucernis oleum illo fluit ubi exurit, sic aqua illo incumbit quo vis caloris et terrae aestuantis arcessit. unde ergo trahit? ex illis scilicet partibus semper hibernis:

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

ANAXIMAND. D35b] and Diogenes. Diogenes also says that this is the cause of salinity: the sun removing the sweet part, the residue and deposit turn out to be saline.

The Floods of the Nile (D25)

D25

a (\neq DK) Aristotle (?), *On the Flooding of the Nile*

But Diogenes of Apollonia †Nakithemius† says that additional water arrives at its sources, the earth attracting it because it has been made dry by the sun in the summer; for by nature it draws from what is nearest when it is in need [. . .].

b (A18) Seneca, *Natural Questions*

Diogenes of Apollonia says, “The sun attracts to itself the moisture that the dried-out land draws from the sea and also from other waters. But it cannot happen that the land is dry in one place and overflows in another: for the whole is perforated and one part communicates with another, and the dry parts take from the moist ones. Otherwise, if the earth received nothing, it would have completely dried up. Thus the sun attracts [scil. water] from everywhere, but [scil. especially] from those regions that it most oppresses: these are the southerly ones. When the earth has become completely dried up, it attracts more moisture to itself: just as in lanterns the oil flows to the place where it is burning, so too water flows to where the force of heat and of the burning earth summons it. From where then does the latter attract it? Evidently from those regions

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

septemtrionales semper exundant (ob hoc Pontus in infernum mare assidue fluit rapidus, non, ut cetera maria, alternatis ultro citro aestibus, in unam partem semper pronus et torrens); quod nisi factis¹ itineribus quod cuique deest redderetur, quod cuique superest emitteretur, iam aut sicca essent omnia aut inundata.”

¹ factis *Diels*: faceret his *T*: facit his *PE*

c (T35b Laks) Io. Lyd. *Mens.* 4.107

Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης φησὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀρπάζοντος τὴν ὑγρότητα ἔλκεσθαι ὑπὸ¹ τῆς ξηρᾶς τὸν Νεῖλον ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης· σηραγγώδης γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχουσα καὶ διατετρημένη ἔλκει πρὸς ἐαυτὴν τὸ ὑγρόν· καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξηροτέρα ἢ γῇ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, τοσοῦτῳ πλεόν ἔλκει πρὸς ἐαυτὴν τὴν νοτίδα, καθάπερ τὸ ἔλαιον ἐπὶ τῶν λύχνων ἐκείσε πλεόν ὀρμᾶ, ὅπη καὶ δαπανᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός.

¹ ὑπὸ AB: ἀπὸ T

d (A18) Schol. in Apoll. Rhod. 4.269

Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀρπάζεσθαι τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς θαλάσσης ὃ τότε εἰς τὸν Νεῖλον καταφέ-ρεσθαι· οἶεται γὰρ πληροῦσθαι τὸν Νεῖλον ἐν τῷ θέρει διὰ τὸ τὸν ἥλιον εἰς τοῦτον τὰς ἀπὸ γῆς ἰκμάδας τρέπειν.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

where it is always winter: the northerly ones constantly overflow (that is why the Black Sea runs continuously in a rapid stream into the lower sea [i.e. the Mediterranean] and does not ebb and flow with alternating tides like other seas, but always flows swiftly in the same direction). For if what each one lacks were not restored to it and the excess were not discharged thanks to these passages, then everything would already be either dry or overflowing.”

c (≠ DK) John Lydus, *On the Months*

Diogenes of Apollonia says that, the sun taking away the moisture, the Nile draws it from the sea by means of the dry land: for being by nature cavernous and perforated, it [i.e. the land] draws moisture to itself; and as the land of Egypt is drier than the others, it attracts liquid all the more strongly, just as oil in the case of lanterns moves more abundantly to where it is being consumed by the fire.

d (A18) Scholia on Apollonius Rhodius

Diogenes of Apollonia: the water of the sea is drawn away by the sun and then precipitates onto the Nile; for he thinks that the Nile floods in the summer because the sun directs toward it the moistures from the earth.

*The Magnet (D26)***D26** (A33) Alex. (?) *Quaest.* 2.23, p. 73

Διογένης τε ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης πάντα τὰ ἐλατά φησιν καὶ ἀφιέναι τινὰ ἱκμάδα ἀφ' αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔλκειν ἔξωθεν, τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω, πλείστην δὲ ἀφιέναι χαλκόν τε καὶ σίδηρον, οὗ σημεῖον τό τε ἀποκαίεσθαί τι καὶ ἀπαναλίσκεσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πυρί, καὶ τὸ χριόμενα αὐτὰ ὅξει καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἰοῦσθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ἔλκειν ἔξ αὐτῶν τὴν ἱκμάδα τὸ ὅξος· τὸ γὰρ¹ πῦρ καίειν ἄν· καίειν <δὲ> αὐτὸ τῷ² εἰσδυνόμενον εἰς ἕκαστον ἔλκειν τε καὶ ἀναλίσκειν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑγρόν· τοῦ σιδήρου ἔλκοντός τε καὶ πλείον ἀφιέντος ὑγρόν, τὴν λίθον οὖσαν ἀραιότεραν τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ γεωδεστέραν πλείον ἔλκειν τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ παρακειμένου ἀέρος ἢ ἀφιέναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν συγγενὲς ἔλκουνσαν ἐν αὐτῇ δέχεσθαι τό τε μὴ συγγενὲς ἀπωθεῖν· εἶναι δ' αὐτῇ συγγενῇ τὸν σίδηρον διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου ἔλκειν τε καὶ δέχεσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ· καὶ διὰ τῆς τούτου ἑλξεως καὶ τὸν σίδηρον ἐπισπᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἑλξιν τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγροῦ, μηκέτι δὲ τὸν σίδηρον ἔλκειν τὴν λίθον μήθ' οὕτως εἶναι τὸν σίδηρον ἀραιὸν ὥς δέχεσθαι δύνασθαι ἀθρόαν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς ὑγρότητα.

¹ τὸ post γὰρ hab. mss., secl. Panzerbieter

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

The Magnet (D26)

D26 (A33) Alexander of Aphrodisias (?), *Natural Questions*

Diogenes of Apollonia says that by nature all metals both emit a certain moisture from themselves and draw it in from outside, the ones more, the others less, and that copper and iron emit the most. A sign of this is that a part of them burns up and is consumed in fire, and that when they are smeared with vinegar and oil they become rusty: for this happens to them because the vinegar draws the moisture out of them. For the fire burns, but it burns because, penetrating into each of these, it draws in and consumes the moisture that is found in them. Therefore, since iron draws moisture in but emits even more, the magnet, being more rarefied and more earthy than iron, draws in the moisture from the surrounding air more than it emits it. Well, it [i.e. the magnet], drawing material in, welcomes within itself what is related to it and repels what is not related to it. But iron is related to it, because it [i.e. the magnet] draws in and welcomes within itself what comes from it [i.e. the iron]. And it is because of this attraction that the iron itself is displaced toward it because of the massive attraction undergone by the moisture in it; whereas the iron does not draw in the magnet, nor is the iron sufficiently rarefied as to be able to welcome massively the moisture that comes from it.

² καίειν <δέ> αὐτὸ τῶ nos: καίειν ἄν καίειν αὐτῶ τῶ δὲ VFGB^{ac} S^{ac}: καίειν τὴν ἐν αὐτῶ ἱκμάδα ἄν καίειν B^{pc} S^{pc}: καὶ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ καίειν ἃ καίει αὐτῶν τῶ Diels

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Physiology (D27–D44)

The System of the Vessels in Humans (D27)

D27 (B6) Arist. *HA* 3.2 511b 31–513b 11

αἱ δὲ φλέβες ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὧδ' ἔχουσιν· εἰσὶ δύο μέγισται· αὗται τείνουσι διὰ τῆς κοιλίας παρὰ τὴν νωτιαίαν ἄκανθαν, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, ἡ δ' ἐπ' ἀριστερά, εἰς τὰ σκέλη, ἑκάτερα παρ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ἄνω εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν [511b35] παρὰ τὰς κλείδας διὰ τῶν σφαγῶν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων καθ' ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα φλέβες διατείνουσιν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς δεξιᾶς εἰς τὰ δεξιᾷ, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά, μέγισται μὲν δύο εἰς τὴν καρδίαν περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν νωτιαίαν ἄκανθαν, ἕτεραι δ' ὀλίγον ἀνωτέρω διὰ τῶν στήθων ὑπὸ τὴν μασχάλην [512a5] εἰς ἑκατέραν τὴν χεῖρα τὴν παρ' ἑαυτῇ· καὶ καλεῖται ἡ μὲν σπληνίτις, ἡ δὲ ἥπατιτις. σχίζεται δ' αὐτῶν ἄκρα ἑκάτερα, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν μέγαν δάκτυλον, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν ταρσόν, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων λεπταὶ καὶ πολυόζοι ἐπὶ τὴν ἄλλην χεῖρα καὶ δακτύλους. ἕτεραι δὲ λεπτότεραι ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων [a10] φλεβῶν τείνουσιν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς δεξιᾶς εἰς τὸ ἥπαρ, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς εἰς τὸν σπλῆνα καὶ τοὺς νεφρούς. αἱ δὲ εἰς τὰ σκέλη τείνουσαι σχίζονται κατὰ τὴν πρόσφυσιν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μηροῦ τείνουσιν. ἡ δὲ μεγίστη αὐτῶν ὅπισθεν τείνει τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ ἐκφαίνεται¹ παχεῖα· ἑτέρα δὲ εἴσω τοῦ μηροῦ [a15] μικρὸν ἥττον παχεῖα ἐκείνης. ἔπειτα παρὰ τὸ γόνυ τείνουσιν εἰς τὴν κνήμην

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Physiology (D27–D44)

The System of the Vessels in Humans (D27)

D27 (B6) Aristotle, *History of Animals*

The blood vessels in the human are arranged as follows. There are two that are the largest ones. These extend through the belly, along the spinal column, the one on the right, the other on the left, down into the legs, each one on its own side, and up into the head [511b35], along the clavicles, through the throat. Starting from these, vessels extend throughout the whole body, from the one on the right toward the right, from the one on the left toward the left, the two largest ones into the heart near the spinal column itself, and the others a little higher, through the chest, under the armpit [512a5] into that hand located on its own side. And the one is called the ‘splenic’ vessel, the other the ‘hepatic’ one. Each of their extremities is divided, the one toward the thumb, the other toward the palm, and from these other thin vessels, with many branches, going toward the rest of the hand and the fingers. Other, thinner vessels extend from the first [a10] vessels, going from the one on the right into the liver, from the one on the left into the spleen and kidneys. Those vessels that extend into the legs are divided at the juncture and extend through the whole thigh. The largest of these extends to the back of the thigh and is seen to be thick; the other one, on the inside of the thigh, [a15] is a little less thick than that one. They then extend along the knee into

¹ ἐκφαίνεται C^a PD^a: ἐμφ- A^a

τε καὶ τὸν πόδα καθάπερ καὶ εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ταρσὸν τοῦ ποδὸς καθήκουσι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς δακτύλους διατείνουσιν. σχίζονται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ τὸ πλευρὸν πολλὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ λεπταὶ φλέβες. [a20] αἱ δ' εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν τείνουσαι διὰ τῶν σφαγῶν φαίνονται ἐν τῷ αὐχένι μεγάλαι· ἀφ' ἑκατέρας δ' αὐτῶν, ἧ τελευτᾷ, σχίζονται εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν πολλαί, αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀριστερῶν εἰς τὰ δεξιά· τελευτῶσι δὲ παρὰ τὸ οὗς ἑκάτεραι. ἔστι δ' ἑτέρα [a25] φλέψ ἐν τῷ τραχήλῳ παρὰ τὴν μεγάλην ἑκατέρωθεν, ἐλάττων ἐκείνης ὀλίγον, εἰς ἣν αἱ πλείσται ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς συνέχουσιν² αὐτῆς.³ καὶ αὗται τείνουσι διὰ τῶν σφαγῶν εἰσὼ· καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἑκατέρας ὑπὸ τὴν ὠμοπλάτην τείνουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ φαίνονται παρὰ τε τὴν σπληνίτιν καὶ τὴν ἥπατίτιν [a30] ἕτεραι ὀλίγον⁴ ἐλάττους, ἃς ἀποσχῶσιν⁵ ὅταν τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα λυπῇ.⁶ ἂν δ' ἔτι καὶ περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν, τὴν ἥπατίτιν καὶ τὴν σπληνίτιν. τείνουσι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ⁷ τοὺς μαστοὺς ἀπὸ [512b1] τούτων ἕτεραι.⁸ ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ ἑκατέρας τείνουσαι διὰ τοῦ νωτιαίου μυελοῦ εἰς τοὺς ὄρχεις λεπταί· ἕτεραι δ' ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα καὶ διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς τείνουσιν εἰς τοὺς νεφροὺς καὶ τελευτῶσιν εἰς τοὺς ὄρχεις τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν εἰς [b5] τὰς

² συνέχουσιν A^a C^a: συντείνουσιν PD^a

³ αὐτῆς PD^a: αὐταῖς A^a C^a

⁴ ὀλίγον A^a P: ὀλίγαι D^a: ὀλίγον πολλάκις C^a

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

the shank and foot, in the same way as into the hands. And they descend toward the flat of the foot, and from there they extend to the toes. And many thin vessels coming from these divide out toward the belly and the flank. [a20] The ones that extend into the head through the throat are seen to be large in the neck. From each of these two, where they terminate, many vessels divide out into the head, the ones coming from the right side into the left side, the others from the left side into the right side; and they both terminate beside the ear. There is another [a25] vessel in the neck beside the large one on both sides, a little smaller than that one, to which most of the ones coming from the head itself are attached; and these extend through the throat toward the interior, and coming from each of these two, others extend under the shoulder blade and into the hands. And others, a little smaller, are visible beside the splenic blood vessel and the hepatic one; [a30] these are the ones they bleed when something under the skin causes pain; but if it is something near the belly [scil. that causes pain], it is the hepatic and the splenic vessels [scil. that they bleed]. Other vessels also extend from these [512b1] under the breasts. There are others too, thin ones, that extend from each of these two through the spinal marrow into the testicles; and still others extend under the skin and through the flesh into the kidneys, and terminate at the testicles in men and at the uterus in women. [b5]

⁵ ἀποσχωσιν D^a: ἀποσπῶσιν P: ὑποσχίζουσιν αἱ ὑπερέχουσιν A^a: ἀποσχίζονται καὶ αἱ ὑπερέχουσιν C^a

⁶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ δέριμα λυπῇ PD^a: ὑποδράμη λύπη A^a C^a

⁷ ὑπὸ A^a C^a: εἰς PD^a

⁸ ἔτεραι PD^a: ἐκάτεραι A^a C^a

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ὑστέρας. αἱ δὲ φλέβες αἱ μὲν πρῶται ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας
εὐρύτεραί εἰσιν, ἔπειτα λεπτότεραι γίνονται, ἕως ἂν
μεταβάλωσιν ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἐκ
τούτων εἰς τὰ δεξιά. αὗται δὲ σπερματίτιδες καλοῦν-
ται. τὸ δ' αἷμα τὸ μὲν παχύτατον [b10] ὑπὸ τῶν σαρ-
κῶν⁹ ἐκπίνεται, ὑπερβάλλον δὲ εἰς τοὺς τόπους τού-
τους λεπτὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ἀφρώδες γίνεται.

⁹ σαρκῶν A^a C^a: σαρκωδῶν PD^a

Semen (D28)

D28

a (A24) Clem. Alex. *Paed.* 1.6.48.3

τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ζώου ἀφρὸν εἶναι τοῦ
αἵματος κατ' οὐσίαν ὑποτίθενται, ὃ δὴ τῇ ἐμφύτῳ τοῦ
ἄρρενος θέρμῃ παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς ἐκταραχθὲν
ἐκριπιζόμενον¹ ἐξαφροῦται καὶ ταῖς σπερματίτισιν²
παρατίθεται φλεψίν· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης
Διογένης τὰ ἀφροδίσια κεκλήσθαι βούλεται.

¹ ἐκριπιζόμενον F: ἐκραπιζόμενον M

² σπερματίσιν mss., corr. Dindorf

b (ad B6) Cod. Brux. 1348–59, fol. 48 (pp. 208–10 Wellmann)

[1] Alexander [. . .], discipulus Asclepiadis, libro primo de semine spumam sanguinis eius essentiam dixit, Diogenis

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

The first of these blood vessels, which come from the belly, are wider, but then they become thinner, until they cross over from the right side to the left and from this latter to the right. They are called ‘spermatic.’ The thickest blood [b10] is absorbed by the fleshy parts, but when it overflows it flows into these regions in a form that is thin, warm, and foamy.¹

¹ This description is often considered to be a verbal citation, but various indications suggest that Aristotle is summarizing and adapting. Therefore this text is presented here as a testimonium rather than as an original fragment.

Semen (D28)

D28

a (A24) Clement of Alexandria, *Pedagogue*

Some people think that the animal’s semen is in its substance foam (*aphron*) of blood, which is greatly agitated during sexual union because of the male’s inborn heat, and, fanned [scil. by its breath], becomes foam (*exaphroutai*) and is deposited in the spermatic vessels; Diogenes of Apollonia thinks that the sexual act (*ta aphrodisia*) has received its name from this.

b (ad B6) Brussels fragment on semen

Alexander [. . .] a disciple of Asclepiades, said in his first book on semen that it is in its essence foam of blood, agreeing with the views of Diogenes. [. . .] But as for Di-

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

placitis consentiens. [. . .] [3] Diogenes autem Apolloniat¹es essentiam similiter spumam sanguinis dixit libro physico. etenim spiratione adductus spiritus sanguinem suspendit, cuius alia pars carne bibitur,² alia superans in seminales cadit³ vias et semen facit, quod <non>⁴ est aliud quam spuma sanguinis spiritu collisi.

¹ Apollonii mss., corr. Wellman ² bibitur Rose: vivit ms.
³ cadet ms., corr. Neuenar ⁴ <non> Neuenar

Embryology (D29–D32)

D29 (A27) Cens. *Die nat.* 5.4

illud quoque ambiguum facit inter auctores opinionem, utrumne ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ut Diogenes [. . .] scripserunt, an etiam ex matris [. . .].

D30 (A27) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.1

Diogenes Apolloniat¹es ex umore primum carnem fieri existimavit, tum ex carne ossa nervosque et ceteras partis enasci.

D31

a (B9) Gal. *In Hipp. Epid.* 6.2.47, p. 122.3–9

καὶ μέντοι καὶ ὁμολόγηται σχεδὸν ᾧπασι τοῖς ἰατροῖς οὐ μόνον διαπλάττεσθαι θᾶπτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος. [. . .] Ῥοῦφος δέ φησι Διογένη τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην μόνον ἐναντίως ἀποφύνα-

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

ogenes of Apollonia, he said the same thing in his book on nature, viz. that its essence is foam of blood: for the air inhaled during respiration lifts up the blood, of which one part is absorbed by the flesh while the other part, overflowing, falls into the spermatic channels and produces semen, which is <nothing> other than foam of blood that has been struck by the air.

Embryology (D29–D32)

D29 (A27) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

The following question too causes a difference of opinion among the authorities: whether the offspring is born only from the father's seed, as Diogenes [. . .] wrote, or also from the mother's [. . .].

D30 (A27) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Diogenes of Apollonia thought that flesh is produced first from the liquid, and that then from the flesh the bones, the tendons, and the other parts are born.

D31

a (B9) Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics*

In fact, there is agreement among almost all doctors that the male not only is formed, but also begins to move, more quickly than the female. [. . .] Rufus says that Diogenes of Apollonia is the only one who has expressed the opposite

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

σθαι κατὰ τὸ Περὶ φύσεως δεύτερον· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἐν-
έτυχον τῷ βιβλίῳ.

b (> A26) Cens. *Die nat.* 9.2

alii enim plerique, cum omnes partus non uno tempore
fiant maturi, una tamen eademque tempora omnibus
conformandis dederunt; ut Diogenes Apolloniates, qui
masculis corpus ait quattuor mensibus formari et feminis
quinque [. . . = **HIPPO D16**].

D32

a (A25) Cens. *Die nat.* 6.3

at Diogenes et Hippon [**HIPPO D14**] existimarunt esse
in alvo prominens quiddam, quod infans ore adprehendat,
et¹ ex eo alimentum ita trahat ut cum editus est ex matris
uberibus.

¹ et V²: *om. cett.*

b (A25) Aristoph. Byz. *Epit.* 1.78 (p. 23.14–15 Lambros)

[. . .] Διογένην τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην εἰρηκότα ταῖς κο-
τυληδόσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τρέφεσθαι τὰ ἔμβρυα [. . .
= **R12**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

view, in the second book of his *On Nature*; but I myself have not come across this book.

b (> A26) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

Although not all children are ready to be born at the same time, most of the other authorities have determined for the formation of all of them one and the same period of time, like Diogenes of Apollonia, who said that males' bodies are formed in four months and females' in five [. . .].¹

¹ Rufus' statement in **D31a** contradicts Censorinus'.

D32

a (A25) Censorinus, *The Birthday*

But Diogenes and Hippo thought that there exists in the belly [scil. of the mother] a protrusion that the infant takes in its mouth and from which it draws nourishment in the same way as, after it is born, it does from its mother's breasts.

b (A25) Aristophanes of Byzantium, *Epitome of Aristotle's History of Animals*

[. . .] Diogenes of Apollonia [. . .] says that embryos are nourished by cup-shaped cavities located in the uterus.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Respiration, Life, and Death (D33)

D33 (A29) Aët. 5.24.3 (Ps.-Plut.) [πῶς ὕπνος γίνεται καὶ θάνατος]

Διογένης, εἰ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ αἷμα διαχεόμενον πληρώσει μὲν τὰς φλέβας τὸν δ' ἐν αὐταῖς¹ περιεχόμενον² ἀέρα ὥσει εἰς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην γαστέρα, ὕπνον γεγενῆσθαι καὶ θερμότερον ὑπάρχειν τὸν θώρακα· ἐὰν δ' ἅπαν τὸ ἀερῶδες ἐκ τῶν φλεβῶν ἐκλίπη, θάνατον συντυγχάνειν.

¹ αὐτοῖς mss., corr. Beck

² περιεχόμενον MΠ: περιχεόμενον m

Physiology of Sensations (D34–D42) *The General Principle (D34)*

D34 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.*

a 39

Διογένης δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνάπτει [. . . cf. **R10**].

b 43

[. . . = **D42**] ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, σημεῖον εἶναι· διὸ πολλάκις πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες οὗθ' ὁρῶμεν οὗτ' ἀκούομεν [. . . cf. **D43**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Respiration, Life, and Death (D33)

D33 (A29) Aëtius

Diogenes: if the blood, diffusing itself completely, fills the vessels and expels the air that is contained in them toward the chest and the stomach below it, sleep is produced and the thorax is warmer; but if all the air leaves the vessels, death occurs.

See also **D46–D47**

Physiology of Sensations (D34–42) *The General Principle (D34)*

D34 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

a

Diogenes, just as he does in the case of life and thought, connects the sensations too with air [. . .].

b

[. . .] There is evidence that the inner air, **a small portion of god** is what perceives: that is the reason why often, when we are paying attention to something else, we neither see nor hear. [. . .]

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Particular Sensations (D35–D41) *Smelling (D35)*

D35 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 39

[. . . = **R10**] τὴν μὲν ὄσφρησιν τῷ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀέρι· τοῦτον γὰρ ἄθρουν εἶναι καὶ σύμμετρον τῇ ἀκοῇ (τὸν γὰρ ἐγκέφαλον αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ φλέβια, λεπτότατον δ' ἐν οἷς ἡ θέσις ἀσύμμετρος) καὶ οὐ μίγνυσθαι ταῖς ὀσμαῖς· ὥς εἴ τις εἴη τῇ κράσει σύμμετρος, δῆλον ὥς αἰσθανόμενον ἄν. [. . . = **D36**]

Hearing (D36–D37)

D36 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 40

[. . . = **D35**] τὴν δ' ἀκοήν, ὅταν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀῆρ κινηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔξω διαδῶ πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον [. . . = **D38**].

D37 (A21) Aët. 4.16.3 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ ἀκοῆς]

Διογένης τοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινουμένου.

Sight (D38)

D38 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 40

[. . . = **D36**] τὴν δὲ ὄψιν ὁρᾶν ἐμφαινομένην εἰς τὴν κόρην, ταύτην δὲ μιγνυμένην τῷ ἐντὸς ἀέρι ποιεῖν

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

The Particular Sensations (D35–D41) *Smelling (D35)*

D35 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] Smelling [scil. occurs] by means of the air located near the brain: for this is compact and adapted to hearing (?) (for the brain is nothing but this [i.e. air] and vessels, and it is extremely rarefied in those places where its position is not adapted) and it does not mix with smells;¹ so that if one [scil. an air] were adapted in its constitutive mixture, this would clearly be something that perceives. [. . .]

¹The text of this sentence is very uncertain.

Hearing (D36–D37)

D36 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] hearing [scil. occurs] when the air contained in the ears is set in motion by the external air and transmits this to the brain [. . .].

D37 (A21) Aëtius

Diogenes: [scil. hearing occurs] when the air contained in the head is struck by a sound and is set in motion.

Sight (D38)

D38 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] one sees the object of vision when a reflection is formed in the pupil: when this is mixed with the internal

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

σθησιν· σημείον δέ· ἐὰν γὰρ φλεγμασία γένηται
τῶν φλεβῶν οὐ μιγνῦσι τῷ ἐντός, οὐχ ὁράν, ὁμοίως
τῆς ἐμφάσεως οὔσης [. . . = **D39**].

Taste (D39–D40)

D39 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 40

[. . . = **D38**] τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν τῇ γλώττῃ διὰ τὸ μανὸν
καὶ ἀπαλόν [. . . = **D41**].

D40 (A22) Aët. 4.18.2 (Ps.-Plut.) [περὶ γεύσεως]

Διογένης τῇ ἀραιότητι τῆς γλώττης καὶ τῇ μαλα-
κότητι καὶ διὰ τὸ συνάπτειν τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς
αὐτὴν φλέβας διαχεῖσθαι τοὺς χυμοὺς ἐλκομένους
ἐπὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καθάπερ ἀπὸ
σπογγίᾳς.

Touch (D41)

D41 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 40

[. . . = **D39**] περὶ δὲ ἀφῆς οὐδὲν ἀφώρισεν, οὔτε πῶς
οὔτε τίνων ἐστίν [= **D42**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

air, it produces the sensation. And there is evidence for this: for if there is an inflammation of the vessels in people who for this reason do not achieve the mixture with the internal air, they cannot see, even though the reflection occurs in the same way [. . .].

Taste (D39–D40)

D39 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] tasting [scil. occurs] by the tongue, for its consistency is loose and soft [. . .].

D40 (A22) Aëtius

Diogenes: it is by reason of the porosity of the tongue and its softness, and because the vessels that extend from the body to it enter into contact, that the flavors are diffused, drawn toward sensation and the directing principle, as though by a sponge.

Touch (D41)

D41 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] regarding touch he defined nothing, neither how it occurs nor to what objects it applies [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Intensity and Precision of the Different Sensations (D42)

D42 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 40–43

[. . . = **D41**] ἀλλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα πειράται λέγειν, διὰ τί συμβαίνει τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀκριβεστέρας εἶναι καὶ τῶν ποίων.

[41] ὁσφρησιν μὲν οὖν ὀξύτατην, οἷς¹ ἐλάχιστος ἀὴρ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ· ἥκιστα γὰρ μίγνυσθαι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ἐὰν ἔλκη διὰ μακροτέρου καὶ στενωτέρου θᾶπτον γὰρ οὕτω κρίνεσθαι· διόπερ ἔνια τῶν ζώων ὁσφραντικώτερα τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ συμμέτρου γε οὔσης τῆς ὁσμῆς τῷ ἀέρι πρὸς τὴν κρᾶσιν μάλιστα ἂν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

ἀκούειν δ' ὀξύτατα, ὧν αἶ τε φλέβες λεπταί, καθάπερ τῇ αἰσθήσει, καὶ τῇ ἀκοῇ τέτρηται βραχὺ καὶ λεπτόν καὶ ἰθὺ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ οὖς ὀρθὸν ἔχει καὶ μέγα. κινούμενον γὰρ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἀέρα κινεῖν τὸν ἐντός. ἐὰν δὲ εὐρύτερα ᾗ, κινουμένον τοῦ ἀέρος ἥχον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ψόφον ἀναρθρον διὰ τὸ μὴ προσπίπτειν πρὸς ἡρεμοῦν.

[42] ὁρᾶν δ' ὀξύτατον, ὅσα τε τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἔχει λεπτάς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅσα τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν λαμπρότατον. μάλιστα δ' ἐμφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐναντίον χρῶμα· διὸ τοὺς μελανοφθάλμους μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν, τοὺς δ' ἐναντίους νύκτωρ [. . . = **D34b**, **D43**].

¹ ᾗς mss., corr. Schneider

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Intensity and Precision of the Different Sensations (D42)

D42 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] after this, he tries to explain for what reason it happens that sensations are more precise, and in what kinds of conformations.

[41] The most acute sense of smell belongs to those whose head contains the least amount of air, for it is mixed the least; and also when respiration occurs through a passageway that is longer and narrower, for in this way one discerns more quickly. This is why certain animals have a better sense of smell than humans do; except that, the smell being adapted to the air with regard to the mixture, it is the human being that would have this sensation most intensely.

The most acute sense of hearing is found in those whose vessels are thin, just as for sensation, and whose passageway, with regard to the organ of hearing, is perforated short, thin, and straight, and whose ear is straight and big: for it is when the air in the ears is set in motion that it moves the internal air. But if they are too wide, an echo occurs when the air is in motion and the sound is inarticulate, because it does not fall upon a body at rest.

[42] The most acute sense of sight is found in those who have both the air and the vessels thin, just as for the other [scil. sensations], and whose eye is very brilliant. It is the opposite color that reflects the most; and that is why those people who have dark eyes see better during the day and [scil. see] bright objects [scil. better], while those with the opposite [scil. color of eyes see better] at night.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

[43] κριτικώτατον δὲ ἡδονῆς τὴν γλῶτταν· ἀπαλώτατον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μανὸν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἀπάσας ἀνῆκειν εἰς αὐτήν· διὸ σημεία τε πλείστα τοῖς κάμνουσιν ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὰ χρώματα μηνύειν· ὅποσα γὰρ ἂν ᾗ καὶ ὅποια, τοσαῦτα ἐμφαίνεσθαι. [. . . = **D44**]

Pleasure, Pain, and Other Affections (D43)

D43 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 43

[. . . = **D34b**] ἡδονὴν δὲ καὶ λύπην γίνεσθαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. ὅταν μὲν πολὺς ὁ αἷρ μίσγεται τῷ αἵματι καὶ κουφίζῃ κατὰ φύσιν ὦν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα διεξιὼν, ἡδονήν· ὅταν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ μὴ μίσγεται συννισάζοντος¹ τοῦ αἵματος καὶ ἀσθενεστεροῦ καὶ πυκνοτέρου γινομένου, λύπην. ὁμοίως καὶ θάρσος καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ τᾶναντία. [. . . = **D42**[43]]

¹ συννισάζοντος Schneider

Thought (D44)

D44 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 44–45

[. . . = **D42**] [44] φρονεῖν δ' ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῷ ἀέρι καθαρῷ καὶ ξηρῷ· κωλύειν γὰρ τὴν ἱκμάδα τὸν νοῦν· διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλησμοναῖς ἥττον φρονεῖν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ ὑγρότης ἀφαιρεῖται τὸν νοῦν· σημείον δ' ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα χεῖρω

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

[43] The organ that discerns flavor (*hêdonê*) the best is the tongue, for it is the softest and most relaxed, and all the vessels arrive at it. That is why it shows the largest number of signs in people who are sick and why it reveals the colors of the other animals: for whatever their number and their nature, they are all reflected in it. [. . .]

Pleasure, Pain, and Other Affections (D43)

D43 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] pleasure and pain occur in the following way: when a large quantity of air is mixed with the blood and lightens it, acting according to its nature and extending throughout the whole body, this is pleasure; but when it acts against its nature and does not mix, the blood being present in an equal quantity and becoming weaker and thicker, this is pain. And the same applies for vigor, health, and their opposites. [. . .]

Thought (D44)

D44 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] [44] Thinking (*phronein*), as has been said, occurs thanks to pure and dry air, for liquid impedes the mind (*nous*): that is why one thinks less during sleep, intoxication, and conditions of fullness. Furthermore, moisture abolishes the mind; evidence for this is that the other animals are inferior with regard to thought (*dianoia*), for

τὴν διάνοιαν· διαπνεῖν τε γὰρ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀέρα καὶ τροφήν ὑγροτέραν προσφέρεισθαι. τοὺς δὲ ὄρνιθες ἀναπνεῖν μὲν καθαρὸν, φύσιν δὲ ὁμοίαν ἔχειν τοῖς ἰχθύσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν σάρκα στιφρὰν¹ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐ διέειναι διὰ παντός, ἀλλὰ ἰστάναι περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν· διὸ τὴν μὲν τροφήν ταχὺ πέττειν, αὐτὸ δ' ἄφρον εἶναι. συμβάλλεσθαι δ' ἔτι πρὸς τῇ τροφῇ καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν· οὐ γὰρ δύνασθαι συνεῖναι ἀλλήλων. τὰ δὲ φυτά, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κοῖλα μηδὲ ἀναδέχεσθαι τὸν ἀέρα, παντελῶς ἀφηρηῆσθαι² τὸ φρονεῖν. [45] ταῦτόν δ' αἴτιον εἶναι καὶ ὅτι τὰ παιδιά ἄφρονα. πολὺ γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ ὑγρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι διὰ παντός διέειναι τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ ἐκκρίνεσθαι περὶ τὰ στήθη, διὸ νωθῇ τε εἶναι καὶ ἄφρονα. ὀργίλα δὲ καὶ ὅλως ὀξύρροπα καὶ εὐμετάπτωτα διὰ τὸ ἐκ μικρῶν κινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀέρα πολύν· ὅπερ καὶ τῆς λήθης αἴτιον εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἰέναι διὰ παντός τοῦ σώματος οὐ δύνασθαι συνεῖναι.³ σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἀναμιμνησκομένοις τὴν ἀπορίαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ στήθος, ὅταν δὲ εὖρωσιν, “διασκίδνασθαι” καὶ ἀνακουφίζεσθαι τῆς λύπης [. . . = R11].

¹ στιφρὰν Koraïs: στρυφνὰν mss.

² ἀφηρηῆσθαι Schneider: ἀναιρέεσθαι mss.

³ συνεῖναι P: καὶ συνεῖναι F

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

the air coming from the earth blows through them and they consume food that is too moist. As for birds, they breathe pure air, to be sure, but their nature is similar to that of fish: for their flesh is firm and does not let the breath pass through the whole body but keeps it in the area of the belly. That is why it digests its food quickly but is itself without intelligence (*aphron*). Besides their food, their mouth and tongue contributes too, for they cannot understand each other. As for plants, because they have no cavities and do not welcome the air, they are entirely devoid of thinking. [45] It is for the same reason too that small children are without intelligence; for they possess moisture in abundance, so that it cannot penetrate throughout the whole body but is repelled in the area of the chest, the reason for which they are obtuse and without intelligence. And they are irascible and, in general, impetuous and unstable, because a large quantity of air is expelled from small passages. This is also the cause of forgetfulness; for it is because the air does not permeate throughout the whole body that it cannot understand. And there is evidence for this: those people who try to remember feel trouble in the area of the chest, and when they find it, there occurs a “**dispersion**” and an alleviation of the pain [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Animals (D45–D47)

D45 (A30) Aët. 5.20.5 (Ps.-Plut.) [πόσα γένη ζώων καὶ εἰ πάντα αἰσθητὰ καὶ λογικά]

Διογένης μετέχειν μὲν αὐτὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ αἱέρος, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὰ μὲν πυκνότητι, τὰ δὲ πλεονασμῷ τῆς ὑγρασίας, μήτε διανοεῖσθαι μήτε αἰσθάνεσθαι, προσφερῶς δὲ αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι τοῖς μεμνημένοι παρεπταικότος τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ.

D46 (A31) Arist. *Resp.* 2 470b28–471a5

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ καὶ Διογένης, πάντα φάσκοντες ἀναπνεῖν, περὶ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ὀστρέων λέγουσι τίνα τρόπον ἀναπνέουσιν [. . . = **ANAXAG. D83**]. Διογένης δ' ὅταν ἀφῶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν βραγχίων, ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ στόμα περιεστῶτος ὕδατος ἔλκειν τῷ κενῷ τῷ ἐν τῷ στόματι τὸν αἶρα, ὥς ἐνόντος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι αἱέρος.

D47 (< A31) Arist. *Resp.* 3 471b15–19

[. . .] φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν αἶρα πολὺν ἔλκουσι λίαν ἐν τῷ αἱρί, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕδατι μέτριον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀποθνήσκειν [. . .] [cf. **R3**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Animals (D45–D47)

D45 (A30) Aëtius

Diogenes: they [i.e. animals] have a share in the intelligible (*noêtos*)¹ and in the air, but because of the fact that some do so with density, and others with an excess of moisture, they neither think nor perceive; their condition is comparable to that of madmen whose directing principle has stumbled.

¹A post-Platonic expression for the fact that animals, for Diogenes, possess a certain kind of intelligence (*noêsis*).

D46 (A31) Aristotle, *On Respiration*

Anaxagoras and Diogenes, who say that all [scil. animals] breathe, explain in what way fish and oysters breathe [. . .]. For Diogenes, when they [i.e. fish] expel water through their gills, they breathe in the air from the water that is located near their mouth by means of the void that is located in their mouth—for he supposes that there is air in the water.

D47 (< A31) Aristotle, *On Respiration*

[. . .] for he says that when they [scil. fish] are in the air, they breathe in too much of the air, which is present in great quantity, and that that is why they die; but when they are in water, the quantity is moderate.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Plants: Spontaneous Generation (D48)

D48 (A32) Theophr. *HP* 3.1.4

[. . .] καὶ ἔτι τὰς αὐτομάτους, ἃς καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι λέγουσιν, Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν φάσκων [. . . = **ANAXAG. D94**], Διογένης δὲ σηπομένου τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ μίξιν τινὰ λαμβάνοντος πρὸς τὴν γῆν.

An Ionic Form Without Context (D49)

D49 (B10) Hdn. *Mon. Lex.* vol. 3, p. 912 Lentz

τὸ δὲ πλῆ ἐιρημένον παρὰ Διογένει τῷ Ἀπολλωνιάτῃ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέη θηλυκοῦ ἐπιθετικῶς ἄγνωστον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Plants: Spontaneous Generation (D48)

D48 (A32) Theophrastus, *History of Plants*

[. . .] and also the spontaneous [scil. births], which the natural philosophers speak about: Anaxagoras, who asserts [. . .], and Diogenes, [scil. who asserts that plants are born] when the water putrefies and takes on a certain mixture with regard to the earth.

An Ionic Form Without Context (D49)

D49 (B10) Herodian, *On Particular Usages*

As for the form *plê* (= ‘full’) that is found in Diogenes of Apollonia for the feminine adjective *plêê*, it is not attested in other authors.

DIOGENES OF
APOLLONIA [64 DK]

R

Possible Pre-Aristotelian Echoes

See **MED. T10; DERV. Col. XVII–XIX; DRAM. T10, T81**

Peripatetic Reactions (R1–R12)

Aristotle (R1–R7)

Praise for the Unicity of Diogenes' Principle (R1)

R1 (> A7) Arist. GC 1.6 322b9–19

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυνατόν, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μηδενὸς ποιούντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος. [. . .] καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἦν ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ δηλόνοτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστι καὶ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

R

Possible Pre-Aristotelian Echoes

See **MED. T10; DERV. Col. XVII–XIX; DRAM. T10, T81**

Peripatetic Reactions (R1–R12)

Aristotle (R1–R7)

Praise for the Unicity of Diogenes' Principle (R1)

R1 (> A7) Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*

It is not possible that there be alteration either, any more than separation and reunion, if there is nothing that acts or that undergoes. [. . .] And Diogenes is right to say that if everything did not come from only one thing there would not be either reciprocal acting or undergoing, for example what is warm becoming cold and this becoming warm again: for it is not the warmth and the coldness that are transformed into each other, but, evidently, the substrate. So that in those things in which there is acting and undergoing, the nature that forms the substrate must necessarily be one.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Various Criticisms (R2–R4)

R2 (A25) Arist. *GA* 2.7 746a 19–22

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τρέφεσθαι τὰ παῖδια ἐν ταῖς ὑστέραις
διὰ τοῦ σαρκιδιόν τι βδάλλειν¹ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν·
ἐπὶ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ταῦτόν συνέβαινεν ἄν,²
νῦν δ' οὐ φαίνεται (θεωρῆσαι γὰρ τοῦτο ῥάδιον διὰ
τῶν ἀνατομῶν) [. . .].

¹ βδάλλειν O^c i.m. (Gaza): βάλλειν ZPSEO^c: θάλλειν Y

² ἄν P: om. ZSYEO^c

R3 (< A31) Arist. *Resp.* 3 471b11, 15, 17–18

[. . .] διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἀποθνήσκουσι [. . .];
ἦν γὰρ λέγει Διογένης αἰτίαν, εὐήθης· [. . . = **D47**].
καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν πεζῶν ἔδει δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο συμ-
βαίνειν.

R4 (< T35c Laks) Arist. (?), *Inund. Nili* (= Frag. 248
Rose, p. 192.24–29)

[. . . = **D25a**] accidit autem et huic, unum quidem quod
frigidissimum¹ estate quod secundum terram est, trahit
autem omne calidum existens et quando utique maxime
fuerit calidum. adhuc autem quia alios oportebat fluvios
eos qui in Libia idem facere. non enim singulariter solum
illius dessicat fontes.

¹ frigidissimum *ed. Veneta*: frigidissimi *mss.*

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Various Criticisms (R2–R4)

R2 (A25) Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*

Those who say [including Diogenes, cf. **D32**] that children are nourished in the uterus by sucking an appendix of flesh are mistaken; for the same thing would happen in the other animals, but in fact this is seen not to be the case (it is easy to observe this by means of dissections) [. . .].

R3 (< A31) Aristotle, *On Respiration*

[. . .] for what reason do they [i.e. fish] die when they are in the air [. . .]? For the reason that Diogenes gives is silly [. . .]. For this [i.e. death by excess of air breathed in] would have to be possible in the case of terrestrial animals too.

R4 (≠ DK) Aristotle (?), *On the Flooding of the Nile*

[...] But it also happens to it,¹ first of all, that what is found in the earth is extremely cold in the summer, for it [scil. the sun] attracts all the existing warmth, and especially when it is hottest. And what is more, the other rivers located in Libya would have to do the same thing, for it does not dry out the sources of only that one river.

¹ The medieval Latin expression, derived awkwardly from the Greek, means, “His doctrine, like that of other philosophers, encounters difficulties, viz. . . .”

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

An Exegetical Problem in Aristotle and Its Consequences for the Transmission of the Fragments (R5–R7)

R5 (cf. 63.15–28) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 149.3–19

καὶ τῶν ἐν λεγόντων δύο τρόπους εἶναί φησι τῆς ἐκ
τούτου¹ τῶν ὄντων γενέσεως. πάντες μὲν γὰρ σωματι-
κόν τι τὸ ἐν ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐν τι τῶν
τριῶν στοιχείων, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Διογένης
τὸν ἀέρα, Ἡράκλειτος δὲ καὶ Ἴππασος τὸ πῦρ [. . .].
τινὲς δὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν τριῶν ὑπέθεντο, ὃ ἐστὶ πυρὸς μὲν
πυκνότερον, ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, ἢ ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις φη-
σὶν, ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον, ὕδατος δὲ λεπτότερον. καὶ
ὁ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀναξίμανδρον οἶεται τὸν² ἄλλην
τινὰ φύσιν σώματος παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὴν ἀρχὴν
ὑποθέμενον, ὁ μὲντοι Πορφύριος [Frag. 137 Smith] ὡς
τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντι-διαιροῦντος τοὺς σῶμα τὸ ὑπο-
κείμενον ἀδιορίστως ποιήσαντας πρὸς τοὺς ἢ τῶν
τριῶν τι στοιχείων ἐν ἢ ἄλλο τι τὸ μεταξὺ πυρὸς καὶ
ἀέρος, σῶμα μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀδιορίστως Ἀναξί-
μανδρον λέγειν φησὶν ἄπειρον οὐ διορίσαντα τὸ εἶ-
δος εἴτε πῦρ εἴτε ὕδωρ εἴτε ἀήρ, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ καὶ
αὐτὸς, ὥσπερ Νικόλαος ὁ Δαμασκηνός, εἰς Διογένην
τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην ἀνέπεμψεν.

¹ ἐκ τούτου Diels: ἐκ τούτων DE: ἐκ τοῦ F

² τὸν F: τοῦτον DE

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

An Exegetical Problem in Aristotle and Its Consequences for the Transmission of the Fragments (R5–R7)

R5 (cf. 63.15–28) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

He [i.e. Aristotle] says that among those who say that there is only one element there are two ways in which beings are generated out of this. For they all posit that this one is corporeal, but some of them say that it is one of the three elements, like [. . .] air for Anaximenes and Diogenes, fire for Heraclitus and Hippasus [. . .]; while for others, it is different from the three elements, denser than fire but more rarefied than air, or, as he says elsewhere, denser than air, but more rarefied than water. Alexander thinks that Anaximander is the one who posited that the principle is some other corporeal nature besides the elements [cf. **ANAXIMAND. R4**] ; but Porphyrius thinks that Aristotle's distinction is opposing those who make the substrate a body without defining it further to those who make it either one of the three elements or some other thing intermediate between fire and air; and according to him, Anaximander is the one who says that the substrate is an unlimited body without defining it further or specifying whether its form is fire, water, or air; as for what is intermediate, he too, like Nicolaus of Damascus, refers it to Diogenes of Apollonia.

R6 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 25.8–9

[. . . = **D8**] Νικόλαος μέντοι τοῦτον ἱστορεῖ μεταξὺ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος τὸ στοιχεῖον τίθεσθαι.

R7 (cf. A4) Simpl. *In Phys.*, pp. 151.20–153.22

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πλειόνων ἱστορία Διογένην τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην ὁμοίως Ἀναξιμένει τὸν ἀέρα τίθεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον στοιχεῖόν φησι, Νικόλαος δὲ ἐν τῇ Περὶ θεῶν πραγματείᾳ τοῦτον ἱστορεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀποφήνασθαι, καὶ τῷ Νικολάῳ συνηκολούθησεν ὁ πολυμαθέστατος τῶν φιλοσόφων Πορφύριος, ιστέον ὡς [. . . cf. **D1**] ἐν δέ γε τῷ Περὶ φύσεως, ὃ τῶν αὐτοῦ μόνον εἰς ἐμὲ ἦλθε [. . .] προτίθεται μὲν διὰ πολλῶν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἐν τῇ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τεθείσῃ ἀρχῇ ἐστὶ “νόησις πολλή” [**D5a**]. γράφει δὲ εὐθύς μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον τάδε: [. . . = **D3**] τούτοις καὶ ἐγὼ πρῶτοις ἐντυχὼν ὥρῃθην ἄλλο τι λέγειν αὐτὸν παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα τὸ κοινὸν ὑποκείμενον, εἴπερ φησὶν μὴ ἀναμίγνυσθαι ταῦτα μηδὲ μεταπίπτειν εἰς ἄλληλα, εἴπερ ἔν τι αὐτῶν ἦν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχον, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὑπέκειτο, ἀφ' οὗ πάντα ἕτεροι οὔται. ἐφεξῆς δὲ δείξας ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ νόησις πολλή [. . . = **D5b**] ἐπάγει ὅτι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης, ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁ ἀῆρ, καὶ ζῆ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ νόησιν, λέγων οὕτως: [. . . = **D9**] εἶτα μετ' ὀλίγα σαφῶς ἐπήγαγε [. . . = **D10**]: καὶ ἐφεξῆς δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζώων

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

R6 (< A5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] But Nicolaus reports that the element that he posits is intermediate between fire and air.

R7 (cf. A4) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

But since, according to most authors, Diogenes of Apollonia, like Anaximenes, posited that the first element is air, but Nicolaus, in his treatise *On the Gods*, reports that he maintained that the principle is what is intermediate between fire and air, and Porphyry, the most erudite of the philosophers, has followed Nicolaus, one must know that [. . .] in his *On Nature* at least, which is the only book of his that has reached me (cf. **D1**) [. . .] he proposes to show by means of numerous arguments that in the principle which he posits there exists “**much intelligence** [or: cognitive activity, *noêsis*]” [**D5a**]. Immediately after the proem he writes this: [. . . = **D3**]. When I read these first assertions, I too thought that he was saying that the common substrate is something different from the four elements, since he says that these would not mix together or be transformed into each other if one of them were the principle and possessed its own nature, and if there were not the same substrate for all bodies, from which they were all differentiated. But right after he has shown that there exists in this principle **much intelligence** (“[. . . = **D5b**]”), he adds that both humans and the other animals also live and have their soul and intelligence from this principle, which is air, speaking as follows: “[. . . = **D9**].” Then a little later he adds clearly, “[. . . = **D10**].” And right after this he shows both that the semen of animals is of the

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

πνευματώδές ἐστι καὶ νοήσεις γίνονται τοῦ ἀέρος σὺν τῷ αἵματι τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καταλαμβάνοντος διὰ τῶν φλεβῶν, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἀνατομὴν ἀκριβῆ τῶν φλεβῶν παραδίδωσιν [cf. **D27**]. ἐν δὴ τούτοις σαφῶς φαίνεται λέγων ὅτι ὃν ἄνθρωποι λέγουσιν ἀέρα, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ἀρχή. θαυμαστὸν δὲ ὅτι κατὰ ἑτεροίωσιν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λέγων τὰ ἄλλα γίνεσθαι, αἰδίων ὅμως αὐτό φησι λέγων [. . . = **D4**], καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις [. . . = **D6**]. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ Διογένους προσιστορήσθω.

Theophrastus (R8–R11)
His Book on Diogenes (R8)

R8 (II, p. 52.28) Diog. Laert. 5.43 [Catalog of the writings of Theophrastus]

τῶν Διογένους συναγωγὴ α΄

Diogenes' Lack of Coherence (R9)

R9 (< A5) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 25.1–3 (< Theophr. Frag. 226A FSH&G)

καὶ Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης [. . .] τὰ μὲν πλείστα συμπεφορημένως γέγραφε τὰ μὲν κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ Λεύκιππον λέγων [cf. **P2**].

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

nature of air and that cognitive acts (*noêseis*) occur when air together with blood occupies the whole body through the vessels; in this section he also provides a detailed description of the vessels. In these passages he is seen to be saying clearly that what humans call ‘air’ is the principle. But it is surprising that, although he says that the other things come to be from it by differentiation, he nonetheless asserts that it is immortal, saying, “[. . . = **D4**],” and elsewhere, “[. . . = **D6**].” Let this then be what is additionally reported about Diogenes.

Theophrastus (R8–R11)
His Book on Diogenes (R8)

R8 (II, p. 52.28) Diogenes Laertius [Catalog of the writings of Theophrastus]

Collection of Diogenes’ Opinions, one book

Diogenes’ Lack of Coherence (R9)

R9 (< A5) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*

Diogenes of Apollonia [. . .], wrote for the most part in a composite manner, sometimes following Anaxagoras, other times Leucippus.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Should Diogenes Be Connected with Theories of the Similar?[?] (R10)

R10 (< A19) Theophr. *Sens.* 39

Διογένης δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν τῷ ἀέρι, καὶ
τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνάπτει· διὸ καὶ δόξαιεν ἂν τῷ ὁμοίῳ
ποιεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν, εἰ μὴ
πάντ' ἦν ἐξ ἑνός [. . . = **D35**].

Criticisms of Diogenes' Doctrine of Cognition (R11)

R11 (p. 160 Laks) Theophr. *Sens.* 46–48

[. . . = **D44**] [46] Διογένης μὲν οὖν πάντα βουλόμενος
ἀνάπτειν τῷ ἀέρι πολλῶν ἀπολείπεται πρὸς πίστιν.
οὔτε γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὔτε τὴν φρόνησιν ἴδιον ποιεῖ
τῶν ἐμφύχων.¹ ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ἀέρα τοιοῦτον καὶ κρᾶ-
σιν καὶ συμμετρίαν ἐνδέχεται πανταχοῦ καὶ πᾶσιν
ὑπάρχειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτο αὐτὸ λεκτέον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν
αὐταῖς ταῖς διαφόροις αἰσθήσεσιν, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι
τὰ τῆς ὀψεως τὴν ἀκοὴν κρίνειν καὶ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῇ
ὀσφρήσει, ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ζῶον ἑτέρα διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν
ἔχειν κρᾶσιν· ὥστε καὶ τῇ² περὶ τὸν θώρακα ἀναπνοῇ
κρίνειν τότε τὰς ὀσμὰς· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε σύμμε-
τρον εἶναι ταύταις. [47] εὐήθη δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν,
ὥς τῷ ἀέρι τῷ ἐντὸς ὁρώμεν· ἀλλὰ ἐλέγχει μὲν³ πως

¹ ἐμφύχων Wimmer: ὀψεων mss.

² τῇ P: τὸ F

³ ἐλέγχομεν mss., corr. Stephanus

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

*Should Diogenes Be Connected with Theories of the Similar?*⁹ (R10)

R10 (< A19) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

Diogenes, just as he does in the case of life and thought, connects the sensations too with air. That is why one might think that he explains them by the action of what is similar, for there would not even be acting or undergoing if all things did not derive from only one principle [. . .].

Criticisms of Diogenes' *Doctrine of Cognition* (R11)

R11 (≠ DK) Theophrastus, *On Sensations*

[. . .] [46] Diogenes, in wanting to connect everything with air, in many cases fails to persuade. For he makes neither sensation nor thought something that belongs to animated beings as their own. For perhaps air of a certain sort, constitutive mixture, and proportion exists everywhere and in all things; and if not, it is precisely this that needs to be explained. Moreover, it [i.e. this air] might also be found in the different sensations themselves, so that it would be possible for hearing to discern the objects of sight, and as we do by means of the sense of smell, some other living being would discern these things by means of a different sense, because it would possess the same constitutive mixture; so that it would then also be able to discern odors by means of the respiration in its chest; for it is possible that sometimes this would be proportionate to those. [47] Silly, too, is what he says about sight, viz. that we see by means of the internal air. But he does refute in

τοὺς τὴν ἔμφασιν ποιοῦντας, οὐ μὴν αὐτὸς λέγει τὴν αἰτίαν.

ἔπειτα τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν τῇ τε⁴ ἀναπνοῇ καὶ τῇ μίξει τοῦ αἵματος ἀποδίδωσι. πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζώων τὰ μὲν ἄναιμα, τὰ δὲ ὅλως οὐκ ἀναπνεῖ· καὶ εἰ δεῖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος διέναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν, ἀλλὰ μορίων τινῶν (μικροῦ γὰρ ἔνεκα) τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐθὲν ἂν κωλύοι⁵ διὰ γε τοῦτο καὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ μεμνήσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν. ἔτι δὲ εἰ καὶ τοῦτο συνέβαινε, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐμποδών. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσιν ὁ νοῦς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι καὶ τοῖς ποσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ὠρισμένοις,⁶ δι' ὧν καὶ οἱ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ καὶ μέμνηνται καὶ φρο-νοῦσιν. [48] εὐνηθες δὲ καὶ τὸ⁷ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διαφέρειν τῷ καθαρώτερον ἀναπνεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν φύσιν, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἔμψυχα τῶν ἀψύχων. ἐχρήν γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταλλάξαντα τόπον διαφέρειν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἐμφρονεστέρους⁸ εἶναι, τῶν πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τοὺς ὄρνιθας· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἢ τῆς σαρκὸς διαφέρει φύσις ὅσον ἢ τοῦ ἀέρος καθαριότης. ἔτι δὲ τὰ φυτὰ μὴ φρονεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κενόν, οἷς δ' ἐνυπάρχει, ταῦτα πάντα φρονεῖν.

Διογένης μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἅπαντα προθυμούμενος ἀνάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν πολλὰ διαμαρτάνει τῶν εὐλόγων.

⁴ ἔτι δὲ mss., corr. Wimmer

⁵ κωλύοι Stephanus: κωλύει F: κωλύη P

⁶ ὠρισμέναις mss., corr. Camotius

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

some way those people who have recourse to reflection, even if he himself does not indicate the cause.

Then he goes on to explain sensation, pleasure, and thought by respiration and the mixture of blood. But many animals are either bloodless or do not breathe at all. And if respiration has to permeate throughout the whole body, and this is due to certain parts (because of smallness), then nothing would prevent, on this hypothesis, all the parts from being endowed with both memory and thought. Moreover, even if this happened, it would not be an obstacle. For the mind is not located in all the parts, as for example in the legs and feet, but in certain determinate ones, by means of which those who have reached a suitable age remember and think. [48] It is also silly to say that human beings are distinguished by the fact that they breathe a purer one [scil. air], but not by their nature, as animate beings [scil. are distinguished] from inanimate ones. For it would be necessary that by simply changing places one would be distinguished with regard to thought, and that among humans those in lofty places would be more intelligent, and of all creatures most of all birds; for the nature of their flesh does not differ as much as the purity of the air does. Moreover, [scil. it is silly to say] that plants do not think because they do not contain any void, while all of those beings in which there is some [scil. void] do think.

And so Diogenes, as we said, in his eagerness to reduce everything to the principle, often ends up going far astray from plausible explanations.

⁷ τὸ καὶ mss., corr. Wimmer ⁸ ἐμφρονεστέρους Schneider:
ἐμφανεστέρους P: ἐμφαινεστέρους F

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Another Peripatetic Criticism (R12)

R12 (> A25) Aristoph. Byz. *Epit.* 1.78 (p. 23.14–15 Lambros)

διαπίπτειν¹ δὲ Διογένην τὸν Ἀπολλωνιάτην εἰρηκότα
ταῖς κοτυληδόσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τρέφεσθαι τὰ ἔμ-
βρυα· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφωδόντων κοτυληδόνας ἔχει
ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀμφόδους.

¹ διαπίπτει mss., corr. Rose

Diogenes Among the Epicureans (R13–R14) *An Obvious Reference to Diogenes in* *a Report on Epicurus (R13)*

R13 (≠ DK) Aët. 2.20.14 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου]

Ἐπίκουρος γήινον πύκνωμα τὸν ἡλίον φησιν εἶναι
κισηροειδῶς καὶ σπογγοειδῶς ταῖς κατατρήσεσιν ὑπὸ
πυρὸς ἀνημμένον.

A Criticism (R14)

R14 (A8) Cic. *Nat. deor.* 1.12.29

quid? aër, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem
sensum habere potest aut quam formam dei?

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Another Peripatetic Criticism (R12)

R12 (> A25) Aristophanes of Byzantium, *Epitome of Aristotle's History of Animals*

Diogenes of Apollonia is mistaken when he says that embryos are nourished by cup-shaped cavities located in the uterus [cf. **D32b**]. For among the animals that possess incisors on both jaws, no species possesses cup-shaped cavities in the uterus, and man is one of these.

Diogenes Among the Epicureans (R13–14) *An Obvious Reference to Diogenes in* *a Report on Epicurus (R13)*

R13 (≠ DK) Aëtius

Epicurus: it [i.e. the sun] is a concentration that, like a pumice stone and a sponge, is inflamed in its openings by the effect of fire.¹

¹ The term 'pumice stone' is characteristic of Diogenes (cf. **D18**, **D19**, **D21**); cf. also 'sponge' at **D40**.

A Criticism (R14)

R14 (A8) Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*

[Velleius:] And air, which Diogenes of Apollonia makes a god, what sensation can it have, or what form of a god?

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Stoicizing Versions of Diogenes? (R15–R17)

R15 (< A11, cf. 59 A67) Aët. 2.8.1 (Ps.-Plut.) [τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐγκλιθῆναι]

[. . . = **D17**] ἐγκλιθῆναι πῶς τὸν κόσμον [. . .] ἴσως ὑπὸ προνοίας ἔν' ἃ μὲν τινα ἀοίκητα γένηται, ἃ δὲ οἰκητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ ψῦξιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ εὐκрасίαν.

R16 (< A10) Aët. 2.1.6 (Stob.) [περὶ κόσμον]

Διογένης καὶ [. . .] τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄπειρον, τὸν δὲ κόσμον πεπεράνθαι.

R17 (< A8) Aët. 1.7.17 (Stob.) [περὶ θεοῦ]

Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης [. . .] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν.

Three Divergent Presentations of Diogenes in Christian Authors (R18–R20)

R18 (T7b Laks) Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 5.64.1–3

στοιχεῖα μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ἀπέλειπον¹ ἐξυμνήσαντες [. . .] καὶ Ἀναξιμένης [. . .] τὸν ἀέρα, ᾧ Διογένης ὕστερον ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης κατηκολούθησεν. [. . .] ἄθεοι μὲν δὲ καὶ οὔτοι, σοφία τινὶ ἀσόφῳ τὴν ὕλην προσκυνήσαντες [. . .].

¹ ἀπέλειπον ms., corr. Cobet

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Stoicizing Versions of Diogenes? (R15–R17)

R15 (< A11, cf. 59 A67) Aëtius

[. . .] the world inclined somehow on its own [. . .]—perhaps by the working of providence, so that some parts of the world would be uninhabited and others inhabited, because of coldness, extreme heat, and a temperate climate.

R16 (< A10) Aëtius

Diogenes and [. . .]: the whole is unlimited, but the world is limited.

R17 (< A8) Aëtius

Diogenes, Cleanthes [. . .]: [scil. god is] the soul of the world.¹

¹ This might perhaps refer to Diogenes the Stoic (but, as Diels notes, Aëtius never cites him).

Three Divergent Presentations of Diogenes in Christian Authors (R18–R20)

R18 (≠ DK) Clement of Alexandria, *Protreptic*

They [i.e. the philosophers] have accepted that the principles are elements, glorifying [. . .] and Anaximenes [. . .], whom Diogenes of Apollonia later followed, air. [. . .] These men too are atheists, since, by a kind of unwise wisdom, they adore matter [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

R19 (A8) August. *Civ. Dei* 8.2

Diogenes quoque Anaximenis alter auditor aërem quidem dixit rerum esse materiam, de qua omnia fierent; sed eum esse compotem divinae rationis, sine qua nihil ex eo fieri posset.

R20 (T7d Laks) Min. Fel. *Octav.* 19.5

Anaximenes deinceps et post Apolloniates Diogenes aëra deum statuunt infinitum et immensum.

An Alchemical Utilization (R21)

R21 (≠ DK) Ps.-Olymp. *Ars sacra* 22

ὁ δὲ Διογένης τὸν ἀέρα, ἐπειδὴ οὗτος πλούσιός ἐστιν καὶ γόνιμος· τίκτει γὰρ ὄρνεα· καὶ εὐδιάπλαστος καὶ αὐτός· ὥς γὰρ θέλεις διαπλάττεις καὶ τοῦτον· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἷς ἐστιν οὗτος καὶ κινούμενος, καὶ οὐκ αἶδιος.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

R19 (A8) Augustine, *City of God*

Diogenes, Anaximenes' other disciple [scil. besides Anaxagoras], also says that air is the matter of the things from which everything comes; but he says that this is endowed with divine reason, without which nothing could come from it.

R20 (≠ DK) Minucius Felix, *Octavius*

Then Anaximenes, and later Diogenes of Apollonia, assert that air is an unlimited and immense god.

An Alchemical Utilization (R21)

R21 (≠ DK) Ps.-Olympiodorus, *On the Sacred Art*

Diogenes [scil. says that the principle] is air, because it is rich and fertile. For it generates birds. It too [scil. like water, Thales' principle] is easy to shape. For to this too you give the shape you wish. But it too is one and in motion, and it is not eternal.

29. EARLY GREEK MEDICINE (MED.)

Philosophy and medicine, two disciplines that later came to be distinguished clearly from one another, present numerous points of contact throughout antiquity. There is no firm line of demarcation between them during the period presented in this volume: certain authors, such as Alcmaeon, Hippo, and Diogenes of Apollonia, belong just as much to the history of medicine as they do to the history of philosophy; and more generally there are important interferences between the two bodies of texts with regard both to general principles and to particular problems.

In the present chapter we gather together a number of passages of the medical tradition that are useful for situating and explaining, by way of comparison, the doctrines of the early Greek philosophers—and vice versa. Some of these texts illustrate the process of the gradual differentiation between the two disciplines during this period and the relations, sometimes strained, between the two groups of practitioners; others show how certain Hippocratic writers made explicit appeals to cosmological doctrines in order to provide a foundation for their own properly medical theories; still others provide examples of how some medical authors developed their own original epistemo-

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

logical and methodological principles, ones on which Plato and Aristotle reflected as much as they did for example on Empedocles or Democritus; a final group of texts discuss certain aspects of human physiology that were regularly studied by a number of philosophers.

Given the impossibility of attributing the texts involved to a particular author or of dating them, except relatively, without a large margin of error, these passages—which nonetheless are all located within a span of time between the last third of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth centuries BC—must be used with caution. Furthermore, this is only a selection, to which other passages could certainly be added. But there can be no doubt concerning the general relevance and importance of these extracts in the present context.

In this chapter, more than in the others, we have adopted the texts presented by the editions of reference without indicating the variations and corruptions of the manuscript tradition (which are often quite numerous and of limited interest from the point of view of the present collection) nor even all the corrections made by the various editors.

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OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

T

Medicine and Natural Philosophy: Demarcation and Competition (T1–T4)

No Systematic Distinction between Philosophy and Medicine Before the 5th Century (T1)

Existence, Discovery, and Progress of the Medical Discipline (T2–T4)

Medicine Contrasted with Charlatanry (T5)

Medicine Contrasted with Philosophy (T6–T7)

Cosmophysiological Models (T8–T12)

A Pluralist Vision (T8)

An Eclectic Synthesis (T9)

The Power of Breath (T10)

A Cosmophysiology Founded on the Principle of Heat (T11)

A Resolutely Heraclitizing Doctor (T12)

Questions of Method (T13–T22)

Invisible/Visible (T13–T14)

Diagnosis: The Search for the Cause (T15–T17)

The Natural Origin of Diseases (T18)

The Multiplicity of Relevant Factors (T19–T22)

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

Human Physiology (T23–T31)

The Brain (T23)

The Vessels (T24)

Reproduction (T25–T31)

An Argument Against Monism in General (T25)

The Doctrine Called ‘Pangenesis’ (T26–T27)

The Development of the Embryo (T28–T29)

Viability of the Fetus (T30)

Transmission of Acquired Characteristics (T31)

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE [\neq DK]

T

*Medicine and Natural Philosophy:
Demarcation and Competition (T1–T4)
No Systematic Distinction between Philosophy
and Medicine Before the 5th Century (T1)*

T1 (> 68 B300.10) Cels. *Medic.* Prooem. 5–8

ergo etiam post eos, de quibus rettuli, nulli¹ clari viri
medicinam exercuerunt, donec maiore studio litterarum
disciplina agitari coepit [. . .]. primoque medendi scientia
sapientiae pars habebatur, ut et morborum curatio et
rerum naturae contemplatio sub isdem auctoribus nata sit.
[. . .] ideoque multos ex sapientiae professoribus peritos
eius fuisse accipimus, clarissimos vero ex his Pythagoran
et Enpedoclen et Democritum. huius autem, ut quidam
crediderunt, discipulus Hippocrates Cous, primus ex
omnibus memoria dignus, a studio sapientiae disciplinam
hanc separavit, vir et arte et facundia insignis.

¹ nulli VFJ¹T: nonnulli F¹J²

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

T

*Medicine and Natural Philosophy:
Demarcation and Competition (T1–T4)
No Systematic Distinction between Philosophy
and Medicine Before the 5th Century (T1)*

T1 (> 68 B300.10) Celsus, *On Medicine*

Thus after the men about whom I have spoken [i.e. doctors named by Homer], no famous men practiced medicine until the study of letters began to be pursued with greater zeal [. . .]. At first the science of medicine was considered to be a part of wisdom, so that it was among the same authors that the cure of diseases and the observation of natural phenomena first appeared. [. . .] And so we hear about many teachers of wisdom who were experts in this subject [i.e. medicine], but the most celebrated among them were Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. It was Hippocrates of Cos, the disciple of the last-named, as some have believed [cf. **ATOM. P28**], the first of them all to be worthy of being remembered, a man notable both for his science and for his eloquence, who separated this discipline from the study of wisdom.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Existence, Discovery, and Progress of the Medical Discipline (T2–T4)

T2 (87 B1) Hipp. Art. 2

δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τὸ μὲν σύμπαν τέχνη εἶναι οὐδεμία οὐκ
εἶδον· καὶ γὰρ ἄλογον τῶν ἑόντων τι ἡγείσθαι μὴ
ἐνεόν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε μὴ ἑόντων τίνα ἂν τίς οὐσίην θεη-
σάμενος ἀπαγγείλειεν ὥς ἔστιν; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔστι γε
ἰδεῖν τὰ μὴ ἑόντα ὥσπερ τὰ ἑόντα, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἄν
τις αὐτὰ νομίσειε μὴ ἑόντα ἅ γε εἴη καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
ἰδεῖν καὶ γνώμῃ νοῆσαι ὥς ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐκ
ἦ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἑόντα αἰεὶ ὁράται τε
καὶ γινώσκεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἑόντα οὔτε ὁράται οὔτε γι-
νώσκεται. γινώσκεται τοίνυν δεδιδασκέντων¹ ἤδη² τῶν
τεχνέων καὶ οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἣ γε ἔκ τινος εἶδεος οὐχ
ὁράται. οἶμαι δ' ἔγωγε καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτὰς διὰ τὰ
εἶδεα λαβεῖν· ἄλογον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡγεῖ-
σθαι τὰ εἶδεα βλαστάνειν καὶ ἀδύνατον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
ὀνόματα φύσιος³ νομοθετήματά ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ εἶδεα οὐ
νομοθετήματα, ἀλλὰ βλαστήματα.

¹ δεδιδασκέντων A: δεδειγμένων M ² ἤδη AM: εἶδεα
Ermerins: ἤδη <εἶδεα> Gomperz: ἤδη <τῶν εἰδέων ἐκάστη>
Diels ³ φύσιος M: φύσεως A, secl. Diels, transp. post
βλαστήματα Gomperz

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

Existence, Discovery, and Progress of the Medical Discipline (T2–T4)

T2 (87 B1) Hippocrates, *On the Art*

It seems to me that, on the whole, there is no art that does not exist. For it is absurd to think that any of the things that exist is not there; since, of those things that do not exist, what kind of being could one consider in order to proclaim its existence? For if it is possible to see things that do not exist just as well as things that do exist, I do not know how one could think that those things do not exist, the ones that one could both see with one's eyes and know with one's thought as existing. No, it surely cannot be like this, but the things that exist are always seen and known, while things that do not exist are neither seen nor known. Hence it [i.e. the art of medicine] is something known, given that the arts have already been taught, and that there is not one [scil. art] that is not seen on the basis of some form (*eidos*). And I myself think that they have received their names because of their form. For it is absurd to suppose that the forms blossom [scil. like plants, *blastanein*] from the names, and in fact also impossible. For the names are institutions (*nomothetêmata*) of nature, while the forms are not institutions, but blossomings.¹

¹ The transmitted text presupposes that nature manifests itself in two distinct ways, by producing either an institution or a flowering. The editors often emend the text so as to obtain a simple opposition between institution and nature.

T3 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Loc. Hom.* 46

ἰητρικὴ δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη ἀνευρῆσθαι ὅλη, ἥτις οὕτως ἔχει, ἥτις διδάσκει ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ ἥθεα¹ καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς· ὅς γὰρ οὕτως ἰητρικὴν ἐπίσταται, ἐλάχιστα τὴν τύχην ἐπιμένει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ τύχης καὶ σὺν τύχῃ εὖ ποιηθεῖν ἂν. βέβηκε γὰρ ἰητρικὴ πᾶσα, καὶ φαίνεται τῶν σοφισμάτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ συγκεείμενα ἐλάχιστα τύχης δεῖσθαι.

¹ ἥθεα Heidelberg: ἔθεα ms.: εἶδεα Ermerins

T4 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Vet. med.* 3

τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν οὐτ' ἂν εὐρέθῃ ἢ τέχνη ἢ ἰητρικὴ, οὐτ' ἂν ἐξηγήθῃ—οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἔδει—εἰ τοῖσι κάμνουσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ αὐτὰ διαιτωμένοις τε καὶ προσφερομένοιςιν ἅπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες ἐσθίουσιν τε καὶ πίνουσιν καὶ τᾶλλα διαιτέονται συνέφερεν καὶ μὴ ἦν ἕτερα τούτων βελτίω. νῦν δὲ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀνάγκη ἰητρικὴν ἐποίησεν ζητηθῆναί τε καὶ εὐρεθῆναι ἀνθρώποιςιν, ὅτι τοῖσι κάμνουσι ταῦτα προσφερομένοιςιν ἅπερ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες οὐ συνέφερεν, ὥς οὐδὲ νῦν συμφέρει. ἔτι δὲ ἄνωθεν ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ οὐδ' ἂν τῶν ὑγιαίνοντων δίαιτάν τε καὶ τροφήν, ἣ νῦν χρέωνται, εὐρεθῆναι, εἰ ἐξήρκει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα ἐσθίουσι καὶ πίνοντι βοῆ τε καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπου, οἷον τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φνύμενα, καρπούς τε καὶ ὕλην καὶ χόρτον· ἀπὸ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τρέφονται καὶ αὔξονται καὶ ἄπονοι

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

T3 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On Places in Man*

Medicine seems to me to have been discovered already as a whole, as it is now, teaching in each instance both the dispositions (*êthea*) and the appropriate times (*kairoi*). For whoever knows medicine in this way waits for luck hardly at all, but both independently of luck and with the help of luck he would be able to do good. For the whole of medicine is well established, and it is manifest that the finest technical resources (*sophismata*) contained within it need luck hardly at all.

T4 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine*

For in the beginning the art of medicine would not have been discovered or sought after—for there would have been no need of it—if it had been useful for sick people to follow the same way of life and diet as what healthy people do with regard to eating, drinking, and the rest of their way of life, and if nothing better than this existed. But in reality necessity itself made medicine sought after and discovered by human beings, for it was not beneficial for sick people to follow the same diet as healthy ones, just as little as it is beneficial nowadays. And, to go back even further, I myself think that the way of life and nourishment used by healthy people nowadays would not have been discovered either, if it had been sufficient for man to eat and drink the same things as an ox, a horse, and all the animals besides man, like for example what grows from the earth: fruits, wood, and grass. For it is thanks to these things that they [i.e. the animals] are nourished and grow

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

διάγουσιν οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι ἄλλης διαίτης. καὶ τοι τήν γε ἀρχὴν ἔγωγε δοκέω καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοιαύτη τροφῇ κεχρησθαι· τὰ δὲ νῦν διαιτήματα εὐρημένα καὶ τετεχνημένα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γεγενῆσθαι μοι δοκεῖ. ὥς γὰρ ἔπασχον πολλά τε καὶ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἰσχυρῆς τε καὶ θηριώδους διαίτης ὡμά τε καὶ ἄκρητα καὶ μεγάλας δυνάμιας ἔχοντα ἐσφερόμενοι—οἷά περ ἂν καὶ νῦν ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάσχοιεν—πόνοισί τε ἰσχυροῖσι καὶ νούσοισι περιπίπτοντες καὶ διὰ ταχέος θανάτοιςιν· ἦσσαν μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τότε εἰκὸς ἦν πάσχειν διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, ἰσχυρῶς δὲ καὶ τότε· [. . .] διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν χρείην καὶ οὗτοί μοι δοκέουσι ζητῆσαι τροφὴν ἀρμόζουσαν τῇ φύσει καὶ εὐ-ρεῖν ταύτην ἣ νῦν χρεώμεθα.

Medicine Contrasted with Charlatanry (T5)

T5 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Morb. sacr.*

a

[1.4] ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα ἀφιερῶσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβεῖς εἶναι καὶ πλεον τι εἰδέναι. οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεχόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θέϊον τῆς ἀμηχανίας τοῦ μὴ ἴσχειν ὃ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσιν, ὥς μὴ κατάδηλοι

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

and live free of pain, without having need of any other way of life. And I myself think that, at least at the beginning, man too made use of this kind of nourishment. Certainly, I myself think that at the beginning humans too were nourished in this way, and it seems to me that the present ways of life were discovered and elaborated by art over the course of a long period of time. For they used to suffer many terrible things because of their rough and bestial way of life, eating food that was uncooked, unmixed, and extremely potent (just as would happen to them nowadays too), and falling victim to severe pains, illnesses, and rapid death. To be sure, it is likely that they suffered less then because they had become inured to such conditions, but nonetheless then too they must have suffered severely. [. . .] It was by this need, I think, that they were impelled to seek a nourishment fitting for their nature and to discover what we use nowadays.

Medicine Contrasted with Charlatanry (T5)

T5 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease*

a

[1.4] To me it seems that the first people who made this disease [i.e. epilepsy] a sacred one were of the same sort as the men who nowadays too are magi, purifiers, vagabonds, and charlatans, all of them people who pretend to be especially pious and to possess greater knowledge. These people, alleging the divine as a pretext and putting it forward so as to conceal their helplessness in not possessing anything they could apply to be useful, consid-

ἔωσιν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἱρὸν ἐνόμισαν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι, καὶ λόγους ἐπιλέξαντες ἐπιτηδείους τὴν ἴησιν κατεστήσαντο ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς σφίσιν αὐτοῖσι [. . .]. [1.5] ταῦτα δὲ πάντα τοῦ θείου εἵνεκεν προστιθέασιν ὡς πλεόν τι εἰδότες καὶ ἄλλας προφάσις προλέγοντες ὅπως, εἰ μὲν ὑγιὲς γένοιτο, αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα εἴη καὶ ἡ δεξιότης, εἰ δ' ἀποθάνοι, ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ καθίσταται αὐτῶν ἡ ἀπολογία καὶ ἔχοιεν πρόφασιν ὡς οὐδὲν αἰτιοί εἰσιν αὐτοί, ἀλλ' οἱ θεοί [. . .].

b

[1.8] [. . .] καίτοι ἔμοιγε οὐ περὶ εὐσεβείης δοκέουσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὡς οἴονται, ἀλλὰ περὶ δυσσεβείης μᾶλλον καὶ ὡς οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ· τό τε εὐσεβὲς αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβές ἐστι καὶ ἀνόσιον [. . .]. [1.9] εἰ γὰρ σελήνην τε καθαιρεῖν καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανίζειν καὶ χειμῶνά τε καὶ εὐδίην ποιεῖν καὶ ὄμβρους καὶ αὐχμοὺς καὶ θάλασσαν ἄφορον καὶ γῆν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιοντότροπα πάντα ὑποδέχονται ἐπίστασθαι—εἴτε καὶ ἐκ τελετέων εἴτε καὶ ἐξ ἄλλης τινὸς γνώμης ἢ μελέτης φασὶ ταῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι γενέσθαι—, οἱ ταῦτ' ἐπιτηδεύοντες δυσσεβεῖν ἔμοιγε δοκέουσι καὶ θεοὺς οὐτ' εἶναι νομίζειν οὐτε ἰσχύειν οὐδὲν οὐτ' εἶργεσθαι ἂν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὧν ποιέοντες, ὡς οὐ δεινοὶ¹ αὐτοῖσιν εἰσιν.² εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μαγεύων τε καὶ θύων σελήνην τε καθαιρήσει καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανιεῖ καὶ

¹ ὡς οὐ δεινοὶ θ: ἐνεκά γε· πῶς ἄρ' M

² εἰσιν M: ἔωσιν θ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

ered this disease to be sacred in order to avoid it being discovered that they knew nothing, and, adding suitable explanations, they established a course of treatment that served the goal of their own safety [. . .]. [1.5] And all this they assign to the divine as though they possessed greater knowledge, and they speak of additional causes so that, if the patient recovers, the reputation and the skill will be theirs, whereas, if he dies, their defense will be assured and they will have the excuse that it is not at all they who are responsible, but the gods [. . .].

b

[1.8] [. . .] As for me, what they say seems to belong not to piety, as they suppose, but rather to impiety, and to suggest that the gods do not exist; and their piety and notion of the divine is impiety and sacrilege [. . .]. [1.9] For if they swear that they know how to make the moon fall, to make the sun disappear, to produce storm and sunshine, rain and drought, and to make the sea unnavigable and the land infertile, and everything else of this sort (whether they say that this can come about from initiatic rites or from some other knowledge or practice), to me at least those who behave in this way seem to be impious and to suppose that the gods do not exist and that they possess no strength, and it seems that they would not refrain from the worst extremities: they [i.e. such men] act in this way because they [i.e. the gods] are not an object of fear for them. For if a human being, by using magical sacrifices, makes the moon fall, makes the sun disappear, and produces storm and sunshine, I myself for my part would not think that

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

χειμῶνα καὶ εὐδίην ποιήσῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγ' ἔτι θεῖον νομίσαιμι τούτων εἶναι οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινον, εἰ δὴ τοῦ θείου ἢ δύναμις ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου γνώμης κρατεῖται καὶ δεδούλωται. [1.10] ἴσως δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι βίου δεόμενοι πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τεχνῶνται καὶ ποικίλλουσιν ἔς τε τᾶλλα πάντα καὶ ἔς τὴν νοῦσον ταύτην, ἐκάστω εἶδει τοῦ πάθεος θεῶ τὴν αἰτίην προ-στιθέντες. [. . .] [1.13] οὐ μέντοι ἔγωγε ἀξιῶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα μιαίνεσθαι, τὸ ἐπικηρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγνοτάτου· ἀλλὰ κῆν τυγχάνῃ ὑφ' ἐτέρου μεμιασμένον ἢ τι πεπονθός, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθαίρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγνίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μιαίνεσθαι.

Medicine Contrasted with Philosophy (T6–T7)

T6 (> 30 A6) Hipp. Nat. hom. 1

ὅστις μὲν οὖν εἴωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ τῆς φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐς ἱητρικὴν ἀφήκει, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἀκούειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἡέρα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, οὔτε πῦρ, οὔτε ὕδωρ, οὔτε γῆν, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ὃ τι μὴ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐνεὸν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ τοῖσι βουλομένοισι ταῦτα λέγειν παρίημι. δοκέουσι μέντοι μοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες· γνώμη μὲν γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες χρέωνται, λέγουσι δὲ οὐ ταῦτά· ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν γνώμης τὸν ἐπίλογον τὸν αὐτὸν ποίεονται—φασί τε γὰρ ἓν τε

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

any of these actions was divine, but human, since the power of the divine was being dominated and enslaved by a human's thought. [1.10] But perhaps this is not how things are, but certain people, lacking a livelihood, invent and elaborate many contrivances of all kinds, with regard to everything else and also to this disease, assigning the cause for each kind of suffering to a god. [. . .] [1.13] But I myself do not think that a human body, the most corrupt thing of all, can be defiled by a god, the most pure thing of all—on the contrary, if it happened to have been defiled by something else or to have suffered damage from it, then it would be restored to integrity and purity by the god much more than it would be defiled by him.

Medicine Contrasted with Philosophy (T6–T7)

T6 (> 30 A6) Hippocrates, *On the Nature of Man*

For anyone who is accustomed to hear people whose discourses regarding the nature of man go beyond as much of it as pertains to the domain of medicine, to listen to the present discourse is of no utility. For I do not state at all that man is air, fire, water, earth, or anything else that is not visibly present in man—I leave those who wish to make these discourses to do so. But it seems to me that those people who make these discourses do not possess correct knowledge. For while they all share the same conception, they do not say the same things: for regarding the conception, their reflection is the same (for they say that

εἶναι, ὅ τι ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἓν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν—, κατὰ δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οὐχ ὁμολογέουσιν· λέγει δ' αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν τις φάσκων ἡέρα τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἓν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ πῦρ, ὁ δὲ γῆν, καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἕκαστος τῷ ἑωυτοῦ λόγῳ μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια ἃ ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ὁπότε δὲ γνώμη τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες προσ-
 χρέωνται, λέγουσι δὲ οὐ ταυτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδέν¹ γινώσκουσιν.² γνοίη δ' ἂν τόδε τις μάλιστα παρα-
 γενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρὶς ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ οὗτος, τοτὲ δὲ ᾧ ἂν τύχῃ μάλιστα ἢ γλῶσσα ἐπιρρυ-
 εῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀμφὶ τῶν πρηγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἔοντα γι-
 νώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται. ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκέουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων <τῶν>³ ἑωυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀσυνη-
 σίης, τὸν δὲ Μελίσσου λόγον ὀρθοῦν.

¹ οὐδὲ mss., corr. Wilamowitz
 σκουσιν αὐτά MV

² γινώσκουσιν A: γινώ-

³ <τῶν> Jouanna

T7 (> 31 A71) Hipp. Vet. med.

a 1–2

[1.1] ὁκόσοι μὲν ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἱητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοῖσιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

what is, whatever the thing is that is, is one, and that this is the one and the whole), they do not agree with regard to the words. For one of them speaks asserting that this one and whole is air [**ANAXIMEN. D1; DIOG. D7–D8**], another fire [**HER. D86; cf. R45**], another water [**THAL. D3–D4**], another earth [**XEN. D25–D27**], and each one alleges in support of his own thesis evidence and proofs that are worth nothing. But if they share the same conception but do not say the same thing, it is clear that they do not know anything. The best way to know this consists in being present when they argue against each other: for when the same men argue against one another before the same listeners, the same man never wins in the discussion three times in a row, but one time this man wins, another time that one, another time someone whose tongue happens to flow most fluently toward the crowd. And yet it would be right for someone who says he has correct knowledge about the matters in question to always ensure the victory of his own discourse, if he really knows what is and delivers correct statements. But to me it seems that these men themselves, in their stupidity, overthrow themselves in the terms of their own arguments, and that they confirm the argument of Melissus [**MEL. R1**].

T7 (> 31 A71) Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine*

a

[1.1] All those people who have tried to speak or write about medicine by giving themselves as the postulate

λόγῳ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ
 ἂν θέλωσιν, ἐς βραχὺ ἄγοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίας
 τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν νούσων τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου
 καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν ἣ δύο ὑποθέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι
 μὲν καὶ οἷσι λέγουσι καταφανείς εἰσιν ἁμαρτάνοντες,
 μάλιστα δὲ ἄξιον μέμψασθαι, ὅτι ἀμφὶ τέχνης ἐού-
 σης ἢ χρέωνται τε πάντες ἐπὶ τοῖσι μεγίστοισι καὶ
 τιμῶσι μάλιστα τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς χειροτέχνας καὶ δημι-
 ουργούς. [. . .] [1.3] διὸ οὐκ ἡξίουں αὐτὴν ἔγωγε καινῆς
 ὑποθέσιος δεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὰ ἀφανέα τε καὶ ἀπορεό-
 μενα· περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη ἦν τις ἐπιχειρῆ τι λέγειν ὑπο-
 θέσει χρῆσθαι, οἷον περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ
 γῆν· ἃ εἴ τις λέγοι καὶ γινώσκοι ὡς ἔχει, οὐτ' ἂν αὐτῷ
 τῷ λέγοντι οὔτε τοῖσιν ἀκούουσι δῆλα ἂν εἴη, εἴτε
 ἀληθέα ἐστὶν εἴτε μή· οὐ γάρ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ τι χρὴ
 ἐπανενέγκαντα εἰδέναι τὸ σαφές. [2.1] ἱητρικῇ δὲ πάλαι
 πάντα ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁδὸς εὐρημένη, καθ' ἣν
 καὶ τὰ εὐρημένα πολλά τε καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντα εὐρηται
 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ εὐρεθήσεται, ἣν τις
 ἱκανός τ' ἐὼν καὶ τὰ εὐρημένα εἰδὼς ἐκ τούτων ὁρμώ-
 μενος ζητῇ.

b 20

[20] [. . .] λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἱητροὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ὡς
 οὐκ εἴη δυνατὸν ἱητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν ὃ τι

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

(*hupothesis*) for their discourse the hot or the cold, or the moist or the dry, or whatever else they wish—summarily reducing the principle of what is the cause of diseases and death in human beings and postulating the same one or two [scil. causes] for all—they are manifestly mistaken in what they say on many points; but what makes them most blameworthy is that they do this with regard to an art that exists, to which all people have recourse in the most important situations and in which they honor most of all the good craftsmen and practitioners. [. . .] [1.3] And that is why I myself have thought that it [i.e. this art] does not need a new postulate, as in the case of things that are invisible and cause perplexity, for which it is necessary, if one tries to say something, to have recourse to a postulate, as for example in the case of heavenly or subterranean phenomena. For if one spoke about these matters and knew how they are, neither the speaker nor his listeners would know clearly whether [scil. what he was saying was] true or not [cf. **XEN. D49**]. For there is nothing to refer to in order to know with certainty. [2.1] But medicine has possessed all [scil. it needs] for a long time, a principle has been discovered and also a method, thanks to which many fine discoveries have been made over the course of a long time, and the remaining ones will be discovered if someone who is proficient and knows what has already been discovered uses these as a starting point for his own research.

b

[20] [. . .] Certain doctors and sophists [or: experts] (*sophistai*) say that it is impossible for anyone to know

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος [. . .]. τείνει τε αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέης ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃ τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὁπόθεν συνεπάγη. ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὅσα τινὲ εἴρηται ἢ σοφιστῇ ἢ ἱητρῷ ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος ἥσσον νομίζω τῇ ἱητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ, νομίζω δὲ περὶ φύσιος γινῶναι τι σαφὲς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἱητρικῆς [= **EMP. R6**].

Cosmophysiological Models (T8–T12) *A Pluralist Vision (T8)*

T8 (≠ DK) Hipp. Nat. hom. 3

[. . . = **T25**] ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, τῆς φύσιος τοιαύτης ὑπαρχούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, μὴ ἐν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τῶν συμβαλλομένων ἐς τὴν γένεσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον περ συνεβάλετο. καὶ πάλιν γε ἀνάγκη ἀναχωρεῖν ἐς τὴν ἐωυτοῦ φύσιν ἕκαστον, τελευτῶντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τό τε ὑγρὸν πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν πρὸς τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν πρὸς τὸ ψυχρόν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· γίνεταί τε ὁμοίως πάντα καὶ τελευτᾷ ὁμοίως πάντα· συνίσταται τε γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ τελευτᾷ κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· ἐς τωὐτὸ ὅθεν περ συνέστη ἕκαστον, ἐνταῦθα οὖν καὶ ἀπεχώρησε.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

medicine who does not know what a human being is [. . .]. But what they are talking about belongs to philosophy, like Empedocles or others who have written about nature: what a human being is from the beginning, how he first appeared and out of what things he is constituted. But as for me, I think that whatever has been said or written by some sophist [or: expert] (*sophistês*) or doctor about nature belongs less to the art of medicine than to that of painting [or: writing], and I think that there is no other source than medicine for having some clear knowledge about nature [= **EMP. R6**].

Cosmophysiological Models (T8–T12) *A Pluralist Vision (T8)*

T8 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Nature of Man*

[. . .] Of necessity then, since the nature of all the other things and also of the human being is like this [scil. not a single thing but a composite of warm, cold, moist, and dry], the human being is not one, but each of the constituents that contributes to generation possesses in the body the powers that constitute its contribution. And again, of necessity each one returns to its own nature when the human body dies, the moist to the moist and the dry to the dry, the warm to the warm and the cold to the cold. The nature of the animals is like this too, as is that of all other things. All things come to be in the same way and all things end in the same way. For their nature is composed out of all the things I mentioned earlier, and each thing ends in accordance with what I have said: what each thing has been composed of, it is into that that it also returns.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

An Eclectic Synthesis (T9)

T9 (cf. 22 C1) Hipp. Vict.

[2] φημὶ δὲ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς συγγράφειν περὶ διαίτης ἀνθρωπίνης πρῶτον μὲν παντὸς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γινῶναι καὶ διαγινῶναι· γινῶναι μὲν ἀπὸ τίνων συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, διαγινῶναι δὲ ὑπὸ τίνων μερέων κεκράτῃται· εἴτε γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν μὴ γινώσεται, ἀδύνατος ἔσται τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων γινόμενα γινῶναι· εἴτε μὴ διαγνώσεται τὸ ἐπικρατέον ἐν τῷ σώματι, οὐχ ἱκανὸς ἔσται τὰ συμφέροντα προσενεγκεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δεῖ γινώσκειν τὸν συγγράφοντα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπάντων, οἷσι διαιτῶμεθα, δύναμιν ἥντινα ἕκαστα ἔχει καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν δι' ἀνάγκην καὶ τέχνην ἀνθρωπίνην.

[3] συνίσταται μὲν οὖν τὰ ζῶα τὰ τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ δυοῖν, διαφόρου μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, συμφόρου δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος. [. . .] τὴν μὲν οὖν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἔχει ἐκάτερον τοιήνδε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ δύναται πάντα διὰ παντὸς κινῆσαι, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ πάντα διὰ παντὸς θρέψαι· ἐν μέρει δὲ ἐκάτερον κρατεῖ καὶ κρατεῖται ἐς τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ὡς ἀνυστόν. οὐδέτερον γὰρ κρατῆσαι παντελῶς δύναται διὰ τόδε· τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἐπεξὶόν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιλείπει ἢ τροφή· ἀποτρέπεται οὖν ὅθεν μέλλει τρέφεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἐπεξὶόν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρός, ἐπιλείπει ἢ κίνησις· ἵσταται οὖν ἐν τούτῳ·

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

An Eclectic Synthesis (T9)

T9 (cf. 22 C1) Hippocrates, *On Regimen*

[Epistemological considerations]

[2] I say that whoever intends to write a treatise correctly about human regimen must first of all know and discern the nature of the human being as a whole: he must know what it is constituted from at the beginning, and discern by what parts it is controlled. For if he does not know its constitution from the beginning, he will not be capable of knowing the effects that they [i.e. the primary constituents] produce. And if he does not recognize what exercises control in the body, he will not be competent to prescribe what is beneficial for a person. So it is necessary that the author of a treatise know these things, and then the power, both the one that derives from their nature and the one from necessity together with human art, of all the foods and drinks that make up our regimen.

[The primary constituents: fire and water]

[3] Now all animals, including the human being, are composed of two things, different by their power but collaborating in their function: fire and water. [. . .] Each of them then possesses the following powers: fire can always move every thing, while water can always nourish every thing. But each one dominates and is dominated in turn to the greatest or least extent possible. For neither one is capable of dominating completely for the following reason: when fire arrives at the limit of water, it lacks nourishment, and so it turns back to where it will be able to be nourished; while when water arrives at the limit of fire, it lacks movement, and so it stops at this point. But when it stops, it no

όκόταν δέ στῆ, οὐκέτι ἐγκρατές ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἤδη τῷ ἐμπίπτουντι πυρὶ ἐς τὴν τροφὴν καταναλίσκεται [. . .].
[4] τούτων δὲ πρόσκειται ἑκατέρῳ τάδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἐνὶ γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἐνὶ γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν.

οὕτω δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, <ἐς>¹ πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἰδέας ἀποκρίνονται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ σπερμάτων καὶ ζώων οὐδὲν ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοισιν οὔτε τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὴν δύναμιν· ἅτε γὰρ οὔποτε κατὰ τωὐτὸ ἰστάμενα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀλλοιούμενα ἐπὶ τὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τά, ἀνόμοια ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποκρινόμενα. ἀπόλλνται μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, οὐδὲ γίνεται ὅ τι μὴ καὶ πρόσθεν ἦν· συμμισγόμενα δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενα ἀλλοιούνται· νομίζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἐξ Ἄιδου ἐς φάος αὐξηθὲν γενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φάεος ἐς Ἄιδην μειωθὲν ἀπολέσθαι· ὀφθαλμοῖσι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμη, οὐχ ἱκανοῖς εἶναι οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὀρεομένων κρίναι· ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε γνώμη ἐξηγέομαι. ζῶα γὰρ κακείνα καὶ τάδε καὶ οὔτε, εἰ ζῶον, ἀποθανεῖν οἶόν τε, εἰ μὴ μετὰ πάντων· ποῖ² γὰρ ἀποθανεῖται; οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι γενέσθαι πόθεν γὰρ ἔσται; ἀλλ' αὖξεται πάντα καὶ μειοῦται ἐς

¹ <ἐς> Zwingerus

² ποῖ Peck: ποῦ θ: καὶ M

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

longer dominates anything, but is already completely used up by the fire that attacks it in order to nourish itself [. . .]. [4] The qualities that belong to each of these two are the following: to fire, the hot and the dry; to water, the cold and the moist. And each one receives from the other: in the case of fire, the moist coming from water (for there is moisture in fire); and in the case of water, the dry coming from fire (for there is dryness in water) [cf. **ANAXAG. D27**].

[The process of separation]

Since these things are like this, they separate from one another in many forms of all kinds, both of seeds and of animals, which are not at all similar to one another either in their appearance or in their power [cf. **ANAXAG. D12**]. For since they never remain the same but are always changing to this or to that, the things that separate from them are of necessity dissimilar too. Of the totality of things, then, nothing is destroyed, and nothing comes into being out of what did not exist previously [cf. **ANAXAG. D15**]. Things change by mixing and separating. People think that one thing grows and comes to be out of Hades into the light, and that another decreases and is destroyed, leaving the light for Hades: for they trust their eyes more than their thought, even though these are not competent to make a judgment even about what is seen. But as for me, I explain these matters by means of thought. For living things are so both down there and here [cf. **HER. D70**]. And it is not possible, if something is alive, that it die, unless together with everything else: for to what would it die? Nor can what is not come into being: for from what would come its being? But all things, at least all of

τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν γε δυνατῶν. ὅτι δ' ἂν διαλέγωμαι γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπολέσθαι, τῶν πολλῶν εἵνεκεν ἐρμηνεύω· ταῦτα δὲ συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι δηλῶ.

ἔχει δὲ ὧδε· γενέσθαι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι τῷτό, συμμιγῆναι καὶ διακριθῆναι τῷτό, ἀξιεθῆναι καὶ μειωθῆναι τῷτό, γενέσθαι συμμιγῆναι τῷτό, ἀπολέσθαι διακριθῆναι τῷτό, ἕκαστον πρὸς πάντα καὶ πάντα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῷτό, καὶ οὐδὲν πάντων τῷτό· ὁ νόμος γὰρ τῇ φύσει περὶ τούτων ἐναντίος.

[5] χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεία καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα. ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ὡς σελήνη ἐπὶ¹ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, πυρὸς ἔφοδος καὶ ὕδατος, <οὕτως>² ἥλιος ἐπὶ τὸ μακρότατον καὶ βραχύτατον, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ οὐ ταῦτά· φάος Ζηνί, σκότος Ἄιδῃ, φάος Ἄιδῃ, σκότος Ζηνί, φοιτᾷ κείνα ὧδε, καὶ τάδε κείσε, πᾶσαν ὥρην, πᾶσαν χώραν διαπρησσύμενα κείνά τε τὰ τῶνδε, τάδε τ' αὖ τὰ κείνων. καὶ ἃ μὲν πρήσσουσιν οὐκ οἶδασιν, ἃ δὲ οὐ πρήσσουσι δοκέουσιν εἰδέναι· καὶ ἃ μὲν ὀρέουσιν οὐ γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖσι πάντα γίνεται δι' ἀνάγκην θείην καὶ ἃ βούλονται καὶ ἃ μὴ βούλονται. [. . .]

¹ εἴη mss., corr. Diels

² <οὕτως> Diels

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

those capable of doing so, increase and decrease to the greatest and least degree [cf. **ANAXAG. D9**]. Whenever I say that something comes to be or is destroyed, I use this expression for the sake of the majority of people, but what I shall show is that they mix or separate [cf. **EMP. D53**].

[A Heraclitizing perspective]

This is how it is: to come to be and to be destroyed are the same thing; to be mixed and to separate are the same thing; to increase and to decrease are the same thing; to come to be, to mix, the same thing; to be destroyed, to separate, the same thing—each thing in relation to all and all in relation to each one, the same thing; and none of all of them, the same thing [cf. e.g. **HER. D47–D51**]. For in the case of these things, convention (*nomos*) is the opposite of nature (*phusis*).

[5] All things, both divine and human, go upward and downward, exchanging their places: day and night, toward the largest and the smallest; just as the moon goes toward the largest and the smallest, the arrival of fire and of water, so too the sun goes for the longest and the shortest time, all things are the same and not the same: light for Zeus, darkness for Hades, light for Hades, darkness for Zeus, those things come here, and these things go there, every season, in every place those things doing the work of these ones, and these ones in turn doing the work of those. And what they do they do not know, but what they do not do they think that they know; and what they see they do not understand, but nonetheless everything happens for them through divine necessity, both what they want and what they do not want. [. . .] [cf. e.g. **HER. D47–D62, D1–2, D63**]

[6] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα, καὶ ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ σῶμα ὁκοῖον ἢ ψυχῇ, διακοσμεῖται. ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἄνθρωπον μέρεα μερέων, ὅλα ὅλων, ἔχοντα σύγκρησιν πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος, τὰ μὲν ληψόμενα, τὰ δὲ δώσοντα· καὶ τὰ μὲν λαμβάνοντα μείον ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ διδόντα πλέον. πρίουσιν ἄνθρωποι ξύλον· ὁ μὲν ἔλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιέουσι, μείον δὲ ποιέοντες πλείον¹ ποιέουσι. τοιοῦτον φύσις ἀνθρώπου, τὸ μὲν ὠθεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἔλκει· τὸ μὲν δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνει· καὶ τῷ μὲν δίδωσι, τοῦ δὲ λαμβάνει· καὶ τῷ μὲν δίδωσι τοσούτῳ πλέον, τοῦ δὲ² λαμβάνει τοσούτῳ μείον. [. . .]

[7] περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἑάσω, περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπου δηλώσω. ἐσέρπει γὰρ ἐς ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοῖραν σώματος ἀνθρώπου. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρσενα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα τρέφεταί τε καὶ αὖξεται διαίτη τῇ περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ μέρεα ἔχειν πάντα τὰ ἐσιόντα· οὐτινος γὰρ μὴ ἐνείη μοῖρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἂν αὖξηθείη οὔτε πολλῆς ἐπιούσης τροφῆς οὔτε ὀλίγης, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ προσαυξόμενον· ἔχον δὲ πάντα, αὖξεται ἐν χώρῃ τῇ ἐωυτοῦ ἕκαστον, τροφῆς ἐπιούσης ἀπὸ ὕδατος ξηροῦ καὶ πυρὸς ὑγροῦ, τὰ μὲν εἴσω βιαζόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἔξω. ὥσπερ οἱ τέκτονες τὸ ξύλον πρίζουσι,³ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔλκει, ὁ δὲ ὠθεῖ, τὰ τοῦτο ποιέοντες· κάτω δὲ πιεζόντων ἄνω ἔρπει, οὐ γὰρ ἂν παρὰ <και-

¹ μείον . . . πλείον Diels: πλέον . . . μείον mss.

² τοῦ δὲ Littré: οὐδὲν mss.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

[The human being]

[6] All things are arranged in an orderly fashion, man's soul too, and his body like the soul. Into man penetrate parts of parts, wholes of wholes, possessing a mixture of fire and of water, some going to receive, others to give. And the ones that receive make smaller; those that give, bigger. Men saw a log: one pulls, the other pushes; but they do the same thing, and doing less they do more. The nature of the human being is like this: this pushes, that pulls; this gives, and that takes; and it gives to this and it takes from that, and it gives to one this much more and it takes from that this much less. [. . .]

[7] I shall not speak about the other animals, but I shall demonstrate how it is in the human being. For into the human penetrates a soul containing a mixture of fire and of water, a portion of a human body. These [i.e. the constituents of this mixture], both female and male, many and of all kinds, are nourished and increased by the human's way of life. It is necessary that the parts that enter contain everything: for something of which there was not present from the beginning a portion within would not increase, whether the nourishment that supervened were much or little, for it contains nothing that could be increased [cf. **ANAXAG. D21**]. But if each thing possesses all, it is increased at its own place when nourishment supervenes coming from a dry water and a moist fire, some things being forced to penetrate inside, others to depart outside. Just as carpenters saw a log, and the one pulls while the other pushes, although they are doing the same thing: while they are pressing down, the one moves upward, for

³ *πρίζονσι θ¹: τρυπῶσιν θM: πρίονσιν* Diels

ρὸν>¹ δέχοιτο κάτω ἵεναι· ἦν δὲ βιάζεται, παντὸς ἀμαρτήσεται. τοιοῦτον τροφή ἀνθρώπου· τὸ μὲν ἔλκει, τὸ δὲ ὠθεῖ· εἴσω δὲ βιαζόμενον ἔξω ἔρπει· ἦν δὲ βιή-
ται παρὰ καιρὸν, παντὸς ἀποτεύξεται.

[8] [. . .] χώραν δὲ ἀμείψαντα καὶ τυχόντα ἀρμονίης ὀρθῆς ἐχούσης συμφωνίας τρεῖς, συλλαβήν, δι' ὀξέων,² διὰ πασέων, ζῶει καὶ αὖξεται τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν οἷσι καὶ πρόσθεν· ἦν δὲ μὴ τύχη τῆς ἀρμονίης, μηδὲ σύμφωνα τὰ βαρέα τοῖσιν ὀξέσι γένηται ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ συμφωνίῃ ἢ τῇ δευτέρῃ ἢ τῇ διὰ παντός,³ ἐνὸς ἀπογενομένου πᾶς ὁ τόνος μάταιος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν προσαιέ-
σαι· ἀλλ' ἀμείβει ἐκ τοῦ μέζονος ἐς τὸ μείον πρὸ μοίρης· διότι οὐ γινώ-σκουσιν ὅ τι ποιέουσιν.

[10] ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ πάντα διεκοσμήσατο κατὰ τρόπον αὐτὸ ἐωυτῷ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ πῦρ, ἀπομίμησιν τοῦ ὅλου, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς μικρά· κοιλίην μὲν τὴν μεγίστην, ὕδατι ξηρῷ καὶ ὑγρῷ ταμείον, δοῦναι πᾶσι καὶ λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, θαλάσσης δύναμιν, ζώων συμφόρων⁴ τροφόν, ἀσυμφόρων δὲ φθορόν· περὶ δὲ ταύτην ὕδατος ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ σύστασιν, διέξοδον πνεύματος ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἀπομίμησιν γῆς, τὰ ἐπεσπίπτοντα πάντα ἀλλοιούσης. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναλίσκον, τὰ δὲ αὖξον,⁵ σκέδασιν ὕδατος λεπτοῦ καὶ πυρὸς ἐποίησατο ἡερίου, ἀφανέος

¹ <καιρὸν> Diels
corr. Bernays

corrumpum in mss.
θ: ἐν-Μ

² συλλήβδην διεξιὼν vel διεξιὼν mss.,
³ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ . . . διὰ παντὸς Diels: locum

⁴ συμφόρων Wilamowitz: συντροφών

⁵ καταναλίσκοντα δὲ αὖξον mss., corr. Diels

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

otherwise it [scil. the saw] would refuse to go downward at the wrong <moment>; and if it is forced to do so, then it will fail completely. A human being's nourishment is something similar: one thing pulls, the other pushes; what is forced in slips out; but if it is imposed by force at the wrong moment, it will founder completely.

[8] [. . .] And when they [i.e. the constituents] change their place, if they happen to find a correct harmony, one containing three concords, the fourth, the fifth, and the octave [cf. **PHILOL. D14**], then they live and increase by the same things as previously. But if they do not happen to find the harmony, so that the low-pitched ones are not concordant with the high-pitched ones in the first concord, the second one, or the octave, then the whole tuning is futile because of the absence of a single element, for it could not serve as accompaniment, but they change from the greater to the lesser before their allotted portion. And that is why they do not know what they are doing.

[Fire has fashioned the body on
the model of the universe]

[10] To state it in a word, fire ordered all the things in the body in the same way by itself: an imitation of the whole, small things in relation to large ones and large ones in relation to small ones: the largest is the [scil. abdominal] cavity, a reservoir of dry and moist water, to give to all and to receive from all—the power of the sea, the nourishment of animals that are useful and the destruction of those that are not; and around this, an assembly of cold and moist water, a passage of cold and hot breath, an imitation of the earth, which changes everything that falls onto it. Using up this, increasing that, it made the rarefied water and aerial fire scatter, the invisible and the visible, separation

καὶ φανεροῦ, ἀπὸ τοῦ συνεστηκότος ἀπόκρισιν, ἐν ᾧ φερόμενα ἐς τὸ φανερόν ἀφικνεῖται ἕκαστον μοῖρην πεπρωμένην. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐποιήσατο τὸ πῦρ¹ περιόδους τρισσάς, περαινούσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω· αἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ κοῖλα τῶν ὑγρῶν, σελήνης δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορὴν,² πρὸς τὸν περιέχοντα πάγον, ἄστρον δύναμιν, αἱ δὲ μέσαι καὶ εἴσω καὶ ἔξω περαίνουσαι <ἡλίου δύναμιν>.³ τὸ θερμότατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον πῦρ, ὅπερ πάντων κρατεῖ, διέπον ἅπαντα κατὰ φύσιν, ἄθικτον⁴ καὶ ὄψει καὶ ψαύσει, ἐν τούτῳ ψυχή, νόος, φρόνησις, αὔξησις, μείωσις, κίνησις, διάλλαξις,⁵ ὕπνος, ἔγερσις· τοῦτο πάντα διὰ παντὸς κυβερνᾷ, καὶ τάδε καὶ ἐκεῖνα, οὐδέποτε ἀτρεμίζον.

[11] [. . .] πάντα γὰρ ὅμοια, ἀνόμοια ἔοντα· καὶ σύμφορα πάντα, διάφορα ἔοντα· διαλεγόμενα, οὐ διαλεγόμενα· γνώμην ἔχοντα, ἀγνώμονα· ὑπεναντίος ὁ τρόπος ἐκάστων, ὁμολογεόμενος. νόμος γὰρ καὶ φύσις, οἷσι πάντα διαπρησσόμεθα, οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται ὁμολογεόμενα· νόμον μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἔθεσαν αὐτοὶ ἐωντοῖσιν, οὐ γινώσκοντες περὶ ὧν ἔθεσαν, φύσιν δὲ πάντων θεοὶ διεκόσμησαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωποι διέθεσαν οὐδέποτε κατὰ τὸν ὅτι ἔχει οὔτε ὀρθῶς οὔτε μὴ ὀρθῶς· ὅσα δὲ θεοὶ⁶ διέθεσαν αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· καὶ τὰ ὀρθὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει.

¹ τὸ πῦρ Bernays: πυρὸς mss. ² πρὸς τὴν ἔξω περιφορὴν del. Joly suad. Jones ³ <ἡλίου δύναμιν> Joly

⁴ ἄθικτον Bernays: ἀοικτον θ: ἀποφον M

⁵ μείωσις, κίνησις, διάλλαξις Joly: κ., μ., δ. M, om. θ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

of the assembly in which each thing arrives to become visible in conformity with its allotted portion. Within this the fire produced three circular trajectories, limiting with regard to one another both inside and outside: some toward the cavities filled with moisture—the power of the moon—, others toward the outer circuit, toward the solid envelope—the power of the heavenly bodies; and those in the middle, limiting both inside and outside <—the power of the sun>. The hottest and strongest fire, which dominates all things, which directs all things in conformity with nature, unattainable by sight or by touch, in this reside the soul, the mind, thought, growth, decrease, motion, change of place, sleep, waking. It is this that governs everything always, the things here and the things there, and it is never at rest.

[11] [. . .] For all things are similar, even though they are dissimilar; and all things converge, even though they diverge; they converse, they do not converse; they possess thought, they do not think; the manner of each is opposed, yet agreeing [cf. e.g. **HER. D49**]. For custom (*nomos*) and nature (*phusis*), by which we do everything, are not in accord with one another, even though they are in accord: for human beings instituted custom for themselves without knowing the matters regarding which they were instituting it, whereas it is the gods who put in order the nature of all things. So what humans have established never stays the same, whether it was established correctly or not correctly; but everything that the gods have established is always correct—so great is the difference between what is correct and what is not correct.

⁶ ὅσα δὲ θεοὶ Diels: ὁκόσα θεοὶ M: ὅσα δὲ ὅσοι θ

*The Power of Breath (T10)***T10** (> 64 C2) Hipp. *Flat.* 3–4

[3.1] τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τρισσῶν τροφῶν τρέφεται· τῇσι δὲ τροφῇσι τάδε ὀνόματά ἐστι· σῖτα, ποτά, πνεῦμα. πνεῦμα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασιν φύσα καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἔξω τῶν σωμάτων ἀήρ. [2] οὗτος δὲ μέγιστος ἐν τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν. ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ θεήσασθαι τὴν δύναμιν. ἄνεμος γάρ ἐστιν ἥερος ῥεῦμα καὶ χεῦμα· ὅταν οὖν πολλὸς ἀήρ ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ῥεῦμα ποιήσῃ, τά τε δένδρεα ἀνασπαστὰ πρόρριζα γίνεται διὰ τὴν βίην τοῦ πνεύματος, τό τε πέλαγος κυμαίνεται, ὀλκάδες τε ἀπείρατοι μεγέθει διαρριπτεῦνται· τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοισιν ἔχει δύναμιν. [3] ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ γε τῇ μὲν ὄψει ἀφανής, τῷ δὲ λογισμῷ φανερός. τί γὰρ ἄνευ τούτου γένοιτ' ἄν; ἢ τίνος οὗτος ἄπεστιν; ἢ τίνι οὐ συμπάρεστιν; ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ πνεύματος σύμπλεόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο καὶ χειμῶνος καὶ θέρεος αἷτιον, ἐν μὲν τῷ χειμῶνι πυκνὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν γινόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ θέρει πρηνὲς καὶ γαληνόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡλίου γε¹ καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων ὁδὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστίν· τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τροφή· πῦρ δὲ ἥερος στερηθὲν οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ζῶειν· ὥστε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου βίον² ἀέναον ὁ ἀήρ ἀέναος καὶ λεπτὸς ἐὼν παρέχεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε καὶ τὸ πέλαγος μετέχει πνεύματος, φανερόν· οὐ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

The Power of Breath (T10)

T10 (> 64 C2) Hippocrates, *On Breaths*

[3.1] Bodies, both those of the other animals and those of humans, are nourished by three kinds of nourishment. The names of those nourishments are the following: food, drink, and breath (*pneuma*). The breath inside bodies is called ‘air flow’ (*phusa*), the one outside bodies ‘air’ (*aêr*). [2] This latter has the strongest power of all things in all things; and it is worth considering its power. A wind (*anemos*) is a flow and flux of air. So when a large quantity of air produces a strong flow, trees are torn up by their roots by the violence of the breath, the sea swells with waves, cargo ships of vast magnitude are hurled about. So this is the kind of power it has in these cases. [3] And yet it is invisible to the eye—but visible to reason. For what could possibly exist without this? From what is it absent? What thing does it not accompany? For the whole space between the earth and the sky is full of breath (*pneuma*). This is the cause of winter and of summer, becoming dense and cold in the winter, gentle and serene in the summer. Furthermore, the course of the sun, the moon, and the heavenly bodies is due to breath (*pneuma*). For breath is the nourishment of fire, and fire, deprived of air, would not be able to live. Hence it is air, being eternal and subtle, that makes the life of the sun eternal. Moreover, it is evident that the sea too has a share in moving breath:

¹ γε Jouanna: τε A, om. M

² βίον A: δρόμον M: βίον καὶ δρόμον conl. Jouanna

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὰ πλωτὰ ζῶα ζῶειν ἐδύνατο μὴ μετέχοντα πνεύματος· μετέχοντες δ' ἂν πῶς ἂν ἄλλως ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔλκοντα τὸν ἡέρα; καὶ μὴν ἢ τε γῇ τούτῳ βάθρον, οὗτός τε γῆς ὄχημα, κενεόν τε οὐδέν ἐστιν τούτου. [4] διότι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖσιν ὅλοισιν³ ὁ ἀὴρ ἔρρωται, εἴρηται τοῖσι δ' αὖ θνητοῖσιν οὗτος αἷτιος τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν νούσων τοῖσι νοσέουσι.

³ ὅλοισιν Schneider: ὁδοῖς A: ἄλλοισιν M

*A Cosmophysiology Founded
on the Principle of Heat (T11)*

T11 (> 64 C3) Hipp. Carn. 1–3

[1] ἐγὼ τὰ μέχρι τοῦ λόγου τούτου κοινῇσι γνώμῃσι χρέωμαι ἐτέρων τε τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐμεωντοῦ· ἀναγκαίως γὰρ ἔχει κοινὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποθέσθαι τῇσι γνώμῃσι βουλόμενον συνθεῖναι τὸν λόγον τόνδε περὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἰητρικῆς. περὶ δὲ τῶν μετεώρων οὐδέν¹ δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν μὴ τοσοῦτον ἐς ἄνθρωπον ἀποδείξω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ὅπως² ἔφν καὶ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὅ τι ψυχῇ³ ἐστιν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ κάμνειν, καὶ ὅ τι τὸ⁴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅθεν ἀποθνήσκει. νῦν δὲ ἀποφαίνομαι αὐτὸς <τὰς>⁵ ἐμεωντοῦ γνώμας.

varias corruptelas in ms. sanarunt edd.: ¹ οὐδέν Heidel

² ὅπως Ermerins

³ <ῆ> ψυχῇ Heidel

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

for the animals that swim would not be able to live at all if they did not have a share in breath. But how could they have a share in any other way than by drawing in the air through the water and out of the water?⁴ Moreover, the earth is a foundation for this, and this is the vehicle of the earth, and nothing is empty of this. [4] So it has now been stated that air is strong in the universe; but it is also the cause of life for mortals, and of sicknesses for those who are sick [cf. **DIOG. D9**].

A Cosmophysiology Founded on the Principle of Heat (T11)

T11 (> 64 C3) Hippocrates, *Fleshes*

[1] For my part, it is to conceptions commonly held, both by my predecessors and by myself, that I have recourse before undertaking the present discourse. For it is necessary, since I wish to compose this discourse about the art of medicine, that I set as a basis for my own conceptions a principle that is shared in common. I need say nothing about celestial phenomena except insofar as I shall indicate their relevance to humans and the other animals—how they are born by nature and came to exist, what the soul is, what it is to be healthy, what it is to be sick, what is bad and good in the human, and whence it comes that he dies. And now I myself shall declare my own conceptions.

⁴ τὸ edd.

⁵ <τὰς> Ermerins

[2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι ὁ καλέομεν θερμὸν ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι καὶ νοεῖν πάντα καὶ ὀρῆν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα καὶ τὰ ἔοντα τε καὶ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι· τοῦτο οὖν τὸ πλείστον, ὅτε ἐταράχθη πάντα, ἐξεχώρησεν ἐς τὴν ἀνωτάτω περιφορῇ· καὶ ὀνομήναί μοι αὐτὸ δοκέουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ αἰθέρα. ἡ <δὲ>¹ δευτέρῃ μοῖρα κάτωθεν αὐτῆς² καλεῖται μὲν γῆ, ψυχρὸν³ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ πολὺν κινεόμενον·⁴ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔνι δὴ⁵ πολὺ τοῦ θερμοῦ. ἡ δὲ τρίτῃ μοῖρα ἡ τοῦ ἡέρος τοῦ ἐγγυτάτω πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὑγρότατόν τε καὶ παχύτατον.

[3] κυκλομένων δὲ τούτων, ὅτε συνεταράχθη, ἀπελείφθη τοῦ θερμοῦ πολὺ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄλλοθι <καὶ ἄλλοθι>,⁶ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα, τὰ δὲ ἐλάσσω, τὰ δὲ καὶ πάνν σμικρὰ πλήθος πολλά. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ξηρανομένης τῆς γῆς, ταῦτα <τὰ>⁷ καταλειφθέντα⁸ περὶ αὐτὰ σηπεδόνας ποιεῖ οἶόν περ⁹ χιτῶνας. καὶ πολλῷ χρόνῳ θερμαινόμενον, ὅσον μὲν ἐτύγχανεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς σηπεδόνος λιπαρόν τε ἔον καὶ ὀλίγιστον τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἔχον, τάχιστα ἐξεκαύθη καὶ ἐγένετο ὅστέα. ὅποσα δὲ ἐτύγχανε κολλωδέστερα ἔοντα καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετέχοντα, ταῦτα δὲ θερμαινόμενα οὐκ ἐδύνατο ἐκκαυθῆναι, οὐδὲ ξηρὰ γενέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ λιπαροῦ ὡς ἐκκαυθῆναι, οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ ὑγροῦ ὡς ἐκκαυθὲν ξηρὸν γενέσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο ἰδέην¹⁰ ἀλλοιοτέρην ἔλαβε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐγένετο νεῦρα καὶ φλέβες. αἱ μὲν φλέβες

¹ <δὲ> Ermerins ² αὐτῆς Deichgräber

³ ψυχρὸν <δὲ> Deichgräber

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

[2] It seems to me that what we call heat is immortal and that it thinks everything, sees, hears, and knows everything, both what is and what will be. Of this, when all things were in agitation, the greatest part escaped to the most distant rotation; and it is this that the ancients seem to me to have named 'aether.' Its second, lower part is called 'earth'—something cold, dry, and subject to numerous motions; and there is much heat present in this too. The third part is the air that is located closest to the earth, and this is the most moist and dense thing.

[3] While these things were rotating, at the time when they were in agitation, much of the heat remained here <and there> in the earth, in some places a lot, in others less, in others very little but in number very many. And then, in the course of time, as the earth dried out because of the heat, these remainders produced around themselves putrefactions, like cloaks. And if the matter that came from the putrefaction of the earth happened to be fat and to possess the least amount of moisture, when it was heated for a long time it was quickly burned up and became bones. But whatever happened to be more glutinous and had a share of cold could not be completely burned up or become dry when it was heated: for it had no fat that could be burned up nor any moisture that, being burned up, could become dry. That is why it took on a form different from the rest, and became sinews and vessels. The

⁴ πολλὸν κινεόμενον Deichgräber

⁵ ἐνι δὲ Littré

⁶ <καὶ ἄλλοθι> Littré

⁷ <τὰ> Ermerins

⁸ καταλειφθέντα Deichgräber

⁹ πᾶρ Cornarius

¹⁰ ἰδέην Ermerins

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

κοῖλαι, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα στερεά· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνὴν πολὺ τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτοῖσιν.¹ αἱ δὲ φλέβες τοῦ ψυχροῦ εἶχον πολὺ· καὶ τούτου τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ μὲν περίξ ὅσον κολλωδέστατον ἦν, ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐξοπτηθὲν μῆνιγξ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν ἐνεὸν² κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ διελύθη καὶ ἐγένετο ὑγρὸν διὰ τοῦτο [. . .]. περὶ μὲν τούτων οὕτως· τὸ μὲν ψυχρὸν πήγνυσιν· τὸ δὲ θερμὸν διαχεῖ, ἐν δὲ τῷ πολλῷ καὶ ξηραίνει χρόνῳ· ὅπου δὲ <ἄν>³ τοῦ λιπαροῦ συνίη τι τούτοισι, θᾶσσον ἐκκαίει καὶ ξηραίνει· ὅπου δὲ ἄν τὸ κολλῶδες συνίη τῷ ψυχρῷ ἄνευ τοῦ λιπαροῦ, οὐκ ἐθέλει ἐκκαίεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ χρόνῳ θερμαινόμενον πήγνυται.

¹ αὐτοῖσιν Ermerins

² ἐνεὸν Zwingerus

³ <ἄν> Littré

A Resolutely Heraclitizing Doctor (T12)

T12 (< 22 C2) Hipp. *Nutrim.*

a

[1] τροφὴ καὶ τροφῆς εἶδος μία καὶ πολλαί· μία μὲν ἦ γένος ἐν, εἶδος δὲ ὑγρότητι καὶ ξηρότητι· καὶ ἐν τούτοις ιδέαι καὶ πόσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐς τίνα καὶ ἐς τοσαῦτα.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

vessels are hollow, the sinews are solid; for there was not much cold in the latter; but the vessels had much cold, and of this cold the external part, which was most glutinous, was completely baked by the heat and became membrane while the internal cold, overcome by the heat, was dissolved and became liquid for this reason. [. . .]¹ This is how things are in these matters: cold condenses; heat diffuses and, at the end of a long period of time, dries out; where some fat is associated with these, it [scil. heat] burns and dries it out quickly; but where something glutinous is associated with cold but without fat, it tends not to be burned up, but if it is heated, with time it becomes condensed.

¹ The author goes on to use the same principles to explain the formation of the trachea, the viscera, and the bladder.

Cf. **T9**[10–11]

*A Resolutely Heraclitizing Doctor (T12)*¹

¹ The language of these passages is staunchly Heraclitean, but we have only indicated the more evident parallels with the preserved fragments of Heraclitus.

T12 (< 22 C2) Hippocrates, *On Nutriment*

a

[1] Nutriment and form of nutriment, one and many: one inasmuch as it is one kind, but its form [scil. varies] as a function of moisture and dryness. And in these too there exist forms, how much, for what, and for how many.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

b

[2] αὔξει δὲ καὶ ῥώννυσσι καὶ σαρκοῖ καὶ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ ἀνομοιοῖ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστοισι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δύναμιν.

c

[9] ἀρχὴ δὲ πάντων μία καὶ τελευτὴ πάντων μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τελευτὴ καὶ ἀρχή.

d

[13] δυνάμιος δὲ ποικίλαι φύσεις.

e

[14] χυμοὶ φθείροντες καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος καὶ ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνδοθεν, αὐτόματοι καὶ οὐκ αὐτόματοι, ἡμῖν μὲν αὐτόματοι, αἰτίη δὲ οὐκ αὐτόματοι. αἰτίης δὲ τὰ μὲν δῆλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ τὰ μὲν δυνατά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα.

f

[15] φύσις ἐξαρκεῖ πάντα πᾶσιν.

g

[17] [. . .] μία φύσις ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ οὐ μία· πολλαὶ φύσιές εἰσι πάντα ταῦτα καὶ μία.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

b

[2] It increases, strengthens, develops the flesh, makes similar and dissimilar what is found in each one according to the nature of each one and its original power.

c

[9] The beginning of all things is one, the end of all things is one, and the end and the beginning are the same [cf. **HER. D54**].

d

[13] Of power, the natures are various.

e

[14] Humors: destructive totally and in part, from outside and from inside, spontaneous and not spontaneous, spontaneous for us but not spontaneous as far as their cause. Of the cause, certain aspects are clear and certain ones are unclear; and certain things are possible and certain ones are impossible.

f

[15] Nature suffices in all things for all.

g

[17] [. . .] All these things are one nature and not one; all these things are many natures and one.

h

[23] σύρροια μία, σύμπνοια μία, συμπαθέα πάντα.
κατὰ μὲν οὐλομελίην πάντα, κατὰ μέρος δὲ τὰ ἐν
ἐκάστῳ μέρει μέρεα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.

i

[24] ἀρχὴ μεγάλη εἰς ἔσχατον μέρος ἀφικνέεται· ἐξ
ἐσχάτου μέρους ἐς ἀρχὴν μεγάλην ἀφικνέεται· μία
φύσις εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

j

[32] δύναμις μία καὶ οὐ μία, ἥ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
ἐτεροῖα διοικεῖται, ἥ μὲν ἐς ζωὴν ὅλου καὶ μέρους, ἥ
δὲ ἐς αἴσθησιν ὅλου καὶ μέρους.

k

[40] [. . .] τὸ σύμφωνον διάφωνον, τὸ διάφωνον σύμ-
φωνον [. . .].

l

[45] ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω, μία.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

h

[23] Conjoined flowing, one; conjoined breathing, one; conjoined affections, all things. With regard to the totality, all things; but with regard to the part, the parts in each of the parts with regard to their function.

i

[24] A great starting point arrives at the farthest part; from the farthest part it arrives at the great starting point. A single nature, to be and not to be.

j

[32] The power is one and not one, by which all these things and those that are different are governed, the one for the life of the whole and the part, the other for the perception of the whole and the part.

k

[40] [. . .] what is harmonious is dissonant, what is dissonant is harmonious [cf. **HER. D47**] [. . .].

l

[45] The way upward and downward: one [cf. **HER. D51**].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Questions of Method (T13–T22)

Invisible/Visible (T13–T14)

T13 (> 68 B11) Hipp. Art. 11.1

οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὀφθαλμοῖσί γ' ἰδόντι τούτων τῶν εἰρη-
μένων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν ἔστιν εἰδέναι. διὸ καὶ ἄδηλα ἐμοί
τε ὠνόμασται καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ κέκριται εἶναι· οὐ μὴν ὅτι
ἄδηλα κεκράτηκεν, ἀλλ' ἥ δυνατὸν κεκράτηται· δυνα-
τὸν δὲ ὡς αἱ τε τῶν νοσεόντων φύσεις ἐς τὸ σκεφθῆ-
ναι παρέχουσιν, αἱ τε τῶν ἐρευνησόντων ἐς τὴν ἔρευ-
ναν πεφύκασιν. μετὰ πλείονος μὲν γὰρ πόνου καὶ οὐ
μετ' ἐλάσσονος χρόνου ἢ εἰ τοῖσιν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐώ-
ρατο, γινώσκεται· ὅσα γὰρ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων ὄψιν
ἐκφεύγει, ταῦτα τῇ τῆς γνώμης ὄψει κεκράτηται. καὶ
ὅσα δ' ἐν τῷ μὴ ταχὺ ὀφθῆναι οἱ νοσέοντες πάσχου-
σιν, οὐχ οἱ θεραπεύοντες αὐτοὺς αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις
ἣ τε τοῦ νοσέοντος ἣ τε τοῦ νοσήματος.

T14 (< 22 C1) Hipp. Vict. 1.11–12

[11] οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανέα
σκέπτεσθαι οὐκ ἐπίστανται· τέχνῃσι γὰρ χρεώμενοι
ὁμοίησιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ γινώσκουσιν· θεῶν
γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμῆσθαι τὰ ἐώντων, γινώσκοντας
ἂ ποιέουσι, καὶ οὐ γινώσκοντας ἂ μιμῶνται. [. . .] [12]
ἐγὼ δὲ δηλώσω τέχνας φανεράς ἀνθρώπου παθήμα-
σιν ὁμοίας εἰούσας καὶ φανεροῖσι καὶ ἀφανέσι. μαν-
τικὴ τοιόνδε· τοῖσι μὲν φανεροῖσι τὰ ἀφανέα γι-

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

Questions of Method (T13–T22)

Invisible/Visible (T13–T14)

T13 (> 68 B11) Hippocrates, *On the Art*

None of those [scil. internal cavities] that I have spoken of can be known by anyone with his eyes; that is the reason why I call them ‘invisible’ (*adêla*) and why they are judged to exist by the art. But it is not that they are masters because they are invisible, but instead they have been mastered as far as possible; and this is possible insofar as the patients’ nature lends itself to examination and as the investigators’ possesses a natural disposition for investigation. For it requires greater effort and not less time to recognize them than if they were seen with the eyes: for whatever escapes the sight of the eyes is mastered by the sight of thought. And what patients suffer from the observation’s not being rapid is the fault not of those who are treating them, but of the patient’s nature and the disease’s.

T14 (< 22 C1) Hippocrates, *On Regimen*

[11] People do not understand how to examine invisible things (*aphanea*) on the basis of visible ones. For although they are using arts that are similar to human nature, they do not know this. For the mind of the gods taught them to imitate their own activities by knowing what they do, but not by knowing what they imitate. [. . .] [12] But I shall show that the manifest arts are similar to human affections, both manifest ones and not manifest ones. Divination is like this: for it knows things that are not mani-

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

νώσκει, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀφανέσι τὰ φανερὰ, καὶ τοῖσιν
εὐοῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀποθανοῦσι τὰ ζῶντα,
καὶ τοῖσιν ἀσυνέτοισι συνιᾶσιν, ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς αἰεὶ ὀρ-
θῶς, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. φύσιν ἀνθρώπου
καὶ βίον ταῦτα μιμείται· ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ συγγενόμενος
παιδίον ἐποίησε· τῷ φανερῷ τὸ ἄδηλον γινώσκει ὅτι
οὕτως ἔσται. γνώμη ἀνθρώπου ἀφανὴς γινώσκουσα
τὰ φανερὰ, ἐκ παιδὸς ἐς ἄνδρα μεθίσταται· τῷ ἐόντι
τὸ μέλλον γινώσκει [...].

Diagnosis: The Search for the Cause (T15–T17)

T15 (≠ DK) Hipp. Flat. 1.4

ἐν δὲ δὴ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν τόδε· τί ποτε τὸ αἰτιόν
ἐστι τῶν νούσων καὶ τίς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ γίνεται τῶν
ἐν τῷ σώματι κακῶν; εἰ γάρ τις εἰδείη τὴν αἰτίην τοῦ
νοσήματος, οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη τὰ συμφέροντα προσφέρειν
τῷ σώματι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιστάμενος τῷ νοσήματι.
αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ἱητρικὴ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.

T16 (≠ DK) Hipp. Art. 6.3–4

[. . .] οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄνευ ἱητροῦ ὑγιαζο-
μένων τὸ αὐτόματον αἰτιήσασθαι ὀρθῶς λόγῳ. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ αὐτόματον οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐὼν ἐλεγχόμενον· πᾶν
γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον διὰ τι εὐρίσκειτ' ἂν γινόμενον, καὶ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

fest by means of ones that are manifest, and things that are manifest by means of ones that are not manifest, and things of the future by means of ones of the present, and things that are living by means of ones that are dead; and they [i.e. the diviners] understand by means of what is not understood—he who knows, always correctly; he who does not know, sometimes correctly, sometimes not. All this imitates a human being's nature and life. A man has intercourse with a woman and makes a child; by means of what is manifest, he knows what is invisible: that it will be like this. A human being's thought, not manifest, knowing manifest things, passes from the child to the man; by means of the present, it knows the future [. . .].

Diagnosis: The Search for the Cause (T15–T17)

T15 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On Breaths*

One of the questions of this sort [scil. particularly difficult ones] is this: what is the cause of diseases, and what is the origin and source of the ills in the body? For if someone knew the cause of a disease, he would be able to administer to the body what is beneficial to it by opposing the disease on the basis of the contraries. For this is the medicine that is most in accord with nature.

T16 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Art*

[. . .] it is not possible either, for anyone who recovers his health without a doctor, to assign the cause by a correct reasoning to spontaneity. For the spontaneous, if it is examined closely, reveals itself to be nothing: for everything

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἐν τῷ διὰ τι τὸ αὐτόματον οὐ φαίνεται οὐσίην ἔχον
οὐδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ὄνομα· ἡ δὲ ἰητρικὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖσι διὰ
τι καὶ ἐν τοῖσι προνοεuvμένοισι φαίνεται τε καὶ φα-
νέται αἰεὶ οὐσίην ἔχουσα.

T17 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Vet. med.* 19.3–4

δεῖ δὲ δήπου ταῦτα αἷτια ἐκάστον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, ὧν
παρεόντων μὲν τοιοντότροπον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, μετα-
βαλλόντων δ' ἐς ἄλλην κρήσιν παύεσθαι. ὁκόσα τε
οὖν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς θερμῆς εἰλικρινέος ἢ ψύξιος γίνε-
ται καὶ μὴ μετέχει ἄλλης δυνάμιος μηδεμιᾶς, οὕτω
παύοιτ' ἂν ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐς τὸ ψυ-
χρὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐς τὸ θερμόν.

The Natural Origin of Diseases (T18)

T18 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Morb. sacr.*

a 1.1

περὶ τῆς ἱερῆς νούσου καλεομένης ὧδε ἔχει· οὐδὲν τί
μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρῃ εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱε-
ρωτέρῃ, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχει καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ νοσήματα
ὅθεν γίνεται, φύσιν δὲ αὕτη καὶ πρόφασιν. οἱ δ' ἄν-
θρωποι ἐνόμισαν θεῖόν τι πρῆγμα εἶναι ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας
καὶ θαυμασιότητος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν ἐτέροις.

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

that happens is found to happen because of some thing (*dia ti*), and, with this cause, the spontaneous reveals itself not to possess any reality and to be merely a name. But medicine, with its causes and prognoses, reveals itself, and always will reveal itself, to possess reality.

T17 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine*

It is surely necessary to consider that the causes of each phenomenon are those factors whose presence necessarily produces a condition of this sort [scil. a flux of the throat], whereas it ceases when they change so as to create a different mixture. So all the conditions that are produced by pure heat or cold and have no share in any other power will cease in this way, when a change occurs from hot to cold and from cold to hot.

The Natural Origin of Diseases (T18)

T18 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease*

a

Regarding the so-called 'sacred' disease [cf. **T5**], this is how it is: it does not seem to me to be at all more divine than other diseases nor more sacred, but just as the other diseases have a nature from which they arise, so too this disease has a nature and a cause (*prophasis*). But people thought that it is something divine on account of their inexperience and their astonishment at the fact that it does not at all resemble the other ones.

b [2.1–2, c. 5 Jones]

τὸ δὲ νόσημα τοῦτο οὐδέν τί μοι δοκεῖ θειότερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχειν καὶ τᾶλλα νοσήματα ὅθεν ἕκαστα γίνεται, φύσιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πρόφασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτου θεῖον γίνεσθαι ἀφ' ὅτε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, καὶ ἰητὸν εἶναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐτέρων ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἤδη ὑπὸ χρόνου πολλοῦ καταβεβιασμένον ἦ ὥστε ἤδη ἰσχυρότερον εἶναι τῶν φαρμάκων τῶν προσφερομένων. [2] ἄρχεται δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα νοσήματα κατὰ γένος.

c [18, c. 21 Jones]

αὕτη δὲ ἡ νοῦσος ἡ ἱερὴ καλεομένη ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προφασίων γίνεται ἀφ' ὧν καὶ αἱ λοιπαί, ἀπὸ τῶν προσιόντων καὶ ἀπιόντων, καὶ ψύχεος καὶ ἡλίου καὶ πνευμάτων μεταβαλλομένων τε καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀτρεμιζόντων. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ θεῖα ὥστε μὴ δεῖν¹ ἀποκρίνοντα τὸ νόσημα θειότερον τῶν λοιπῶν νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῖα καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα· φύσιν δὲ ἕκαστον ἔχει καὶ δύναμιν ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄπορόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀμήχανον.

¹ μηδὲν mss., corr. Ermerins

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

b

It seems to me that this disease is not in any regard more divine than the others, but just as the other diseases have a nature from which each one arises, this one has a nature and a cause, and it is divine for the same reason as all the others, and it can be treated not less than the others, unless it has acquired such force by the passage of much time that it is already stronger than the remedies that are applied to it. But it has its origin, like the other diseases, from within the family.

c

This disease, which is called 'sacred,' comes from the same causes as all the other ones come from, viz. what penetrates in and what goes out [scil. from the body], the cold, the sun, and the winds that change and are never at rest. These things are divine, so that we should not separate off this disease and consider it to be more divine than the other ones: instead, all of them are divine and all of them are human. Each one has a nature and a power of its own, and none is without a way of escape or a means of salvation.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Multiplicity of Relevant Factors (T19–T22)

T19 (≠ DK) Hipp. Nat. hom. 2

τῶν δὲ ἰητρῶν οἱ μὲν τινες λέγουσιν ὥς ὄνθρωπος αἰμά ἐστιν, οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν χολήν φασιν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔνιοι δέ τινες φλέγμα· ἐπίλογον δὲ ποιέονται καὶ οὗτοι πάντες τὸν αὐτόν· ἐν γὰρ εἶναί φασιν, ὃ τι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ιδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τε τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖον. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδέν τι δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. οἱ μὲν οὖν πλείστοι τοιαυτά τινα ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων ἀποφαινούνται, ἐγὼ δέ φημι, εἰ ἐν ᾗν ὄνθρωπος, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἥλγει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ᾗν ὑπ' ὅτεν ἀλγήσειεν ἐν ἐόν· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ ἀλγήσειεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἰώμενον ἐν εἶναι· νῦν δὲ πολλά· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντα, ἃ, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων παρὰ φύσιν θερμαίνηται τε καὶ ψύχηται, καὶ ξηραίνεται καὶ ὑγραίνεται, νόσους τίκτει· ὥστε πολλὰ μὲν ιδέαι τῶν νοσημάτων, πολλὰ δὲ ἢ ἰησίς ἐστιν.

T20 (≠ DK) Hipp. Vet. med. 15

ἀπορέω δ' ἔγωγε οἱ [. . .] ἄγοντες ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τέχνην, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον θεραπεύουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ ὑποτίθενται· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖσιν, οἶμαι, ἐξευρημένον αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

The Multiplicity of Relevant Factors (T19–T22)

T19 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Nature of Man*

Among doctors, some say that a human is blood, others say that a human is bile, and some say phlegm. These too [scil. like the natural philosophers; cf. **T6**] all draw the same conclusion. For they say that he is one thing, whatever name each of them wants to give it, and that this thing undergoes a change in form and power when it is constrained by the hot and cold, and that it becomes sweet and bitter, white and black, and of all sorts. But it does not seem to me that this is how things are in any case. Well, most of them make assertions of this kind or very similar to these. But I myself say that if a human were one he would never suffer, for there would never be anything because of which he could suffer, being one; and even if he did suffer, the remedy too would necessarily have to be one. But as it is there are many of them: for there exist many things in the body which generate diseases when against nature they are heated and cooled by each other, and are dried and moistened; so that there exist many forms of diseases, and many ways of treating them.

T20 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine*

I myself cannot understand: in what way do those people [. . .] who lead our art away from this method [scil. that of ancient medicine; cf. **T7**] toward a postulate (*hypothesis*) treat men in conformity with what they postulate? For I do not think that they have discovered something that is

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

θερμόν ἢ ψυχρόν ἢ ξηρόν ἢ ὑγρόν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνέον. ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε ταῦτὰ βρώματα καὶ πόματα αὐτοῖσιν ὑπάρχειν οἷσι πάντες χρεώμεθα· προστιθέασι δὲ τῷ μὲν εἶναι θερμῷ, τῷ δὲ ψυχρῷ, τῷ δὲ ξηρῷ, τῷ δὲ ὑγρῷ· ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ἄπορον προστάξαι τῷ κάμνοντι θερμόν τι προσενέγκασθαι· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐρωτήσει· τί; ὥστε ληρεῖν ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐς τούτων τι τῶν γινωσκομένων καταφεύγειν.

T21 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Loc. Hom.* 41.1–2

[1] ἱητρικὴν οὐ δυνατόν ἐστι ταχὺ μαθεῖν διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστι καθεστηκός τι ἐν αὐτῇ σόφισμα γενέσθαι, οἷον ὁ τὸ γράφειν ἓνα τρόπον μαθὼν ὃν διδάσκουσι, πάντα ἐπίσταται· καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πάντες ὁμοίως¹ διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοίως ποιούμενον νῦν τε καὶ οὐ νῦν οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὑπεναντίον γένοιτο, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐνδυκέως ὁμοίον ἐστι, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καιροῦ. [2] ἡ δὲ ἱητρικὴ νῦν τε καὶ αὐτίκα οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπεναντία ποιεῖ, καὶ ταῦτὰ ὑπεναντία σφίσιν ἐωντοῖσι.

¹ ὁμοίως <γράφουσι> Ermerins

T22 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Epid.* 1.23

τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ νοσήματα, ἐξ ὧν διεγινώσκομεν, μαθόντες ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσιος ἀπάντων καὶ τῆς ἰδίης ἐκάστου, ἐκ τοῦ νοσήματος, ἐκ τοῦ νοσέοντος, ἐκ τῶν

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

hot in itself or cold, or dry or moist, without participating in any other form. But I myself think that they have available the same food and drinks as the ones we all use; but they add that this one is hot, that other one cold, that other one dry, that other one wet, since it would be impossible to prescribe to a patient that he consume so-mething hot—for at once he will ask, “What?” So that either they must be speaking nonsense or else they must have recourse to one of these substances that are known.

T21 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On Places in Man*

[1] The reason why it is not possible to learn medicine quickly is that it is impossible for it to produce an established routine (*sophisma*), as someone who is learning how to write in the one way that they have for teaching it knows everything [scil. one must know]; and all those who know [scil. do it] in the same way for the reason that what is done in the same way now and at another time would not become the opposite, but it is always consistently similar and does not depend upon the particular circumstance (*kairos*). [2] But medicine does not proceed in the same way at present and afterward, and it does things that are opposite with regard to the same person, and the same things that are opposite to themselves.

T22 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Epidemics*

As for the circumstances concerning diseases from which we establish a diagnosis, we derive our knowledge from the following sources: from the nature that is in common to all people and the individual nature of each person,

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

προσφερομένων, ἐκ τοῦ προσφέροντος—ἐπὶ τὸ ῥᾶον γὰρ καὶ χαλεπώτερον ἐκ τούτων –, ἐκ τῆς καταστάσιος ὅλης καὶ κατὰ μέρεα τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ χώρης ἐκάστης, ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους, ἐκ τῆς διαίτης, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἐκ τῆς ἡλικίης ἐκάστου, λόγοισι, τρόποισι, σιγῇ, διανοήμασιν, ὕπνοισιν, οὐχ ὕπνοισιν, ἐνυπνίοισι, οἷοισι καὶ ὅτε, τιλμοῖσι, κνησμοῖσι, δάκρυσιν, ἐκ τῶν παροξυσμῶν, διαχωρήμασιν, οὔροισιν, πτυάλοισιν, ἐμέτοισι, καὶ ὅσαι ἐξ οἶων ἐς οἷα διαδοχαί νοσημάτων καὶ ἀποστάσεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὀλέθριον καὶ κρίσιμον, ἰδρώς, ῥίγος, ψύξις, βήξ, παρμοί, λυγμοί, πνεύματα, ἐρεύξεις, φῦσαι, σιγῶσαι, ψοφώδες, αἱμορραγίαι, αἱμορροῖδες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅσα διὰ τούτων σκεπτέον.

Human Physiology (T23–T31) The Brain (T23)

T23 (> 24 A11, 64 C3a) Hipp. *Morb. sacr.* 3, 14, 16–17

[3.1, c. 6 Jones] ἀλλὰ γὰρ αἷτιος ὁ ἐγκέφαλος τούτου τοῦ πάθεος ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων νοσημάτων τῶν μεγίστων. [. . .]

[14.1–4, c. 17 Jones] εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὅτι ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν καὶ ἡδοναὶ γίνονται καὶ εὐφροσύναι καὶ γέλωτες καὶ παιδιαὶ ἢ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅθεν καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἀνίαι καὶ δυσφροσύναι καὶ κλαυθμοί. καὶ τούτῳ φρονέομεν μάλιστα καὶ νοέομεν καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

from the disease, from the patient, from the prescriptions, from the prescriber—for an easier or more difficult [course of illness] depends upon that –, from the general and particular condition of the celestial phenomena and of each country, from the custom, from the way of life, from the activities, from the age of each one, in terms of discourses, personalities, silence, thoughts, sleep, lack of sleep, dreams (of what sort and when), plucking, scratching, weeping, from paroxysms, defecations, urines, sputa, regurgitations, and all the sequences of diseases (from which [scil. phases] to which ones) and the deviations toward fatal conditions and crises, sweat, shivering, cold, cough, sneezes, hiccups, kinds of breaths, eructations, flatulence (silent, noisy), he-morrhages, hemorrhoids. The examination must be performed on the basis of these phenomena and of everything that occurs because of them.

Human Physiology (T23–T31) *The Brain (T23)*

T23 (> 24 A11, 64 C3a) Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease*

[3.1] The cause of this affection [i.e. the ‘sacred’ disease, cf. **T5**, **T18**], as of the other diseases that are most severe, is the brain. [. . .] [cf. **ALCM. D19**]

[14.1–4] People ought to know that it is from no other part [scil. than from the brain] that our pleasures, joys, laughter, and amusements come, and our distress, pains, sorrow, and weeping. And it is by this that we think most of all, reflect, see, hear, distinguish the ugly from the beautiful,

ἀκούομεν καὶ διαγινώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχροὶ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα, τὰ μὲν νόμῳ διακρίνοντας, τὰ δὲ τῷ συμφέροντι αἰσθανόμενοι, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἀηδίας τοῖσι καιροῖσι διαγινώσκοντες· καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀρέσκει ἡμῖν. τῷ δ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρην, καὶ ἐνύπνια καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἰκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι τῶν καθεστωέτων καὶ ἀηθίαι. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα, ὅταν οὗτος μὴ ὑγιαίνει, ἀλλ' ἢ θερμότερος τῆς φύσιος γένηται ἢ ψυχρότερος ἢ ὑγρότερος ἢ ξηρότερος, ἢ τι ἄλλο πεπόνθη πάθος παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ὃ μὴ ἐώθει. [. . .]

[16–17, c. 19–20 Jones] κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν πλείστην ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡέρος γινομένων ἐρμηνεύς, ἦν ὑγιαίνων τυγχάνη· τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὃ ἀἦρ παρέχεται. οἱ δ' ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ οἱ πόδες οἷα ἂν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος γινώσκη, τοιαῦτα ὑπηρετέουσι. γίνεται γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ σώματι τῆς †φρονήσιος†,¹ τέως ἂν μετέχη τοῦ ἡέρος. ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ διαγγέλλων· ὅταν γὰρ σπάσῃ τὸ πνεῦμα ὠνθρωπος ἐς ἐωυτόν, ἐς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖται καὶ οὕτως ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα σκίδνεται ὃ ἀἦρ καταλελοι-

¹ κινήσιος Jouanna

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

the bad from the good, and the pleasant from the unpleasant, when we discriminate the ones in terms of our custom, perceive others in terms of their utility, and sometimes discern pleasures and displeasures in terms of the circumstances; and the same things are not pleasing to us. And it is by the same [scil. organ] that we go mad and become delirious, that terrors and fears seize us, some at night, some during the day, as well as dreams and somnambulism, pointless anxieties, failure to recognize objects that are present, and uncharacteristic behavior. And all these sufferings have their origin in the brain when it is not healthy but has become either warmer or colder or moister or dryer than its nature, or has undergone some other affection contrary to its nature to which it was not accustomed. [. . .]

[16–17] It is for these reasons that I think that the brain is that part in a human being that possesses the greatest power. For when it is healthy, it is this that is the interpreter for us of what comes from the air. Now, air supplies it with thought; by contrast, the eyes, ears, tongue, hands, and feet merely perform what the brain conceives. For there exists everywhere in the body †thought† to the degree that it has a share in air.¹ But with regard to understanding, the brain is the messenger. For when a human draws breath into himself, the air reaches his brain first, and in this way the air is diffused throughout the rest of

¹ Jouanna suggests that “motion” should be read instead of “thought.”

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

πὼς ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐωντοῦ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ᾗ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ γνώμην ἔχον. εἰ γὰρ ἐς τὸ σῶμα πρῶτον ἀφικνέϊτο καὶ ὕστερον ἐς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ἐν τῇσι σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν τῇσι φλεψὶ καταλελοιπὼς τὴν διάγνωσιν, ἐς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἂν ᾗ θερμὸς ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀκραιφνής, ἀλλὰ ἐπιμεμιγμένος τῇ ἱκμάδι τῇ ἀπὸ τε τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ τοῦ αἵματος, ὥστε μηκέτι εἶναι ἀκριβής. [c. 20 Jones] διότι φημὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον εἶναι τὸν ἐρμηνεύοντα τὴν ξύνεσιν. [. . .] ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τῆς φρονήσιος² τοῦ ἡέρος πρῶτος αἰσθάνεται τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐόντων, οὕτω καὶ ἦν τις μεταβολὴ ἰσχυρὴ γένηται ἐν τῷ ἡέρι ὑπὸ τῶν ὥρέων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐωντοῦ διάφορος γένηται, ὁ ἐγκέφαλος πρῶτος αἰσθάνεται. διότι καὶ τὰ νοσήματα ἐς αὐτὸν ἐμπίπτειν φημὶ ὀξύτατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ θανατωδέστατα καὶ δυσκριτῶτατα τοῖσιν ἀπείρουσιν.

² τῆς φρονήσιος secl. Jouanna

The Vessels (T24)

T24 (≠ DK) Hipp. Nat. hom. 11

αἱ παχύταται δὲ τῶν φλεβῶν ὧδε πεφύκασιν· τέσσερα ζεύγεά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι, καὶ ἐν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς ὅπισθεν, διὰ τοῦ αὐχένος [. . .] ἐς τοὺς πόδας ἀφήκει. [. . .] αἱ δ' ἕτεραι φλέβες ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς παρὰ τὰ ὦτα διὰ τοῦ αὐχένος [. . .] ἐς τοὺς ὀρχίας καὶ τοὺς μηρούς [. . .] καὶ τοὺς πόδας. [. . .] αἱ δὲ τρίται φλέβες ἐκ τῶν κροτάφων [. . .] ἔπειτα συμ-

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

the body, after having left behind in the brain the best part of itself, i.e. what thinks and possesses intelligence. For if the air reached the body first and the brain afterward, it would be after having left behind discernment in the flesh and vessels that it would arrive at the brain, in a hot and impure condition, mixed with the moisture coming from both the flesh and the blood, so that it would no longer be precise. That is why I say that the brain is the interpreter of understanding. [. . .] So just as the brain is the first of all the things in the body to perceive the thought that comes from the air, so too if some powerful change occurs in the air by the effect of the seasons and this becomes different from itself, the brain is the first thing to perceive this. That is why I say that the diseases that are the most acute, the most severe, the most deadly, and the most difficult to judge for the inexperienced are the ones that befall it.

The Vessels (T24)

T24 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Nature of Man*

The largest vessels are arranged by nature in the following way. There are four pairs in the body: the first pair from the back of the head, through the neck [. . .] arrives at the feet. [. . .] The second vessels from the head, along the ears, through the neck [. . .] to the testicles and thighs [. . .] to the feet. [. . .] The third vessels from the temples [. . .]

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

φέρονται ἐς τὸν πλεύμονα [. . .] καὶ ἡ μὲν [. . .] καὶ ἐς τὸν σπλήνα καὶ ἐς τὸν νεφρόν, ἡ δὲ [. . .] καὶ ἐς τὸ ἥπαρ καὶ ἐς τὸν νεφρόν, τελευτῶσι δὲ ἐς τὸν ἀρχὸν αὐται ἐκάτεραι. αἱ δὲ τέταρται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα καὶ τὰς κληίδας, ἔπειτα δὲ [. . .] ἐς [. . .] τοὺς δακτύλους, ἔπειτα ἀπὸ τῶν δακτύλων πάλιν [. . .] ἄνω ἐς τὰς συγκαμπάς, καὶ [. . .] ἡ μὲν ἐς τὸν σπλήνα ἀφικνεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἐς τὸ ἥπαρ, ἔπειτα [. . .] ἐς τὸ αἰδοῖον τελευτῶσιν ἀμφοτέραι.

Reproduction (T25–T31)

An Argument Against Monism in General (T25)

T25 (≠ DK) Hipp. Nat. hom. 3

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν γενέσθαι μὴ ἀφ' ἑνός· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἓν γ' εἶναι τι γεννήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τιμι μιχθείη; εἰτ' οὐδὲ ἦν¹ μὴ ὁμόφυλα εἶναι μίσηται καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα δύναμιν γέννα² οὐδ' ἂν μία³ συντελέοιτο. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ μὴ τὸ θερμὸν τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τῷ ὑγρῷ μετρίως πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔξει καὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐτέρου πολλὸν προέξει καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον τοῦ ἀσθενεστερου, ἡ γένεσις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. ὥστε πῶς εἰκὸς ἀπὸ ἑνός τι γεννηθῆναι, ὅτε γε οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν πλειόνων γίνεται, ἦν μὴ τύχη καλῶς ἔχοντα τῆς κρήσιος τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα; [. . . = T8]

varias corruptelas in mss. sanarunt edd. ¹ εἰτ' οὐδὲ ἦν
Jouanna ² γέννα Ermerins ³ μία Wilamowitz

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

then converge toward the lung [. . .] and the one [. . .] arrives at the spleen and kidney, the other [. . .] at the liver and kidney; both of them end at the anus. The fourth from the front of the head and the eyes, under the neck and the collarbones, then [. . .] to the fingers, then from the fingers back [. . .] up to the armpits; and [. . .] the one arrives at the spleen, the other at the liver; then [. . .] they both end at the genital organ [cf. **DIOG. D27**].

Reproduction (T25–T31)

An Argument Against Monism in General (T25)

T25 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On the Nature of Man*

First of all, therefore, it is necessary that birth not occur from only one thing: for how could something that is only one engender something without mixing with something? And then, even if, without being akin, things mix together that have the same power (*dunamis*), they cannot engender and could not be united in one.¹ Again, if the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist are not in a relation that is proportionate and equal to each other, but rather the one is much greater than the other and the stronger than the weaker, then birth will not occur. So how is it plausible that something be engendered from only one thing, when nothing is born even from a plurality of things when they do not happen to be in a condition to mix properly with each other?

¹ This sentence has been considered obscure since Galen, and the text is suspect.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

The Doctrine Called 'Pangenes' (T26–T27)

T26 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Genit.*

a

[1.1] νόμος μὲν πάντα κρατύνει· ἡ δὲ γονὴ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔρχεται ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐόντος τὸ ἰσχυρότατον ἀποκριθέν· τούτου δὲ ἱστόριον τόδε, ὅτι ἀποκρίνεται τὸ ἰσχυρότατον, ὅτι ἐπὴν λαγνέυσωμεν σμικρὸν οὕτω μεθέντες, ἀσθενεῖς γινόμεθα.

b

[2.2] χωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς παρὰ τὰ οὖατα ἐς τὸν νωτιαῖον μυελόν.

T27 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Aer.* 14.5

[. . . = **T31**] ὁ γὰρ γόνος πανταχόθεν ἔρχεται τοῦ σώματος, ἀπὸ τε τῶν ὑγιερῶν ὑγιερὸς ἀπὸ τε τῶν νοσερῶν νοσερός.

The Development of the Embryo (T28–T29)

T28 (≠ DK) Hipp. *Carn.* 6.3

τὸ δὲ παιδίον ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ συνέχον τὰ χεῖλεα μύζει ἐκ τῶν μητρῶν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἔλκει τήν τε τροφήν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ καρδίῃ ἔσω· τοῦτο γὰρ θερμότατόν

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

The Doctrine Called 'Pangenesi's' (T26–T27)

T26 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *On Generation*

a

Law dominates all things; but as for the sperm of a man, it proceeds from all the moisture that exists in the body, the strongest part of it having separated out. There is evidence for the fact that it is the strongest part that separates out: after we have had sexual intercourse, even though what we have ejaculated is so little, we become weak.

b

The greatest part [scil. of the sperm] proceeds from the head along the ears into the spinal marrow.

T27 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Airs, Waters, Places*

[. . .] For the sperm comes from the whole body, what is healthy from the healthy places, what is sick from the sick ones.

The Development of the Embryo (T28–T29)

T28 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Fleshes*

The fetus in the womb, applying its lips, sucks and draws from its mother's uterus nourishment and breath (*pneuma*) to its heart inside. For it is this [i.e. its heart, or perhaps:

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ, ὅταν περ ἡ μήτηρ ἀναπνέῃ·
τούτῳ¹ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι τὴν κίνησιν παρέχει
τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοισι πᾶσιν.

¹ τούτῳ Littré: τοῦτο V

T29 (≠ DK) Hipp. Nat. puer.

a

[17.1] ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀνζομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀρ-
θροῦται, καὶ ἔρχεται ἐν αὐτῇ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον ὡς τὸ
ὁμο-ιον, τὸ πυκνὸν ὡς τὸ πυκνόν, τὸ ἀραιὸν ὡς τὸ
ἀραιόν, τὸ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸ ὑγρόν· καὶ ἕκαστον ἔρχεται
ἐς χώραν ἰδίην κατὰ τὸ συγγενές, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἐγένετο,
καὶ ἄσσα ἀπὸ πυκνῶν ἐγένετο πυκνά ἐστι, καὶ ἄσσα
ἀπὸ ὑγρῶν ὑγρά.

b

[18.1] καὶ γέγονεν ἤδη παιδίον καὶ ἐς τοῦτο ἀφικνέ-
ται, τὸ μὲν θῆλυ ἐν τεσσεράκοντα ἡμέρησι καὶ δύο
τὸ μακρότατον, τὸ δὲ ἄρσεν ἐν τριήκοντα ἡμέρησι τὸ
μακρότατον.

c

[27.1] φημὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ φνόμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ
τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱκμάδος, καὶ ὅκως ἂν ἡ γῇ ἔχῃ ἱκμάδος
ἐν ἐωυτῇ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ φνόμενα ἔχειν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

the air] that is what is hottest in the fetus when the mother breathes in; and it is the heat that provides motion to it, as well as to the rest of the body and all other things.

T29 (≠ DK) Hippocrates, *Nature of the Child*

a

The flesh, growing under the effect of breath (*pneuma*), becomes articulated, and within it what is similar goes to what is similar, the dense to the dense, the rarefied to the rarefied, the moist to the moist; and each thing goes to its proper place in accordance with what is akin to it from which it arose, and everything that comes from dense things is dense, and everything that comes from moist things is moist [. . .].¹

¹ There follows a detailed enumeration of the articulation of the parts: bones, head, arms, legs, muscles, nose, ears, eyes, viscera.

b

And a fetus has already been formed and has arrived at this point, the female in forty-two days at most, the male in thirty days at most.

c

For I assert that everything that grows (*phuomena*) in the earth lives from the moisture (*ikmas*) that comes from the earth, and that the condition of what grows depends on

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

παιδίον ζῇ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσι, καὶ ὅκως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιείης ἔχῃ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἔχει. ἦν δέ τις βούληται ἐννοεῖν τὰ ῥηθέντα ἀμφὶ τούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐς τέλος, εὐρήσει τὴν φύσιν πᾶσαν παραπλησίην ἐοῦσαν τῶν τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην.

Viability of the Fetus (T30)

T30 (≠ DK) Hipp. Oct. 9.2–3

αἱ μὲν οὖν ἡμέραι <αἱ>¹ ἐπισημόταταί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖσι πλείστοις αἱ τε πρῶται καὶ αἱ ἑβδομαί, πολλαὶ μὲν περὶ νούσους, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ τοῖσιν ἐμβρύοις. [. . .] ἐν δὲ τοῖσι μῆσι ταῦτά τε καὶ ἐν τῇσιν ἡμέρῃσι γινόμενα ἔνεστι κατὰ λόγον [. . .]. ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ οἱ ἑβδομοὶ μῆνες τῇσιν ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃσι τὰ ἔμβρυα ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν καθιστᾶσι τῆς τελειώσεως, τοῖσι δὲ παιδίοις ἐπταμήνοισιν ἐοῦσι καὶ ἄλλα διαφέρομενα γίνονται ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι καὶ οἱ ὀδόντες φαίνεσθαι ἀρχονται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ.

¹ <αἱ> Diller

Transmission of Acquired Characteristics (T31)

T31 (≠ DK) Hipp. Aer. 14.2–4

τούτων γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο ἔθνος ὁμοίας τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχον οὐδέν· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν ὁ νόμος αἰτιώτατος

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

that of the moisture that the earth contains within itself. In the same way, the fetus too lives from the mother in her uterus, and the condition of the fetus' health depends on the mother's. And if someone wishes to reflect from beginning to end about what I have said about these matters, he will find that the nature of everything [scil. that grows, *phusis*], both what grows from the earth and that of humans, is extremely similar.

Viability of the Fetus (T30)

T30 (\neq DK) Hippocrates, *On the Eight-Month Fetus*

The most significant days, in most cases, are the first and the seventh, in many cases regarding diseases, and in many regarding embryos. [. . .] The same thing applies to the months as to the days, proportionately [. . .]. It is for this reason that the seventh months, for pregnant women, bring the embryos to the beginning of their completion, and that significant changes occur in the bodies of seventh-month embryos, including the teeth, which begin to appear at this time.

Transmission of Acquired Characteristics (T31)

T31 (\neq DK) Hippocrates, *Airs, Waters, Places*

There is no other people [scil. than the Macrocephali] that have heads like theirs. For in the beginning it was a custom

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ἐγένετο τοῦ μήκεος τῆς κεφαλῆς, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις
ξυμβάλλεται τῷ νόμῳ· τοὺς γὰρ μακροτάτην ἔχοντας
τὴν κεφαλὴν γενναιοτάτους ἡγεύνται. [. . .] τοῦ δὲ
χρόνου προϊόντος, ἐν φύσει ἐγένετο, ὥστε τὸν νόμον
<μοῦνον>¹ μηκέτι ἀναγκάζειν. [. . . = **T27**].

¹<μοῦνον> Jacoby

EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

that was the principal cause for the length of their head, but now nature too collaborates with the custom. For they think that those who have the longest heads are the most noble, and their custom is the following: [. . .].¹ But as time went by, it became part of their nature, so that it is no longer the custom that constrains them.

¹ There follows a description of a procedure whereby the heads of newborn children are elongated.

30. THE DERVENI PAPYRUS [DERV.]

The Derveni Papyrus, discovered in 1962 at Derveni, near Thessaloniki in Macedonia, and finally published in an authorized edition in 2006 (KPT, see Bibliography below), is one of the most extraordinary discoveries of the twentieth century regarding ancient Greek philosophy and religion. Unlike most of the texts presented in our collection, it needs some specific clarifications in order to be understood.

The bottom half of the papyrus roll was completely destroyed when it was burned, presumably at the time of the funeral of the man at whose burial site it was found; of the approximately twenty-six columns that remain, the top parts of most of them are quite legible, but others, especially at the beginning, have been reduced to numerous tiny fragments that are extremely difficult to combine and decipher. The papyrus itself is dated, on the basis of its writing style and especially of the archaeological context, to ca. 340/20 BC.

Most of the portion of the book that has survived consists of a series of quotations from an apparently mythical cosmogonic poem attributed to Orpheus (cf. **COSM. T12** and the following texts), followed each time by allegorical interpretations of these passages in terms of natural philosophy presenting striking resemblances to the several

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

known doctrines, especially those of Anaxagoras and of Diogenes of Apollonia. There are also etymological explanations, especially of the names of gods, and a passage from Heraclitus about the sun is cited and discussed. The first columns, which are very fragmentary, refer to sacrificial practices and beliefs about the Underworld. The author and title of the text are not known; the original allegorical commentary (reproduced on the papyrus) dates most probably from the beginning of the fourth century or indeed the end of the fifth BC; in this case not only the Orphic cosmogonic poem, but also its allegorical commentary, can be assigned with full legitimacy to the Pre-Platonic period.

For the text up to and including Col. VI, we rely upon the edition currently being finished by Valeria Piano (see Bibliography), for columns VII–XXVI upon that of K. Tsantsanoglou and G. M. Parássoglou in KTP.

Starting with Col. III, the top portions of the Derveni Papyrus can be reconstructed, at least partially, with great uncertainty but with varying degrees of confidence. But with regard to the initial columns, at the time of the preparation of this edition (2015), the small size and poor condition of the fragments that can be assigned to these do not permit collocations secure enough to allow a responsible reconstruction of the text preceding Col. III. Furthermore, on the basis of the preserved fragments, it is certain that before the column now numbered III there were originally more than two columns of text, and it cannot be excluded that between what are now Cols. III and IV there was a column referring to sacrifice that, depending on which papyrological hypothesis is adopted, is to be collocated either among the very first columns of text or

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

else between what are now Cols. III and IV. For papyrological and textual reasons, for Cols. III and IV we have chosen to maintain the arrangement of the fragments proposed by the editors of the *editio princeps* (except for a new join proposed by Piano in Col. IV and adopted by us). But as for the portion of the papyrus roll preceding what is now Col. III, we have decided, given the high degree of uncertainty regarding its reconstruction, to refrain from attempting to assign each of the surviving fragments from this part of the papyrus to one or another of these first columns, and instead we simply provide a list, arranged by fragments, of the significant terms that can be read on the papyrus fragments that can be identified as belonging to this portion of the roll. The topics that can be discerned on the basis of the full or partial words on these exiguous scraps include justice (or Justice), the Erinyes, various sacrificial practices, prayers, signs, water and fire, something that is natural, and human; these subjects are all ones that recur in the later columns, and we provide cross-references to signal the specific connections. For further hypotheses of reconstruction for the beginning of the papyrus roll, see the papyrological chapter in the edition of V. Piano.

In this chapter, as elsewhere, we make use of the following signs:

- <xx>: editorial supplements to lacunae in the papyrus
- (xx): transcription, in the translation, of Greek words in the papyrus
- [xx]: editorial explanations
- (?): readings in the papyrus or translations of the Greek that are uncertain

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

But in certain regards our editorial policy in this chapter differs from that used in our treatment of other texts transmitted on papyri:

1. We have decided in this case to maintain the arrangement in columns found in the papyrus (cf. volume 1, Note on Editorial Principles and Translations) and to keep the iota adscripts (but not the spellings that result from assimilation, e.g. when *nu* becomes *gamma* before *kappa*, *gamma*, or *chi* in the papyrus).

2. We use double quotation marks (“xxx”) for citations from the Orphic poem, for passages from other authors cited by the commentator, and for what people say or could have said, even if they did not actually say it; single quotation marks (‘xxx’) are used for all citations of a meta-linguistic sort, including names that are the object of an explanation provided by the commentator himself.

3. We use three horizontal dashes (— — —) at the top or bottom of the Greek text of a column to indicate that the top or bottom edge of the papyrus as well as at least one line of text are lacking for that column; this is the case for the tops of all the columns up to and including Col. III and for the bottoms of all the columns.

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THE DERVENI PAPYRUS [\neq DK]¹

¹ Text up to and including Col. VI ed. Piano; Cols. VII–XXVI ed. KPT; nos = Laks and Most

FRAGMENTS FROM THE COLS. PRECEDING COL. III

Fr. G5

l. 3:] ξ $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ $\tau\iota$

l. 4: $\delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta\iota$ (vel $\Delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\eta\iota$, cf. Cols. III, IV)

Frr. G15+G6 (cf. Col. VI)

G15.2: $\Xi\rho\iota\nu$ [

G15.3: $\tau\iota\mu\acute{\omega}\sigma\iota\nu$

G15.4+G6.1: $\chi]$ $\rho\alpha\acute{\iota}$ $\sigma\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{o}\sigma\iota\nu$

G15.5+G6.2: $\tau\iota\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$

G15.6+G6.3: $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron$ [.]c

Fr. G7

l. 5: $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\epsilon$ [

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

FRAGMENTS FROM THE COLS. PRECEDING COL. III

A list of the legible significant terms on the fragments belonging to the part of the papyrus preceding Col. III (the designation of the papyrus fragments is that of the editions of reference).

Frag. G5

line 3: **something divine** [or: some brimstone]

line 4: **to** [or: with] **justice** [or: Justice] (cf. cols. III, IV)

Frag. G15+G6 (cf. Col. VI)

G15.2: **Erinyes**

G15.3: **they honor**

G15.4+G6.1: **libations in drops**

G15.5+G6.2: **honors**

G15.6+G6.3: **each** [or: to each]

Frag. G7

line 5: **he added** [or: imposed]

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

l. 6:].τα σημαί[

Fr. F10

l. 4: τὰ σημεί[ι- (cf. fr. F18+H45; etiam fr. G7.6)

Fr. F14

l. 1:].περ φυσικ[

l. 2: εὐχα[

l. 3: ἀνημμε[ν-

Frr. F18+H45

l. 2: π]νρὸς ὕδατος δ.[

l. 3: ἔκαστα σημει.[(cf. fr. F10; etiam fr. G7.6)

l. 4: καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσα

Fr. F19

l. 1:]ιερ

l. 3: ἀνθρῶ[π

Col. III

3]... αἰῶς[. . .]σι κατῶ[
δαίμ]ων γίνεται[ι ἐκά]στωι ἰλξ[ως] ηᾶλ[ca. 9 litt.]ρ. ἥ
5 γὰρ Δί]κη ἐξώλεας [οὐ μ]έττεισι ἐκ[ὰς] Ἐρινύῳ[ν· καὶ
οἱ] δὲ

3 μυσ]τικαὶ ὥς .[Tsantsanoglou potius quam θυ]ηλαί, ὥς

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

line 6: **the things signified** (?)

Frag. F10

line 4: **the signs** (?) (cf. Frags. F18+H45; also Frag. G7.6)

Frag. F14

line 1: **natural** (?)

line 2: **prayer** (?)

line 3: **kindled** [or: fastened]

Frag. F18+H45

line 2: **of fire** (?) **of water**

line 3: **each sign** (?) (cf. Frag. F10; also Frag. G7.6)

line 4: **and all the other things that**

Frag. F19

line 1: **holy** (?)

line 3: **human** (?)

Col. III

. . . **below** . . . <a personal de>**ity** (*daimôn*) **becomes**
for each person benevolent or <otherwise vindictive?>.
 <For Jus>**tice does not pursue malefactors far from**
 [i.e. independently of?] **the Erinyes; and the deities**

[Janko	fin. ὁ δὲ ἱδῖος e.g. nos	4 ἱλ[ω]ς Tsant-
sanoglou]ηαλ[Piano, ἡ ἄλ[λω]ς ἀλάστω]ρ nos	
4-5 ἡ	[γαρ Δί]κη KPT	5 ἐξώλεας Tsantsanoglou
[οὐ nos	μ]έττεισι Piano, νοῦθ[ε]τ[ε] δ[ι] KPT	ἐκ[ὰς]
nos	Ἐρινύω[ν Tsantsanoglou	καὶ οἱ] δὲ Piano mon.
Battezzato qui οἱ] δὲ con.		

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

- δ]αίμονες οἱ κατὰ [γῆς ο]ὐδέκοτ[(ε)]ροῦσι [?
 θεῶν ὑπηρέται δ[2–3 litt.]ι πάντα υ[ca. 16 litt.]ι
 εἰσὶν ὅπωςπερ ἀ[νδρὸς] ἀδίκου θ . . [ca. 17 litt.]νοι
 αἰτίην [. ἔ]χουσι[
 10 οἷους γ[. .] . [
 . .]υτ[

— — —

6 ὅστε]ροῦσι vel ἐκχω]ροῦσι Piano, τ]ηροῦσι KPT
 7 Δ[ίκη]ι vel δ[ίκη]ι coni. Piano, δ[είσ]ι KPT 8 ἀ[νδρὸς]
 ἀδίκου Piano, ἄ[νδρες] ἀδικοὶ ceteri θ . . [Piano, an
 θρά[σο- ? 9 [δ' ἔ]χουσι[Burkert fort. recte, [τ' ἔ]χουσι[
 Tsantsanoglou

Col. IV

- 1 [.]ον ε.[]εων
 ὁ κείμ[ενα] μετὰθ[εῖς ca. 14 litt. ἔ]κδοῦναι
 μᾶλλ[ον ἂ] σίνεται [ca. 17 litt.]τὰ τῆς τύχης
 γὰ[ρ]
 οὐκ εἴ[α λα]μβάνειν. ἂρ' οὐ τα[κτὸς ὁ διὰ
 τό]νδε κόσμος;
 5 κατὰ [ταῦτ]α Ἑράκλειτος μα[ρτυρόμενος] τὰ
 κοινὰ
 — κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἰδ[ι]α, ὅσπερ ἵκελα [ιερῶι]
 λόγῳ λέγων [ἔφη·]
 “ἥλιος” ...]μον κατὰ φύσιν “ἀνθρω[πηίου]
 εὖρος ποδός [ἐστι”],
 τὸ μ[έγεθος] οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων. εἰ γὰ[ρ τι
 οὔ]ρους ἐ[ωντοῦ]

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

(*daimones*) **under the earth never** <delay? [or: withdraw]> . . . **servants of the gods** <for Justice? [or: justly]> . . . **they all . . . they are like an unjust man's . . . they have the guilt** [or: responsibility] . . . **such as** (masculine plural) . . .

Col. IV

. . . **he** [i.e. the god? a name-giver?] **having displaced what lay** [scil. inert, or: what was established] . . . **to hand over rather what causes damage . . . for he did not allow it** [i.e. probably the world] **to admit the workings of chance. Is not the world** <[scil. that is created] by him [i.e. probably the god]> **ordered? In conformity with this, Heraclitus,** <invoking the testimony of> **what is shared in common** [scil. by all men], **overturns what belongs to each individual** [cf. **HER. D2**], **he who, saying things similar to a** <holy> **discourse, said, “The sun”** in accordance with the nature of the [perhaps: <ordinance>] **“is of the breadth of a human foot,” not exceeding that size. For if it** <exceeds> **at all** <its own

-
- 1 θ]εῶν KPT 4 οὐ πα[κτὸς ὁ διὰ τό]νδε Piano
 5 [ταῦτ]α Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou, [ταῦτ]ὰ ceteri
 6 [ίερῳ] Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou, [ἀστρο]λόγῳ KPT
 7 ἥλιος leg. Piano, ἥλι[ος ceteri θεσ]μῶν prop. nos,
 κόσμ]ον Piano [WITH DOT UNDER BOTH μ] an [ἔχει],?
 8 τὸ μ[έγεθος] KPT, τοῦ[ς οὐρον]ς Tsantsanoglou

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ὑπερβαλεῖ[ι, “Ἐρινύε[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσονται”.
τὰ δὲ] ὑπελάμ[βανε]

10 ὅπως μὴ εὖρος ὑπερ]βατὸν ποῆι κ[6–7 litt.]α
Δίκης[

]·ι θνο.[
]α Δίκης[
] μηνὶ τακ[τῶι
]....[.]ιζ.[

— — —
9 ὑπερβαλεῖ[ι Tsantsanoglou-Parásoglou τὰ δὲ] nos
9–10 ὑπελάμ[βανε et Δίκης[Piano ex fr. F17
10 κ[ατὰ μέτρ]α tempt. Piano
13] . . . [.]ιζ.[Piano,] . . ιπαῖς[KPT

Col. V

1]δ[.]υδει.[
χρη[στη]ριαζομ[]·οι·ε[
χρησ[τ]ηριάζον[ται] . [.] [..]ι
αὐτοῖς πάριμεν [εἰς τὸ μα]ντεῖον ἐπερ[ω]τήσονται[ες]
5 τῶμ μαντενομένων[ων ἔν]εκεν εἰ θέμι[ς προσ]δοκᾶν
ἐν Ἄιδου δεινὰ. τί ἀ[πισ]τοῦσι; οὐ γινώσ[κο]ντες
ἐνύπνια
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πρ[α]γμάτων ἑκαστ[ον], διὰ ποίῳν
ἂν
παραδειγμάτων π[ι]στεύοιεν; ὑπό τ[ε γὰρ] ἀμαρ-
τῶν
καὶ [τ]ῆς ἄλλης ἡδον[ῆ]ς νενικημέν[οι, οὐ]
μανθ[ά]νο[υσιν]

limits,> **“the Erinyes will find it out.”** [cf. **HER. D89**]
He made <this> **supposition** <in order that it not> **make**
 <its breadth> **excessive . . . of Justice . . . <sacrifice> . . .**
of Justice . . . at the established month . . .

Col. V

. . . **consulting** [or: we consult] **an oracle . . . they con-**
sult an oracle . . . for [?] **them we enter into the**
oracular shrine (*manteion*) **in order to ask, for the**
sake of those who are consulting the oracle, if it
is licit to expect terrors in Hades. Why do they dis-
believe? Not understanding dreams or each of the
other real things, how could they believe on the ba-
sis of other examples? For, overcome by error and
by something else, pleasure [or: by the other pleasure],

1 Piano mon. Janko qui . . . ἄλιδον δειν[à suppl. fort. recte,
]ηδε.[Tsantsanoglou 3 (προσ)τε[ταγμα[νο]ι Tsantsanoglou

4 ἐπερ[ω]τήσον[τες Piano mon. Tsantsanoglou (qui ἐπερ[ω]-
 τήσον[τες leg.), ἐπερ[ω]τήσ[οντες KPT 5 μαντενομένων
 Janko, μαντενομένων Tsantsanoglou εἰ θέμι[s προσ]-
 δοκᾶν Piano, εἰ θέμι[s ἀπ]ιστήσαι Ferrari, εἰ θέμι[s ταῦτ]α
 δρᾶν Tsantsanoglou, θεμι[. . .] . . . ἡδᾶ[KPT 6 ἐν leg. Piano
 mon. West, ἀρ' KPT, ἐξ Ferrari γνώσ[κο]ντες ἐνύπνια
 leg. Piano mon. Tsantsanoglou qui γινώσ[κοντες ἐ]νύπνια suppl.

7 πραγμάτων Tsantsanoglou ἕκαστ[α Janko

8 ὑπὸ τ[ῆς] Janko 9–11 Tsantsanoglou

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

- 10 οὐδὲ] πιστεύουσι. ἀπ[ι]στίη δὲ κᾶμα[θίη ταυτόν· ἦν
 γὰρ]
 μὴ μα[γθάνωσι μῆ[δ]ὲ γινώ[σ]κωσ[ιν, οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὅπως]
 πιστεύσου]σιν καὶ ορ[
]ην ἀπιστί[ην
]φαίνεται [

— — —

- 12 πιστεύσου]σιν Tsantsanoglou ὁρ[ῶντες Tsantsano-
 glou, ὁρ[ῶντες ἐνύπνια coni. Janko 13]ην ἀπιστί[ην KPT

Col. VI

- ca. 8 litt. εὐ]χαὶ καὶ θυσ[ί]αι μ[ε]ιλ[ί]σσουσι τὰ[ς ψυ-
 χάς,]
 ἐπ[αιοιδῇ δ]ὲ μάγων δύν[α]ται δαίμονας ἐμ[ποδῶν]
 γι[ννομένο]υς μεθιστάγει. δαίμονες ἐμπο[δίζουσι ὡς]
 ψ[υχαι τιμω]ροί. τὴν θυσ[ία]ν τούτου ἔνεκεν π[ο(ι)-
 οῦσ]ι[ν]
 5 οἱ μά[γο]ι ὥσπερ εἰ ποινὴν ἀποδιδόντες, τοῖ[ς] δὲ
 ἱεροῖ[ς] ἐπισπένδουσιν ὕ[δ]ωρ καὶ γάλα, ἐξ ὧν περ
 καὶ τὰς
 χοὰς ποιοῦσι. ἀνάριθμα [κα]ὶ πολυόμφαλα τὰ πό-
 πανα
 θύουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχὰ[ι ἀν]άριθμοί εἰσι. μύσται
 Εὐμερίσι προθύουσιν κ[ατὰ τ]αὐτὰ μάγοις. Εὐμερί-
 δες γὰρ
 10 ψυχαί εἰσιν, ὧν ἔνεκε[εν ὁ θέλων ἱ]ερά θεοῖς θύειν

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

<they do not learn nor> **do they believe. Disbelief and lack of learning** <are the same thing. For if they do not> **learn and do not understand**, <it is not possible that they will believe> **and . . . disbelief . . . appears . . .**

Col. VI

. . . **prayers and sacrifices** <placate> **the souls, and** <the incantation> **of the Magi is capable of trans forming the deities** (*daimones*) **when they are a hindrance. They** [i.e. these *daimones*] **are a hindrance** <as avenging souls>. **It is for this reason that the Magi perform a sacrifice, as though they were paying a penalty, and upon the sacrificial offerings they pour water and milk, out of which things they also make the libations. Numberless and many-knobbed are the cakes they sacrifice, because the souls too are numberless. The initiates perform a preliminary sacrifice to the Eumenides in the same way as the Magi do, for the Eumenides are souls, because of which** <he who wants> **to perform sacrificial offerings for the gods a**

<p>1–9 Tsantsanoglou recte dispexit, sed interpretatio dubia Piano mon. Tsantsanoglou qui ἐμπο[δίζουσι τὰς suppl., ἐμπο- [δὼν δ' εἰσὶ KPT 4 ψ[υχὰι τιμω]ροί Tsantsanoglou, ψ[υχᾶῖς ἐχθ]ροί KPT leg. Piano, ὕ[δω]ρ ceteri αὐτὰ ceteri 10 ἐνεκ[εν Tsantsanoglou ἱ]ερὰ Janko ex fr. I 70, τὸν μέλλοντ]α Tsantsanoglou</p>	<p>2 τ supra litt. μ (μάγων) Piano 3 ἐμπο[δίζουσι ὡς 6 ὕ[δω]ρ 9 κ[ατὰ τ]αὐτὰ Piano, κ[ατὰ τὰ] ὁ θέλων Piano, ὁ μέλλων</p>
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EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

ὁ'[[ω]]ρνίθιον πρότερον [ca. 11 litt.].ἔποτε[2–3 litt.]
ται

κάτ]ω [ὄ]τε καὶ τὸ κ . []ου ... [. .] . ι.

εἰσὶ δὲ [ψν]χαὶ ... []τουτο.[

ὄσαι δὲ []ων ἀλλ[

15 φοβον[]..[

— — —

11 ὁ'[[ω]]ρνίθιον Piano (post o litt. deleta incerta ω congruens), ὁ[[ρ]]ρνίθιον Ferrari, ὁ[ρ]νίθ[ε]ιον Tsantsanoglou
[.ἔποτε[. .]ται KPT, αὐτ]αῖς τὸτ' ἐ[ρχη]ται
Ferrari 12 κάτ]ω Bernabé ὅτε Ferrari

13 [ψν]χαὶ Janko 15 φοβον[Piano, φορον[Tsantsanoglou, φοροῦ[σι Janko

Col. VII

[3–4 litt.]οce[

[..ῥ]μνον[ύγ]ιῇ καὶ θεμ[ι]τὰ λέγοντα· ἱερουργεῖ]το
γὰρ

[τῇ]ι ποήσει. [κ]αὶ εἰπεῖν οὐχ οἶόν τ[ε τὴν τῶν ὀ]νο-
μάτων

[θέ]σιν καίτ[οι] ῥηθέντα. ἔστι δὲ ξ[ένη τις ἡ] πόη-
σις

5 [κ]αὶ ἀνθρώ[ποις] αἰνι[γμ]ατώδης, [κε]ῖ [Ὀρφεν]ς
αὐτ[ὸ]ς

[ἀό]ριστ' αἶν[ίγμα]τα οὐκ ἤθελε λέγειν, [ἐν αἶν]ί-
γμασ[ιν] δὲ

[μεγ]άλα. ἱερ[ολογ]εῖται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀ[πὸ το]ῦ
πρώτου

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

small bird first . . . <down>, when the . . . too . . . But souls are [or: . . . are souls] . . . this [?] . . . But all those <souls?> that . . . but [or : others ?] . . . fear [?] . . .

Col. VII

. . . a hymn that says sound and lawful things. For <he was performing a sacred rite> by means of his poem. And it is not possible to state the meaning imposed (*thesis*) on the words even though they are uttered; but the poem is an alien one and, for human beings, riddling, even if Orpheus himself intended by means of it to say not undeterminable riddles, but rather great things in the form of riddles. Indeed, he is making a holy discourse, and from the first word

versum compos. viri docti e comm. e.g. φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις
 ἐστι· θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι = Frag. 3 Bernabé 1 ἰε-
 ρουργεῖ]το Tsantsanoglou, ἱερολογεῖ]το Janko 4 [θέ]σιν
 Janko, [λύ]σιν vel [φύ]σιν Tsantsanoglou 5 [κε]ῖ KPT,
 [κα]ῖ Ferrari 6 [ἀό]ριστ' Ferrari, [ἐ]ρίστ' Tsantsanoglou

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

- [ἀεὶ] μέχρι οὗ [τελε]υταίου ρήματος, ὡ[ς δηλοῖ] καὶ
 ἐν τῷ
 [εὐκ]ρινήτω[ι ἔπει· “θ]ύρας” γὰρ “ἐπίθεσ[θε] ὁ
 κελ]εύσας τοῖ[ς]
 10 [“ὡσὶ]ν” αὐτ[οὺς οὐτι νομο]θετεῖν φη[σιν τοῖς] πολ-
 λοῖς
 τῇ]ν ἀκοὴν [ἀγνεύο]ντας κατ[ὰ]
]ρειτ[...].
]ωι τ[...εγ.[...].
 ἐν δ]ὲ τῷ ἐχομ[έ]νῳ πα[ρ]
 15]ἔτλη ἔργ’ ο[ὗ]κ ἀτ[έ]λεστα

— — —

- 8 οὗ vel <τ>οὐ Tsantsanoglou 9 ἐπίθεσ[θ]ε ὁ [κε]λεύ-
 σας Janko ex frr. I 7 et I 55, ἐπιθέ[σθαι κελ]εύσας Tsantsanoglou
 11 ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς τῇ]ν ἀκοὴν [καθαρεύ]οντας κατ[ὰ]
 Janko 15 Janko,].τ . . εἰγ.[.]κατ[KPT

Col. VIII

- [ca. 10 litt.] ἐδήλω[σεν ἐν τῷ]δε τῷ ἔπ[ει.]
 <_> [“ο]ὐ Διὸς ἐξεγέροντο [μεγασθεν]έος βασι-
 λῆος.”
 [—] ὅπως δ’ ἄρχεται ἐν τῷ[ιδε δη]λοῖ.
 “Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πα[τρὸς ἐο]ῦ πάρα
 θέ[σ]φατον ἀρχὴν
 5 [—] [ἀ]λκήν τ’ ἐν χείρεσσι ἔ[λ]αβ[εν κ]α[ὶ]
 daίμον[α] κυδρόν.”

3

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

<continuously> **until his last one, as he makes clear in this well-chosen verse too: for he who has ordered them, “put doors to your ears,” says that he is <not legislating> for the many . . . <who are pure> in their hearing according to . . . and in the following verse . . . “dared deeds that were not <unfulfilled>” . . .**¹

¹ On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary, scholars reconstruct *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: “I shall proclaim to those for whom it is licit; you who are profane, shut your doors.”

Col. VIII

. . . he has made it clear in this verse:

“who were born from Zeus the mighty king.”

And how he begins he makes clear in this one:

**“Zeus, when from his father the prophesied rule
(*arkhên*)**

**And strength (*alkên*) in his hands he received and
the glorious divinity (*daimona*).”**

1 ὥς] Janko

2 [μεγασθεν]έος Sider, [ὑπερμεν]έος ZPE

[τ]αῦτα τὰ ἔπη ὑπερβατὰ ἐό[ν]τα λανθά-
 ν[ει].
 [ἔσ]τιν δ' ᾧδ' ἔχοντα. 'Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ τῇ[ν
 ἀλ]κὴν
 [πα]ρὰ πατρὸς ἐοῦ ἔλαβεν καὶ δαίμονα
 [κνδρ]όν.'
 [χρὴ ᾧ]δ' ἔχοντα οὐκ ἀκούειν τὸν Ζᾶ[να ὡς
 κρα]τεῖ
 10 [τοῦ πατρ]ὸς ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀλκὴν λαμβά[νει
 παρ' αὐτο]ῦ.
 [ἄλλως δ' ἔ]χοντα παρὰ θέσφατα δ[όξειεν
 ἂν λαβεῖ]ν
 [τὴν ἀρχήν· ἔο]ικεν γὰρ τούτῳ μα[
 [κατ' ἀ]νάγκην νομίζοιτ' [ἂν
 [ca. 9 litt.] καὶ μαθὼν το[.].][

— — —

9 [χρὴ ᾧ]δ' ZPE, [οὔτω] δ' Tsantsanoglou ὡς κρα]τεῖ
 Piano, mon. Tortorelli, ὅπως κρα]τεῖ Janko, ἐπικρα]τεῖ Tsantsa-
 noglou, ἀμφισβη]τεῖ Betegh
 10 λαμβά[νει Bernabé-Piano mon. Janko, λαμβά[νειν KPT
 mon. Rusten 12 [τὴν ἀρχήν Bernabé-Piano, [τὴν ἀλκὴν
 Tsantsanoglou μα[θόντι Janko 13 [ἂν Tsantsanoglou

Col. IX

εἶναι· τῇ[ν ἀρ]χὴν οὖν τοῦ ἰσχυρ[ο]τάτου ἐπόη[σεν]
 εἶναι ὡς[περ]εῖ παῖδα πατρός. οἱ δὲ οὐ γινώσκον-
 [τες]
 τὰ λεγό[μεν]α δοκοῦσι τὸν Ζᾶνα παρὰ τοῦ αὐτο[ῦ]

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

People do not notice that these words are transposed; but they are as follows: “Zeus on the one hand when he received from his father the strength and the glorious divinity.” If this is so, it is necessary to understand not that Zeus <overpowers his> father, but rather that he receives the strength <from hi>m; but if it were otherwise, <he would seem to receive the rule [or: the strength]> in violation of the prophecies. For it seems that for him . . . and one would think necessarily . . . and knowing . . .

Col. IX

. . . to be. Therefore he made the rule [or: the strength] belong to what is the strongest, just as a son [scil. belongs] to his father. But those who do not understand what is said think that Zeus received from his

1 ἀρ]χῆν Tsantsanoglou, ἀλ]κῆν Betegh

- πατρὸς [τὴν] ἀλκὴν τε κα[ὶ] τὸν δαίμονα λαμβά-
νειν.]
- 5 γινώσκ[ω]ν οὖν τὸ πῦρ ἀναμειγμένον τοῖς
ἄλλοις ὅτι ταρασσοὶ καὶ κ[ωλ]ύοι τὰ ὄντα συν-
ίστασθαι
- διὰ τὴν θάλψιν ἐξάλλασ[σει ὅσ]ον τε ἱκανόν ἐστιν
ἐξάλλαχθὲν μὴ κωλύ[ειν τὰ] ὄντα συμπαγῆναι.
ὅσα δ' ἄ[ν] ἀφθῆι ἐπικρα[τεῖται, ἐπικ]ρατηθὲν δὲ
μίσχεται
- 10 τοῖς ἄλ[λ]οις. ὅτι δ' “ἐν χεῖρ[εσσιν ἔλαβ]εν” ἡνί-
ζετο
- ὥσπε[ρ τ]ᾶλλα τὰ π[ρὶν μὲν ἄδηλα φαι]νόμεν[α,
ἀλλ]ᾶ
- [β]εβαιοτάτα νοηθ[έντα. αἰνιζόμενος ο]ὗν ἰσχυρῶς
ἔφη τὸν Ζᾶνα τῇ[ν ἀλκὴν λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ]ν δαίμονα
[ὦ]σπερεὶ ε[]οῦ ἰσχυροῦ

— — —

Col. X

- καὶ λέγειν [οὐδὲ γ]ὰρ λέ[γ]ειν οἶόν τε μὴ
φωνοῦντ[α.]
- ἐνόμιζε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ ‘λέγειν’ τε καὶ
‘φωνεῖν.’
- ‘λέγειν’ δὲ καὶ ‘διδάσκειν’ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται.
οὐ γὰρ
- οἶόν τε δι[δ]άσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ λέγειν ὅσα διὰ
λόγων
- 5 διδάσκετα[ι.] νομίζεται δὲ τὸ διδάσκειν ἐν
τῷ

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

own father the strength and the divinity (*daimôn*). Therefore, knowing that fire, if it is mixed with the other things, disturbs the things that exist and prevents them from becoming constituted (*sunistasthai*) on account of its heating, he sets it at a distance far enough that, once it has been set at a distance, it does not prevent the things that exist from solidifying; but whatever is kindled is dominated [scil. by fire], and, being dominated, it is mixed with the other things. As for “he received in his hands,” he expressed this in a riddling way, just like the other ones [scil. expressions], which at first seem <obscure but> seem quite certain once they have been thought about. Therefore, <expressing himself in a riddling way,> he said that Zeus forcefully <received the strength [or: the rule] and the> divinity (*daimôn*) just as . . . of forceful . . .

Col. X

. . . and to say. For to say (*legein*) without uttering (*phônein*) is not possible either; and he thought that ‘to say’ and ‘to utter’ were the same thing; but ‘to say’ and ‘to teach’ have the same meaning, for it is not possible to teach without saying whatever is taught by means of words, and teaching is thought to consist in saying. Therefore teaching is not separated from saying, nor saying from uttering, but

versum compos. Tsantsanoglou e comm. et e fr. 112
 Bernabé e.g. ἦστο πανομφεύουσα θεῶν τροφὸς ἀμβροσίη
 Νύξ 5 ἐν Anonymus in ZPE, ἐν KPT

λέγειν εἶν[αι.] οὐ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν διδάσκειν ἐκ
 τοῦ
 λέγειν ἐχ[ωρί]σθη τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἐκ τοῦ φω-
 νεῖν,
 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ [δύνα]ται 'φωνεῖν' καὶ 'λέγειν'
 καὶ 'διδάσ[κειν.]'
 οὕτως [οὐδὲν κωλ]ύει "πανομφεύουσιν" καὶ
 'πᾶν[τα]
 10 — διδά[σκουσιν] τὸ αὐ]τὸ εἶναι.
 "τροφ[ὸν]" δὲ λέγων αὐ]τῇν αἰνί[ζε]ται ὅτι
 [ᾶ]σσα
 ὁ ἥλι[ος θερμαίνει καὶ δι]αλύει ταῦτα ἢ νύξ
 ψύ[χουσα]
 συ[νίστησι] ἄσσα ὁ ἥλιος
 ἐθέρ[μινε
]τα[

— — —

12 θερμαίνει καὶ δι]αλύει Piano, θερμαίνων δι]αλύει Tsant-
 sanoglou 13 ἐθέρ[μινε Janko

Col. XI

[τ]ῆς Νυκτός. "ἐξ ἀ[δύτοι]ο" δ' αὐτὴν [λέγει]
 "χρηῆσαι"
 γνώμην ποιού[με]νος ἄδυτον εἶναι τὸ βάθος
 τῆς νυκτός. οὐ γ[ὰρ] δύνει ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς,
 ἀλλὰ νιν
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέ[νο]ν αὐγὴ κατα[λ]αμβάνει.
 5 'χρηῆσαι' δὲ καὶ 'ἀρκέσαι' ταῦτὸ [δύ]ναται.

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

‘to utter,’ ‘to say,’ and ‘to teach’ have the same meaning. Thus <nothing pre>vents “all-pronouncing” and ‘teach<ing all things>’ from being the same thing.

And <in calling it [i.e. the night]> “nurse,” he shows in a riddling way that everything that the sun <heats and dis>solves, the night re<unites by cool>ing . . . everything that the sun was heating . . .¹

¹ On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary and a separately transmitted fragment, Tsantsanoglou reconstructs *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: “She was seated, the all-pronouncing nurse of the gods, ambrosial Night.”

Col. XI

. . . of Night. <He says> that “she proclaims the oracle out of the <innermost shrine>,” his view being that the innermost shrine (*adyton*) is the depth of night; for it [i.e. the night] does not set (*ou . . . dynei*) as the light does, but the daylight seizes it while it remains in the same place. And ‘to proclaim an oracle’ and ‘to prevent harm’ have the same meaning; and we must

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

σκέψασθαι δὲ χρὴ ἐφ' ᾧ κείτα[ι τὸ] 'ἀρκέ-
σαι'

καὶ τὸ 'χρηῆσαι.'

χρᾶν τόνδε τὸν θεὸν νομίζοντ[ες ἔρ]χονται
πενυσιόμενοι ἄσσα ποῶσι. τάδ' [ἐπὶ τούτῳ]φι
λέγει.

10 [—] ["Νὺξ"] ἔχρησεν ἅπαντα τά οἱ θέ[μις ἦν]
ἀνύσασθ[αι]."

[....]θ[ε]ῖς ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ο.[]ε

[.....]ι παρὰ τὰ ἐόντα .[

[.....]αι οἰόν τ[ε

[.....] . . σθαι συ.[

— — —

9 τάδ' Janko, τὰ δ' Tsantsanoglou 10 [Νὺξ] Santamaría,
[ἡ δὲ] ZPE, [ἡ οἱ] West ἀνύσασθ[αι] Tsantsanoglou, ἐκτε-
λέεισθ[αι] Sider

Col. XII

καὶ ἀφα[ιρεῖ]ν· τὸ δ' ἐχόμε[νον ἔ]πος ᾧδ'
ἔχει.

— “ὡς ἂν ἔ[χ]οι κά[τα] καλὸν ἔδος νιφόεντος
’Ολύμπου.”

“’Ολυμπ[ος] καὶ ‘χ]ρόνος’ τὸ αὐτόν. οἱ δὲ
δοκοῦντες

“’Ολυμπ[ον] καὶ] ‘οὐρανὸν’ [τ]αὐτὸ εἶναι
ἐξαμαρ-

5 τάν[ου]σ[ι]ν, οὐ γ[ινώσκοντες] ὅτι οὐρανὸν
οὐχ οἰόν τ[ε]

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

consider what ‘to prevent harm’ and ‘to proclaim an oracle’ refer to.

It is in the belief that this god proclaims oracles that they come to find out what they should do. This is what he says <after this [scil. verse]>:

<“Night> proclaimed an oracle about all that was
ri<ght for him to perform.”>

. . . he made clear that . . . next to the things that exist . . . as . . .

Col. XII

. . . and to re<move> [probably: the power]. The next verse goes like this:

“That he might reign on the lovely seat of snow-capped Olympus.”

‘Olympus’ and ‘time’ are the same thing. Those who think that ‘Olympus’ and ‘heaven’ are the same thing are completely wrong, for they do not understand that heaven cannot be long rather than wide,

μακ[ρό]τερον ἢ εὐρύτε[ρο]ν εἶναι, χρόνον δὲ
‘μακρὸν’

εἴ τις [όνομ]άζο[ι] οὐκ ἂν [έξα]μαρτάνοι. ὁ
δὲ ὅπου μὲν

“οὐρανὸν” θέ[λοι λέγειν, τήν] προσθήκην
“εὐρὺν”

ἐποιεῖτο, ὅπου [δ’ “Ὀλυμπον,” το]ῦναντίον
“εὐρὺν” μὲν

10 οὐδέποτε, “μα[κρὸν] δέ. “νιφό[ε]ντα” δὲ φή-
σας εἶναι

τῇ [δ]υνάμει ἐ[ί]καζε τὸν χρόνον ὅρε[ι] νιφε-
τώδει.

[τὸ δὲ] νιφετῶ[δες ψυχρόν τε καὶ λ]εῦκόν
ἐ[στι].

[....] λαμπ[ρ]] πολὺν δ’
ἀ[έρ]α

]ια καὶ τα.[

]...τοδε[

— — —

1 ἀφα[ιρεῖ]ν Janko qui τὴν ἀρχὴν ante 1 suppl.

9 [δὲ χρόνον Colabella, Parsons 11 ἐ[ί]καζε τὸν χρό-
νον ὅρε[ι] Bernabé-Piano, ἐ[ί]κάζει χρόνον τῶ[ι] vel αὐτὸν ὅρε[ι]
Tsantsanoglou

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

whereas if someone were to call time ‘long,’ he would not be wrong at all. Whenever he wanted <to say> “heaven,” he added <the> epithet “wide,” but whenever [scil. he wanted to say] <“Olympus”> on the contrary, he never [scil. added] “wide,” but “long.” And in saying that it is “snow-clad” <he was comparing time> in its property with a snowy <mount>ain. <What is> snowy <is cold and> white . . . ; gleaming . . . gray air . . . and . . . this . . .

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Col. XIII

“Ζεὺς μὲν ἐπεὶ δὴ πατρὸς ἐοῦ πάρα [θ]έ-
σφατ’ ἀκούσα[ς].”

οὔτε γὰρ τότε ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ δεδήλωται
ὅπως

— ἤκουσεν, οὔτε ἡ νύξ κελεύει. ἀλλὰ δηλοῖ
ὧδε λέγων.

— “αἰδοῖον κατέπινεν, ὃς αἰθέρα ἔκθορε
πρῶτος.”

5 ὅτι μὲν πᾶσαν τὴν πόησιν περὶ τῶν πρα-
γμάτων

— αἰνίζεται κ[α]θ’ ἕπος ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη λέ-
γειν.

ἐν τοῖς α[ἰδοίοι]ς ὁρῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοὺς
ἀνθρώπου[ς]

νομίζον[τας εἶ]ναι τούτῳ ἐχρήσατο, ἄνευ
δὲ τῶν

αἰδοίων [οὐ γίν]εσθαι, αἰδοίῳ εἰκάσας τὸν
ἥλιο[ν.]

10 ἄνευ [γὰρ τοῦ ἡ]λ[ίο]ν τὰ ὄντα τοιαῦτα οὐχ
οἶόν [τε]

γίν[εσθαι]ένων τῶν ἐόντων [

ἡρε[μεῖν διὰ] τὸν ἥλιο[ν] πάντα ὁμ[οίως
]οὐδ’ ἐοῦσ[ιν] οὐ.[

] περιέχειν [

15].....[

— — —

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XIII

“When Zeus, having heard the prophecies from his father.”

For neither was it at that time that he heard—but it has been made clear in what sense he heard—nor does Night command. But he makes [scil. this] clear saying as follows:

“he swallowed down the *aidoion* [i.e. either ‘the reverend one’ or the phallus’¹], the first to have expelled/ejaculated [or: to leap forth in] the aether.”

Because he speaks in a riddling way about real things during the whole poem, it is necessary to speak about each word in turn. Since he saw that men consider generation to be dependent upon the <genital>s (*aidoia*) and that this does not happen without the genitals, he used this [i.e. the word ‘*aidoion*’], comparing the sun to the *aidoion*. <For> without the sun, it would not have been possible for the things that exist to be generated . . . of the things that exist . . . to be at rest . . . <because of> the sun all things in the same way . . . nor being . . . to encompass . . .

¹ The Greek word can have both meanings, and scholars disagree about which one is meant here.

2 τóτϵ Betegh, τóδϵ Tsantsanoglou

4 οὐ emend. Ferrari

Col. XIV

[ἐ]κθόρῃι τὸ λαμπρότατόν τε [καὶ θε]ρμό-
[τ]ατον

χωρισθὲν ἀφ' ἑωυτοῦ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν Κρό-
νον

γενέσθαι φησὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἥλιου τῇι Γῇι, ὅτι
αἰτίαν ἔσχε

διὰ τὸν ἥλιον κρούεσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα.

5 — διὰ τοῦτο λέγει “ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξεν.” τὸ δ' ἐπὶ
τούτῳ,

— “Οὐρανὸς Εὐφρονίδης, ὃς πρώτιστος βα-
σίλευσεν”

κρούοντα τὸν Νοῦν πρὸς ἄλληλ[α] ‘Κρόνον’
ὀνομάσας

“μέγα ῥέξαι” φησὶ τὸν Οὐρανόν· ἀφ[αι]-
ρεθῆναι γὰρ

τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτόν. ‘Κρόνον’ δὲ ὠνόμα-
σεν ἀπὸ τοῦ

10 ἔ[ρ]χου αὐτὸν καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τ[ὸν] αὐτὸν
λ[ό]γον.

[τῶν ἐ]όντων γὰρ ἀπάντ[ω]ν [οὔ]πω κρουο-
μέ[νων]

[ὁ Νοῦ]ς ὥς ὁρ[ίζω]ν φύσιν [τὴν ἐ]πωνυμίαν
ἔσχε]ν

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XIV

. . . **it** [i.e. the fire?] **expelled/ejaculated** [or: leaped forth,] **what is brightest and hottest** [i.e. the aether], **separated from itself** [i.e. the fire?]. **Therefore he says that this Cronus was born to Earth from the sun because he was the cause via the sun that they** [i.e. the things] **strike** (*krouesthai*) **against one another. That is why he says,**

“He who did a great deed.” [= COSM. T12a.1]¹

And the verse after this,

“Ouranos, son of Euphronê [i.e. Night], **who was the first of all to rule.”** [= COSM. T12a.2]

Having called ‘Cronus’ Mind (*Nous*) **that makes things strike** (*krouonta*) **against each other, he says that he** [i.e. Cronus] **did a great deed to Ouranos; for** [scil. he says that] **he** [i.e. Ouranos] **was deprived of his kingship. And he called him ‘Cronus’ from his action, and all the others** [scil. things] **according to the same principle. For when all the things that exist** <were not yet striking against one another, Mind,> **since it delimits** (*horizôn*) **nature,** <received the name

¹ Here Janko suggests that a line has been lost, e.g. “And to him from Gaea was born Cronus, who did a great deed” (see the textual note on line 6).

1 [ἐ]κ[χ]θόρηι Janko	τὸ{ν} Rusten	2 χωρισθέν<τα>
Janko si τὸν l. 1 conservandum esset		6 ante hanc lineam
versum compos. e comm. Janko e.g. τῶι δ' αὐτ' ἐκ Γαίης γένετο		
Κρόνος ὃς μέγ' ἔρεξεν		

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

[‘Οὐρανός]ς· “ἀφαιρ[εῖ]σθαι” δ’ αὐ[τόν] φησι
 “τὴν βασιλ[είαν]”
 [κρονο]μένων τ[ῶν] ἐ[ό]ντ[ων]
].ντα — — —

14 τὰ ἐό]ντα vel τὰ ὄ]ντα Janko

Col. XV

κρούειν αὐτὰ πρὸ[ς ἄλ]ληλα κα[ν] ποήσῃ
 τὸ[ν ἥλι]ον
 χωρισθέντα διαστήναι δίχ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ
 ἑόντα.
 χωρ[ι]ζομένου γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ ἀπολαμ-
 βανομένου
 ἐν μέσῳ πῆξας ἴσχει καὶ τάνωθε τοῦ ἡλίου
 5 — καὶ τὰ κάτωθεν. ἐχόμενον δὲ ἔπος,
 — “ἐκ τοῦ δὴ Κρόνος αὐτῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ
 μητίετα Ζεύς”.
 λέγει ὅτι ἐκ τοῦδε [ἀ]ρχή ἐστίν, ἐξ ὅσου
 βασιλεύει. ἡ δὲ
 ἀρχή· διηγείται, ὅ[τι τὰ] ἑόντα κρούων πρὸς
 ἄλληλα
 διαστήσας τ’ ἐ[πεί] τῇ]ν νῦν μετάστασιν
 οὐκ ἐξ ἐτέρ[ων]
 10 — ἕτερ’ ἀλλ’ ἔτε[ρα] ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.
 τὸ δ’ “ἔπειτα [δὲ μητίετα Ζε]ύς”. ὅτι μὲν
 οὐχ ἕτε[ρος]

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

‘Oura>nos.’ And <he says> that he “was deprived of his kingship” while the things that exist were striking against one another . . .

Col. XV

. . . to strike against one another, even if he [i.e. Orpheus] made the <sun>, having been separated, hold the things that exist at a distance from one another; for when the sun is separated and is confined in the middle, he [i.e. Mind] fastens and maintains both what is above the sun and what is below it. And the next verse,

“from him in turn came Cronus and then
prudent Zeus” [= COSM. T12a.3]:

he [i.e. Orpheus] says that the beginning (*archê*) dates from the time when he [i.e. Zeus] is king. And the beginning [scil. of the verse]: he explains that he [i.e. Mind], by making the things that exist strike against one another and by holding them apart, <made> the current reconfiguration, [scil. making] not different things out of different ones but diff<erent things out of the same ones.> As for <“then prudent Zeus”:> it is

1 κα[ν] Betegh, κα[ν] Tsantsanoglou τὸ[ν] ἡ[ν]λιον
Betegh, τὸ [πρωτ]ον Tsantsanoglou 7 ὅ[τι] legit Piano,
<ὁ>τι ZPE, τι KPT ἡ δὲ Burkert, ἡδε KPT 7–8 ita
dist. nos, post βασιλεύει Rusten, post ἀρχή Tsantsanoglou
8 ὅ[τι] τὰ ἐόντα Rusten, Ν[οῦς τ]ὰ ὄντα KPT 9 τ’ ἐ[πεί]
τῇ]ν Bernabé-Piano mon. Burkert, τ’ ἐ[πεί]σε τῇ]ν Janko, τ’
[πρὸς τῇ]ν Tsantsanoglou 10 Janko

— ἀλλὰ ὁ αὐ[τὸς δῆλον σημαίν]ει δὲ [τ]όδε·
 “μῆτιν κα.[ca. 13 litt.]ων βασιληίδα τιμ[ήν.]”
 15 ες.[]αι ἱναῖς ἀπ.[
 εἰ[

— — —

13 καὶ [μακάρων κατέχ]ων conī. West,]εν βασιληίδα KPT

Col. XVI

[αἰδοῖ]ον τὸν ἥλιον ἔφ[η]σεν εἶναι δε[δῆλ]-
 ῶται· ὅτι δὲ
 — ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται
 λέγει.
 “πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου· τῷ δ’
 ἄρα πάντες
 ἀθάνατοι προσέφυν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ
 θέαιναι
 5 καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ κρήναι ἐπήρατοι ἄλλα τε
 πάντα,
 — ἄσσα τότε ᾗν γεγαῶτ’, αὐτὸς δ’ ἄρα μοῦ-
 νος ἔγεντο.”
 [ἐ]ν τούτοις σημαίνει ὅτι τὰ ὄντα ὑπῆ[ρ]χεν
 αἰί, τὰ δὲ
 νῦν ὄντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται. τὸ
 δὲ
 “[αὐ]τὸς δὲ ἄρα μῦνος ἔγεντο”· τοῦτο δὲ
 [λ]έγων δηλοῖ

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

<clear> **that this is not a different one, but the same one. He** <indicat>**es this:**

“Metis . . . royal honor.”

. . . sinews . . .

Col. XVI

. . . it has been made clear [scil. that] he said that the sun is *aidoion* (i.e. ‘reverend’ or ‘phallus’). And he says that the things that are now come to be from the things that exist:

**“Of the firstborn king, the reverend one. And
upon him all
The immortals grew, blessed gods and
goddesses
And rivers and lovely springs and everything
else
That was born then; and he himself was alone.”
[= COSM. T12b]**

**In these [scil. verses] he indicates that the things that are have always existed and that the things that are now come to be out of the things that exist.
As for “and he himself was alone”: in saying this**

3 Πρωτογόνου West

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

- 10 [ἀεὶ] τὸν Νοῦν πάντων ἄξιον εἶναι μόν[ο]ν
 ἔόντα,
 [ὥσπερ]εὶ μηδὲν τᾶλλα εἶη· οὐ γὰρ [οἷόν τε
 δι' α]ὐτὰ εἶναι
 [τὰ νῦν] ἔόντα ἄν[ε]ν τοῦ Νοῦ. [καὶ ἐν τῷ
 ἐχ]ομένῳ
 [—] [ἔπει τούτ]ου ἄξιον πάντων [τὸν Νοῦν ἔφη-
 σεν ε]ἶναι.
 [—] [“νῦν δ' ἐστὶ]ν βασιλεὺς πάντ[ων καὶ τ'
 ἔσσετ' ἔπ]ειτα.”
 15 [δῆλον ὅτι] Νοῦς καὶ π[άντων βασιλεὺς ἐστι
 τα]ῦτόν.

— — —

12 [τὰ νῦν] ἔόντα KPT, τὰ ὑπάρχ]οντα Janko

Col. XVII

- π[ρ]ότερον ἦν πρ[ὶν ὁ]νομασθῆναι, ἔπ[ει]τα
 ὀνομάσθη.
 ἦν γὰρ καὶ πρόσθεν ἑ[ὸν] τὰ νῦν ἔόντα
 συσταθῆναι
 ἀὲρ καὶ ἔσται αἰεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ
 ἦν. δι' ὃ τι δὲ
 ‘ἀὲρ’ ἐκλήθη δεδῆλωται ἐν τοῖς προτέροις.
 γενέσθαι δὲ
 5 ἐνομίσθη ἐπεὶ τ' ὀνομάσθη ‘Ζεὺς,’ ὥσπερ εἰ
 πρότερον
 μὴ ἐὼν. καὶ “ὑστατον” ἔφησεν ἔσεσθαι
 τοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τ'

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

he makes clear that Mind itself, being alone, is <always> **worth everything**, <as if> **everything else were nothing**. For <it is not possible> **for the things that are <now> to exist <by> themselves without Mind**.
<And in the verse foll>**owing** <this one>, <he has said that Mind> **is worth everything**:

“<He is now> **the king of** <all things and will be> **later.**”

<It is clear that> **Mind and** <the king of all things are the sa>**me thing**.

Col. XVII

. . . it existed before it was named; and it was named later. For air existed both before the things that are now were assembled, and it will always exist. For it was not born, but it existed. The reason why it was called ‘air’ (*aêr*) was made clear in what preceded. But it was thought that it was born, because it was named ‘Zeus,’ as if it did not exist previously. And he said that this one would be “the last” [cf. COSM.

2 `[é]ῶν Janko, `ῶν Tsantsanoglou

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

- ὠνομάσθη ‘Ζεὺς’ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῷ διατελεῖ
 ὄνομα ὄν,
 μέχρι εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τὰ νῦν ἔοντα συν-
 εστάθη
 ἐν ᾧπερ πρόσθεν ἔοντα ἡιωρεῖτο. τὰ δ’
 ἔοντα δ[ηλοῖ]
 10 γενέσθαι τοιαῦτ[α] διὰ τοῦτον καὶ γενόμενα
 π[άλιν]
 — ἐν τούτῳ [ca. 5 litt. .ση]μαίνει δ’ ἐν τοῖς
 ἔπεσι το[ῖσδε].
 — “Ζεὺς κεφα[λή, Ζεὺς μέσ]σα, Διὸς δ’ ἐκ
 [π]άντα τέτ[υκται.”]
 κεφαλῇν [ο]ντ’ αἰν[ί]ζεται .[
 κεφαλῇ [] ἀρχὴ γίνε[ι]ται συ[στά]-
 σεως]
 15 δ[συστ]αθῆναι γ[

— — —

- 10 π[άλιν] dub. Tsantsanoglou, εἶναι Janko
 11 post τούτῳ π[άντα]. leg. et con. Janko, [μένειν. vel [κεί-
 σθαι. West, [ένειναι. Tsantsanoglou
 13 [φῆσας ἔχειν τὰ ἑό]ντ’ Janko fin. ὅ[τι] con. Janko

Col. XVIII

καὶ τὰ κάτω [φερό]μενα. `τῇν δὲ “Μοῖρα]ν” φάμε-
 νος [δηλοῖ]
 τήνδ[ε γῆν] καὶ τὰλλα πάν[τ]α εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι [πνε]ῦμα ἔόν. τοῦτ’ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα
 Ὀρφεὺς

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

T12c.1] because it was named ‘Zeus,’ and this will continue to be its name until the things that are now have been assembled into the same form in which they were floating (*êiôreito*) when they existed previously. And he s<hows> that the things that exist become such [scil. as they are] because of him and that, once they have come about, they [scil. are] <all?> once again in him. He indicates it in the following verses [or: words]:

“Zeus [scil. is] the head, Zeus the middle, and by Zeus all things are made.” [= COSM. T12c.2]

. . . head . . . he indicates the things that exist in a riddling way . . . head . . . the beginning of the organization takes place . . . to be assembled . . .

Col. XVIII

. . . and the things that move downward. And by saying <“Destiny” (*Moirā*)> [cf. COSM. T12c.3], <he shows> that this earth and all the other things are in the air, which is (?) breath (*pneuma*). This breath, therefore, Orpheus named it ‘*Moirā*’; but all other

unum versum compos. West e comm. et e frag. 31.1 et 243.1
 Bernabé e.g. *Zeὺς πρῶτος γένητο*, *Zeὺς ὕστατος ἄργικέρανος*,
 alterum Merkelbach e.g. *Zeὺς πνοίη πάντων*, *Zeὺς πάντων ἔπλετο μοῖρα* 1 τὴν δ[ίην] Burkert

- ὠνόμασεν ‘Μοῖραν,’ οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι κατὰ
 φάτιν “Μοῖραν
 ἐπικλῶσαι” φασί[ν] “σφίσιν” καὶ “ἔσεσθαι ταῦθ’
 ἄσσα Μοῖρα
 5 ἐπέκλωσεν,” λέγοντες μὲν ὀρθῶς, οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ
 οὔτε τὴν ‘Μοῖραν’ ὅ τι ἐστὶν οὔτε τὸ ‘ἐπικλῶσαι.’
 Ὅρφεὺς γὰρ
 τὴν φρόνησ[ι]ν ‘Μοῖραν’ ἐκάλεσεν. ἐφαίνετο γὰρ
 αὐτῶι
 τοῦτο προσφερέστατον εἶ[ν]αι ἕξ ὧν ἅπαντες
 ἄνθρωποι
 ὠνόμασαν. πρὶν μὲν γὰρ κληθῆναι ‘Ζῆνα,’ ἦν
 Μοῖρα
 10 φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ αἰεί τε καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός. ἐπεὶ δ’
 ἐκλήθη
 ‘Ζεὺς,’ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθη], ὄντα μὲν καὶ
 πρόσθεν
 [ὁ]νομαζόμε[ν]ον δ’ ο[ὗ]. διὰ τοῦτο λέ[γει] “Ζεὺς
 πρῶτος
 [γέν]ετο”. πρ[ὶ]ν γὰρ ἦν Μοῖρα φρόνησις], ἔπει-
 τ[α δ’] ἱερεῖθ[η]
 [Ζεὺ]ς ὢν. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρω[ποι οὐ γινώσκοντ]ες τὰ λε-
 γόμενα
 15 [ὥς π]ρωτόγονο[ν] ὄντα [θεὸν νομίζουσι] τὸν Ζῆνα [
]...[...][

— — —

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

men, according to common usage, say, “Moira has spun for them” and “these things will be whatever Moira has spun”—speaking correctly, but not knowing either what ‘Moira’ is or what ‘spinning’ is. For it is wisdom that Orpheus called ‘Moira’: for this seemed to him to be the most suitable out of the names that all men have given. For before he [i.e. Zeus] was called ‘Zeus,’ Moira was the wisdom of the god, always and everywhere. But since he has been called ‘Zeus,’ they think that he was born, although he existed before but did not have a name. <This is why he sa>ys, “Zeus was born first.” For at first <Moira was wisdom>, but then she became consecrated (?) as being <Zeus>. But people, <not understanding> what is said, <think> that <Zeus> is the firstborn god . . . ¹

¹ On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary and separately transmitted fragments, West reconstructs *exempli gratia* one verse from the Orphic theogony, “Zeus was born first, Zeus the last, god of the bright bolt,” and Merkelbach another, “Zeus, the breath of all, Zeus is the fate of all.”

13 *ἱερεῦθῃ* KPT leg. at vestigia valde dubia

15 *ὄντα* KPT qui an huc collocandum recte dub.

Col. XIX

ἐκ [του δ] ἐ [τ] ἄ ἔόντα, ἐν [ἐκ] αστον κέκ[λη]-
τ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ

ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺ[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον ἐκλήθη· πάντων γὰρ ὁ ἀῆρ ἐπικρατεῖ
τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται. “Μοῖραν” δ’ “ἐπι-
κλῶσαι”

5 λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶ-
σαι

λέγουσιν τὰ ἔόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ
μέλλοντα,

ὅπως χρή γενέσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ὶ] παύ-
σασθαι.

Βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ
προσφέρειν

— ἐφα[ί]νετο ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων) λέ-
γων ὧδε.

10 [—] “Ζεὺς βασιλεύς, Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων
ἀργικέραννος.”

[Βασιλέ]α ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶ[ν τῶν ἀρ]-
χῶν μία

[Πασῶν κ]ρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [ἅπερ θνη]
τῶν οὐδενὶ

[ἄλλωι ἔξ]εσ[τιν τε]λ[έ]σαι· ..[]·ν[.]·[.]·εὔ[.]

[] ἀρχὸν δὲ [ἀπάντων ἔφη εἶναι
α]ὐτὸν

15 [ὅτι πάντα ἄρ]χεται δια[]·δε

— — —

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XIX

. . . <ever since?> **each single thing that exists has received its name from what dominates, all things have been called Zeus according to the same principle. For the air dominates all things as much as it wishes. And when they say, “Moirā has spun,” they are saying that the wisdom of Zeus ratifies how the things that are, the things that become, and the things that will be must come to be, exist, and cease. And he compares him to a king (for out of the names that are said, this one seemed to him to be suitable), when he says as follows:**

“Zeus the king, Zeus the ruler of all, god of the bright bolt.” [= COSM. T12c.4]

He said that he is <king> because, although there are man<y magistra>cies, there is one that governs <all of them> and accomplishes everything <that it is> not per<mitted> to any <other mort>al to accomplish. . . . <he said that> he <was the> ruler <of all because all things are ru>led by . . .

Col. XX

ἀνθρώπων ἐν πόλεσιν ἐπιτελέσαντες [τὰ
 ἱ]ερὰ εἶδον,
 ἔλασσόν σφας θαυμάζω μὴ γινώσκειν· οὐ
 γὰρ οἶόν τε
 ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα· ὅσοι
 δὲ παρὰ τοῦ
 τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά, οὗτοι ἄξιοι
 θαυμάζεσθαι
 5 καὶ οἴκτε[ι]ρεσθαι· θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν ὅτι δο-
 κοῦντες
 πρότερον ἢ ἐπιτελέσαι εἰδήσειν ἀπέρχονται
 ἐπι-
 τελέσαντες πρὶν εἰδέναι οὐδ' ἐπανερόμενοι
 ὥσπερ
 ὡς εἰδότες τι ὧν εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσαν ἢ ἔμα-
 θον· [οἶ]κτε<ί>ρεσθαι δὲ
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄρκεῖ σφιν τὴν δαπάνην προανηλω-
 σθαι, ἀλλὰ
 10 — καὶ τῆς γνώμης στερόμενοι πρὸς ἀπέρχονται,
 πρὶν μὲν τὰ [ι]ερὰ ἐπιτελέσαι ἐλπίζον[τε]ς
 εἰδήσειν,
 ἐπ[ι]τελέσ[αν]τ[ες] δὲ στερηθέντες κα[ὶ] τῆς
 ἐλπί[δος] ἀπέρχονται.
 — τῷ[ca. 10 litt.].νοντ[...] λόγος ..[...]ται.[..]να
 15 .[]ι τῇ εἰρητοῦ ο..[]μητρὶ μὲν
]δ' ἀδελφῇ[]ωσειδε
]..[

— — —

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XX

... <those> **men who, having performed holy rites in the cities, have seen them** [i.e. the sacred objects]—**I am less astonished that they do not understand: for it is not possible to hear and at the same time to understand what is being said. But all those** [scil. who hope to acquire knowledge] **from an expert in holy rites—they deserve that people feel astonishment and pity for them: astonishment because, thinking, before they perform the rites, that they will know, they go away after having performed them, before they know and without asking further questions, as though they knew something of what they had seen or heard or learned; and pity because it is not enough that they have spent their money in advance, but also they go off thwarted of their intention as well, since, hoping before they perform the holy rites that they will know, they go away after they have performed them, having been thwarted of this hope too** ... **discourse ... to his own ... mother ... sister ...**

ante 1 ὅσοι μὲν coni. Burkert

8 τῷ ὧν Tsantsanoglou, τῶν KPT

14 Δῆμ]ητρι coni. Janko

Col. XXI

οὐτε τὸ ψυχ[ρὸν] τῷ ψυχρῷ. “θορνη” δὲ λέγ[ων]
 δηλοῖ

ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἄερί κατὰ μικρὰ μεμερισμένα ἐκινεῖτο
 καὶ ἐθόρνυτο, θορνύμενα δ’ ἕκα<σ>τα συνεστάθη
 πρὸς ἄλληλα. μέχρι δὲ τούτου ἐθόρνυτο, μέχρι
 5 ἕκαστον ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σύννηθες. Ἀφροδίτη

Οὐρανία

καὶ ‘Ζεὺς’ καὶ ‘ἀφροδισιάζειν’ καὶ ‘θόρνυσθαι’ καὶ
 ‘Πειθῶ’

καὶ ‘Ἀρμονία’ τῷ αὐτῷ θεῷ ὄνομα κεῖται. ἀνὴρ
 γυναικὶ μισγόμενος ‘ἀφροδισιάζειν’ λέγεται κατὰ
 φάτιν. τῶν γὰρ νῦν ἐόντων μιχθέντων ἀλλ[ή]λοις

10 ‘Ἀφροδίτῃ’ ὠνομάσθη. ‘Πειθῶ’ δ’ ὅτι εἶξεν τὰ

ἐ[ό]ντα

ἀλλήλο[ι]σιν. ‘ἐ[ῖ]κειν’ δὲ καὶ ‘πείθειν’ τὸ αὐτόν.

‘[Ἀ]ρμονίᾳ’ δὲ

ὅτι πο[λλὰή]ρμοσε τῶν ἐόντων ἐκάστω[ι.]

ἦν μὲν γ[ὰρ καὶ π]ρόσθεν, ὠνομάσθη δὲ γενέ-
 σθ[αι] ἐπεὶ

versum compos. Tsantsanoglou e comm. e.g. Πειθῶ θ’ Ἀρμο-
 νίην τε (vel Ἀρμονίην Πειθῶ τε) καὶ Οὐρανίην Ἀφροδίτην
 1 θόρνη (dativum) Kapsomenos, θορνῇ West, θορῇ vel θορ-
 νύῃ Janko, θόρη (verbum) Tsantsanoglou 12 πο[λλὰ
 συνή]ρμοσε Kapsomenos

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XXI

. . . nor the cold to the cold. And when he says "by leaping" (?) (*thornei*¹), he shows that, divided into little pieces, they [scil. the particles or the things that are] were moving in the air and were leaping, and by leaping each of them was put into mutual relation with the other ones. And they went on leaping until each one came to its fellow. 'Heavenly Aphrodite' and 'Zeus,' 'to engage in the works of Aphrodite' (*aphrodisiazein*) and 'to leap,' and 'Persuasion' and 'Harmony' are names established for the same god. A man who mixes [scil. sexually] with a woman is said by common usage 'to engage in the works of Aphrodite.' For she [i.e. Aphrodite] received the name 'Aphrodite' when the things that exist now were mixed with one another. And 'Persuasion' [scil. received her name], because the things that exist yielded to one another; and 'yield' and 'persuade' are the same. And 'Harmony' [scil. received her name], because she fitted together (*hêrmose*) many of the things that exist to each one [scil. among them]. For they existed before too, but the term 'being born' was used for them after they had been separated. And he shows that

¹ The form and meaning of this word are very uncertain.

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

15 διεκρίθ[η· δι]ακριθῆναι δηλοῖ οτ[.]..[.....]τρεῖς
κ]ρατεῖ ὥστε δι... []
].[]ν.[]νῦν

— — —

14 δι]ακριθῆναι δηλοῖ ὅτ[ι] τ[ὰς γενέ]σεις Piano

Col. XXII

πάν[τ' οὖ]ν ὁμοίω[ς ὦ]νόμασεν ὡς κάλλιστα
ἡ[δύ]νατο,
γινώσκων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι οὐ
πάντες
ὁμοίαν ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ θέλουσιν πάντες
ταῦτά.
κρατιστεύοντες λέγουσι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν
ἐκάστωι
5 ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἔλθῃ, ἅπερ ἂν θέλοντες τυγ-
χάνωσι,
οὐδαμὰ ταῦτά, ὑπὸ πλεονεξίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ
ὑπ' ἀμαθίας.
Γῆ δὲ καὶ Μήτηρ καὶ Ῥέα καὶ Ἥρη ἡ
αὐτή. ἐκλήθη δὲ
'Γῆ' μὲν νόμῳ, 'Μήτηρ' δ' ὅτι ἐκ ταύτης
πάντα γ[ίν]εται,
'Γῆ' καὶ 'Γαῖα' κατὰ [γ]λῶσσαν ἐκάστοις.
'Δημήτηρ' [δὲ]
10 ὠνομάσθη ὥσπερ ἡ 'Γῆ Μήτηρ,' ἐξ ἀμφο-
τέρων ἐ[ν] ὄνομα.

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

they have been separated . . . they [or: it] dominate [or: dominates]² so that . . . now . . .³

² The subject of the verb is uncertain. ³ On the basis of the Derveni author's commentary, Tsantsanoglou reconstructs *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: "Peitho, Harmonia, and Heavenly Aphrodite."

Col. XXII

So he named all things in the same way, as best as he could, knowing the nature of men, viz. that not all of them have a similar one [scil. nature] nor do all want the same things. When they have power, they say anything that occurs to each one's mind, whatever they happen to want, never the same things, through greed, sometimes also through ignorance. Earth and Mother and Rhea and Hera are one and the same. 'Earth' (*Gê*) was given as a name by convention; 'Mother,' because all things are born from her; '*Gê*' and '*Gaia*,' according to each one's dialect. She was named 'Demeter' just like '*Gê-meter*' [i.e. 'Earth-Mother']: one name made out of both of them,

versum compos. e comm. West e.g. μήσατο δ' αὖ Γαίάν τε
καὶ Οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ὑπερθευ

- τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἦν.—ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 Ὕμνοις εἰρ[η]μένον.
 “Δημήτηρ [‘Ρ]έα Γῆ Μήτηρ Ἑστία
 Δηιώι.” καλε[ῖτ]αι γὰρ[ρ]
 καὶ ‘Δηιώ’ ὅτι ἐδηϊ[ώθ]η ἐν τῇ μείξει· δη-
 λώσει δὲ [ὅτ]αν
 κατὰ τὰ ἔπη γέν[ηται]. ‘Ρέα’ δ’ ὅτι πολλὰ
 καὶ παν[τοῖα]
 15 ζῶια ἔφν [ἐκρέυσαντα] ἐξ αὐτῆς, ‘Ρέα’ καὶ
 [‘Ρείη’]
 κατ[ὰ] γλῶσσαν ἐκάστοις. “Ἡ[ρ]ῆ’ δ’ ἐκ[λήθη]
 ὅτι

— — —

- 12 cf. Frag. 398 Bernabé 13 [ὅτ]αν Janko, [λί]αν Tsant-
 sanoglou 14 γέν[ηται] Janko, γεν[νᾶν] Tsantsanoglou
 παν[τοῖα] Tsantsanoglou, πο[ι]κ[ίλα] KPT

Col. XXIII

- τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος πα[ρα]γωγὸν πεπóηται καὶ
 το[ῖς] μὲν
 πολλοῖς ἀδελόν ἐστιν, τοῖς δὲ ὀρθῶς γινώ-
 σκουσιν
 εὐδελον ὅτι Ὀκεανός ἐστιν ὁ ἀήρ, ἀήρ δὲ
 Ζεύς.
 οὐκουν “ἐμήσατο” τὸν Ζᾶνα ἕτερος Ζεύς,
 ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς
 5 αὐτῶι “σθένος μέγα.” οἱ δ’ οὐ γινώσκοντες
 τὸν

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

for they were the same. And it is said in the *Hymns* too:

“Dêmêtêr Rhêa Gê Mêtêr Hestia Dêiô.”¹

For she is called ‘Dêiô’ too, because she was split apart (*edêiôthê*) during the mixture [i.e. the episode mentioned at the beginning of Col. XXI?]. **He will show this when in his verses she is born.** [Scil. she is called] **‘Rhea’ because many animals of all kinds were born <by flowing out> of her, ‘Rhea’ and <‘Rheiê’>, according to <each one’s dialect>. And <she was called> ‘Hêrê’ because . . .**²

¹ A collection of eighty-seven hymns ascribed to Orpheus and focusing on Dionysus survives; this line is not found in any of them, but the same line is attributed to the Orphic hymns by Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F185 = Philodemus, *Piet.* P. Herc. 1428 fr. 3 + 248 fr. 2. ² On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary, West reconstructs *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: “And he devised in turn Earth and broad Sky on high.”

Col. XXIII

This verse has been composed in such a way as to be misleading, and it is unclear to the many, but to those who understand correctly it is quite clear that Ocean is the air and that the air is Zeus. It is not the case that one Zeus “devised” another Zeus, but instead the same one [scil. devised] for himself “great strength” [cf. COSM. T12d.1–2]. But those who do

versum compos. West e comm. e.g. μήσατο δ' Ὀκεανοῦ μέγα σθένος εὐρὺν ῥέοντος, Burkert μήσατο δ' Ὀκεανὸν βαθυδίνην εὐρὺν ῥέοντα

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ὅτι “εὐρὺ
ῥέοντα”

— προσέθηκεν.—ὁ δὲ σημαίνει τὴν αὐτοῦ
γνώμην

ἐν τοῖς λεγομέν[ο]ις καὶ νομιζομένοις
ῥήμασι.

καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀν[θ]ρώπων τοὺς μέγα δυνα-
τ[οῦ]ντας

10 — “μεγάλους” φασὶ “ῥυῆναι.” τὸ δ’ ἐχόμενον,

— “ἱνας δ’ ἐκατ[έ]λεξ’ Ἀχελωῖον ἀργυ[ρ]-
οδίνε[ω].”

τῶ[ι] ὕδα[τι] ὅλ[ως] τίθη]σι ‘Ἀχελῶιον’ ὄνο-
μ[α]. ὅ]τι δὲ

τά[σ]δ’ ἱνα[ς] ἐγκαταλ]έξαι ἐστ[ὶ] τά[σ]δε
ἐγκατῶ[σ]αι.

τὴν [γ]ὰρ [ca. 10 litt.]των αυ[τ]]...

15 ἐκασ[τ]]δε βουλ[

ε.ν[]οντε[

— — —

13 τά[σ]δ’ potius quam τά[σ]δε Kouremenos

Col. XXIV

ἴσα ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ [μέ]σου μετρούμενα· ὅσα
δ[ὲ] μ]ῆ

— κυκλοειδέα οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσομελῆ εἶναι. δη-
λοῖ δὲ τόδε·

— “ἢ πολλοῖς φαίνει μερόπεσσι ἐπ’
ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.”

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

not understand think that Ocean is a river because he added “broadly flowing” [cf. COSM. T12d.1–2]. But he indicates his thought in current and customary expressions. For they say that those who are very powerful among men “have flowed great.” And the next [scil. verse],

**“He placed in it the sinews of silver-eddyding
Achelous.” [= COSM. T12d.3]**

He <attribu>tes the name ‘Achelous’ to water in general. And his placing these sinews in it is his having pushed these down . . . for the . . . each . . .¹

¹ On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary, West reconstructs *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: “he devised the great strength of broadly flowing Ocean”; Burkert reconstructs the verse as “he devised Ocean, deep-eddyding, broadly flowing.”

Col. XXIV

. . . they [i.e. either things that have a circular shape or those that are “equal-limbed”] **are equal, measured from the center; but it is not possible that all those that are not circular be “equal-limbed”** [cf. COSM. T12e.1]. **This is what this** [scil. verse] **shows:**

**“She who shines for many mortals upon the
boundless earth.” [= COSM. T12e.2]**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος δόξειεν ἂν τις ἄλλως ἐκίρῃ-
σθαι, ὅτι,

5 ἤν ὑπερβάλῃ, μάλλον τὰ ἑόντα φαίνεται ἢ
πρὶν

ὑπερβάλλειν. ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, φαίνειν
αὐτήν.

εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγε, οὐκ ἂν “πολλοῖς” ἔφη
φαίνειν αὐτήν,

ἀλλὰ “πᾶσιν” ἅμα τοῖς τε τὴν γῆν ἐργαζο-
μένοις

καὶ τοῖς ναυτιλλομένοις, ὅποτε χρὴ πλείν
τούτοις

10 τὴν ὥραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾗν σελήνη, οὐκ ἂν
ἐξηύρ[ι]σκον

οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὔτε τῶν ὥρέων
οὔτε τῶν

ἀνέμω[ν ca. 8 litt.] καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα [ca. 7
litt.]ην

εκ[]σ_α εν[]ει
].θ_ατω.[]ι
]νητουτ.[]
] ἄλλ_α ἐ_ογ[τα]ς
]φ_ης[]

4 $\epsilon\langle i \rangle\rho\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ Bernabé-Piano mon. Kapsomenos, $\epsilon\rho\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$
KPT

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Someone might think that this verse is said in a different sense, namely that if she is at her maximum, the things that exist come to appear more than before she is at her maximum. But he does not say this, namely that she shines; for if this were what he was saying, he would have said that she shines not “for many” but rather “for all,” both for those who work the land and for those who sail, when it is necessary that they sail at the right season. For if there were no moon, men would not have discovered the number either of the seasons or of the winds . . . and all the other things . . . other things that exist . . .

Col. XXV

καὶ λαμπρό[τ]ητα· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡ σελήνη
[λ]ευκότατα μὲν

τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεμερι-
σμένα,

θερμὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νῦν ἐν
τῷ αέρι ἐκὰς

ἀλλήλων α[ἰ]ωρούμεν', ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν
ἡμέρης ἄδηλ' ἐστὶν

5 ὕ[π]ὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐπικρατούμενα, τῆς δὲ
νυκτὸς ἑόντα

δῆλὰ ἐστίν, ἐπικρατεῖται δὲ διὰ σμικ[ρ]-
ότητα.

αἰωρεῖται δ' αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν ἀνάγκῃ, ὥς
ἂν μὴ συνίη

πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ μή, συνέλθοι ἀλέα
ὅσα τὴν αὐτὴν

δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἥλιος συνεστάθη. τὰ
νῦν ἑόντα

10 ὁ θεὸς εἰ μὴ ᾗθελεν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐπόησεν
ἥλιον. ἐποίησε δὲ

τοιούτον καὶ τ[ο]σοῦτον γινόμενον οἶος ἐν
ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου

διηγείται. τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπίπροσθε
π[ο]ιεῖται

— [οὐ β]ου[λό]μενο[ς] πάντα[ς] γιν[ώ]σκε[ι]ν. ἐν
δὲ [τ]ῶιδε σημαί[ν]ε[ι].

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

Col. XXV

. . . and brightness; but the things out of which the moon is composed, being divided according to the same principle, are the most luminous [or: white] of all, but they are not hot. And there are now too other things floating in the air far from one another; but during the day they are invisible, since they are dominated by the sun, but during the night it is visible that they exist. They are dominated because of their smallness. Each of them floats by necessity, so as not to be united with one another; for otherwise there would have been united in a single mass all the things that have the same property, and of which the sun is composed. If the god had not wished the things that exist now to exist, he would not have made the sun. But he made it of such a sort and of such a size as he [i.e. Orpheus] explains in the beginning of his account. The ones [i.e. verses] that follow these he puts forward [scil. as a screen], since he does not wish all men to understand. He indicates [scil. that] in this one:

8 συνέλθοι <ᾶν> Burkert

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

— “[αὐτ]ᾶρ [ἐ]πεὶ δ[ὲ] πᾶν]τα Διὸ[ς νοῦς μῆ]σα-
τ[ο ἔ]ργα.”

15

]· φρονησ[
]μπηγι·[
]ων·[

— — —

14 νοῦς Sider, φρὴν Tsantsanoglou

15]. φρονησ[Piano

16]μπηγι·[Bernabé-Piano leg.

Col. XXVI

“μη[τρ]ὸς” μὲν ὅτι μήτηρ ὁ Νοῦς ἐστὶν τῶν
ἄλλων,

“ἐὰς” δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθῆς. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν
τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν

ὅτι ‘ἀγαθὴν’ σημαίνει·

— “Ερμῇ Μαιάδος υἱὲ διάκτορε δῶτορ
— ἐάων.”

5 — δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν τ[ῶ]ιδε·

— “δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακῆνται ἐν Διὸς
οὔδει

— δώρων, οἷα διδοῦσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δέ τ’
ἐάων.”

οἱ δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα οὐ γινώσκοντες δοκοῦσιν εἰ-
ναι

‘μητρὸς ἑαυτοῦ.’ ὁ δ’ εἴπερ ἤθελεν ἑαυτοῦ
μητρὸς

10

ἐν φιλότῃ ἀποδείξαι θέλοντα μιχθῆναι
τὸν

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

“But when Zeus’ mind conceived all the deeds”

... thought (?) ...

Col. XXVI

... “of mother” because Mind is the mother of all other things; and “of his own” (*heas*, i.e. also “good”) because she is good. And he also shows in the following words that it [i.e. the word] means ‘good’:

“Hermes Diaktoros, son of Maia, giver of goods (*eaôn*).” [cf. Homer, *Od.* 8.335]

And he also shows it in this one:

**“For two urns are placed on Zeus’ threshold,
Of gifts such as he gives: of evils [scil. in the one],
and the other one of goods (*eaôn*).”** [Homer, *Il.* 24. 527–28, cf. MOR. T10]

Those who do not understand the term think that it is ‘of his own mother.’ But if he had wished to show the god “wishing to unite in love with his own

versum compos. Burkert e comm. e.g. μητρὸς ἑὰς ἐθέλων
μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότῃτι, West ἤθελε μητρὸς ἑὰς μιχθήμεναι
ἐν φιλότῃτι

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY VI

θεόν, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ γράμματα παρακλίναντα
 “μητρὸς ἐοῖο” εἶπε[ι]ν. οὕτω γ[ὰ]ρ ἂν ‘έαν-
 τοῦ’ γίνοιτο,
 [υἱὸς δ’] αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη.....δ]ῆλον ὅτι .[.....]..[]
 [.....] ἐν τῇ συγ[γ.....].ἀμφοτερ[
 [.....] ἀγαθῇ.[]α..[
 [.....].ενα. [

15

— — —

11 παρακλίναντι emend. Janko
 XXVI, nam *agraphon* sequitur

textus desinit in Col.

THE DERVENI PAPYRUS

mother,” he could have altered the letters and said “of his own (*heoio*) mother.” For thus it would have been ‘of himself,’ and he would be <her son> . . . it is clear that . . . in the . . . both . . . good . . .¹

¹ On the basis of the Derveni author’s commentary, Burkert and West reconstruct *exempli gratia* a verse from the Orphic theogony: “he wished to be mixed in the love of his mother.” At the end of this column, the written text on this papyrus roll ends.

The first edition of the Loeb *Early Greek Philosophy* contained errors of various kinds – inconsistencies, inconcinnities, typographical slips, errors in orthography and punctuation, larger and smaller omissions, mistaken or outdated references, minor and more serious outright mistakes in translation, but also decisions regarding the text, translation, and/or interpretation of extremely difficult and controversial passages on which we have come in the meantime, after further reflection and advice, to adopt a somewhat different view from that reflected in the first edition. The editors, André Laks and I, expect that these errors will all be corrected in a forthcoming second edition. In the meantime, we are making available here the list of corrigenda of all sorts that we and others have noted so far. We have also taken the opportunity provided by the forthcoming second edition to update references to new critical editions of some of the authors involved and to add to the bibliographies a very few significant works of secondary scholarship that have appeared recently.

The list will be updated periodically.

These corrigenda are intended to be understood as André Laks' and my wholly self-published and preliminary plans for the second edition, and not as official supplements. Should scholars wish to cite them, they may of course do so as they would any other document posted on a personal website, specifying the date of the list and the date retrieved.

The corrections take the following form:

- volume, page, line number(s);
- then the erroneous version, with the erroneous letters indicated by highlighting and strikethrough;
- then the symbol >;
- then the correct version, with the correct letters indicated by highlighting.

We are deeply grateful to numerous friends and colleagues who have pointed out errors to us, and we would welcome any and all further corrections, which should be sent to both most@sns.it and laks.andre@gmail.com.

A corresponding list for the Fayard edition *Les Débuts de la philosophie* will be posted on the academia.edu site of André Laks.

LOEB CORRIGENDA POST PUBLICATION 2018.02.21

Vol. 6, p. 29, P29, lines 1-2 of text:

That is why **they** say that Anaxagoras [...] and men **of this sort** are wise, but not prudent, when they see that **these**

>

That is why **people** say that Anaxagoras [...] and men **like that** are wise but not prudent, when they see that **they**

Vol. 6, p. 31, P29, lines 1-4:

men do not know what is **useful** for themselves; and they say that **these people** know **what** is extraordinary; marvelous; difficult; and divine – but useless, since **their studies are not directed toward human goods.**

>

do not know what is **advantageous** for themselves; and they say that **what they** know is extraordinary and marvelous and difficult and divine – but useless, since **they do not inquire about human goods.**

Vol. 6, p. 32, P34, lines 1-2:

Ἀναξ-

αγόρας

>

Ἀνα-

ξαγόρας

Vol. 6, p. 35, line 4:

if **he** seemed

>

if **such a man** seemed

Vol. 6, p. 49, D3, line 8, ADD THE NEW NOTE BELOW AND
RENUMBER THE FOLLOWING NOTE 2 AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE PAGE TO MAKE IT N. 3:

and all the other parts. But

>

and all the other parts.² But

Vol. 6, p. 64, D18, lines 3-4 of the text:

σν-

γκρίσει

>

σνγ-

κρίσει

Vol. 6, p. 66, line 4:

εναντα

>

εναντα

Vol. 6, p. 72, line 5:

καὶ ὅσα⁷ νῦν ἐστι καὶ

>

καὶ ὅσα⁷ νῦν ἐστι καὶ

Vol. 6, p. 74, D29a, line 1:

φησὶν

>

[...] φησὶν

Vol. 6, p. 74, D29a, line 3:

διακρῖναι.

>

διακρῖναι [... cf. EMP. D84a].

² Cf. Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* 1.18.723a10-11: “Anaxagoras says, with good reason, that fleshs coming from food are added to the fleshs.”

Vol. 6, p. 75, D29a, line 1:

For

>

[...] For

Vol. 6, p. 75, D29a, line 3:

them.

>

them [...].

Vol. 6, p. 78, D35b lemma:

In Phys. 250b18, p. 529 Rashed

>

In Phys. 539 ad 8.1 250b18, p. 487 Rashed

Vol. 6, p. 78, D35b, text:

ἄφθαρτον

>

φθαρτὸν¹

Vol. 6, p. 78, D35b, new app. crit:

¹φθαρτὸν] ἄφθαρτον Rashed

Vol. 6, p. 79, D35b, translation and note:

one world, ~~un~~generated and ~~in~~destructible, coming from inactivity [...].[†]

[†]Either D35a or D35b must be erroneous, probably the latter.

>

one world, generated and destructible, coming from inactivity [...].

Vol. 6, p. 96, D60, line 4 of the text:

ὅτι ἐστὶ τι ὁ

>

ὅτι ἐστὶ τι ὁ

Vol. 6, p. 120, D92, lemma:

D92 (B22) **Aristoph. Byz.** *Epit.* 2.57D

>

D92 (B22) **Athen. *Deipn.*** *Epit.* 2.57D

Vol. 6, p. 121, D92, lemma:

D92 (B22) **Aristophanes of Byzantium**, *Epitome of Aristotle's History of Animals*

>

D92 (B22) **Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists***, *Epitome*

Vol. 6, p. 122 ANAXAG. D95b, line 3 middle word:

שעלתו

>

לשעתו

Vol. 6, p. 128, last two lines on the page:

Ἄναξ-

αγόρας

>

Ἄνα-

ξαγόρας

Vol. 6, p. 134, R5, 4 lines from the bottom of the text:

προτῶν

>

προτῶν

PLEASE NOTE THAT ON THE COLORED IOTA THERE SHOULD BE A DIAERESIS OR UMLAUT “.”

Vol. 6, p. 139, 10 lines from bottom:

See also **R15, R16; EMP. D81**

>

See also **D95e, R15, R16, R23[35], R33; EMP. D81, D84a**

Vol. 6, p. 155, R22, next to last line:
does explain
>
does **not** explain

Vol. 6, pp. 170, last line on the page, and 172, first line on the page:

Ἄναξ

αγόρα,
>

Ἄνα-

ξαγόρα,

Vol. 6, p. 174, R33, lines 7-8 of text:

Ἄναξ

αγόρας
>

Ἄνα-

ξαγόρας

Vol. 6, p. 175, R33, 2nd line:
elements are unlimited
>
elements are **not** unlimited

Vol. 6, p. 182, line 3:
R37 (≠ DK) *Turba Phil.* Sermo III, p. **49.1-7 Plessner**
>
R37 (≠ DK) *Turba Phil.* Sermo III, pp. **354.10-356.5 Lacaze**

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, line 2 of text:
God creates **is**
>
God **has** created **is**

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, lines 3-4 of text:
and **the** density **of earth** **[?]** appeared;
>
and **what earth has of** density appeared;

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, line 6 of text:

elements comes to rest in

>

elements rests in

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, lines 5-4 from the bottom:

because the density of fire falls

>

because what fire has of density falls

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, lines 4-3 from the bottom:

while the density of air and of what is aggregated from the density of fire falls

>

while what air has of density as well as what is aggregated from the dense part of fire falls

Vol. 6, p. 183, R37, lines 2-1 from the bottom:

and the density of water and what is united out of the density of fire and of air comes to rest in earth."

>

and what water has of density as well as the dense part of the fire and of the air that is united with it also rests in earth."

Vol. 6, p. 187, lines 2-3:

Is the World Destructible? Two Incompatible Doxographical Reports (D14)

>

The World is Destructible (D14)

Vol. 6, p. 196, line 10 from the bottom of the text:

ἐμίσγητο,

>

ἐμίσγητο,

Vol. 6, p. 204, lines 1-2:

Is the World Destructible? *Two Incompatible Doxographical Reports*
(D14)

>

The World is Destructible (D14)

Vol. 6, p. 204, D14b, lemma:

In Phys. 539 ad *Θ*.1 250b18, p. 487 Rashed

>

In Phys. 539 ad *Σ*.1 250b18, p. 487 Rashed

Vol. 6, p. 204, D14b, text:

ἄφθαρτον

>

φθαρτὸν¹

Vol. 6, p. 204, D14b, new app. crit:

¹φθαρτὸν] ἄφθαρτον Rashed

Vol. 6, p. 205, lines 1-2:

Is the World Destructible? *Two Incompatible Doxographical Reports*
(D14)

Vol. 6, p. 205, D14b, translation, line 1:

created and indestructible,

>

generated and destructible,

Vol. 6, p. 214, R7a lemma:

a p. 109.1-9 Ruska

>

a p. 348.1-10 Lacaze

Vol. 6, p. 214, lines 3-1 from the bottom:

liber, in quo discipulorum suorum prudentiores Arisleus congregavit,
Pitagoram se. philosophum et sapientum verba, qui in tertia synodo
Pitagorica qui artifex dicitur

>

initium libri turbæ qui dicitur codex veritatis, libri scilicet in quo Arisleus, cum Pitagoras, qui dicitur artifex, discipulorum suorum prudentiores congregavisset in tertia synodo pitagorica, sapientum verba coadunavit.¹

Vol. 6, p. 215, lines 5-1 from the bottom:

~~The book, in which Arisleus (i.e. Archelaus) has gathered together the wiser among his students, viz. [scil. the students of] the philosopher Pythagoras, who is called ‘the master of the art [i.e. alchemy],’ and the discourses of the wise men who met in the third Pythagorean synod.~~

>

The beginning of the *Book of the Assembly*, which is called the *Codex of Truth*, namely the book in which Arisleus (i.e. Archelaus) collected the words spoken by the sages when Pythagoras, who is called ‘the master of the art [i.e. alchemy],’ gathered together the wiser among his students in the third Pythagorean synod.

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 1:

~~sunt coadunati~~ quem

>

quem

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 3:

pervenit.¹

>

pervenit.

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 6:

de-

>

di-

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 9, app. crit.:

1 ~~liber~~ ... ~~pervenit~~: *textus valde incertus*

>

1 ~~initium~~ ... ~~coadunavit~~: *textus valde incertus*, ita Lacaze

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 10:

b Sermo V, p. 57.1-58.9 Plessner

>

b Sermo V, pp. 360.11-362.4 Lacaze

Vol. 6, p. 216, R7b, line 2 of text:

unde non ascendit sol super

>

unde sol non ascendit super

Vol. 6, p. 216, line 6 from the bottom:

nobis aliud di-

>

nobis aliquid di-

Vol. 6, p. 217, line 7:

teaching

>

proclaiming

Vol. 6, p. 217, line 11:

text follows the tentative suggestions of Ruska, cf. p. 173, n. 1.

>

text follows the reconstruction of Lacaze, cf. pp. 191-94.

Vol. 6, p. 217, 6 lines from the bottom:

anything else to say?

>

anything to say?

Vol. 6, p. 217, 4 lines from the bottom:

beginning

>

principle

Vol. 6, p. 229, line 1:

that is free of ambiguity,

>

that cannot be disputed,

Vol. 6, p. 236, D11, end of line 4:

εἶναι.

>

εἶναι [... = HER. R43].

Vol. 6, p. 237, D11, end of line 6:

motion.

>

motion [...].

Vol. 6, p. 238, D11, end of line 6:

motion.

>

motion [...].

Vol. 6, p. 256, lines 4-5:

καλοῦ-
ται.

>

καλοῦν-
ται.

Vol. 6, p. 282, lines 5-4 from the bottom of the text:

Ἀναξ-
μανδρον

>

Ἀναξί-
μανδρον

Vol. 6, p. 299, second line from the bottom:

reference of the

>

reference in vol. 1 of this edition for the

Vol. 6, p. 300, line 6:
1992).

>

1992), English translation Baltimore 1999.

Vol. 6, p. 302, last line on the page:
nulli:

>

nulli

Vol. 6, p. 314, T7:

T7 (>31 A71) Hipp. Vet. Med. 1-2

a

>

T7 (>31 A71) Hipp. Vet. Med.

a 1-2

Vol. 6, p. 316, 3 lines from bottom:

b

>

b 20

Vol. 6, p. 383, three lines from the bottom of text:

<world>]

>

<ordinance>]

Vol. 6, p. 383, three lines from the bottom of the apparatus:

κόσ] μ ον Piano [WITH DOT UNDER μ]

>

θεσ] μ οῦ prop. nos, κόσ] μ ον Piano [WITH DOT UNDER BOTH μ]